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Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.—By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, a Co-operative Society, calls in question the legality and validity of an interim order dated 16.12.2010 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Surat below Exhibit-23 in Reference (IT) No. 32 of 2008 substantially on the grounds that the same is erroneous, contrary to law and without jurisdiction.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The petitioner is a co-operative bank registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act. It has its administrative office at Valsad and various branches in the Districts of Navsari and Dangs, including one at Silvassa, Dadra and Nagar Haveli.
It is the case of the petitioner that there are two Unions representing the workmen employed, namely, (i) Valsad Jilla Bank Karamchari Mandal (for short, "the Mandal") and (ii) Valsad District Cooperative Employees Union (for short, "the respondent Union"). According to the petitioner, the Mandal is a recognized Union, having majority of the workmen as its members. The Mandal raised demands for pay revision, etc. on 14.02.2006 for the period from 01.07.2002 onwards. On the other hand, the Union raised its charter of demands dated 18.01.2008 for the period of three years with effect from 01.07.2006. The industrial dispute pertaining to both the charter of demands was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Surat by the order of reference dated 29.09.2008 passed by the State Government. In the said Reference, the Union filed its Statement of Claim on 22.12.2008 along with an application for interim relief dated 29.12.2008. On 25.09.2009 the petitioner and the Mandal entered into a settlement with regard to the various demands raised by the Mandal. It is the case of the petitioner that prior to the settlement with the Mandal, it had entered into a settlement dated 15.02.1995 for the period between 01.07.1994 and 20.06.1998 with the respondent-Union and thereafter, it had entered into a settlement dated 26.07.1999 for the period between 01.07.1998 and 20.06.2002 with the Mandal and the current settlement dated 25.09.2009 with the Mandal for the period between 01.07.2002 and 30.06.2012. According to the petitioner, it paid wages to all the workmen in terms of the settlement dated 25.09.2009 for the month of September 2009, which was accepted by all the workmen, except two workmen, who accepted the same under protest.
On 11.11.2009 the respondent-Union filed a Complaint (IT) No. 04 of 2009 in Reference (IT) No. 32 of 2008 along with an application for interim relief in Complaint (IT) No. 04 of 2009 in Reference (IT) No. 32 of 2008. On 29.01.2010 the Industrial Tribunal, Surat passed an order rejecting the application for interim relief filed by the respondent-Union in Reference (IT) No. 32 of 2008.
It is the case of the petitioner that on 03.07.2010 the Industrial Tribunal, Surat, passed an order below the application for interim relief filed by the respondent-Union in Complaint (IT) No. 04 of 2009 directing the petitioner to give an option to the members of respondent-Union not to accept the wages and other benefits according to the settlement dated 25.09.2009 and to opt for the wages and other benefits according to the old settlement dated 26.07.1999. Accordingly, the Bank issued a Notice dated 21.07.2010 to the workmen that they were required to inform the Bank that they do not want to avail the benefits of the settlement dated 25.09.2009 and thereupon the Bank would withdraw the benefits of the settlement dated 25.09.2009.
It is the case of the Bank that as there was no response from the workmen to the Notice dated 21.07.2010, it issued another Notice dated 26.07.2010 informing the workmen that they must immediately exercise their option in terms of the order dated 03.07.2010 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Surat.
On 27.08.2010 the respondent-Union tendered an Undertaking, duly signed by 93 workmen on a stamp-paper of Rs. 20, stating that they were not claiming the benefits of the settlement dated 25.09.2009 before the Industrial Tribunal, Surat
According to the petitioner, out of 93 workmen who signed the Undertaking, 10 have retired from the service prior to that date and 8 others have given in writing to the Industrial Tribunal, Surat that they wish to withdraw the Complaint (IT) No. 04 of 2009. At present 112 workmen are receiving wages and benefits according to the settlement dated 25.09.2009 and 75 workmen are receiving wages and other benefits according to the old settlement dated 26.07.1999. Out of 198 workmen, 11 workmen have retired and therefore, at present 187 workmen are actually working. In the month of July 2010, out of 75 workmen, only 43 opted for the old settlement and in the month of September 2010, 32 more workmen opted for the old settlement.
It is also the case of the petitioner that on 27.08.2010, the respondent-Union filed a second application for interim relief in Reference (IT) No. 32 of 2008. The Industrial Tribunal, Surat passed an order dated 16.12.2010 thereby partly allowing the second application for interim relief filed by the respondent-Union in Reference (IT) No. 32 of 2008, which is the subject matter of challenge in the present petition.
Mr. N.D. Nanavati, the learned senior advocate, assisted by Mr. Abhilash Clerk, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Bank, vehemently submitted that the Industrial Tribunal, Surat, having already passed an order dated 29.01.2010 rejecting the application for interim relief prayed for by the respondent-Union in Reference (IT) No. 32 of 2008, could not have entertained the second application filed by the respondent-Union as the same would amount to reviewing or recalling its earlier order dated 29.01.2010, in the absence of any such provision of law empowering the Tribunal to review its earlier order.
Mr. Nanavati submitted that the second application for interim relief filed by the respondent-Union on 27.08.2010 ought to have been rejected by the Tribunal by applying the principles of res judicata and estoppel. According to Mr. Nanavati, by the impugned order dated 16.12.2010, the Tribunal has directed the petitioner-Bank to pay wages and other benefits according to the settlement dated 25.09.2009 to the 75 workmen and also to continue paying the wages and other benefits according to the settlement dated 26.09.1999.
Mr. Nanavati further submitted that both the settlements cannot be made operative at the same time and such aspect has not been taken into consideration by the Tribunal. Mr. Nanavati also submitted that the Complaint (IT) No. 04 of 2009 filed by the respondent-Union challenging the settlement dated 25.09.2009 was not maintainable at all as it fails to satisfy the preconditions for filing a complaint u/s. 33(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Nanavati would submit that a settlement could be challenged only by raising an industrial dispute u/s. 10 of the Act. Mr. Nanavati submitted that although in the second application for interim relief, the respondent-Union has not prayed for grant of any benefits of the settlement dated 25.09.2009 to the 75 workmen, yet, the Tribunal granted those benefits of the new settlement dated 25.09.2009 and therefore, the impugned order dated 16.12.2010 travels beyond the relief prayed for in the second application for interim relief.
On the other hand, Mr. Mukul Sinha, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Union, opposed this petition and submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Tribunal warranting any interference at the end of this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sinha submitted that the order impugned in this petition is an interim order, which merely directs the petitioner-Bank to pay wages and benefits of the settlement dated 25.09.2009 and 26.07.2009 to the 75 concerned workmen, who were not granted the benefits under the above referred two settlements.
Mr. Sinha would submit that by the interim order, the Tribunal has placed the 75 concerned workmen at par with the other workmen who have already been granted the benefits of the aforesaid two settlements. Mr. Sinha submitted that the petitioner-Bank has adopted an unfair labour practice by entering into settlements with the Mandal with an oblique motive, more particularly, when the petitioner-Bank is aware of the fact that majority of the workmen are the members of the respondent-Union. Mr. Sinha submitted that the averments made by the petitioner in para-25 of the petition that "The Bank reserves the right to recover the wages and other benefits paid to such retired workmen as per the new settlement dated 25.09.2009" by itself would suggest the unfair labour practice adopted by the petitioner-Bank. Mr. Sinha clarified that the payments made to the concerned 75 workmen according to the old settlement dated 26.07.1999, are much less than the other workmen who are receiving benefits of the settlement dated 25.09.2009. Considering such aspects of the matter, the Tribunal has thought fit to restore the equality in the payment of wages to all the workmen and therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal committed any serious error.
Mr. Sinha submitted that the plea of estoppel and res judicata is completely misconceived and has no application to the facts of the present case.
Mr. Sinha, in the circumstances referred to above, submitted that their being no merit in the petition, the same deserves to be rejected.
Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration in this petition is whether the Industrial Tribunal, Surat committed any error in passing the order impugned.
It appears from the materials on record that this petition was taken up for hearing for the first time on 28.01.2011 and on that very same day, the respondent-Union also entered their appearance. The respondent-Union was granted time to file affidavit-in-reply to the petition and at the same time, the prayer for interim relief was rejected. Thereafter, on 22.09.2011, Rule was issued in this petition and the matter was ordered to be listed for final hearing on the re-opening of the Court after the Diwali vacation. It also appears that against the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court refusing interim relief the petitioner had challenged such order by filing a Special Leave Application before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court also refused to pass any order of stay.
In the meantime, the petitioner filed C.A. No. 9926 of 2013 praying for an order of status quo so far as the implementation of the impugned order passed by the Industrial Tribunal is concerned. However, no orders have been passed on the C.A. No. 9926 of 2013. It also appears from the materials on record that the C.A. No. 8645 of 2012 was filed by the respondent-Union in this petition with a prayer for a declaration that in view of the fact that the interim order dated 16.12.2010 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Surat has not been complied with by the petitioner-Bank in spite of the fact that there is no stay, the petitioner-Bank is not entitled to maintain the main writ petition, in which the order of the Tribunal has been challenged.
This very Bench, vide order dated 29.07.2013, clarified that in the absence of any interim order, the respondent-Union was free to enforce the interim order dated 16.12.2010 impugned in this petition in accordance with law so long as such interim order passed by the Tribunal was not set aside by this Court in this petition.
Accordingly, the Civil Application filed by the respondent-Union was disposed of with an order that the main writ application, i.e. the present petition, would be taken up for final hearing.
Before proceeding further, we are quite alive to the scope of interference at the instance of a High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India, as repeated and reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Shama Prashant Raje Vs. Ganpatrao and Others, , where the said Court made the following observations:--
Undoubtedly, in a proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, is supervisory and not appellate. Consequently Article 226 is not intended to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of Appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or order to be made. But notwithstanding the same on a mere perusal of the order of an inferior Tribunal if the High Court comes to a conclusion that such Tribunal has committed manifest error by misconstruing certain documents, or the High Court comes to the conclusion that on the materials it is not possible for a reasonable man to come to a conclusion arrived at by the inferior Tribunal or the inferior Tribunal has ignored to take into consideration certain relevant materials or has taken into consideration certain materials which are not admissible, then the High Court will be fully justified in interfering with the findings of the inferior Tribunal. Then again the two questions on which the Tribunal under the Rent Control Order were required to give finding, namely, habitual defaulter and subletting are not pure questions of fact but can be held to be mixed questions of fact and law. In this view of the matter, on going through the Appellate order passed by the District Collector as well as the order of the learned single Judge, we are not in a position to hold that the High Court exceeded the parameters prescribed for interference with the findings of an inferior Tribunal. Under Clause 13(3)(ii) Controller has to be satisfied that the tenant is habitually in errors with the rent. The expression "habitually" would obviously connote some act of continuity. Under the Lease Deed dated 8-4-1982 between the landlord and the tenant Clause 4 made it obligatory for the tenant to pay the rent before 10th day of each English Calendar month, and under Clause 9 in the event of arrears of rent over 3 months is not paid then the landlord was entitled to give notice and then if the matter is not settled within one month from the date of the notice then the landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy. Reading the aforesaid two Clauses it would not be correct, as contended by Mr. Verma, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, that under the agreement itself 4 months period has been provided to enable the tenant to pay the rent. If a tenant, notwithstanding the obligation of paying the rent by 10th day of each English calendar month continuously makes a default of paying the rent for the first month by two months thereafter, and pays the rent in similar manner, then he must be held to be habitually in arrear with the rent in question. This being the position, the fact that the rent for September to November, 1984 was paid in December only after the Distress Warrant was issued and that again from December, 1984 to March, 1985 the rent had not been paid and were deposited within the 10th of next month, as stipulated in the lease agreement would constitute the tenant to be habitually in arrear within the meaning of Clause 13(3)(ii) of the Control Order. The Appellate Authority under the Control Order was obviously in error in interfering with the well reasoned conclusion of the Controller on this score, and the High Court was fully justified in correcting the said error by interfering with the finding of the lower Appellate Authority on the question of applicability of Clause 13(3)(ii) to the case in hand. Similarly, on the question of subletting, there is no dispute with the proposition that the two ingredients namely, parting with the possession and some consideration therefor, had to be established. The conclusion of the lower Appellate Authority on this score was obviously on a misconstruction of the document Exhibit N2 and the High Court, therefore, was entitled to correct the error which was based upon a construction of the aforesaid document. The different Clauses of the lease deed unequivocally indicates that the sum of Rs. 1,500/- p.m. was the consideration money for parting with the possession of the premises and allowing the Singer Sewing Machine to do business in the premises.
In the aforesaid premises, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Verma, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the High Court committed error in interfering with the finding of the Appellate Authority under the Control Order by way of re-appreciating the evidence. In our considered opinion, the High Court was fully justified in interfering with the conclusion of the Appellate Authority and correcting the error of the said Authority, as already stated. In the premises, as aforesaid, this appeal is devoid of any merits and the same is dismissed accordingly.
It will also be profitable to quote and rely upon the decision in the case of Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, , in which the Supreme Court led emphasis to keep in mind while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the need to keep goals set out in the Preamble and in part IV of the Constitution, while construing social welfare legislations. The Court made the following observations in paragraphs 21 and 23.
Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e),43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J, opined that "the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State" - The State of Mysore Vs. The Workers of Gold Mines, .
The preamble and various Articles contained in Part IV of the Constitution promote social justice so that life of every individual becomes meaningful and he is able to live with human dignity. The concept of social justice engrafted in the Constitution consists of diverse principles essentially for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. Social justice is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species. Social justice is a dynamic devise to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, dalits, tribals and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectation of every section of the society.
Yet again in a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Jai Singh and Others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another, , the Court observed that the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India must be within the well recognized constrains. It should not be exercised in the words of the Supreme Court like "a bull in a China shop" to correct all errors of judgment of the Court or a Tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of the fundamental principles of law and justice.
It would also be profitable to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi Vs. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi and The Bharat Bank Employees'' Union, Delhi, , wherein the apex Court has observed as under:--
In settling the dispute between the employers and the workmen the function of the Tribunal is not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law. It can confer rights and privileges on either parties which it considers reasonable and proper though they may not be within the terms of any existing agreement. It is not merely to interpret or give effect to contractual rights or obligations of the parties. It can create new rights or obligations between them which it considers essential for them for keeping industrial peace. An industrial dispute as has been said on many occasions is nothing but a trial of strength between the employers on the one hand and the workmen''s organisation on the other and the Industrial Tribunal has to arrive at some equitable arrangement for averting strikes and lock-outs which impede production of goods and the industrial development of the country. The Tribunal is not bound by the rigid rules of law.
We have gone through the impugned order passed by the Industrial Tribunal threadbare, more particularly, the finding recorded in paragraph 10 of the order. We deem fit to quote the observations made by the Tribunal in paragraph 10. The free English translation of the vernacular is as under:--
In this case, the learned advocate, appearing on behalf of the first party, while advancing arguments, submits that earlier the Hon''ble Tribunal, after hearing the parties on merits of the application for interim relief exh. 10 filed by the second party Union, has rejected the said interlocutory application by passing an order exh. 19 on 29.1.2010 and, therefore, the present another interlocutory application is barred by the principles of res judicata, constructive res judicata and estoppel and after relying upon the judgments of various Hon''ble High Courts as well as that of the Hon''ble Supreme Court, he prays to dismiss the application. Learned advocate, appearing on behalf of the second party Union, while advancing arguments in this connection submits that the judgments relied upon can be taken into consideration at the time of considering the merits finally. These judgments do not apply to the interlocutory application and therefore, he also in support of his arguments relies upon several judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court. Taking into consideration the arguments of the parties and reading the judgments submitted, one fact has become clear that the first party bank has arrived at a settlement with the second party union and the first party bank has complied with the same and the two employees of the relevant point of time left at present had not obtained the benefits of the settlement granted by the bank and thereafter, in its written reply filed by the bank in the case of Complaint [I.T.] No. 4 of 2009, it has stated that increase in salary has been given to all the employees since September, 2009 and as the opponent bank has accepted that upon all those employees and the members of the Union informing the Hon''ble Industrial Tribunal in writing in the said complaint, the opponent Bank will withdraw the said increase in the salary and will grant the benefits according to the position prevailing prior to 25.9.2009, this Tribunal had accordingly passed an order on 3.7.2009 on the interlocutory application exh. 4 filed in the complaint [I.T.] No. 04 of 2009 and in connection with the said order, 93 members of the second party Union, by signing on the stamp paper of Rs. 20/- have declared that they do not accept the increase in salary given since September, 2009 as the same is illegal. In this connection, it is submitted on behalf of the opponent bank that 14 employees out of 93 employees as indicated, have retired and some employees have directly requested that they accept the benefits of this settlement and, therefore, it is prayed that as the circumstances have not changed, the second interlocutory application of the second party may be rejected. However, looking to the record, one fact has become clear that some workmen of the present union have stated on the stamp paper of Rs. 20/- that they do not admit and accept the increase in salary given by the bank from 25.9.2009 and therefore, based on the same, the first party bank has reduced the salary of these employees which was prevailing after 25.9.2009 and therefore, [the benefit of] the settlement which was accepted by the bank with the other Union is given to the concerned employees from September, 2009, whereas this benefit of the employees of the present union is withdrawn, meaning thereby, it clearly appears that anomaly has arisen as regards the salaries of the employees of the present Union working in the first party bank. The present Tribunal is not required to verify as to how many members are there with both the Unions. In that regard, they can make submissions before the appropriate authority. But looking to the situation so arisen one fact has become clear that upon withdrawing the increase in the salary given by the bank in September, 2009 to whatever members of the present Union, the salary has reduced and therefore, it clearly appears that anomaly in the salary has arisen at this stage and therefore, it is also necessary to see that no enmity arise among the employees working in the bank and therefore, despite an order passed earlier upon the application exh. 10, in view of the changed facts and circumstances, it would be just, proper and equitable if until the decision of the original Reference on merit is rendered, the monetary benefit according to the increase in salary which has been given by the bank in September, 2009 to the members of the other party Union, is given to the members of the present Union at this stage and it appears to be just, reasonable and equitable to continue the other benefits as per the settlement arrived at in 1999 except these monetary benefits. Moreover, as regards the other reliefs except this relief, sought in the present interlocutory application, this Tribunal has discussed at length in connection with interlocutory application exh. 10 and therefore, it does not appear to be just and proper to reiterate the same. Furthermore, it appears to be just, reasonable and equitable to direct the first party bank to continue the other benefits according to the settlement which was arrived at by the first party Bank with the Valsad District Bank Employees Union on 26.7.1999 and not to effect or cause to effect any change except the monetary benefits of this order and, therefore, the following order is passed:--
ORDER
Interim relief application exh. 23 of the second party is hereby partly allowed and it is hereby ordered that until final order is passed in the original Reference case, all those members-employees of the present Union who are placed by the first party bank in a situation prevailing prior to 25.9.2009, shall be given the monetary benefits that have been given by the bank by arriving at a settlement with other Union and other reliefs according to the agreement dated 26.7.1999 shall be continued to be given to the members of the present Union and it is ordered that until the said case is finally decided, no other changes except the monetary benefits as mentioned in this order shall be made or caused to be made. Further hearing of this case is kept on 28.1.2011.
It appears from the reasonings assigned by the Tribunal that the petitioner-Bank entered into a settlement with the Mandal and such settlement has been implemented by the petitioner-Bank but, two of its employees were not able to seek the benefit of such settlement and the petitioner-Bank, thereafter in Complaint (IT) No. 04 of 2009, clarified in its Written Statement that from September 2009, the rise which has been given in the wages to all the workmen would be withdrawn and the position prevailing prior to 25.09.2009 would be restored and they would be granted the benefits. On the basis of such a statement being made by the petitioner in its Written Statement, the Tribunal had passed an order dated 03.07.2009 below Exhibit-4 in Complaint (IT) No. 04 of 2009 and in context with the said order, the 93 members of the respondent-Union have declared on a stamp-paper of Rs. 20 in September 2009 that the rise in the salary being illegal and unlawful was not being accepted by them. As against that, the case of the Bank was that out of 93 employees, 14 of them have already retired and few others have indirectly requested to extend the benefit of such settlement and therefore, in the absence of any changed circumstances, it was prayed before the Tribunal to reject the application Exhibit-23. It appears from the order passed by the Tribunal that it perused the record and on perusal of the record, it noticed that majority of the members of the respondent-Union have declared that the settlement which was arrived at on 25.09.2009 was not acceptable to them.
We are not impressed by the submission of Mr. Nanavati, the learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioner that the second application filed by the respondent-Union for interim relief ought to have been rejected only on the ground of being hit by the principles of res judicata and estoppel.
The doctrine of res judicata is a universal doctrine laying down the finality of litigation between the parties. When a particular decision has become final and binding between the parties, either of the parties will not be permitted to reopen the issue decided by such decision. It is equally true that although the doctrine of res judicata, as embodied in Section 11, applies to proceedings before the Industrial Tribunals, yet, it does not, however, mean that a question which is once decided can never be re-agitated. There are certain classes of cases, like disputes regarding wage-structure, with which we are concerned in the present case, service conditions, etc. which arise as circumstances change and new situations arise, which will not be barred by the rule of res judicata [See Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bharat Barrel Employees Union, ].
Although the doctrine of res judicata as embodied in Section 11 CPC may not apply with full vigour to a decision of the Industrial Tribunal, yet the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" is applicable to it. It is only when the circumstances are changed that new controversies between the parties can be agitated. [See Walford Transport Ltd. Vs. First Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal and Others, ].
In the present case also, the aforesaid principle of law has been well taken into consideration by the Industrial Tribunal and the Tribunal has observed in clear terms that it is under the changed circumstances that it has thought fit to grant the relief partially in favour of the respondent-Union. In such circumstances, we do not find any reason to interfere with the interim order passed by the Tribunal. It is well settled that the Court, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution will not review the findings of fact reached by the Tribunal, simply because another view from the selfsame material is possible.
It is now settled law that even in a statutory appeal against an order of discretionary relief, the Appellate Authority interferes not because a different conclusion can be arrived at by the appellate authority on the selfsame materials but it interferes only when the order impugned is clearly a wrong order and in arriving at the conclusion, the authority below did not follow the well-settled principles which are required to be followed. (See Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. and Others Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Others, ). In a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court adopts almost the same approach. The Court interferes if there is a plain excess of jurisdiction, which, we do not find in the present case. Where the question of jurisdiction turns upon the disputed questions of fact, the Court generally declines to interfere.
For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any reason to disturb the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal and consequently, the petition must fail. The petition fails and is hereby rejected with no order as to costs.
Before parting, we may only say that the main dispute is pending with the Industrial Tribunal and it will not be appropriate for us to go into the niceties of the question in detail, because any observation made by this Court may prejudice the case of either of the parties. It is needless to mention that the interim award will be subject to the award that will be passed by the Tribunal, and we also make it clear that we have otherwise not gone into the merits of the dispute, which is the subject of reference for which the final award is yet to be given. It will be open for both the sides to raise all possible objections the factual as well as legal, in the main dispute, which is pending and it is expected that the Tribunal would decide the main dispute as early as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of certified copy of this order is served upon the Industrial Tribunal.