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Judgment
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) seeking quashing/setting aside of the order dated 4.8.2026 (Annexure P-6) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula, whereby bail granted to the petitioners was cancelled; their bail bonds and surety bonds were forfeited to the State and non-bailable warrants were ordered to be issued against them in case FIR No.257 dated 21.9.2014, registered under Sections 148, 149, 201, 323, 326, 427, 307, 452 and 120-B of IPC and Sections 25 of Arms Act, 1959 (Sections 324 of IPC and Section 54 and 59 of Arms Act added later on) at Police Station Chandimandir, District Panchkula.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioners had been earlier granted the concession of anticipatory bail by this Court vide order dated 27.4.2015 passed in CRM-M No.9031 of 2015 and order dated 8.7.2016 passed in CRM-M No.9315 of 2016, and were regularly appearing before the trial Court. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioners couldn’t appear before the learned trial Court on 30.5.2026 and 20.7.2026 and exemption applications were filed, which were allowed by the concerned Court after consideration. Learned counsel has further submitted that the petitioners had filed exemption applications on 4.8.2026 on the grounds :
Petitioner no.1 had to take his child to hospital;
Petitioner no.2 was suffering from fever;
Petitioner no.3 had to go out of town to attend last rites of his relative.
But the concerned Court while rejecting the applications for exemption from personal presence of the petitioners, cancelled their bail. Their bail/ surety bonds were cancelled and forfeited and the learned Court had ordered for issuance of warrants of arrest against them for 25.8.2026. Learned counsel submits that issuance of warrant of arrest against the petitioners was harsh, disproportionate and contrary to the principles governing judicial discretion, particularly when absence of the petitioners was purely inadvertent, which was neither intentional nor deliberate. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioners unequivocally undertakes to enter appearance before the trial Court as also join the proceedings in accordance with law, the petitioners shall appear before the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and also cooperate therein, in accordance with law for expeditious culmination of the trial.
Notice of motion.
On the strength of advance service of copy of petition, Ms. Priyanka Sadar, Senior DAG, Haryana, appears and accepts notice on behalf of the State. She opposes the petition in hand by arguing that allegations against the petitioners are serious in nature, the petitioners have misused the concession of bail earlier extended to them, by not appearing before the trial Court & no plausible explanation has been brought forth as to why the petitioners did not appear before the trial Court on the aforesaid date.
I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have perused the available record.
At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court titled as Gudikanti Narasimhulu and others vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1978 SUPREME COURT 429, relevant whereof reads as under:
“10.The significance and sweep of Article 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and State necessity spelt out in Article 19. Indeed, the considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom- by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected.
11.We must weigh the contrary factors to answer the test of reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence, of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare or present his case than one remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted, mechanical detention should be close to ours, the function of bail is limited, 'community roots' of the, applicant are stressed and, after the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, monetary suretyship is losing ground. The considerable public expense in keeping in custody where no danger of disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a negligible consideration. Equally important is the deplorable condition, verging on. the inhuman, of our sub-jails, that the unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of avoidable incarceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable and a Policy favouring release justly sensible.
12.A few other weighty factors deserve reference. All deprivation of liberty is validated by social defence and individual correction along an anti-criminal direction. Public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even, through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with public peace by tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offence while on judicially sanctioned 'free enterprise,' should be provided against. No seeker of justice shall play confidence tricks on the court or community. Thus, conditions may be hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion correlated to the values of our constitution.”
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as Gurcharan Singh vs. State (UT of Delhi) 1978 (1) SCC 118, has held as under:-
“Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.”
Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment tiled as Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40, has held as under:
“21.In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.
22.From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un-convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.”
Keeping in view the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case; especially the factum of prime object of cancellation of bail and forfeiture of bail bonds being securing the presence of the accused, the petitioners-accused having come forward themselves to face trial, willingness shown by the petitioners-accused to appear before the trial Court on each and every date in accordance with law, the petitioners having submitted that they shall cooperate for an expeditious culmination of the trial & there being no tangible material brought forward to indicate likelihood of the petitioners to interfere with the prosecution evidence; this Court is of the considered opinion that the petition in hand deserves to be allowed.
In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:
The present petition is allowed;
The impugned order dated 4.8.2026 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula, as well as all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are set-aside subject to the petitioners appearing before the trial/concerned Court on or before 25.8.2026, & shall furnish an undertaking that the petitioners shall continue to appear before the trial/concerned Court on each and every date of hearing. It is clarified that the trial/concerned Court shall be at liberty to impose such other condition(s) upon the petitioners, as deemed appropriate by it in the facts and circumstances of the case;
The petitioners shall deposit costs of ₹40,000/- with the Haryana Police Welfare Fund, Bank Account No. 50100097073807, HDFC Bank, Sector-8 Panchkula, IFSC Code: HDFC0000108. Payment of costs and production of receipt thereof shall be a condition precedent for recording of statements in the manner directed for hereinabove. In absence of deposit of such costs, the present petition would be deemed to be dismissed without any further reference to the Bench.