Victoria vs State of Punjab

VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J. (Oral)

The present petition has been filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case FIR No. 64 dated 01.04.2026, registered under Sections 21(c)/29 of the NDPS Act and Sections 25/29 of the Arms Act at Police Station Dinanagar, District Gurdaspur (Annexure P-1).

As per the prosecution version, the present FIR was registered on the basis of a ruqa submitted by ASI Ramesh Kumar, Police Station Dinanagar. It is alleged that on 01.04.2026, ASI Ramesh Kumar along with other police officials was on patrolling duty in the area of Jhande Chak, Paniar, Gandhian and Ghula for checking of bad elements. It is alleged that when the police party reached near Ghula Mor within the area of village Gandhian, one person namely Gurvinder Singh @ Gindu, son of Surinder Singh, resident of village Kharl, Police Station Dinanagar, was seen coming on foot. On seeing the police party, he allegedly became perplexed and started moving towards the kachha road after throwing a black polythene bag held by him on the ground. The police party apprehended him on suspicion.

It is further alleged that efforts were made to join independent witnesses, but none agreed to associate themselves with the police proceedings. Thereafter, the black polythene bag allegedly thrown by Gurvinder Singh @ Gindu was checked and heroin was recovered from the same. The recovered substance was weighed and found to be 260 grams along with the polythene bag. The recovered contraband was taken into possession after preparing a sealed parcel.

It is further alleged that during the personal search of accused Gurvinder Singh @ Gindu, one pistol along with five live cartridges was recovered from his possession. Since he could not produce any valid licence or authority for possessing the said firearm and ammunition, the same were also taken into possession and offences under the Arms Act were added.During the course of investigation, accused Gurvinder Singh @ Gindu allegedly suffered a disclosure statement, on the basis of which accused Harpreet Singh @ Haria was nominated. Thereafter, on the basis of further disclosure statements, accused Jodh Lal @ Jodha and his wife Vandana were nominated as accused.

It is further the case of the prosecution that during police remand, accused Jodh Lal @ Jodha and Vandana disclosed that the heroin recovered from accused Gurvinder Singh @ Gindu had been purchased from them. They further disclosed that they had purchased about 300 grams of heroin from Philips @ Monu, son of the present petitioner Victoria, wife of John Masih, resident of Christian Mohalla, Awankha. It was further alleged that the payment of Rs.4.5 lakh towards the said transaction was made to the present petitioner Victoria. On the basis of the aforesaid disclosure statements and investigation conducted thereafter, the present petitioner Victoria was nominated as an accused in the present case and was arrested on 06.07.2026. The prosecution alleges that the petitioner was involved in receiving the payment pertaining to the alleged sale transaction of heroin.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case and has no concern whatsoever with the alleged recovery of 260 grams of heroin effected from co-accused Gurwinder Singh @ Gindu. It is contended that the petitioner was not named in the original FIR and her name surfaced only during the course of investigation on the basis of disclosure statements of co-accused persons.

Learned counsel further submits that no recovery of any contraband, alleged sale proceeds or any other incriminating material has been effected from the present petitioner. It is argued that the only allegation against the petitioner is that an amount of Rs.4.5 lakh was allegedly paid to her, which is based solely upon the disclosure statements of co-accused persons recorded in police custody and is not supported by any independent evidence.

It is further submitted that the petitioner is a 63-year-old lady having no criminal antecedents and has been implicated due to previous dispute with police officials. Learned counsel contends that the alleged disclosure statements cannot be made the sole basis for denying the concession of bail to the petitioner.

Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is in custody since 06.07.2026, the investigation stands completed and challan has already been presented. It is argued that the petitioner is no longer required for custodial interrogation and her continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose. Learned counsel also submits that the petitioner is not involved in any other NDPS case, there is no likelihood of her absconding or influencing the prosecution witnesses and she is ready to abide by any condition imposed by this Court. Accordingly, prayer for grant of regular bail is made.

Notice of motion.

Mr. Nitesh Sharma, DAG, Punjab, has put in appearance on behalf of the respondent-State and opposes the prayer for grant of bail and submits that the allegations against the petitioner are serious in nature. It is submitted that the present case relates to recovery of 260 grams of heroin, which falls within the category of commercial quantity under the NDPS Act. Learned State counsel further submits that during the course of investigation, the role of the petitioner surfaced on the basis of disclosure statements of co-accused persons, wherein it was revealed that the alleged payment of Rs.4.5 lakh pertaining to the sale transaction of heroin was made to the present petitioner. It is further submitted that the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are attracted and the petitioner is not entitled to the concession of regular bail at this stage.

I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at considerable length and have carefully perused the paper book as well as the material placed on record with their able assistance.

The right to a speedy trial is an integral facet of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The constitutional mandate is not confined merely to ensuring a fair trial but also obligates the State to conclude criminal proceedings within a reasonable time so that the process itself does not become punitive.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, 1980 (1) SCC 81, authoritatively held that the right to a speedy trial is an essential and integral part of Article 21, and that any procedure which permits prolonged incarceration without expeditious trial cannot be regarded as fair, just or reasonable. The aforesaid principles are in consonance with the Constitution Bench decisions in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225, and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (4) SCC 578, wherein it was held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right flowing from Article 21 and constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene wherever inordinate and unexplained delay results in denial of substantive justice.

Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 and in Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 (2) SSC(Criminal) 271, the Court categorically held that “the right to a speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence.” It was further held that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without commencement or reasonable progress of the trial, effectively converts pre-trial detention into a form of punishment and cannot be constitutionally sustained. The Court observed that if the State or the prosecuting agency is unable to secure an accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial, it cannot oppose the grant of bail merely on the ground of the seriousness of the allegations, as Article 21 prevails over statutory restrictions where continued incarceration becomes oppressive and justified.

This constitutional position has acquired greater significance in prosecutions under special statutes containing restrictive bail provisions. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is undoubtedly a stringent penal statute enacted to combat the menace of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The principle was specifically applied to prosecutions under the NDPS Act in Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352. The Apex Court held that Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot be construed so rigidly as to compel indefinite incarceration of an undertrial merely because the trial has not progressed. The Court observed that a literal interpretation of Section 37, divorced from constitutional values, would amount to sanctioning punitive detention before conviction. It was emphatically held that where the State is unable to conclude the trial within a reasonable time, the rigours of Section 37 necessarily yield to the constitutional mandate of Article 21. The Court further observed that Section 436A Cr.P.C. applies even to prosecutions under special statutes and constitutes an important legislative safeguard against indefinite pretrial detention.

Recently, in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC Online SC 1693, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that prolonged incarceration militates against the most cherished fundamental right under Article 21. The Court observed that where the accused has remained in custody for an unduly long period and the trial is nowhere near completion, constitutional liberty must prevail over the statutory embargo contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court succinctly held that conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo when the constitutional guarantee itself stands threatened. Similarly, the Apex Court has recently reaffirmed these constitutional principles in.

Thus, the legal position that emerges from the above authorities is that while offences under the NDPS Act are undoubtedly grave and the statutory conditions governing bail are stringent, the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 remains paramount. Courts are required to balance the societal interest in effective prosecution with the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty. Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without meaningful progress in the trial cannot be justified merely by invoking the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. In such exceptional circumstances, Constitutional Courts are duty-bound to harmonise the statutory restrictions with the fundamental right to personal liberty and ensure that pre-trial detention does not degenerate into punishment before adjudication of guilt. Where delay is inordinate and not attributable to the accused, constitutional courts are empowered to grant appropriate relief so as to prevent violation of Article 21.

It is equally relevant to note that while Section 37 prescribes stringent conditions for grant of bail, the NDPS Act itself reflects the legislative intent that such prosecutions should proceed expeditiously. Section 36 empowers the Government to constitute Special Courts for the very purpose of ensuring speedy trial of NDPS offences. Therefore, the statutory scheme itself proceeds on the assumption that greater restrictions on bail are constitutionally sustainable only when accompanied by equally expeditious adjudication. Where the State fails to provide the infrastructure necessary for speedy disposal, continued reliance upon Section 37 alone would produce an unconstitutional imbalance between individual liberty and societal interest. Delay defeats that legislative premise. If trials remain pending for years because of systemic inadequacies, repeated adjournments, non-production of witnesses, or institutional delays not attributable to the accused, continued incarceration ceases to be preventive and assumes a punitive character.

Be that as it may, this Court has considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and has perused the material available on record. The allegations against the petitioner are that she was involved in the alleged transaction of contraband, which was recovered from co-accused Gurwinder Singh @ Gindu. As per the prosecution case, the name of the petitioner surfaced during the course of investigation on the basis of disclosure statements of co-accused persons, wherein it was alleged that the payment of Rs.4.5 lakh pertaining to the alleged sale of heroin was received by the present petitioner. It is not disputed that the initial recovery in the present case was effected from co-accused Gurwinder Singh @ Gindu, from whom 260 grams of heroin along with a pistol and live cartridges was allegedly recovered. The present petitioner was not named in the FIR and came to be nominated subsequently during the course of investigation. It is also not the case of the prosecution that any contraband or alleged sale proceeds have been recovered from the present petitioner. This Court is conscious of the fact that the alleged recovery of 260 grams of heroin falls within the category of commercial quantity and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are attracted. However, at this stage, the material available against the petitioner is primarily based upon the disclosure statements of co-accused persons. The admissibility, evidentiary value and the extent of involvement of the petitioner are matters which would be determined during the course of trial. The petitioner is stated to be a 63-year-old lady and has been in custody since 06.07.2026. The investigation stands completed, challan has already been presented before the learned Trial Court and the petitioner is no longer required for custodial interrogation.

Accordingly, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be admitted on regular bail, subject to furnishing requisite bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned/Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate, as the case may be, and further subject to the following conditions:-