Vijay Jindal & Ors. vs State Of U.P.

And whereas at present Ghaziabad Development Authority is charging Rupees 1948/- per sq mtr towards the External Development Charges ("EDC") for developing the land into a township Whereas the Govt. of U.P. has been levying EDC charges amounting to Rupees 400 per sq.mt. in other towns in U.P. The partners of the firm have agreed to file a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad seeking to challenge the levy of Rupees 1948/- per sq. mtrs. as EDC by the GDA in Ghaziabad and seek appropriate reliefs for the payment of EDC charges @ Rs. 400/- per sq. mtrs. to the Ghaziabad Development Authority.

And whereas accordingly, accounts have been made up of the profits and assets of the Partnership firm subject to the debts and liabilities, contingent or otherwise, till date and of the profits earned till the said date and a sum of Rs. 149046478.72 (Rupees Fourteen Crore Ninety Lacs Forty Six Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Eight & Paisa Seventy Two only) is found to be due and payable to the Retiring Partners in lieu of their share in the profit and asset of the firm.

That subject to stipulation mentioned in Clause 10 and 11 to this deed, the Retiring Partners confirms that as a result of accounts having been finalized by the Chartered Accountant, a sum of Rs. 149046478.72 (Rupees Fourteen Crore Ninety Lacs Forty Six Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Eight & Paisa Seventy Two only) is due and payable to them in lieu of their share, right, title and interest in the said partnership business including its assets and good will and upon payment received the retiring partners have no other claim against the Continuing Partners in respect of the firm.

The Parties to this Deed have agreed that in the event EDC is payable @ 400/-per sq mt. than in such an eventuality, the firm shall be bound to transfer the UPSIDC and HAF lands mentioned above equivalent thereof marked in ____ colour in the disclosed Site Plan to the Retiring Partners or to any other person/persons nominated by the retiring partners in writing. It is also agreed by the parties herein that the Continuing Partners' Firm shall execute required documents for the same.

The Parties to this Deed have agreed that in the event EDC become liable to be paid in excess of Rupees 400/- per sq. mtr. the differential amount so payable shall be paid by the Firm. However, the Retiring Partner will have the option to pay the said amount of EDC and the Firm shall be bound to transfer the UPSIDC and HAF lands mentioned above, equivalent thereof marked with Red Colour in enclosed site plan to the Retiring Partner or to any person/ persons nominated by the retiring partner in writing. It is also agreed by the Parties that the Continuing Partners/ Firm shall execute required documents for the same.

That all dispute or difference that may arise between the Retiring Partners and the Continuing Partners shall be resolved by Arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Either Party shall be entitled to nominate an Arbitrator and the Arbitrators so nominated shall nominate the Presiding Arbitrator. The language of the proceedings shall be English and the venue of the proceedings shall be at Ghaziabad."

“5.

That subject to stipulation mentioned in Clause 10 and 11 to this deed, the Retiring Partners confirms that as a result of accounts having been finalized by the Chartered Accountants, a sum of Rs. 149046478.72 (Rupees Fourteen Crore Ninety Lacs Forty Six Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Eight & Paisa Seventy Two only) is due and payable to them in lieu of their share, right, title and interest in the said partnership business including its assets and good will and upon payment received the retiring partners have no other claim against the Continuing Partners in respect of the firm.

10.

The Parties to this Deed have agreed that in the event EDC is payable @ 400/- per Sq. Mt. than in such an eventuality, the firm shall be bound to transfer the UPSIDC and HAF lands mentioned above equivalent thereof marked in ____ colour in the enclosed Site Plan to the Retiring Partners or to any other person/persons nominated by the retiring parties in writing. It is also agreed by the parties herein that the Continuing Partners/ Firm shall execute required documents for the same.

11.

The Parties to this Deed have agreed that in the event EDC become liable to be paid in excess of Rupees 400/- per Sq. Mtr. the differential amount so payable shall be paid by the Firm. However, the Retiring Partner will have the option to pay the said amount of EDC, and the Firm shall be bound to transfer the UPSIDC and HAF lands mentioned above, equivalent thereof marked with Red Colour in enclosed site plan to the Retiring Partner or to any person/persons nominated by the retiring partner in writing. It is also agreed by the Parties that the Continuing Partners/Firm shall execute required documents for the same.”

“31.

In the instant case, on a careful reading of the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet, in our view, it cannot be said that the complaint does not disclose the commission of an offence. The ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420IPC cannot be said to be absent on the basis of the allegations in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet. We would like to add that whether the allegations in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during the course of trial. Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract or arbitral proceedings initiated at the instance of the appellants, that does not by itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482CrPC for quashing such proceedings.

32.

We have perused the pleadings of the parties, the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and orders of the courts below and have taken into consideration the material on record. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the issue involved in the matter under consideration is not a case in which the criminal trial should have been short-circuited. The High Court was not justified in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has primarily adverted on two circumstances,

(i)

that it was a case of termination of agreement to sell on account of an alleged breach of the contract and;

(ii)

the fact that the arbitral proceedings have been initiated at the instance of the appellants. Both the alleged circumstances noticed by the High Court, in our view, are unsustainable in law. The facts narrated in the present complaint/FIR/charge-sheet indeed reveal the commercial transaction but that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such transaction. In fact, many a times, offence of cheating is committed in the course of commercial transactions and the illustrations have been set out under Sections 415, 418 and 420IPC.

33.

Similar observations have been made by this Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] : (SCC p. 690, para 9)

"9.

We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that the provision incorporated in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence. Arbitration is a remedy for affording reliefs to the party affected by breach of the agreement but the arbitrator cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an offence albeit the same act may be connected with the discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence, those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down the complaint at the threshold itself. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme cases as indicated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] ."

34.

So far as initiation of arbitral proceedings is concerned, there is no correlation with the criminal proceedings. That apart, the High Court has not even looked into the charge-sheet filed against the second respondent which was on record to reach at the conclusion that any criminal offence as stated is prima facie being made out and veracity of it indeed be examined in the course of criminal trial.

35.

The submission made by Mr P. Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent showing bona fides and taking us through the documentary evidence annexed to the counter-affidavit on record to show that it was a simple case of termination because of breach of terms of the contract giving rise to a purely civil dispute or initiation of the arbitral proceedings would not attract the provisions under Sections 406, 420 and 34 IPC may not hold good at this stage for the reason what is being suggested by the learned counsel for the second respondent can be his defence during the course of trial but was not open to be examined by the High Court to take a judicial notice and for quashing of the criminal proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.”

“14.

In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8 SCC 686 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing of FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482 CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception; merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal offence.”

“9.

We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that the provision incorporated in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence. Arbitration is a remedy for affording reliefs to the party affected by breach of the agreement but the arbitrator cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an offence albeit the same act may be connected with the discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence, those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down the complaint at the threshold itself. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme cases as indicated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426].”

“23.

In view of the above settled legal position, it is no more res integra that economic offences constitute a class apart, as they have deep rooted conspiracies involving huge loss of public funds, and therefore such offences need to be viewed seriously. They are considered as grave and serious offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threats to the financial health of the country. The law aids only the abiding and certainly not its resistants. ............………………...”

“34.

Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country.

35.

While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations.”

"23.

Unfortunately, in the last few years, the country has been seeing an alarming rise in white-collar crimes, which has affected the fibre of the country's economic structure. Incontrovertibly, economic offences have serious repercussions on the development of the country as a whole. In State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal [(1987) 2 SCC 364: 1987 SCC (Cri) 364] this Court, while considering a request of the prosecution for adducing additional evidence, inter alia, observed as under: (SCC p. 371, para 5) "5. … The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white-collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest.””

"9.

We are conscious of the fact that the accused is charged with economic offences of huge magnitude and is alleged to be the kingpin/ringleader. Further, it is alleged that the respondent-accused is involved in tampering with the answer sheets by illegal means and interfering with the examination system of Bihar Intermediate Examination, 2016 and thereby securing top ranks, for his daughter and other students of Vishnu Rai College, in the said examination. During the investigation when a search team raided his place, various documents relating to property and land to the tune of Rs 2.57 crores were recovered besides Rs 20 lakhs in cash. In addition to this, allegedly a large number of written answer sheets of various students, letterheads and rubber stamps of several authorities, admit cards, illegal firearm, etc. were found which establishes a prima facie case against the respondent. The allegations against the respondent are very serious in nature, which are reflected from the excerpts of the case diary. We are also conscious of the fact that the offences alleged, if proved, may jeopardise the credibility of the education system of the State of Bihar.

13.

We are also conscious that if undeserving candidates are allowed to top exams by corrupt means, not only will the society be deprived of deserving candidates, but it will be unfair for those students who have honestly worked hard for one whole year and are ultimately disentitled to a good rank by fraudulent practices prevalent in those examinations. It is well settled that socio-economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail [Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 466 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 575; Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 552] . Usually socio-economic offence has deep-rooted conspiracies affecting the moral fibre of the society and causing irreparable harm, needs to be considered seriously."

"21.

The consistent view taken by this Court is that economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country. Further, when attempt is made to project the proceeds of crime as untainted money and also that the allegations may not ultimately be established, but having been made, the burden of proof that the monies were not the proceeds of crime and were not, therefore, tainted shifts on the accused persons under Section 24 of the 2002 Act.

22.

It is not necessary to multiply the authorities on the sweep of Section 45 of the 2002 Act which, as aforementioned, is no more res integra. The decision in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra [Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 : (2005) SCC (Cri) 1057] and State of Maharashtra v. Vishwanath Maranna Shetty [State of Maharashtra v. Vishwanath Maranna Shetty, (2012) 10 SCC 561 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 105] dealt with an analogous provision in the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999. It has been expounded that the Court at the stage of considering the application for grant of bail, shall consider the question from the angle as to whether the accused was possessed of the requisite mens rea. The Court is not required to record a positive finding that the accused had not committed an offence under the Act. The Court ought to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. The duty of the Court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. Further, the Court is required to record a finding as to the possibility of the accused committing a crime which is an offence under the Act after grant of bail."

“20.

Apart from the infirmities noted in the impugned order, we are also of the view that this is not a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail. The allegations, as borne out from the record, pertain to an economic offence involving a substantial amount, coupled with assertions of deliberate and premeditated conduct on the part of Respondent No. 2 and her son in inducing the complainant to part with a significant portion of the consideration and thereafter transferring the property to a third party. The material on record also indicates that Respondent No. 2 and her son were not readily available during the course of investigation and coercive steps were required to secure their presence. Having regard to the nature of the allegations, the magnitude of the transaction, the antecedents attributed to Respondent No. 2, and the requirements of a fair and effective investigation, we are of the considered view that the grant of anticipatory bail to Respondent No. 2 at this stage is not warranted.”

“69.

Ordinarily, arrest is a part of procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of the pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; possibility of the applicant fleeing justice and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes in the sphere of investigation of an offence and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.

70.

……………………………….

71.

Article 21 of the Constitution of India states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure prescribed by law. However, the power conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India is not unfettered and is qualified by the later part of the Article i.e. "…except according to a procedure prescribed by law". In State of M.P. v. Ram KishnaBalothia [State of M.P. v. Ram Kishna Balothia, (1995) 3 SCC 221: 1995 SCC (Cri) 439] , the Supreme Court held that the right of anticipatory bail is not a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and held as under: (SCC p. 226, para 7)

"7.

… We find it difficult to accept the contention that Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an integral part of Article 21. In the first place, there was no provision similar to Section 438 in the old Criminal Procedure Code. The Law Commission in its 41st Report recommended introduction of a provision for grant of anticipatory bail. It observed:

'We agree that this would be a useful advantage. Though we must add that it is in very exceptional cases that such power should be exercised.' In the light of this recommendation, Section 438 was incorporated, for the first time, in the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. Looking to the cautious recommendation of the Law Commission, the power to grant anticipatory bail is conferred only on a Court of Session or the High Court. Also, anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a matter of right. It is essentially a statutory right conferred long after the coming into force of the Constitution. It cannot be considered as an essential ingredient of Article 21 of the Constitution. And its non-application to a certain special category of offences cannot be considered as violative of Article 21.

72.

We are conscious of the fact that the legislative intent behind the introduction of Section 438 CrPC is to safeguard the individual's personal liberty and to protect him from the possibility of being humiliated and from being subjected to unnecessary police custody. However, the court must also keep in view that a criminal offence is not just an offence against an individual, rather the larger societal interest is at stake. Therefore, a delicate balance is required to be established between the two rights—safeguarding the personal liberty of an individual and the societal interest. It cannot be said that refusal to grant anticipatory bail would amount to denial of the rights conferred upon the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

73.

to 76………………………………

77.

After referring to Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre [Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] and other judgments and observing that anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances, in Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar [Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 468] , the Supreme Court held as under: (SCC p. 386, para 19)

"19.

Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence are required to be satisfied and further while granting such relief, the court must record the reasons therefor. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has falsely been enroped in the crime and would not misuse his liberty. (See D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran [D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran, (2007) 4 SCC 434: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 345], State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain [State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain, (2008) 1 SCC 213: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 176] and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal [Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal, (2008) 13 SCC 305: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 1].)"

Economic offences

78.

Power under Section 438 CrPC being an extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different class as they affect the economic fabric of the society. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain [Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain, (1998) 2 SCC 105: 1998 SCC (Cri) 510], it was held that in economic offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail.”

"30.

We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion by the Court depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass an interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases. At any rate, when warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the applicant is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary power. Certainly, this will not deprive the power of the Court to grant pre-arrest bail in extreme, exceptional cases in the interest of justice. But then, person(s) continuously, defying orders and keep absconding is not entitled to such grant."

"14

74.

Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of the investigation intended to secure several purposes. There may be circumstances in which the accused may provide information leading to discovery of material facts and relevant information. Grant of anticipatory bail may hamper the investigation, Pre-arrest bail is to strike a balance between the individual's right to personal freedom and the right of the investigating agency to interrogate the accused as to the material so far collected and to collect more information which may lead to recovery of relevant information

6

75.

Observing that the arrest is a part of the investigation intended to secure several purposes, in Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B. [Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B., (2005) 4 SCC 303: 2005 SCC (Cri) 933], it was held as under: (SCC p. 313, para 19)

"19.

Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of investigation intended to secure several purposes. The accused may have to be questioned in detail regarding various facets of motive, preparation, commission and aftermath of the crime and the connection of other persons, if any, in the crime. There may be circumstances in which the accused may provide information leading to discovery of material facts. It may be necessary to curtail his freedom in order to enable the investigation to proceed without hindrance and to protect witnesses and persons connected with the victim of the crime, to prevent his disappearance, to maintain law and order in the locality. For these or other reasons, arrest may become an inevitable part of the process of investigation. The legality of the proposed arrest cannot be gone into in an application under Section 438 of the Code. The role of the investigator is well defined and the jurisdictional scope of interference by the court in the process of investigation is limited. The court ordinarily will not interfere with the investigation of a crime or with the arrest of the accused in a cognizable offence. An interim order restraining arrest, if passed while dealing with an application under Section 438 of the Code will amount to interference in the investigation, which cannot, at any rate, be done under Section 438 of the Code."

76.

In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2011) 1 SCC 694: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514], the Supreme Court laid down the factors and parameters to be considered while dealing with anticipatory bail. It was held that the nature and the gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made and that the court must evaluate the available material against the accused very carefully. It was also held that the court should also consider whether the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her.

77.

After referring to Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre [Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694: (2011) 1 SCC (Crl) 514] and other judgments and observing that anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances, in Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar [Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 468], the Supreme Court held as under: (SCC p. 386, para 19)

"19.

Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence are required to be satisfied and further while granting such relief, the court must record the reasons therefor. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has falsely been enroped in the crime and would not misuse his liberty. (See D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran [D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran, (2007) 4 SCC 434 :(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 345], State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain [State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain, (2008) 1 SCC 213: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 176] and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal [Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal, (2008) 13 SCC 305: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 1].)"

Economic offences

78.

Power under Section 438 CrPC being an extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different class as they affect the economic fabric of the society. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain [Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain, (1998) 2 SCC 105: 1998 SCC (Cri) 510], it was held that in economic offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail."

15.

In Sushila Agrawal and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another reported in (2020) 5 SCC 1, Constitution Bench of this Court held that while considering an application for grant of pre-arrest bail the Court has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the person, the likelihood of his influencing the course of investigation, or tampering with evidence or likelihood of fleeing justice. The Court held:-

"92.4.

Courts ought to be generally guided by considerations such as the nature and gravity of the offences, the role attributed to the applicant, and the facts of the case, while considering whether to grant anticipatory bail, or refuse it. Whether to grant or not is a matter of discretion; equally whether and if so, what kind of special conditions are to be imposed (or not imposed) are dependent on facts of the case, and subject to the discretion of the court."