Vaidyanatha Iyer vs Meenakshi Amma

Varadaraja Iyengar, J.—In the suit, which has led to this second appeal, for recovery of arrears of rent from the 2nd Defendant defaulting tenant, the Plaintiff landlord had been refused his costs and some interest. Though the amount involved is not considerable, Plaintiff has taken this appeal presumably because a question of principle is at stake.

The rent consisted of some paddy and also cash and rears had accrued for the years 1119 to 1123. The tenant had a case that the rent for 1119 and 1120 had been discharged (Eventually this plea was found against). Even so, she sent the entire rent by M. O. to the Plaintiff, committing for this purpose the kiddy portion into its ropier money value. The Plaintiff refused to accept the M. O. and the 2nd Defendant thereafter deposited the amount into Court along with her writ ten statement.

The question arose in these circumstances whether there was a proper tender and on that turned the question of interest and costs with which we are now concerned. The Munsiff held that there was no proper tender. The Judge held contra and hence this appeal by the Plaintiff.

Learned Counsel for Plaintiff raised twofold contentions, (i) That the tender should have been in kind in the first instance and only on refusal thereof could the remittance by way of M. O. be resorted to and (ii) that the deposit in Court following the tender was not unconditional. It seems to me that he is entitled to succeed on both these aspects.

The first point about an initial offer of the rent in kind is the subject-matter of a statutory provision. See Sections 16 and 19 of the Veruinpattomdars Act 8 of 1118. But the learned Judge in the Court below sought to get over this requisite by an argument based on the paddy procurement rules which were then in force. He said "that the Defendant could not tender paddy in kind unless the Plaintiff had obtained a permit and intimated the fact to the 2nd Defendant. There is. no case that the Plaintiff had obtained such a permit."

But this argument has no substance in the light of the paddy control notification No. 72 dated 1-5-1943 by which only Taluq to Taluq movement was prohibited and further of the admitted fact in the case that the parties herein were denizens of the same village There is also the decision of the Cochin High if in 38 Cochin LR 522 (A), followed recently in 1953 Ker LT SN 22 (sic) (B),to the effect that the paddy procurement rules do not affect the liability of the lessees to pay their landlords in kind. The Plaintiff''s learned Counsel is, therefore, on strong ground in the first aspect. This is enough to dispose of the case but because the other point was also argued and is clear on the face of it, that also may be considered.

the argument of learned Counsel on the second point is that in depositing the amount into Court, after refusal of the tender, the 2nd Defendant attached the condition that the amount should not be paid out in full since she had a contention as to discharge of the 1119 and 1120 rent dies and those amounts also were included in the deposit. Learned Counsel for the Respondent 2nd Defendant was unable to refute the fact as above stated.

No argument is needed to say that the tender made by the 2nd Defendant became totally ineffective. For however ready and willing to pay a party may have been, there will not be a tender in law unless there is. Following the offer outside Court, unconditional deposit into Court of the money due. It is curious that the lower appellate Court failed to notice this aspect. On this point also the Appellant is entitled to succeed.

It follows that the trial Court''s decision is right and the meditation introduced therein by the lower appellate Court is unsupportable. I therefore, allow the appeal and revise the decision of the lower Court. The trial Court''s decision will stand restored. The Respondent will pay the costs of this Court and the lower appellate court to the Appellant.