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Judgment
Gita Gopi, J
RULE. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor and learned Advocate Mr. DC Sejpal waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondents No.1 & 2 respectively.
This application has been filed by the applicant, who is the brother-in-law (diyar) of the complainant and who is residing at Mumbai under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing and setting aside the First Information Report bearing I-C.R. No.61 of 2019 registered with Dhoraji Police Station, Rajkot Rural for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and the proceedings initiated in pursuant thereto.
Learned Advocate Mr. Kishan Nayi for learned Advocate Ms. Gayatriba B. Jadeja for the applciant submits that the applicant had never resided with the complainant and his brother and since 2012, the applicant is having his own permanent house at Mumbai and therefore, there would not be any occasion to have any interaction with the complainant. Learned Advocate Mr. Kishan Nayi has referred to the judgment dated 16.11.2022 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhoraji in Criminal Case No.270 of 2020. It is further submitted that the complainant has already the settled the case with the the two main co-accused, i.e. the husband and the mother-in-law and the learned trial Court Judge after having observed the settlement so arrived at, acquitted both the accused. Thus, taking into consideration the above acquittal, the prayer is made for quashing of the above First Information Report as no case would survive against the present applicant.
Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent No.2 Mr. Divyesh C. Sejpal submitted that the matter is settled between the parties and that has resulted into the divorce. Under instructions, it is further submitted that the complainant has no objection if the impugned First Information Report is quashed and set aside.
On going through the records of the case, it appears that the main accused, i.e. the husband and mother-in-law have been acquitted by the learned Additional Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhoraji in Criminal Case No.270 of 2020 on 16.11.2022. In addition, the complainant and the husband have also taken a divorce. Further, the applicant is staying at Mumbai and is having his own residential house there since the last many years, therefore, the allegations made in the impugned First Information Report would not survive.
It is true that certain section of IPC is non-compoundable and that the other sections could be compounded with the permission of the Court.
Considering the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another reported in 2012 (10) SCC 303, the present matter would fall under the criteria laid down therein. In paragraph-61 of the said judgment, it has been observed thus:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
In the case of State of Haryana V. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in AIR 1992 SC 604, the Apex Court made the following observations:-
“8.1. In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following categories of cases are given by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guide in myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:-
(a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;
(b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;
(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;
(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;
(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and / or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
This Court would like to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Geeta Mehrotra & Another vs State Of U.P. & Another reported in 2012 (10) SCC 741. The Court held as under :-
“24. However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that even if there are allegation of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasize by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses specific allegations which would persuade the court to take cognisance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the complainant-wife. It is the well settled principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of the process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing specially in cases of matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of over-implication by involving the entire family of the accused at the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.
In the case at hand, when the brother and unmarried sister of the principal accused Shyamji Mehrotra approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings against them, inter-alia, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as also on the ground that no case was made out against them under Sections 498A,/323/504/506 including Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, it was the legal duty of the High Court to examine whether there were prima facie material against the appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the trial, besides the question of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court seems to have overlooked all the pleas that were raised and rejected the petition on the solitary ground of territorial jurisdiction giving liberty to the appellants to approach the trial court.
The High Court in our considered opinion appear to have missed that assuming the trial court had territorial jurisdiction, it was still left to be decided whether it was a fit case to send the appellants for trial when the FIR failed to make out a prima facie case against them regarding the allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant demanding dowry from the complainant. Since the High Court has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court as already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter to the High Court to consider whether a case was made out against the appellants to proceed against them. But as the contents of the FIR does not disclose specific allegation against the brother and sister of the complainant’s husband except casual reference of their names, it would not be just to direct them to go through protracted procedure by remanding for consideration of the matter all over again by the High Court and make the unmarried sister of the main accused and his elder brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against them specially when the FIR does not disclose ingredients of offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504 and 506 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
We, therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any material which could be held to be constituting any offence against these two appellants. Merely by making a general allegation that they were also involved in physical and mental torture of the complainant-respondent No.2 without mentioning even a single incident against them as also the fact as to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only related as brother and sister of the complainant’s husband, we are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings in so far as these appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled.
The appeal accordingly is allowed.”
In view of the settlement arrived at between the parties and judgment of acquittal as referred hereinabove, there exists no scope for any further proceeding in the matter. The continuance of proceedings would lead to wastage of precious judicial time as there would remain no possibility of any conviction in the case. Hence, considering the facts of the case, the judgment of acquittal so delivered as well as the ratio laid down in the above judgments, the Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case where the inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could be exercised for securing the ends of justice.
In the result, the application is allowed. The impugned First Information Report bearing I-C.R. No.61 of 2019 registered with Dhoraji Police Station, Rajkot Rural and the proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof qua the applicant is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.
Direct Service is permitted.