Veeru Singh vs State Of Bihar

Heard Mr. Kunwar Narayan Jamuar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. Mukeshwar Dayal, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State.

This appeal has been preferred by the appellant challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23rd November, 2005 passed by Sri. Abdur Rahman, Additional Sessions Judge III, Gaya in Sessions Trial No. 109/2003 and 539 of 2003 arising out of Kotwali P.S. Case No. 109 of 2002, whereby and whereunder appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304(B)/34 of the Indian Penal Code. He has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years.

It would be proper to mention here that one trial facing accused, namely, Hanuman Singh was acquitted.

On the basis of information given by informant Sumitra Devi, mother of the deceased on 25.04.2002, after eight days of the occurrence, Kotwali P.S. Case No. 109 of 2002 was registered under Section 304(B) of the Indian Penal Code and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act against four accused persons including the appellant.

As per prosecution story, Sanju Devi (deceased), daughter of the informant was married with appellant Veeru Singh on 12.07.2001. At the time of marriage she gave Rs. 40,000/- cash and gold ornaments to her daughter. Soon after her marriage, her in-laws started to demand colour T.V and Rs. 20,000/- in cash as additional dowry. Daughter of the informant informed to her mother about demand of dowry. Later on Sanju Devi gave birth of a female child at her maternal home. It is further alleged that appellant with his brother-in-law and other family members came to her maternal house and threatened the informant that her daughter would be killed by setting fire if demand of dowry were not fulfilled. They forcefully took her daughter from her maternal home to her sasural. On 16.4.2002 at 4:0 A.M. morning, appellant and in-laws of her daughter set her on fire. After getting information about burning of her daughter by the local people, she rushed to her daughter’s sasural. She found her daughter alive but in burnt condition and on being asked, her daughter told her that she was burnt by Veeru Singh, (husband), Hanuman Singh (Devar), Kameshwar Singh (Bahnoi of her husband) and maya Devi (nanad). Informant requested to appellant Veeru Singh for treatment in hospital but inspite of taking her to hospital, he arranged a doctor at home, who had given her poisonous injection due to which she died at 4:00 A.M. on next day i.e. 17.4.2002.

After completing the investigation, Investigating Officer has submitted chargesheet against the two accused persons, namely, Veeru Singh (appellant/husband of deceased) and Hanuman Singh (dever of deceased) under Section 304(B) of the Indian penal Code and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Thereafter cognizance was taken and accused persons were summoned for trial. The case was committed to the court of Sessions for trial and disposal. The case of other two accused persons, namely, Kameshwar Singh (brother-in-law of deceased ) and Maya Devi (sister-in-law of deceased) have been finalized by the police as no evidence has come against them during investigation.

Trial court has explained the charges to both the accused persons to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

To substantiate the charges leveled against the accused person, altogether five witness were examined by the prosecution. P.W.-1, Gayatri Devi, P.W.-2 Sumitra Devi (informant), P.W.-3 Vikarmaditya Shukla (I.O) and P.W.-4 Ram Shankar Tiwari (2nd I.O.) and P.W.-5 Madan Rai. Defence has not examined any witness. Out of five prosecution witnesses, two witnesses i.e. P.W.-1 and P.W.-5 turned hostile. P.W.-3 and P.W.-4 are formal witnesses.

P.W. 1 Gayatri Devi deposed in her deposition that Sanju Devi was married to appellant Veeru Singh. At the time of alleged occurrence, deceased was at her sasural. She denied the knowledge about killing of Sanju Devi by her in-laws. She has been declared hostile by the prosecution.

P.W.-2 Sumitra Devi is mother of the deceased. She has deposed that her daughter was married to the appellant Veeru Singh in the year 2001. She gave birth of a female child at her maternal home. Thereafter appellant and his other family members forcefully took her to her sasural. There was demand of dowry of T.V and cash by her sasural members. Her daughter was done to death by setting her on fire at her matrimonial home. She made her statement before the police and her fardbeyan was recorded by Mahesh Singh and she put her L.T.I. on it. She further deposed that after getting information of burning of her daughter, she went to her sasural where she found her daughter in burnt condition. In her cross-examination, she deposed that her daughter was demanding T.V for herself to see it.

P.W.-3 Vikramddiyta Shukla, A.S.I. and the I.O. of the case. He has deposed that at the time of occurrence, he was posted at Kotwali P.S. and on 25.4.2002 informant gave a written report on which basis, case was registered. He has proved formal F.I.R., which is marked as Ext-1 and he was entrusted with the investigation of the case. He took re-statement of Sumitra Devi (informant) and inspected the place of occurrence. He found that house of the accused was locked from outside and accused persons had fled away. He took statement of P.W.-1 Gayatri Devi, who stated that due to demand of dowry, her husband Veeru Singh and dever Hanuman Singh sprinkled Kerosin oil and set ablaze. He further deposed that after his transfer investigation was handed over to S.I. Rama Shankar Tiwary.

P.W.-4 Ramashankar Tiwary was the 2nd I.O of the case and during investigation he arrested accused Hanuman Singh (devar of deceased). He submitted chargesheet against accused Veeru Singh and Hanuman Singh.

P.W.-5 Madan Rai has deposed in his deposition that he does not know about Sumitra Devi or deceased Sanju Devi. He also denied to have knowledge about the occurrence. He has been declared hostile by the prosecution.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted that entire proceeding leading to present appeal conducted by the trial court is without jurisdiction and trial court has completely failed to appreciate the entire evidence made by the prosecution. Although five witnesses have been examined in this case , out of them, two independent witnesses P.W.-1 and P.W.-5 have turned hostile. Prosecution has failed to prove that prior to the death of Sanju Devi, demand of T.V or cash was made by accused Veeru Singh or she was subjected to harassment at her matrimonial home. Allegedly, deceased was burnt to death but place of occurrence was not examined neither any burnt material was collected for forensic examination. P.W.-2 informant has stated in her deposition that when she had visited to sasural of her daughter, she found her daughter alive and her daughter had disclosed the name of the accused persons but still she had not registered the FIR against them, which creates doubt in authenticity of the prosecution case. FIR was registered after a delay of eight days without any plausible reason. Furthermore, appellant remained in custody for more than four and half year.

Learned trial court had completely failed to appreciate the entire evidence made by the prosecution during trial by not considering the essential ingredients of section 304(B) IPC as no witness has deposed that soon before the death of Sanju Devi, any demand of dowry was made by the appellant. Place of occurrence was not examined by the I.O.. Postmortem of deceased was not conducted. There is no inquest report or prosecution report are brought on record to proof the allegation of killing by burning, making the entire case doubtful. Prosecution story is completely weak and as such, the order passed by learned trial court is bad, illegal and perverse in the eye of law. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is fit to be set aside.

Learned APP appearing for the state argued that impugned judgment in question is based on cogent and consistent evidence. Deceased was married to the appellant in the year 2001 and after about a year, she was done to death by burning at her matrimonial home. P.W.-2 deposed in her deposition that demand of T.V and cash was made by her in-laws, thus, all the ingredients of Section 304(B) IPC is proved. Now, it was the duty of the husband to prove that she was died under normal circumstances but the defense kept silent on this point. I.O. had visited the house of the accused but found the house locked from outside and accused persons had fled away after the crime. P.W.-2 informant is natural and legal guardian of the deceased has specifically deposed that she went to the P.O. and found her daughter in injured condition. A doctor was called for treatment in the house who had given her poisonous injection and thereafter she died. FIR is fully corroborated by the deposition of P.W.-2. The defense failed to discredit the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. He further submitted that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts, and therefore, learned trial court has rightly convicted the appellant. It has been contended that minor contradictions and variations in the testimony of the witnesses cannot be a ground to discard their evidence as a whole. Therefore, the judgment and order assailed in this appeal requires no interference and appeal is liable to be dismissed.

I have gone through the entire prosecution evidence and exhibits which are available on record adduced by the prosecution to prove the charges levelled against the appellant/accused. It is also pertinent to mention here that in order to establish the offence under Section 304(B) of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is obliged to prove that death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than normal circumstances and such death occurs within seven years of her marriage and if it is shown that soon before the death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, such harassment and cruelty must be in connection with any demand of dowry. If the prosecution proves the aforesaid circumstances then the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act will operate. Such presumption is rebuttable and the onus to rebut shifts on the accused persons. In the light of the aforesaid provision, I proceed to examine the evidence on record, P.W.-1 not supported the prosecution case and not deposed in respect of demand of dowry and reason of causing death of the deceased by the appellant. P.W.-2 who is informant and mother of the deceased, who deposed on the basis of heresay evidence. In her deposition she had not specifically deposed in respect of demand of dowry of T.V and cash by the appellant on which date and time. There is no prior oral or documentary complaint in respect of demand of dowry against the appellant. P.W.-5 Madan Rai denied to have knowledge about Sanju Devi or Sumitra Devi even about the occurrence. He turned hostile by the prosecution. The evidence of informant/P.W.-2 is not corroborated by any independent witnesses. The informant is interested witness and it is a Rule of Prudent that interested witness should be corroborated by other cogent and consistent evidence and without corroboration, evidence of P.W.-2 would not be safe to convict the appellant. The prosecution is not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. P.W.-2 did not say in her evidence that there was any demand and and due to non-fulfillment of dowry demand, her daughter was subjected to death. It would be proper to mention here that in respect of burning, there is no medical evidence on record. It is evident that there is nothing on record to show that soon before the death, there was any demand or torture by the appellant which is a necessary ingredient to bring the accused under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code clearly says that in case of abnormal death, if it is shown that soon before the death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with demand of dowry, such death can be called dowry death. It is evident from the discussions made that necessary ingredient has not been established by the prosecution to bring the case within the ambit of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. If the prosecution fails to establish the aforesaid ingredient then presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act does not apply and in such case the burden does not shift to the accused/appellant to rebut the presumption under the law. Since the ingredient of Section 304-B is absent on the record, in my view, the appellant cannot be convicted under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. The court below did not consider the aforesaid aspect of the matter.

In view of of the aforesaid finding, the evidence on record which remains to be considered is only circumstantial evidence. It appears from the prosecution evidence as discussed above, no medical evidence is brought on record to prove the fact that deceased died due to burning. It is evident that circumstantial evidence, which have been brought on record is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that appellant had committed murder of informant’s daughter by burning. It is well established law that in case of circumstantial evidence, chain must be complete to establish the guilt of the accused person.

It is established that the circumstantial evidence which has been brought on record, as discussed above, is not sufficient to come a conclusion that the appellant had committed dowry death. It is well established rule of law that in case of circumstantial evidence, chain must be completed to establish the guilt of the accused. In the instant case, there is no such circumstantial evidence/chain of circumstances to establish the guilt of the appellant. The prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond the shadow of all reasonable doubts and the appellant is entitled to get the benefits of doubt.

Thus, on consideration, as discussed above, I am of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish its case and as such the conviction of the appellant cannot be upheld. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is hereby quashed and set aside.

The appellant Veeru Singh, who is on bail is acquitted by giving him the benefits of doubt and he is dis-charged from the liabilities of the bail bonds.

Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed.