Veerappaswami vs The Village Panchayat Karaimedu

Anantanarayanan, J.—This revision proceeding will have to be allowed, on the two grounds on which it has been pressed by Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner, at least very clearly and beyond all controversy on the second ground, which is an equitable principle that has received recognition in all Courts, even if the first ground be somewhat in doubt. The facts are that the plaintiff was appointed as a part-time clerk and bill collector in the defendant Panchayat and the plaintiff (revision petitioner) duly performed his services from 15th January, 1955, to 31st December, 1955, upon a salary of about Rs. 20 per mensem. The total salary for the period aggregated to the not very considerable figure of Rs. 230 and this has not been paid. The action was against the Panchayat in small cause jurisdiction, claiming the amount. The learned District Munsif has dismissed the suit, though the merits are overwhelmingly clear and indeed not controverted, upon the highly technical ground that the Panchayat is represented in the action by the President, and that the President has no authority to make this particular appointment. One question which arose during the trial was whether the appointment was temporary or permanent. Apparently, under the rules, if the appointment was temporary, it would be doubtful if the President could make it, but, fortunately for the revision petitioner, the appointment has been held to be permanent, as the order did not specify that it was temporary. However this might be, it seems from the record that the appointment was made in a context which justified the inference that it was subject to the approval of a higher authority, like the Inspector of Panchayats. On an examination of the Act and the Rules, the learned District Munsif came to the conclusion that the appointment could not be held strictly authorised, and hence that the plaintiff, the revision petitioner, had no remedy against the Panchayat.

Sri Ratnam, for the revision petitioner, relies upon two relevant provisions of the Madras Village Panchayats Act, X of 1950. The first provision, S. 2, Sub-Cl. 7, defines "executive authority" and under S. 2, Sub-Cl. 7 (ii) the President is such an authority. Under S. 34, Sub-Cl. 6 (a) of the same Act, the President has the power to appoint. But the complication in the present case is that the appointment was apparently made, subject to approval by a higher authority; the record does not show that such approval was obtained. In that sense, this part-time employee could not rely upon the binding nature of the contract on the Panchayat itself. That is the argument on which the suit was dismissed. But there appears to be something to be said for the opposite view that the appointment would be valid by virtue of the power vested in the President under S. 34, Sub-Cl. 6 (a) of the Act.

However this might be, the claim would be entirely saved upon the equitable principle enacted in S. 70 of the Contract Act. It is somewhat surprising that this seems to have escaped the notice of the trial Court and the Learned Counsel there. Learned Counsel for the Panchayat raises the doubt whether an institution would be subject to the obligations under S. 70 but I do not see why any "legal person" such as an institution, should not be bound by that section, if the institution is capable of entering into a contract at all. There can be no doubt that the services rendered by the clerk (revision petitioner) were not intended to be gratuitous. It is equally indisputable that the "legal person" (the Panchayat) enjoyed the benefit of the services. Hence, I allow the revision petition, and decree the suit with costs in the trial Court. The parties will bear their own costs here.