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Judgment
The first appeal is directed against the Judgment and Decree, dated 30.11.1994, passed in O.S.No.71 of 1987, on the file of the Subordinate
Court, Kumbakonam.
The parties are referred to as per the ranking in the original suit.
The suit has been laid by the plaintiffs for the reliefs of possession and profits.
The case of the plaintiffs in brief is as follows:
4.1. The property described in the plaint schedule and shown in the plan as ACDF absolutely owned by the first plaintiff, he having purchased the
same from P.Krishnamurthy, on 26.03.1963, and being put in possession of the same and enjoying the property as the absolute owner thereof.
The title of the first plaintiff to the suit property had been upheld by the Judgment and Decree in O.S.No.74 of 1975, dated 15.11.1978, on the file
of the Subordinate Court, Kumbakonam. The first plaintiff purchased the suit property only to locate his business in that place and he being
appointed as the sole selling agent of ""Jawa"" make Motorcycles for Thanjavur District and the said business was run in the suit building and a
workshop was also running in the suit building for the repair of the motorcycles. The first defendant is a Mechanic by profession and doing repair
works for the oil engines and pumpsets owned by the first plaintiff and also doing odd jobs, such as, repair of the vehicles etc., and for the work
done by him, he was paid remuneration. When the first plaintiff started his business in the suit property, the first defendant was permitted to occupy
the rear portion of the building which is the suit property, during September, 1976, as a licensee to keep watch over the premises marked in the
plan as BCED. In the front portion, vehicles were stocked and the repair works were done in that place shown as ABEF. For the work done, the
first defendant was paid remuneration and he was only a licensee of the suit property and not having any better right. The business of the first
plaintiff was shifted to another building bearing Door No.79 as the front portion of the suit door number ABEF had become old and required
reconstruction. The rear portion is also under disrepair and a major portion of the same had fallen down. The first defendant with his family
members is residing only in that portion. The first plaintiff wants to completely demolish and reconstruct the building and hence, terminated the
permission granted to the first defendant by a notice, dated 02.05.1987 and the first defendant had sent a reply through his counsel on
27.05.1987, for which a rejoinder was sent on 10.06.1987. The contents of the reply notice sent by the defendants are absolutely false. It is false
to state that the first plaintiff had agreed to convey the suit property to the first defendant and there was no such agreement at any time. The first
plaintiff has no necessity to sell the suit property nor the first defendant has sufficient funds to purchase any property. The further assertion that the
first defendant had entrusted jewels to the first plaintiff is false. There is no salary arrears due to the first defendant from the first plaintiff. The first
defendant was paid his remuneration as and when he did the job and there was no fixed pay as asserted by him. There was no agreement to pay
salary at the rate of Rs.750/- per month to the first defendant. The defendants have no manner or right over the suit property and they have to
vacate the same. It is false to state that the first defendant was appointed as the agent of the first plaintiff and looking after his transactions.
Excluding the rear portion, the remaining portion is in the exclusive possession of the first plaintiff. The first plaintiff died on 23.03.1989 and his
legal heirs are the plaintiffs 2 to 7 and they are entitled to the suit property. The second defendant is the son of the first defendant and after the suit,
he is also working along with the first defendant and in possession of the suit property and his possession is that of trespasser and hence, he has
also been added as a party respondent to the suit. Hence, the suit.
The case of the first defendant in brief is as follows:
5.1. It is true that the first defendant is in possession of the suit property from April, 1974 onwards. It is false to state that the first defendant was
permitted to occupy the rear portion of the building during September, 1976. The entire house was occupied by the first defendant from April,
1974 onwards. The first defendant is a Mechanic of Two Wheelers, Electrical and Water Pumps and during 1954, the first plaintiff contacted the
first defendant for doing the repair works of Motorcycles and Pleasure Cars and the friendship between the first plaintiff and the first defendant
started in the year 1954 itself and from that point of time, the first defendant had developed contacts with the first plaintiff in all his matters both
family as well as business matters and when the first plaintiff started the Jawa Motor Cycle dealings for Thanjavur District, the first defendant was
appointed as the Chief Motorcycle Mechanic for doing various jobs and as a Mechanic, the first defendant had served under the first plaintiff till
March, 1967. In April 1967, the first plaintiff approached the first defendant and requested him to continue his service as a Chief Motorcycle
Mechanic and the first defendant was appointed as his agent and the first defendant was also directed to look after the household works, litigation
matters, Bank transactions and other needs of the first plaintiff and his eldest son-in-law M.S.Tajudeen, who is residing at Sri Colony,
Kumbakonam. The first plaintiff is a Malaysian citizen and doing business at Epoh in Malaysia and used to visit India once in two or three years.
The first plaintiff''s son-in-law is also doing business in Bangkok. When the first defendant was about to purchase a residential house, during 1974,
for his occupation and when he represented the same to the first plaintiff that he has decided to dispose of his wife''s jewels for the purpose of
purchasing a house, the first plaintiff immediately directed him not to sell the jewels, but directed him to occupy the suit property and handover the
jewels to him. Accordingly, the first defendant, during April, 1974, has given 15 soverigns of jewels to the first plaintiff and the first plaintiff had
agreed to reconvey the suit property after the disposal of the pending litigation between him and K.M.Ismath Khan in O.S.No.74 of 1975, on the
file of the Sub Court, Kumbakonam. Believing the same, the first defendant entrusted the jewels to the first plaintiff. For the services of the first
defendant, his remuneration was fixed at Rs.750/- per month, but a sum of Rs.250/- was paid every month and the balance of Rs.500/- was
retained by the first plaintiff and the first plaintiff agreed to settle the same and give in lump sum to the first defendant. In the beginning of February,
1987, the first defendant requested the first plaintiff to settle the retained remuneration and also to execute a sale deed in respect of the suit
property. However, the first plaintiff, with some ulterior motive, has not settled the same. But, on account of the friendship and also considering the
financial status of the first plaintiff, the first defendant has not taken any immediate action. It is incorrect to state that during September, 1976 first
defendant was permitted to occupy the suit property as a licensee. The building is in a very good condition. There is no need to repair the building
or demolish the same. For the Lawyer''s notice, a due reply has been given by the first defendant. The first defendant is not liable to hand over the
possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs. There is no cause of action and hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed.
The case of the second defendant in brief is as follows: 6.1. The second defendant is the eldest son of the first defendant and he is residing along
with the first defendant in the suit property from 1974 onwards and the allegations that he is only a trespasser and he has no right to be in
possession of the suit property are entirely incorrect. The second defendant as the son of the first defendant is entitled to be in possession of the
suit property along with the first defendant. In other respects, the second defendant is adopting the written statement of the first defendant and
hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed.
The case of the plaintiffs in the reply statement is as follows:
7.1. The first defendant was never in possession of the suit property prior to 1976 and he was permitted to occupy a portion of the suit property
only as a licensee. He is not in possession of the entire house from 1974. The first defendant was doing mechanic job and it is false to state that the
friendship between the first plaintiff and the first defendant was started from 1954 onwards. It is false to state that the first defendant was appointed
as a Chief Motorcycle Mechanic and he was not appointed on any permanent salary basis as asserted by him in the written statement. There was
no need for the first plaintiff to request the first defendant to continue his service. It is absolutely false to state that the first defendant had proposed
to the first plaintiff to purchase a residential house. He has not entrusted any jewels to the first plaintiff and there was no such understanding or
undertaking from the first plaintiff to convey the suit property to the first defendant as pleaded. The first plaintiff has acquired the suit property for
his business purpose and therefore, he never intended to part with the suit property. The first defendant has never entrusted any jewels to the first
plaintiff and there was no occasion for the same. No amount is due from the first plaintiff to the first defendant. The first plaintiff was never in such
an affluent circumstances to pay the heavy amount and the first defendant never demanded any sale or execution of the sale deed of the suit
property. There was no need to settle any accounts as asserted. The first defendant is in occupation of a portion of the suit property only as a
licensee, which has been legally terminated by a notice and he is only a trespasser now and hence, the suit be decreed as prayed for.
On the basis of the pleadings set out above, the following issues were framed by the Trial Court for determination:
i. Whether the alleged oral sale agreement pleaded by the first defendant is true?
ii. Whether the first defendant is in possession of the entire house as contended by him?
iii. Whether the entrustment of the jewels as contended by the first defendant is true?
iv. Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to obtain the reliefs of possession and profits? and
v. To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled to?
The following additional issue was framed on 15.11.1994 for determination:
i. Whether the first defendant is entitled to the benefit of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act?
In support of the plaintiffs'' case, P.W.1 was examined and Exs.A1 to A4 were marked and on the side of the defendants'', D.Ws.1 and 2
were examined and Exs.B1 to B28 were marked.
On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the respective parties and the submissions made, the Court below was
pleased to decree the suit as prayed for. Impugning the said Judgment and Decree of the Court below, the present first appeal has been preferred
by the defendants.
The following points arise for consideration in this appeal:
i. Whether the plea of oral sale agreement made by the first defendant is true?
ii. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the possession of the suit property and profits as claimed by them in the plaint? and
iii. To what relief the appellants / defendants are entitled to?
POINT NOS.I & II:
The suit has been laid by the first plaintiff against the defendants for recovery of possession of the suit property and profits. Pending suit, the
first plaintiff had died and subsequently, his legal representatives had been brought on record as the plaintiffs 2 to 7. The second defendant is the
son of the first defendant. It is not in dispute that the suit property belonged to the deceased first plaintiff and on his demise, the title to the suit
property had devolved upon his legal heirs, namely, the plaintiffs 2 to 7. Thus, it is found that the plaintiffs'' title to the suit property is not in issue as
such. The same has also been admitted by the first defendant examined as D.W.1. From the pleadings set out by the respective parties, it is found
that the suit has been laid by the deceased first plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit property and profits based upon the title. Inasmuch as
there is no dispute as regards the title of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property, it is found that inasmuch as the defendants resisted the claim of
the plaintiffs for recovery of possession of the suit property on the defence projected by them, it is seen that as rightly determined by the Court
below, the onus is upon the defendants to establish their defence to thwart the claim of the plaintiffs. For the said purpose, the defendants have set
up the plea of oral sale agreement.
Now, it is the case of the defendants that the first defendant had been working under the first plaintiff as a Mechanic and also doing his other
odd jobs and accordingly, it is their further case that when the first defendant proposed to the deceased first plaintiff as to his intention to purchase
a property, according to the case of the defendants, the deceased first plaintiff agreed to convey the suit property in his favour and in pursuance of
the same, it is the case of the defendants that the first defendant had entrusted the jewels weighing about 15 sovereigns to the deceased first plaintiff
and it is the further case of the defendants that out of the remuneration to be paid by the deceased first plaintiff to the first defendant for the services
rendered by him, quantified at Rs.750/- per month, it is stated that only a sum of Rs.250/- had been paid by the deceased first plaintiff and the
remaining Rs.500/- had been retained by him and thus, pleaded that an oral sale agreement had been entered into between the deceased first
plaintiff and the first defendant in respect of the suit property and on account of the close and cordial relationship, which had existed between them,
it is the further case of the defendants that the first defendant had not immediately proceeded further based upon the sale agreement to obtain the
sale deed in respect of the suit property and therefore, it is their case that in part performance of the sale agreement, as the first defendant had been
put in possession of the suit property, he is entitled to retain the possession of the property concerned and it is further stated that as such the
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover the possession of the suit property from the defendants. The above case of the defendants is stoutly contested
and disputed by the plaintiffs.
In the light of the above pleas set out by the parties, it is seen that the onus is heavy upon the defendants to establish the oral sale agreement set
out by them. From the pleadings made in the plaint, it is found that according to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as the first defendant had been doing some
odd jobs for the deceased first plaintiff, accordingly, the first defendant was allowed to be in possession of a portion of the suit property with his
family and it is stated that the possession of the suit property by the first defendant is only in the nature of a licensee and that apart, the first
defendant could not claim any better right to the suit property and further, it is the case of the plaintiffs that inasmuch as the suit property had fallen
into repairs and requires demolition, it is the case of the plaintiffs that by a notice, dated 02.05.1987, they had terminated the license / permission
granted to the first defendant and inasmuch as the first defendant had repudiated the said notice by sending a reply containing false allegations,
according to the plaintiffs, they had been necessitated to lay the suit against the defendants.
As adverted above, the defendants have set out the plea of oral sale agreement to resist the claim of the plaintiffs. With reference to the same,
as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, even the pleas set out in the written statement do not in any manner serve the case of the
defendants to establish the plea of oral sale agreement. In this connection, the defendants, in their written statement, have stated that when the first
defendant was about to purchase a residential house in the year 1974 for his occupation, he represented the same to the deceased first plaintiff that
he had decided to dispose of his wife''s jewels for the purpose of purchasing a house and that the deceased first plaintiff immediately directed the
first defendant not to sell the jewels, but directed him to occupy the suit property and hand over the jewels to him and accordingly, the first
defendant, during April, 1974, had given 15 sovereigns of jewels to the deceased first plaintiff and the deceased first plaintiff had agreed to
reconvey the suit property, after the disposal of the pending litigation between him and K.M.Ismath Khan in O.S.No.74 of 1975, on the file of the
Sub Court, Kumbakonam and the first defendant having believed the above statement of the deceased first plaintiff, entrusted the jewels to the
deceased first plaintiff and for the services rendered by the first defendant, his remuneration was fixed at Rs.750/- per month, however, the
deceased first plaintiff had paid only Rs.250/- to first defendant and retained the remaining Rs.500/- and he had agreed to settle the same and give
back in a lump sum to the first defendant and the first defendant had served as his agent till February, 1987. This is what that has been pleaded by
the defendants in their written statement to resist the claim of the plaintiffs for recovery of possession of the suit property.
Therefore, on a perusal of the above pleadings set out in the written statement, it is found that even as per the case of the defendants, the
jewels of the first defendant had been entrusted to the deceased first plaintiff. Now, according to the first defendant, the same had been entrusted
only for the purpose of purchasing the suit property from the deceased first plaintiff. If that be so, as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the
plaintiffs, the parties would have endeavoured to fix the sale price for the suit property then and there and also arrived at an understanding as to the
mode of payment, whether the jewels entrusted form part of the entire sale consideration or any amount remained to be paid still further and
further, the parties would have arrived at a consensus as to when the proposed sale transaction is to be completed and the mode of conveyance in
respect of the property concerned etc. However, with reference to the above aspects, it is found that the written statement is very very silent and
the only statement that has been made in the written statement is that the deceased first plaintiff had agreed to reconvey the suit property after the
disposal of the pending litigation in O.S.No.74 of 1975. Even the above statement would only go to show that there is no plea that the deceased
first plaintiff had agreed to convey the suit property in favour of the first defendant, on the other hand, the statement reads as if the deceased first
plaintiff had agreed to reconvey the suit property after the conclusion of the pending litigation in O.S.No.74 of 1975. Subsequent to the same, it is
stated that believing the above statement of the deceased first plaintiff, the first defendant had entrusted the jewels. With reference to the purchase
of the suit property, as pleaded by the defendants, if at all there had been a consensus ad idem between the parties concerned with reference to the
conveyance of the suit property, the other detailed aspects, with reference to the same as referred to supra, would have been arrived at between
the parties and if such an understanding had been arrived at between the parties, one could understand that the plea of oral sale agreement set out
by the defendants may deserve some attention. However, with reference to the details about the purchase of the suit property, particularly, as to
the sale price fixed for the same, the period within which the sale transaction should be completed etc., are not at all arrived at between the parties
concerned and when the plea of the defendants is that only the jewels had been entrusted believing the statement of the deceased first plaintiff, in
my considered opinion and also as rightly determined by the Court below, the plea of oral sale agreement as set up by the defendants in the written
statement could not in any manner be construed as a valid sale agreement between the parties in respect of the suit property. Therefore, it is found
that the plea of oral sale agreement set out by the defendants is very very hazy, indistinct and nebulous and the resultant conclusion would be that
inasmuch as the plea set out by the defendants as regards the oral sale agreement is not true, they are unable to give any concrete particulars about
the same so as to affix the seal of legal approval to the same for extending the benefits to the defendants with reference to the same.
Now, according to the defendants, in pursuance of the above said arrangement entered into between the deceased first plaintiff and the first
defendant, the first defendant was permitted to be in possession of the suit property along with his family. Thus, the defendants claim to be in
possession of the suit property in part performance of the sale agreement as contemplated under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.
However, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the defendants has stated that the claim under Section 53-A of the Transfer of
Property Act is not pressed and it is waived. Be that as it may, even if the said plea is stressed by the defendants, it is found that as rightly
determined by the Court below, when the particulars regarding the sale agreement in respect of the property concerned had not been set out by
the defendants either in the written statement or during the course of evidence and only the entrustment of the jewels had been pleaded and when
the nature and description of the suit property had also not been set out clearly, it is seen that the defendants as such would not be entitled to claim
the benefit provided under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.
Now, the learned counsel for the defendants contended that considering the correspondence between the deceased first plaintiff and the first
defendant, as seen from the documents marked by the defendants, the Court should conclude that there has been a cordial and good relationship
between the parties concerned and accordingly, the parties had trusted each other and resultantly, believing the statement and promise given by the
deceased first plaintiff, the first defendant had entrusted the jewels only to the deceased first plaintiff with an intention to purchase the suit property
and also agreed for the part payment of his remuneration and in such view of the matter, the Court should hold that the oral sale agreement pleaded
by the defendants is true. However, the above contention does not merit acceptance. No doubt, from the correspondence between the deceased
first plaintiff and the first defendant, as seen from the documents exhibited by the defendants, we could gather that there has been some good
relationship between the deceased first plaintiff and the first defendant for a long time. However, that by itself would not automatically lead to the
conclusion that the deceased first plaintiff had agreed to convey the suit property to the first defendant as set out by the defendants. If that be so, as
rightly argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, necessary and essential particulars with reference to the consensus ad idem between the
parties as to the purchase of the suit property as detailed above would have been agreed between the parties concerned and the said particulars
would have been set out in the written statement. Not stopping there, it is further seen that even during the course of evidence and also in the reply
notice sent prior to the institution of the suit, the details of the sale agreement as regards the above essential facts have not been spelt out by the
defendants and this would only go to show that inasmuch as no such understanding had been arrived at between the deceased first plaintiff and the
first defendant, it is found that the defendants are unable to give details of the same and when the position remains as such, as rightly put forth by
the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, the only conclusion that could be arrived at is that inasmuch as no such sale agreement had been entered into
between the parties concerned, the defendants are unable to put forth the details with reference to the same in any manner as discussed above.
Even though the defendants have pleaded that the part of the fixed remuneration of the first defendant has been retained by the deceased first
plaintiff only towards the sale consideration of the suit property, however, the plea set out in the written statement had not served the same. In the
written statement, as seen above, it has been only pleaded that the deceased first plaintiff had retained the sum of Rs.500/- out of the fixed
remuneration of Rs. 750/- to be paid to the first defendant with an agreement to settle the same and give back the same in a lump sum to the first
defendant. In such view of the matter, it is found that the retainment of the remuneration by the deceased first plaintiff, even if the said defence is
taken to be true, is not for the purpose of purchasing the suit property pursuant to the sale agreement and it is on the basis of some other
arrangement entered into between the parties concerned and accordingly, it is pleaded by the defendants that the said amount had been promised
to be returned back by the deceased first plaintiff to the first defendant in lump sum. Therefore, it is seen that the case of the defendants has been
subsequently developed to the effect that the said amount of remuneration retained by the deceased first plaintiff also forms part of the sale
consideration, as such, cannot be accepted in any manner.
It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that the first defendant had been paid the remuneration for the odd jobs done by him both in the
maintenance of the cars and other sundry works and there is no agreement to pay any fixed remuneration as set out by the defendants. With
reference to the plea of the defendants that the deceased first plaintiff had fixed his remuneration at Rs.750/- per month for the services rendered
by him, there is no material forth coming on the part of the defendants. Even the correspondence marked on the side of the defendants had not
spelt out that a fixed remuneration had been fixed between the parties concerned and it is further seen that the first defendant had been directed to
receive some amount from the second plaintiff also by the deceased first plaintiff and it is not clear whether the said amount has been received by
the first defendant from the second plaintiff. Be that as it may, even assuming for the sake of arguments that such a fixed remuneration had been
agreed to be paid to the first defendant by the deceased first plaintiff, when there is no plea made in the written statement that the retainment of the
part of the fixed remuneration to be paid by the deceased first plaintiff also forms part of the sale consideration in respect of the suit property, it is
found that the above plea set out by the defendants would not in any manner be useful to sustain their case. That apart, there is no proof at all on
the side of the defendants to establish that the deceased first plaintiff had retained Rs.500/- from the fixed remuneration to which the first defendant
is entitled to.
The learned counsel for the defendants contended that in order to establish the case, the plaintiffs have not endeavoured to enter into the
witness box and on the other, they have chosen to examine only the power agent and in such view of the matter, when the power agent examined
as P.W. 1 is unable to speak about the essential facts pertaining to the case and when the fact remains that he could also not speak about the facts
to which the principal had special knowledge, according to him, the plaintiffs'' case should be disbelieved as having not proved. However,
countering the said submission, it is argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that inasmuch the suit has been laid by the plaintiffs based upon
the title and when the title of the plaintiffs is not in dispute and when the plea set out by the defendants to resist the claim of the plaintiffs also not
being established in any manner, it is contended that dehors the evidence of P.W.1, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the possession of the suit
property from the defendants as claimed in the plaint. The above argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs seems to be acceptable. Even
though the defendants had pleaded that the P.W.1 is not aware of the relationship or the understanding between the parties concerned, it is found
that almost all the documents relied upon by the defendants have come to be marked only through P.W.1. That apart, when the defendants have
pleaded oral sale agreement to resist the claim of the plaintiffs for recovery of possession and when the said plea has not been established by the
defendants in any manner as discussed above, it is found that resultantly, the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover the possession of the suit
property legally from the defendants.
The learned counsel for the defendants further contended that the plaintiffs have not come forward with a clear evidence as to whether the
possession of the suit property by the defendants is in the nature of the licensee or for doing mechanic jobs under the deceased first plaintiff and
therefore, it is stated that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to secure the reliefs claimed by them. However, a reading of the plaint as a whole
would go to show that the plea of the plaintiffs is that the first defendant was granted permission to be in possession of the part of the suit property
for the services rendered by him and accordingly, it is seen that they have pleaded that the nature of the possession of the suit property by the first
defendant as only a licensee, accordingly, it is found that the plaintiffs having terminated the said license by issuing a notice above stated, it is found
that thereafter, the defendants could not claim any legal right to be in possession of the suit property and their possession would only be in the
nature of trespass and in such view of the matter, when the plaintiffs have title to the suit property, which is also not in dispute, it is found that the
defendants being trespassers of the suit property could not resist the claim of the plaintiffs to recover the possession of the suit property in any
manner.
As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs a person holding possession of the property gratuitously or in the capacity as a
caretaker or a servant would not acquire any right or interest in the property merely on account of long possession after the termination of their
license. As far as this case is concerned, as the defendants have not disputed the title of the plaintiffs and from the materials placed, when the title
of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property has also been confirmed in O.S.No.74 of 1975, it is found that the defendants cannot claim to be in
legal possession of the suit property as such.
Inasmuch as the oral sale agreement pleaded by the defendants is not true, it is found that the defendants did not endeavour to take further
follow-up action in continuation of the same to get a pucca conveyance of the suit property from the deceased first plaintiff. It is pleaded that the
deceased first plaintiff had agreed to convey the suit property after the conclusion of the suit in O.S.No.74 of 1975. It is found that the said suit
had concluded on 15.11.1978 and the copy of the Judgment rendered in the above said suit has been marked as Ex.A4. Even thereafter, it is
found that the defendants have not taken any legal steps to recover the conveyance of the suit property from the deceased first plaintiff. On the
other hand, it is found that only after the plaintiffs have laid the present suit in the year 1987, the defendants have taken the plea of oral sale
agreement. This would also go to show that inasmuch as the oral sale agreement pleaded by the defendants is not true, it is found that the
defendants pursuant to the same did not endeavour to get any conveyance of the suit property from the plaintiffs in accordance with law and
therefore, the above factor also would only expose the falsity of the defence set out by the defendants.
The learned counsel for the defendants, in support of his contentions, placed reliance upon the decision reported in (2010) 4 LW 148
[Shanmugam vs. Lumalai Gounder and others]. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs, in support of his contentions, placed reliance upon the
decisions reported in AIR 1981 SC 2235 [Pandurang Jivaji Apte vs. Ramchandra Gangadhar Ashtekar and others], 1988-1-L.W. [James vs.
Y.Davidson], 2004-1-L.W.728 [R.V.E.Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P.Temple] and 2017 (1) CTC 755 [Behram
Tejani and others vs. Azeem Jagani]. The principles of law outlined in the above cited decisions are taken into consideration and followed as
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand.
In the light of the above discussions, it is found that the Court below has rightly determined that the oral sale agreement pleaded by the
defendants is not true. I do not find any reason to differ with the above said conclusion of the Trial Court and I, therefore, also hold that the plea of
the oral sale agreement set out by the defendants is not true and resultantly, I hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the possession of the suit
property and also the other reliefs from the defendants as claimed in the plaint. Accordingly, Point Nos.I and II are answered in favour of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants.
POINT NO.III:
In conclusion, the Judgment and Decree, dated 30.11.1994, passed in O.S.No.71 of 1987, on the file of the Subordinate Court,
Kumbakonam, are confirmed and resultantly, the first appeal is dismissed with costs.
Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.