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Judgment
Pritpal Singh, J.
A Criminal Complaint dated April 7, 1986, filed by the respondent Smt. Lajo (Annexure P.1) and the order dated April 8, 1986, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra (Annexure P.2), are sought to be quashed in this petition under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called `the Code'').
Smt. Lajo, respondent No. 1 filed a criminal complaint under Sections 467, 468, 469, 471, 420, 419, 406, 193, 120B, 209 and 210, Indian Penal Code, against six persons including the present petitioner V.B. Aggarwal, Advocate (Annexure P.1). It was alleged in the complaint that in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy amongst the six accused some false documents were prepared on the basis of which a civil suit was filed on behalf of minor sons of the accused Chander Pati, Labh Singh, Shero and Harbans Singh claiming ownership over the land belonging to the complainant. The suit was filed in the court by the accused Ved Parkash Saini, Advocate. The petitioner fraudulently put in appearance purporting to be on behalf of the complainant although the latter had not engaged him as her counsel. He filed a false and fabricated written statement on behalf of the complainant admitting the plaintiff''s claim. With the result that on the basis of the consent written statement the suit was decreed by the Court.
The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, without taking cognizance of the complaint forwarded the same to the Station House Officer of Police Station, City Thanesar, for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code vide the impugned order dated April 8, 1986 (Annexure P.2).
The grievance of the petitioner is that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was barred from taking cognizance of the complaint in view of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code. It is, therefore, contended that the learned Magistrate could not have made over the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. There is no merit in this contention. Powers under Section 156(3) are invoked by the Magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence. The impugned order (Annexure P.2) has, therefore, been made by the Magistrate at the recognizance stage. The question whether the Magistrate will eventually be able to take cognizance of the complaint after the police investigation does not raise at this juncture. Only after the investigation of the police on receipt of the report of the investigation the Magistrate will consider whether the proviso of Section 195 of the Code stands in his way to take cognizance of the offence. It was held by a Division bench of this Court in Karnail Singh and another v. The State of Punjab, 1983(1) Recent Criminal Reports 38 : 1983 P.L.R. 293 , that merely because the cognizance of an offence can only be taken at the instance of a Court in view of Section 195 of the Code the investigation thereof by the police would not be automatically prohibited. It was highlighted that courts do not investigate cognizable offences which is the primary function of the police.
Thus, at this precognizance stage neither the complaint (Annexure P.1) nor the impugned order (Annexure P.2) is liable to be quashed. This petition is, therefore, dismissed.
