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Judgment
Phillips, J.—This is an application to consolidate the several appeals from awards passed by the District Judge of Madura on reference
made to him by the Land Acquisition Officer u/s 18 of Act I of 1894. Several references appear to have been made to the District Judge, but they
were all in connection with land taken up for the extension of Madura town, except one with which we are not now concerned. The District Judge
treated all the references as 47 separate petitions and passed a separate award on each of these, although they were all tried together and were
disposed of in one judgment. It is not quite clear whether the Land Acquisition Officer divided up the references in this way, either of his own
initiative or at the request of the District Judge, or whether it was done by the District Judge himself.
The first question argued is whether this Court has power to consolidate appeals. No express power to do so is conferred by the Legislature,
but such power has been held to be inherent in the Court, and I think has rightly been so held. So long ago as 1871 the Calcutta High Court
approved of the consolidation of two suits and their disposal by one decree. Enayetoollah v. Radha Churn Roy 15 W.R. 395. In Kashi Prosad
Singh v. Secretary of State 29 C.d 140 appeals from 44 references under the Land Acquisition Act were ordered to be consolidated. In Fink v.
Secretary of State 31 C. 599 it was held that in that case it was too late to consolidate the appeals from references under the Land Acquisition
Act, but the Court painted out the inconveniences that arose from the failure to consolidate and remarked that the Judge and the Collector should
have consolidated the references. In Dorabji Curstji Shroff, In re 10 Bom. L.R. 675, Macleod, J., held that the Court had power to consolidate,
and relied on Fink v. Secretary of State 34 C.d 599 Reference may also be made to In the matter of the ""Falls of Ettrick"" 22 C.j 511 : 11 Ind.
Dec. 341, where the question is considered. There appears to be no decision of this Court on the point, and the only case at all analogous is that
when two appellate decrees have been passed on appeal from one decree, the second appeals are consolidated into one Gangylakurti Sanyasi
Lingam v. Nidugonda Gavaramma 16 M.L.J. 411, but the analogy is somewhat remote. Consolidation is allowed in England and consequently I
agree with the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts that a Court has power to consolidate appeals and would, if necessary, invoke the provisions of
Section 151 of the CPC in support of the proposition.
The learned Government Pleader takes objection to consolidation only on the ground that if it is allowed the public revenues will be deprived of
a portion of the Court-fees payable by appellants. We have, therefore, to consider whether this is a fit case for consolidation. Although several
plots of land were acquired from appellants, only one notice was served on them u/s 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of all the plots,
and u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act the appellants only made the application to the Collector to refer their objection to the award. u/s 20 of the
Land Acquisition Act the Court has to determine the objection, i.e., the objection referred to in Section 18(2). The fact that only one notice was
sent u/s 12 and one objection filed u/s 18 would prima facie indicate that there was only one award, the correctness of which had to be determined
by the District Court. The fact that the award contained several items does not make it as many awards, for there is no reason why one single
award should not decide many questions referred for decision. So far, therefore, as appellants were concerned, there was only ore award which
was referred u/s 18 for the decision of the District Court. The fact that, in the arbitration proceedings before the District Court, the award was split
up and amalgamated with other awards, which had reference to other claimants, ought not to be allowed to prejudice the right of the appellants to
treat their a ward as one, and they appear to be equitably entitled to consolidation.
A further objection is taken that the appeals cannot be allowed to be consolidated as there was no consolidation nor even a request for
consolidation in the lower Court, and reliance is placed on Rakhal Chandra Tewary v. Manmatha Nath Mitter 15 C.W.N. 994 and Janardan
Kishore Lal v. Sib Prasad Ram 36 Ind. Cas. 179. These are, bowever, appeals not from suits, but from arbitration proceedings vide Secretary of
State v. Chelikani Rama Rao 35 Ind. Cas. 902 : 20 C.W.N. 1311 and in the lower Court there was no occasion for appellants to ask for
consolidation. They had been furnished with only one award to which they objected and consequently there was only their objection to be
disposed of, and it was disposed of in conjunction with other objections at one hearing and by one order. The splitting up of the award by the
referring officer or by the Court may not even have been known to the parties, and in any case there was no occasion for the claimants to take any
objection at the hearing, for all the cases were heard together. The splitting up of the awards, if made by the Land Acquisition Officer, was
apparently not communicated to the parties u/s 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act and consequently there was only one valid award, so far as the
appellants are concerned, and they are entitled to appeal against it in one appeal. The petition is, therefore, allowed with costs.
Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 2138 and 2139 follow the order in the petition. The time allowed for the payment of the costs is three months
from this date.