Veerprabhu Marketing Limited vs Bardi Lal Jat

THERE is delay of 274 days in filing this revision petition.

WE have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and perused the application seeking condonation of delay. This is explained that there were various procedural hindrances which took some time for the petitioner to arrive at a decision for preferring a revision petition before this Commission. It is further averred that the case papers and other documents have been called form the concerned lawyer and then the authorized representatives of the petitioner came to Delhi and had a meeting with the Counsel and upon due deliberation, a decision was taken to prefer a further revision. We have considered the application for condonation of delay. There is no sufficient ground for permitting this application. There must be some reasonable and good ground which must constitute a sufficient cause. The facts mentioned above do not constitute a sufficient cause and the case is hopelessly barred by time. The following authorities apply to this case on all fours.

IN Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Fora ".

IN R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)=I (2009) SLT 701, it has been observed that "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Appeal Leave Petition stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition ". In Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361, it has been observed that "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant ".

IN Sow Kamalabai, W/o Narasaiyya Shrimal and Narsaiyya, S/o Sayanna Shrimal v. Ganpat Vithalroa Gavare, 2007 (1) Mh.LJ 807, it was held that the expression ''sufficient cause '' cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such ''sufficient cause '' stated in the application and no such interference in the impugned order is called for.

THE Hon ''ble Supreme Court in case, Bikram Dass v. Financial Commissioner and Others, AIR 1977 SC 1221, has held that: "Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around Section 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay. " In Housing Board, Haryana v. Dr. S.L. Chaudhary, I (1991) CPJ 140 at pp 142, 144 (Haryana SCDRC, Chandigarh), it was held that Section 5, Limitation Act and proviso to Section 15, Consumer Protection Act,.is in pari materia -A bare look at Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes it plain that the materia part of the language of the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act is in pari materia therewith. Therefore, it would seem settled beyond caisil; that it is incumbent on the appellant to explain each day of default beyond the terminus line of the prescribed period of limitation.

IN another authority reported in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh and Ors., V (2010) SLT 790=III (2010) CLT 201 (SC)=decided on 8.7.2010 in Civil Appeal No. 1166 of 2006 it was held: "The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. RamanathaAiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005] "

IN another authority reported in Office of the Chief Post Master General and Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. and Anr., I (2012) CLT 338 (SC)=II (2012) SLT 312=2012 STPL (Web) 132 (SC), Hon ''ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold: "13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure, that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. "

Now we advert to the merits of the case.

THE present revision petition has been filed by M/s. Veerprabhu Marketing Limited-opposite party No. 1 against the complainant and opposite party Nos. 2 to 4. The case of the complainant is as follows. Shri Sumit Chauhan, Assistant Manager of Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. and Shri Amit Lodha, opposite parties 3 and 4, respectively, facilitate finance for vehicles. They suggested the complainant, Badri Lal Jat to buy Tata Company Truck as there was a discount of Rs. 50,000 on the truck. Sometimes in the year 2003, Shri Badri Lal Jat approached petitioner/opposite party No. 1 and desire to purchase a truck. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, who are the finance agents also assured the complainant that they would arrange for full finance of the sale price of the vehicle purchased from Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 got a loan in the sum of Rs. 12,86,487 sanctioned in favour of the complainant from opposite party No. 2. The complainant also deposited Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 20,000 for insurance and registration. The total amount of vehicle was Rs. 12,68,021. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 misappropriated a sum of Rs. 18,466 by way of getting extra money in the name of truck loan. The opposite parties 3 and 4 did not even get the insurance and registration of the vehicle, which was eventually done by the complainant. The grouse of the complainant is that he was defrauded by a sum of Rs. 70,000 + Rs. 18,466. The above said discount of Rs. 50,000 was also not given back.

THEREAFTER , a complaint was filed before the District Consumer Forum. The District Forum allowed the complaint and opposite parties 3 and 4 were ordered to pay the applicant sums of Rs. 70,000 and Rs. 18,466 within one month of the passing of the order, failing which they were directed to pay interest @ 9% per annum from the date of announcement till the date of payment. It was held that all the three parties were jointly and severally liable for the payment of a sum of Rs. 500 towards the cost of litigation and Rs. 2,000 towards damages were also awarded. The case against Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., opposite party No. 2 was dismissed. Before the District Forum, the opposite party did not appear and they were proceeded against ex parte. The State Commission by a cryptic order dismissed the appeal. It should have passed a speaking order. We have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner. He could not give valid ground for not appearing before the District Consumer Forum. He contended that as a matter of fact, the opposite parties were aware of the proceedings pending before the District Forum. However, they did not appear before the District Forum because their Counsel advised them that that case was in respect of misappropriation of amount. He contended that consequently, they could not appear before the District Forum and allowed the case to proceed against them. We enquired from learned Counsel for the petitioner, whether this contention forms part of any record. He admitted that no such application was ever moved and all these facts found no mention in any of his applications. First of all, there is no ground as to why the ex parte order should be set aside when the opposite parties did not appear deliberately. No effort was made to get that order set aside. We are not inclined to upset the above said ex parte order, which appears to be correct and suffers from no flaw, whatsoever.

LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner argued that he has good case on merits. He should be given liberty to appear before the trial Fora. We find no merit in this argument as well because the petitioner could not produce any prima facie evidence in his favour. It rather appears that the finance agents and opposite party No. 1 led the complainant up the garden path and to take unnecessary advantage of a gullible person. There is no merit in this revision petition. The revision petition is dismissed. Revision Petition dismissed.