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Judgment
M. Venugopal, J.—The Appellant/Petitioner has projected the present Writ Appeal as against the order dated 26.04.2010 in W.P. No.
21109 of 2000 passed by the Learned Single Judge in dismissing the Writ Petition. The Learned Single Judge, while passing the order in W.P. No.
21109 of 2000 dated 26.04.2010 [filed by the Appellant/Petitioner], has, inter alia, observed, in paragraph 19, as follows:
In the instant case, a full-fledged enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer appointed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The
evidence of T. Loganathan and the Expert''s opinion marked would go to show that it was only the petitioner who tampered with the records and
committed irregularities and thereby caused loss to the Corporation. The Enquiry Officer''s finding is based on evidence legally admissible. The
Enquiry officer had never strayed out of the materials brought on record by the parties.
Also, in paragraphs 21 to 23 of the impugned order in the Writ Petition, the Learned Single Judge has observed hereunder:
Nothing has been demonstrated in the instant case by the petitioner that there was procedural infraction committed by the respondents which
led to manifest injustice. Nothing also has been shown that there is violation of principles of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry by the
Enquiry Officer. This Court cannot act as an appellate authority to substitute its own reasons to upset the decision of the respondents.
As there is sufficient materials to establish the guilt of the petitioner in the departmental enquiry conducted by the Life Insurance Corporation of
India, the question of interfering with the decision taken by the respondents does not arise for consideration.
Coming to the quantum of punishment awarded to the petitioner, it is found that recovery of loss to the Corporation and reduction in basic pay
to the lowest time scale of pay viz., Rs. 1950/= was ordered by the disciplinary authority and the same was confirmed by the appellate authority.
and resultantly held that ''It is not a case where the punishment awarded to the petitioner is shockingly disproportionate to the charges established
as against her. Within one year from the date of joining service, it appears that the petitioner has committed irregularities alleged against her.
Financial loss has occasioned to the Corporation. The petitioner, who was completely trusted by the employer, has breached the trust. In fact, the
Corporation has taken a lenient view in the matter of punishment of an employee who had committed serious lapses which resulted in financial loss
to the Corporation etc.'' and dismissed the Writ Petition without costs.
According to the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner, the order of the Learned Single Judge dated 26.04.2010 in W.P. No. 21109 of
2000 is contrary to law and based on miss-appreciation of the facts of the case.
The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner urges before this Court that the Learned Single Judge has rested his findings based on mere
surmises, without even probing into the merits and facts of the case.
That apart, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner that in the instant case, there is no independent evidence
available against the Appellant/Petitioner to link her with the charges and further, the only evidence of T. Loganathan (Appellant''s Superior) who
was Higher Grade Assistant at that time and whose duty was to verify whether the entries were made in the forms by his subordinates correctly or
not, was given much importance when the Appellant herself made allegations against him that it was he who was responsible for the error occurred
in the policy statements of various individuals.
The Learned Counsel for the Appellant vehemently projects an argument that the Appellant/Petitioner was a probationer and she was guided by
the Senior Official T. Loganathan (Higher Grade Assistant) and others and even assuming, without admitting, that the Appellant was made entries
in the policy statement, in question, they would have been made only under the guidance and supervision of her superiors, particularly the above
named person and hence, she ought not to have been charge sheeted at all when there is no action against any of the officials who had to finalise
the entries made by her. In any event, the plea taken on behalf of the Appellant/Petitioner is that when the Appellant/Petitioner accused her
Superior T. Loganathan in respect of the subject matter of the charges, then, his evidence should not have been taken note of at all to prove the
charges against her.
The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner contends that the charges levelled against the Appellant/Petitioner are not related to corruption
or misappropriation and in fact, the charges only point out that she made wrong entries in the policy statements of certain policy holders amounting
to a total sum of Rs. 16,000/- and odd only. Even assuming, without admitting, that the charges were proved, they are only minor ones and for
that, it is submitted on behalf of the Appellant, that a major punishment of reduction to the bottom scale for ever could not be awarded and
therefore, the punishment imposed on the Petitioner is highly disproportionate to the nature of charges levelled against her.
Yet another stand taken on behalf of the Appellant/Petitioner is that the charges levelled against the Appellant/Petitioner are very vague as the
specific period during which the occurrence is said to have taken place was not at all mentioned as the policies were very old and related to even
number of years before the date of Appellant''s joining.
A forceful plea taken on behalf of the Appellant/Petitioner is that there is no evidence to establish the handwriting of the Appellant and the
Forensic Report also does not say anything against the Appellant and this vital aspect of the matter was not taken into account by the Learned
Single Judge, while passing the impugned order in the Writ Petition.
Added further, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner submits that officials, who furnished the Forensic Report, were not subjected to
enquiry and also a copy of the Forensic Report admittedly was not given to the Appellant.
The Learned Counsel for the Appellant strenuously contends that the evidence of T. Loganathan (Superior Higher Grade Assistant) was not
only unreliable and unbelievable, but was a biased one since against him only the Appellant made some complaints. Therefore, the present case is a
case of no evidence and as such, the Appellant/Petitioner should not have been punished.
Apart from the above, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner submits that mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof and in the
instant case on hand, there is no proof at all against the Appellant/Petitioner and as such, the order of punishment is tainted with mala fide motives
and illegalities, besides the same being against all principles of natural justice, fair play, equity and good conscience.
Lastly, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner that there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating and
completing the disciplinary proceedings which would vitiate the entire proceedings in the eye of law.
Per contra, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the 2nd Respondent that impugned final order dated 30.12.1998 has
been passed by the Divisional Manager [Disciplinary Authority] of the Corporation only after providing adequate opportunity to the Appellant and
during the course of the Audit, it was found that settlement of surrender value in regard to 17 policies which expired long ago were tampered with
as regards the premium position in the policy ledger sheet, to make it appear that they were still alive/in force and they acquired a surrender value.
Furthermore, a specific plea was taken on behalf of the 2nd Respondent that the Appellant was permitted to peruse the Forensic Expert''s Report
on 30.09.1997 during the enquiry and only with a view to shift the blame, the allegations are made against the Enquiry Officer, Presenting Officer
and Management witnesses. That apart, it is also denied on behalf of the 2nd Respondent that Mr. T. Loganathan was responsible in regard to the
irregularities found out by the Life Insurance Corporation relating to the 17 expired/lapsed policies.
The Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent makes a forceful submission that since there are no procedural infirmities in regard to the
conduct of domestic enquiry held in respect of the Appellant/Writ Petitioner, the impugned final order dated 30.12.1998 in imposing a penalty of
(i) Recovery of loss to the Corporation of Rs. 16,001.90 and (ii) Reduction in Basic Pay to the lowest time scale (i.e.) Rs. 1950/- applicable to the
Appellant under Regulation 39(1) (c) and (d) of L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 with immediate effect, are result of a lenient view taken
by the authorities concerned, while awarding punishment and as such, this Court may not interfere with the same at this distance point of time.
The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner relies on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab
National Bank and Others, wherein it is held hereunder:
A departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the
delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the
materials brought on record by the parties.
The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be
evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the
documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been
treated as evidence.
The appellant being an employee of the Bank, his confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to
show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. There was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the
report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that
the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.
He also cites the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, at special pages 92 & 93,
wherein it is laid down as follows:
So far as the second charge is concerned, it has not been shown as to what were the duties of the appellant in terms of the prescribed rules or
otherwise. Furthermore, it has not been shown either by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority as to how and in what manner the
maintenance of ACE-8 Register by way of sheets which were found attached to the estimate file were not appropriate so as to arrive at the
culpability or otherwise of the appellant. The Appellate Authority in its order stated that the appellant was not required to prepare ACE-8 Register
twice. The appellant might have prepared another set of register presumably keeping in view the fact that he was asked to account for the same on
the basis of the materials placed on records. The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings
were initiated after six years and they continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance
thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer.
That apart, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner invites the attention of this Court to the decision in S. Rathinavelu Vs. The
Chairman and The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board, at page 524 & 529] wherein in paragraphs 19 and 34, it is
observed and held as follows:
It is not in dispute that the alleged irregularities relate to the year 1988, when the petitioner was an Assistant Executive Engineer, RWS Sub
Division, Coimbatore and for the irregularities, charges have been levelled against the petitioner only on 06.01.1998, after nearly 10 years.
The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that there is delay in filing the Writ Petition and therefore, the same has to be
dismissed on the ground of latches is liable to be rejected. The Writ Petition has been entertained and pending for nearly five years on the file of
this Court. Further, a similar matter has been considered and decided by a Division Bench of this Court. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier,
the Writ Petition has got to be allowed on the ground of inordinate delay of 10 years in initiating the disciplinary proceedings.
The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner places reliance on the decision of this Court in R. Madhavan, Assistant Director of Rural
Development (Retired), Regional Institute of Rural Development Vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu wherein it is held as follows:
Complainant has not appeared and marked the documents, whereas the petitioner has marked the documents to show that the charges are false.
The enquiry officer rightly found that charges were not proved. The disciplinary authority while disagreeing with report of enquiry officer must
record reasons on the basis of the evidence on record. If there is no proper evidence or there is lacuna in the conduct of enquiry, the disciplinary
authority must refer the enquiry back to the enquiry officer for further investigation. Without doing so, the impugned notice was issued which is
prohibited under law. Second show cause notice issued only after the directions issued by the Court. There was delay on the part of the first
respondent which certainly prejudiced the right of the petitioner. Impugned show cause notice quashed.
The Appellant/Petitioner joined the service as an Assistant in the Vellore Division of the Respondent/Life Insurance Corporation of India. On
14.09.1991 she was issued with the charge sheet stating that she deliberately tampered with the premium position and other records pertaining to
17 policies, which resulted in settlement of Surrender Value payments, though these policies had not acquired Surrender Value and as such, she
caused pecuniary loss to the Corporation. The details of Policy Numbers and names of the Policy Holders are stated hereunder:
SL. No. Policy Number Name of Policy Holder
1 61810071 L.V. Natesan
2 43760261 L.V. Natesan
3 43760361 L.V. Natesan
4 61825626 M.S. Mani
5 43980939 V. Veerasamy
6 43972464 V. Kuppan
7 43134471 A. Arasappan
8 61822106 M. Balu
9 61802061 Maswood Ahmed
10 49151347 K. Elumalai
11 43648110 K. Arumugam
12 43972185 A. Perumal
13 43659481 O.M. Ibrahim
14 43980509 A. Perumal
15 43755770 M. Vadivel
16 43394905 S. Sundarayya
17 43980597 S. Krishnamurthy
As such, the Appellant/Petitioner was informed that she failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, failed to serve Corporation
honestly and faithfully, acted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and prejudicial to good conduct and thereby committed
breach of Regulations 21 and 24 read with Regulations 39(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, for which one
or more of the penalties specified under Regulation 39(1)(a) to (g) of the aforesaid (Staff) Regulations, 1960 could be imposed on her. Further,
she was directed to state, in writing, within 15 days from the date of charge sheet dated 14.09.1991, as to whether or not she plead guilty to the
charges and if she admits the charges, a statement of admission and if not, a statement of denial should be submitted to the Senior Divisional
Manager (Disciplinary Authority) within 15 days from the date of Charge Sheet together with list of witness/es through whom as also a list of
document/s by which, she would like to defend herself etc.
The Appellant/Petitioner submitted a reply to the 3rd Respondent/Senior Divisional Manager, L.I.C. of India, Vellore, on 17.10.1991, inter
alia, stating that she joined the service on 23.06.1986 and served for 15 months in SSS Department, she was posted to Surrender Value Section
under Policy Service Department and in regard to the 17 cases (policies) to which the charges relate, she stated that the last premiums in each of
these cases were paid long before she joined the service and that she was never incharge of posting of the ledgers at any point of time.
The Appellant/Petitioner had stated in the reply dated 17.10.1991 that as an Assistant in the Surrender Value Section, whenever a claim came
up before her, she adopted the normal and usual procedure of verifying the postings in the concerned ledger relating to that Policy and merely
transported the entries found there into the review slip and she did these things in each of these cases. Also, she had stated that it was too remote
to expect from her to doubt the truth of the entries which were found there and she had neither any necessity nor opportunity to doubt the postings
in any of these cases and also that the review slips prepared by her go to Superiors in the Section who also exercise their minds over the problem
because it involves the payment out by the Corporation. Added further, these cases passed through the review of the concerned Supervisory
Officers on similar observations who passed the papers for payment, which were approved and then only the payments were made.
Also, she had stated that in view of her certainty and conscientious feeling she committed no fraud and also she committed no false entries and
further, she had no sort of interest or connection with any of the policy holders to enable them to cheat the Corporation and also that in any fraud
there must have been a motive or a gain, which the 3rd Respondent could not establish in any of the cases and as such, charges were irrelevant and
baseless.
Originally, one N. Jayakumar was appointed as Enquiry Officer and R. Kesavan, A.A.O. was appointed as Presenting Officer as per Senior
Divisional Manager''s order dated 20.06.1997. Thereafter, G. Swaminathan, AO, Vellore Branch Office of L.I.C. was appointed as Presenting
Officer by virtue of order dated 07.07.1997 [in place of Kesavan] to enquire into the charges. The Charge Sheeted Employee was represented
through her Counsel S. Babu, in the first sitting of the enquiry held on 21.08.1997. Because of typographical errors that had crept in the earlier
Charge Sheet dated 14.09.1991, a revised Charge Sheet was issued to the Appellant/Petitioner.
The Enquiry Officer, in his Enquiry Report dated 23.12.1997, had categorically observed that the Appellant/Petitioner was always present in
the Department and she was not in the habit of absenting herself now and then and even in the case of her absence, the HGA was there and so the
non-availability of SSS personnel for giving the premium position was not at all there and moreover, she also detailed about the procedure of
carrying over the gap premiums and also confirmed that wherever gaps were received. Subsequently the date, receipt number and the initials of the
posting, were written there. She confirmed that there was neither shortage of hands in the Branch, nor, any pressure of work or any industrial
problem during the relevant period i.e. 1987-88. Continuing further, she also confirmed that the record room was opened only between 10.00
a.m. and 5.00 p.m. and the ledger cupboards were also locked and the keys for both were under the control of the then AAO. She added that
there was a ledger assistant to give the premium positions and he was not a temporary hand. As a matter of fact, the Enquiry Officer, after
examining prosecution witnesses and the delinquent, in his report dated 23.12.1997, had come to the conclusion that the charge framed against the
Appellant/Petitioner stood proved.
In the domestic enquiry, Sri Samuel Soundararajan (then HGA of SSS Department), in his deposition, had stated that the Appellant was doing
only Surrender Work and no other work in addition. He further stated that he had an Assistant in the SSS department who was giving the premium
position and in her absence, he would give the premium position and in case of absence of both of them, the AAO will do that work. Furthermore,
he confirmed that except the people from the SSS department others were not allowed to give the premium position. As regards the Gap
procedure, he confirmed that the gap position would be carried over and whenever it was paid, the date and the receipt number, initials of the
person posting it were marked in the group ledgers. Further, he uttered that after 1986, there was no paucity of staff strength in the Branch and
also the record room and ledgers were kept under lock and key. There was a permanent Assistant in-charge of premium posting in the Branch. T.
Loganathan (then HGA for Surrenders Department), as Management witness, deposed that ledgers were being kept in Cash cabin under lock and
key and it would be opened at 10.00 a.m. only. The keys were with the AAO. He also confirmed that a full time ledger Assistant was there. Even
the lapsed ledgers were kept in the racks inside the record room which was not accessible to Agents or Development Officers and further stated
that there was no pressure of work as full compliment of staff was provided during the relevant period. That apart, he had stated that the
Appellant/Petitioner was attending only to Surrenders and she had not performed any other work such as foreclosure or writing of BPC or other
miscellaneous works and further identified many defence witness documents wherein the Appellant/Petitioner''s handwriting and initials were
identified.
Further, the Management witness T. Loganathan stated in his evidence that as HGA he was concerned with verifying the calculation only and
further he had not checked the premium position, though some times he used to take the ledgers and verify the entries and further, he checked the
calculations only, as he had utmost good faith in his subordinates. Moreover, he opined that the handwriting, especially numericals were that of the
Appellant/Petitioner and this he could confirm since he being HGA of the department and also for the reason that for some time he worked with
the Appellant.
The stand of the Appellant was that she had not made the entries and her further case was that no one saw her making the entry in the ledger
sheet and that she was guided by the Supervisors and she simply copied the premium position as appeared in the ledger sheet. Furthermore, she
had stated that in the Audit Report of October/November 88 of Ranipet Branch, there was a mention that the Record Room was not at all kept
under lock and key and that there was no Record Clerk in-charge for the Record Room and that work of posting of premium entries was made by
Temporary Assistant for a long period. In fact, according to her, she had no motive to commit this irregularity and that the supervisory official
should have checked and verified the premium positions and should not have allowed the irregular entries. In regard to the Forensic Department
Report, the Appellant''s plea was that the ledger entries were verified by them and in regard to the writings marked as Q1, Q2, Q17, they have
stated that it was not possible to express any opinion as regards the authorship and she took a stand that the markings S-21, S-22 and S-25 were
not in her handwriting.
Finally, the Enquiry Officer concluded that the fact that SSS premiums were taken and posted by the Appellant though it was not a
responsibility and the manner in which the premium position in the Surrender Review Slip were written and subsequently, overwritten to acquire
surrender forms and calculations were corrected and the corrections made in the Surrender Value application form as regards the PW-30 of
Policy No. 61802061 and also the fact that the premium paying term taken as 6 = years as against the noting of 4 = years behind the Surrender
Application under PW-66 of Policy No. 43134471 and also in Surrender Review Slip and also the fact of taking the premium position as 3 years
in PW-11 of Pol No. 61826626 whereas on the backside of it the noting was there as 2 = years, all point to a clear proof that the employee has
manipulated the premium position so that Surrender Value is acquired and in some cases increased Surrender Value was made available.
Resultantly, the Enquiry Officer held that the Appellant (Employee) was clearly guilty of deliberately tampering with the premium position as
detailed in the report causing the settlement of Surrender Value payment under 15 policies as stated therein and further in another case where the
premium paying term has shown as 3 = years, whereas it has actually 2 years 9 months under Policy No. 43980597 of PW-49 and also under
another case where the actual premium was paid 4 = years whereas it has shown as 6 = years under Policy No. 43134471 of PW-25.
The Appellant/Petitioner was issued with a show cause notice dated 07.12.1998 by the Divisional Manager/Disciplinary Authority stating that
he concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and came to the conclusion that the Appellant is guilty of the charges mentioned in the charge
sheet dated 14.09.1991 and 26.06.1993 and also informed the Appellant that he provisionally proposed to impose the penalty of (i) Recovery of
loss to the Corporation of Rs. 16,001.90 and (ii) Reduction in Basic Pay to the lowest time scale (i.e.) Rs. 1950/- applicable to her under
Regulation 39(1)(c) and (d) under LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and directed her to give a reply in writing within a period of 15 days from
this date as to why the proposed penalty be not imposed upon her.
The Appellant/Petitioner, in her reply dated 17.12.1998 (to the show cause notice dated 07.12.1998), had, inter alia, stated that the instances
mentioned in the charge sheet relate to the period prior to her joining LIC and that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated during September
1991 and that enquiry was completed in October 1997 and after 14 months, she was issued with the show cause notice and that her present basic
pay was Rs. 4,170/- and reduction to the lowest time scale viz., Rs. 1,950/- would mean that she would be losing increments earned during her
unblemished service of 13 years, resulting in a reduction of Rs. 2,220/- in basic pay + corresponding allowances on date per month. The Divisional
Manager/Disciplinary Authority, in the final order dated 30.12.1998, had stated that he was convinced that the charges enumerated against the
Appellant in the charge sheet dated 14.09.1991 and 26.6.1993 were proved and that she deserved a penalty as proposed in the show cause
notice and imposed a penalty of (i) Recovery of loss to the Corporation of Rs. 16,001.90 and (ii) Reduction in Basic Pay to the lowest time scale
(i.e.) Rs. 1950/- applicable to her under Regulation 39(1) (c) and (d) under LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 with immediate effect.
The Appellant/Petitioner preferred an Appeal on 27.1.1999 against the final order dated 30.12.1998 passed in the disciplinary proceedings by
the 3rd Respondent before the 2nd Respondent/Appellate Authority and that on 28.10.1999, the Appellate Authority affirmed the order of
punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 30.12.1998 and rejected the Appeal.
The Appellant/Petitioner presented the Memorial dated 09.02.2000 to the 1st Respondent and that the same was rejected on 25.9.2000
finding that there were no merits in the Memorial, warranting interference into the penalties imposed on her by the Disciplinary Authority.
Apart from the above, the Learned Counsel for the Respondents contends that the Appellant, together with other eligible candidates, was
considered for promotion to HGA (Admn.) in respect of the years 1992 to 2001 and 2006 and 2012 and that the process of promotion for the
said grade was governed by LIC of India Promotion Rules, 1987 for class III and IV Employees. Further, as per instructions in para 6 of the
Rules, Selection for promotion to the cadre of HGA is on the basis of written test plus total marks gained on three counts viz., (i) Seniority; (ii)
Qualification and Work Record and from out of the panels so prepared, candidates in the order of merit equal to five times the number of
vacancies would be called for interview and separate marks would be assigned for performance in the interview. Only on the basis of final ranking
secured by each candidate, promotion is granted commensurate with the number of vacancies available in respective categories.
The strenuous submission of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents is that the Appellant was considered for promotion and though she
participated in the selection process from the years 1992 till 2012, she could not be promoted as she could not secure sufficient marks and ranking
for promotion. As a matter of fact, the Appellant and several other candidates were considered from the year 1992 for promotion but they were
not promoted for want of sufficient ranking on their part in conformity with the Promotion Rules. The Appellant, after taking part in the selection
process for several years and being unsuccessful in the selection process, she can not complain at this distance point of time that she was not
promoted. Also that, she had not challenged the 1987 Promotion Rules applicable to her category and indeed, her non-promotion had nothing to
do with the impugned punishment imposed on her.
By means of reply, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that no promotion was offered to the Appellant after the
commencement of the disciplinary proceedings and only she was called and that the result was withheld because of the disciplinary proceedings
and her juniors were promoted and that she was not promoted because of the punishment having permanent impact. Furthermore, in the last two
years she had applied for promotion, but she was not even called for selection.
At this stage, we deem it appropriate to extract the Instructions For Implementation of Life Insurance Corporation of India Class III & Class
IV Employees Promotion Rules, 1987 which speaks of ''Selection of Candidates for Promotion'' and the same enjoins as follows:
(2) Selection for promotion to the cadre of HGAs, HGA (Stenos), HGA (Projectionists), HGA (Programmers), HGA (Data Processing),
Assistants, Record Clerks & Sepoys/Watchmen/Liftmen:
A single panel of all eligible candidates, viz., those who have passed the test and those who have been exempted from the test wherever prescribed
will be prepared on the basis of total marks gained on the three counts namely, (i) seniority (ii) qualifications and (iii) work record. Out of the
panels so prepared, candidates in the order of merit equal to 5 times the number of vacancies will be called for interview.
The Learned Counsel for the Respondents submits that during the year 1992, the Appellant passed the Departmental Test for Promotion to the
cadre of HGA (Admn) and from the year 1992, in all the years she applied for Promotion and her candidature was considered for the Promotion
Process, such as Calling for Interview, if falling within the number of eligible candidates restricted to 5 times the number of Vacancies declared for
that year in the cadre of HGA (Admn).
In short, the stand of the Respondents is that the Appellant applied for promotion from the year 1992 to 2001, 2006 & 2012 and in fact, she
was called for Interview on the basis of her candidature falling within the eligible candidates restricted to 5 times the number of vacancies declared
for that particular year. Moreover, the eligibility criteria is based on the Total Marks obtained for Qualification, Service & Work Record as per the
Promotion Rules, 1987 and further that separate marks are awarded for interview.
The substance of the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents is that although the Appellant/Petitioner attended Interview from
the year 1992 to 1999, she was not selected by the Interview Committee appointed for this purpose inasmuch as she had not secured the
necessary marks for promotion (Eligibility & Interview marks taken together) and also that she was not called for Interview in respect of the years
2000, 2001, 2006 & 2012 because of her ranking as per the eligibility criteria mentioned earlier.
The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner submits that loss of wages to the Appellant due to the punishment imposed on her from
30.12.1998 as per the following tabular column comes to Rs. 31,72,974/-.
Also that, her date of appointment was 23.06.1986 and she was due for promotion as Higher Grade Assistant on 01.07.1992, as Assistant
Administrative Officer on 01.07.1997, as Administrative Officer on 01.07.2002, as Assistant Divisional Manager on 01.07.2007 and as Divisional
Manager on 01.07.2010. Moreover, the Appellant is presently working as Assistant from the date of her appointment but her colleagues who
joined with her are now working as ADM by taking four promotions and some of them are as Administrative Officers/Senior Branch Managers.
Besides the aforesaid loss, the Appellant/Petitioner suffered a loss in perks and allowances in regard to (a) Entertainment allowance, (b)
Conveyance allowance, (c) Mobile set reimbursement, (d) Mobile bills claim reimbursement, and (e) Newspaper allowance etc.
It is to be pointed out that imposition of punishment is within the power and discretion of an authority and that Civil Courts have no jurisdiction
to substitute the punishment imposed by such authority as per the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others Vs. Surjit
Singh Conductor,
It is to be borne in mind that a distinction has to be drawn between total absence of evidence and cases where there is some evidence. If there
is some evidence, then, the Court or Tribunal in exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot sit as a Court of Appeal and interfere with the
punishment by reassessing the evidence on its own as per the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs.
Bhola Nath Singh and other,
While awarding punishment to the delinquent, the Disciplinary Authority has to apply its own mind. An order imposing punishment ought to be
a reasoned one. Although it need not be in a detailed manner, it must disclose reasons so that the Appellate or Supervisory Authority can
appreciate what factors weighed with the Disciplinary Authority in awarding punishment and also enable the Employee to challenge the order in
Appeal, as per the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in The State of Punjab and Others Vs. Bakhtawar Singh and Others,
It is to be noted that the punishment to be imposed on the delinquent should commensurate with the gravity of misconduct. In fact, a
disproportionate penalty would be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As a matter of fact, ''Judicial Review'' will be maintainable
when the punishment awarded was highly irrational viz., in outrageous defiance of logic. If an employer decides to impose a minor penalty, then,
the employee cannot complain that more stringent procedure for imposing major penalty was not adhered to.
In the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Director General R.P.F. and Others Vs. Ch. Sai Babu, ], it is held as follows:
Normally, the punishment imposed by disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or tribunal except in appropriate cases that
too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors
including nature of charges proved against the delinquent, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard
to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the concerned
delinquent person works. Merely because it is felt that the punishment imposed was extreme is not enough to disturb or modify the punishment
imposed on a delinquent officer. The Court has to record reasons to say as to how the punishment imposed on the delinquent is shockingly or
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of charges held proved against him. It is not that in every case of imposing a punishment of removal or
dismissal from service a High Court can modify such punishment merely saying that it is shockingly disproportionate.
Further, in cases where it is found that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, High Courts or tribunals may remit the cases to the
disciplinary authority for reconsideration on the quantum of punishment.
At this juncture, we aptly recall the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and
Others Vs. P.C. Kakkar, ], it is observed as follows:
The Court should not interfere with the administrator''s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. The Court would not go into the correctness of the choice
made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is
limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
Also, we pertinently cite the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others V. P. Chandra Mouli and others, [(2003)
10 SCC 196], wherein it is held thus:
The power to inflict punishment has been conferred on the employer and there is no embargo on that power which has been exercised under Rule
19 of the CCS Rules. An appropriate notice was issued in terms of proviso to Rule 19 and the procedure indicated therein has been complied
with. The fact that the respondents were convicted and sentenced on a criminal charge being not disputed the power being exercised under Rule
19(i) cannot be faulted with. In this view of the matter, the High Court was wholly unjustified in interfering with the order of compulsory retirement.
It is well settled that once the charge against a delinquent is established, the quantum of punishment is for the employer to decide and the court
ordinarily would not interfere with the order on the quantum of punishment once the court comes to a conclusion that there has been no infirmity
with the procedure.
In the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, wherein it is held as follows:
Judicial review, generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the ""decision making process"". The question of the
choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the
offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in
itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect
which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of
logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. (1984) 3
WLR 1174 (HL) and Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others,
In the instant case the punishment is so strikingly disproportionate as to call for and justify interference. It cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected
in judicial review.
It is not out of place for this Court to quote the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Sanchalakshri and Another Vs. Vijayakumar
Raghuvirprasad Mehta and Another, wherein it is held as follows:
A teacher is expected to maintain higher standard of honesty and integrity in view of the position he holds. He committed acts of forgery either
himself or with the help of some other person by forging signatures of the District Education Officer, the Auditor and the Sanchalak and Principal of
the school where he earlier worked, on his service book. Even after he was called upon by the school Management to disclose names of the
persons who had put their signatures in the service book, he had stated that it was signed by the District Education Officer. That statement was
false to his knowledge. It was on the basis of the forged endorsements that he wanted to get payments as per the revised pay scale regularised.
The teacher had thus not only committed a serious misconduct but also a serious criminal offence. If under such circumstances the punishment of
dismissal was imposed by the School Management, it cannot be said that it was shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. Fact
that by his said acts, he was not to gain any additional financial benefit did not have much bearing on the gravity of the misconduct. The acts
committed by him constituted not only a serious misconduct but also a serious criminal offence.
One cannot brush aside an important fact that the nature of post held by an Employee is a vital consideration to be considered by a Court of
Law. Indeed, an authority who imposes punishment should muster all his faculties in discharging his duties in a fair and just manner. Also, one is to
keep in mind that the punishment to be awarded to a delinquent ought not to be a retaliatory one or expose any vindictive attitude in respect of the
charged employee for his misdemeanour. Furthermore, the punishment should not be an excessive one.
The well settled principle of law is that the awarding of punishment is undoubtedly the right of Disciplinary Authority, consistent with the
magnitude and misconduct imputed and the evidence in support thereof. In short, the sentence must suit the offence and the offender. The sentence
also should not be unduly harsh. Moreover, it should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and this may amount to
conclusive evidence of bias, in the considered opinion of this Court.
In law, there is no fetter to award a minor penalty although an Employee was required to show cause notice as to why a major penalty should
not be inflicted (viz. Removal) for the misconduct alleged against him.
The source of power for the Respondents is Regulation 39 of L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 read with Schedule I. The ingredients of
Regulation 39(1), for better appreciation of the subject matter, are pertinently extracted:
Regulation-39(1): Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations, any one or more of the following penalties for good and sufficient
reasons, and as hereinafter provided, be imposed by the disciplinary authority specified in Schedule I on an employee who commits a breach of
regulations of the Corporation, or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interest of
the Corporation, or conflicting with the instructions or who commits a breach of discipline, or is guilty of any other act prejudicial to good conduct
(a) censure;
(b) withholding of one or more increments either permanently or for a specified period;
(c) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by
negligence or breach of orders;
(d) reduction to a lower service, or post, or to a lower time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time scale;
(e) compulsory retirement;
(f) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment;
(g) dismissal.
In regard to the plea taken on behalf of the Appellant that the Officials who submitted the Forensic Report were not at all subjected to enquiry
and also that a copy of Forensic Report furnished to the Appellant, it is to be pointed out that the opinion of Expert is not binding on the Enquiry
Officer inasmuch as the said Report to a larger extent is advisory in nature. It is open to the domestic Enquiry Officer to arrive at his own
conclusion based on available materials on record and he has to tread cautiously in this regard. Even though the copy of the Forensic Report was
not furnished to the Appellant/Petitioner on the ground that it was confidential in nature, the non-furnishing of the said report to the Appellant is not
fatal, in the considered opinion of this Court. Moreover, the stand of the Respondents is that the Appellant/Petitioner was permitted to peruse the
Forensic Report on 30.09.1997 during the enquiry proceedings.
In fact, a perusal of the contents of the Reasoning Sheet of the Forensic Report dated 26.02.1990 clearly point out to the effect that The
standard writings on inter se examination agree in handwriting characteristics among themselves. They have all been freely written showing natural
variation. The questioned writings have also been freely written and agree in handwriting characteristics with the standard writings''. Further, in the
Reasoning Sheet, it is mentioned thus:
The agreements in hand writing characteristics among other include the following:-
1) The manner of commencement and subsequent execution of the letters ''N'', ''s'', ''r'' and figure ''9''.
2) The detailed design of the letters ''S'', ''p'', ""b"", ''a'', and figures ''2'', ''3'', ''4'', ''6''.
3) The manner of termination of the letters ''V'' ''y'', ''d'', and figures ''5'', ''7'', ''8''.
4) The manner of connection of the letters ''o'' and ''n'', ''a'' and ''i''.
5) The skill of the writing.
At this stage, it may not be out of place for this Court to point out that the Enquiry Officer, in his Report dated 23.12.1997, has, inter alia,
opined that in regard to ledger posting there is similarity of handwriting and many of them were observed as the same, as that of the charge sheeted
Employee by the witness T. Loganathan. Also that, in a domestic enquiry adherence to the strict principles of rules of evidence would not apply, in
the considered opinion of this Court.
It may not be out of place for this Court to point out the decision in R. Gopal Rao Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, , wherein it is held
thus:
In effect, what the learned counsel says is that there is no difference between the order of revision and an order of reduction in rank, that it is well
established that reversion can be only to a post which a person held earlier and that reduction also can only be to a post or class of service which
the person occupied at any time before... In my view, the expression ""reduction in rank"" covers a wider field than reversion to a lower post. It is
true, the word ""reversion"" always connotes ""a return to the original post or place"". But the word ""reduction"" has no such limitation and therefore,
reduction in rank extends even to a rank which the officer concerned never held.
It is to be remembered that though the concept of reduction may not be fully equivalent with ''reversion'', there are certain assumptions basic to
service law which bring in the limitations of the latter on the former. In fact, the penalty of reduction in rank of an employee originally recruited to a
higher time scale, grade, service or post to a lower time scale, grade, service or post virtually amounts to his removal from the higher post and the
substitution of his recruitment to lower post.
On a careful consideration of respective contentions and in view of the detailed discussions and for the reasons mentioned aforesaid, in the
instant case, we hold that the conclusions arrived at by the authorities concerned are based on evidence and on available materials on record. In
fact, the Enquiry Officer has submitted a Report dated 23.12.1997, inter alia, holding that the Appellant is clearly guilty of deliberately tampering
with the premium position as detailed in the Report. The Divisional Manager (Disciplinary Authority) of L.I.C. of India has passed the final order
on 30.12.1998 by imposing the punishment of (i) Recovery of loss to the Corporation of Rs. 16,001.90 and (ii) Reduction in Basic Pay to the
lowest time scale (i.e.) Rs. 1950/-. The Appellate Authority also, on 28.10.1999, has confirmed the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated
30.12.1998. Even to the Memorial dated 09.02.2000 submitted by the Appellant/Petitioner, addressed to the 1st Respondent/Chairman of the
L.I.C. of India, Mumbai, an order of rejection has been passed on 25.09.2000 finding no merit in the Memorial warranting no interference with the
penalties of ''reduction in basic pay to minimum of scale'' and ''recovery of financial loss of Rs. 16,001.90''. As such, we are in complete agreement
in regard to the conclusions arrived at by the authorities concerned that the charges levelled against the Appellant/Petitioner have been proved.
Bearing in mind an important fact that awarding of punishment must suit the offence and offender and also that the said punishment should not be
either vindictive or unduly harsh, we are of the considered view that in the present case, for the proved charges against the Appellant/Petitioner
(Delinquent Employee), the imposition of penalty viz., recovery of loss to the L.I.C. of India to an extent of Rs. 16,001.90 in terms of Regulation
39(1)(c) of L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 is just valid and proper one. However, to secure the ends of Justice, inasmuch as the
imposition of `punishment of reduction in basic pay to the lowest scale pay (i.e.) Rs. 1950/-'' imposed on the Appellant/Petitioner in terms of
Regulation 39(1)(d) of the L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, is on the higher side, accordingly, we set aside the same and instead we
impose a penalty of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect for a period of one year as per Regulation 39(1)(b) of the L.I.C. of India
(Staff) Regulations, 1960, by restoring her to the original position at the time of order of punishment dated 30.12.1998. However, we hereby
direct the Respondents that the period of service put up by the Appellant/Petitioner in the lowest time scale of pay viz., Rs. 1950/- be treated as
service in the original post held by her prior to the award of the penalty, subject to the condition that the Appellant/Petitioner shall not be entitled to
any difference of salary for and during the period of reduction to the lowest time scale of pay. Consequently, the order passed by the Learned
Single Judge dated 26.04.2010, in dismissing the Writ Petition, is set aside by this Court for the reasons assigned in this Appeal.
In the result, the Writ Appeal is allowed in part, in above terms. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.