V NALINA vs LIC of India

THE complainant in O. P. No. 233/2000 on the file of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Chennai (South) is the appellant herein. The case of the complainant was as follows: (a) Her husband had taken four policies during his life-time. The policies were taken respectively on 28. 3. 1992 for Rs. 10,000, 24. 12. 93 for Rs. 30,000, 3. 3. 1997 for Rs. 50,000 and 10. 2. 1998 for Rs. 10,000. On 10. 11. 1998, the complainant''s husband was admitted in the St. John''s Medical College Hospital, Bangalore, for chest pain and vomiting. He died within 5 hours from the time of admission. The complainant preferred a claim before the opposite party. The opposite party settled the claim relating to the first two policies but repudiated the claim with regard to the 3rd and the 4th policies. Attributing deficiency in service, the complaint was filed.

THE case of the opposite party was as follows : The claim in respect of the later two policies was repudiated on the ground that the deceased was suffering from hypertension for over five years prior to his taking the two policies and the repudiation was in order and that there was no deficiency in service. Before the District Forum on the side of the complainants Exs. A1 to A6 were marked while on the side of the opposite parties Exs. Bl to B12 were marked and on the side of the opposite parties Dr. C. R. Krishna Rao, was examined as DW1.

The District Forum held that there was suppression of material facts and that there was no deficiency in service on the part of the opposite parties. Holding thus, by order dated 1. 11. 2002, the District Forum dismissed the complaint. It is as against that the present appeal has been filed.

MR. V. Balaji, learned Cousel for the appellant complainant submitted as follows: The District Forum had not properly appreciated the materials on record, in particular Ex. B5, the medical attendant''s certificate in which in Column No. 4 (a), the primary cause of death was given as Riptured Aortic Aneurysm'' and the secondary cause was given as ''hypertension''. In column No. 6, it was stated as if the patient had reported to the doctor as he was having hypertension for the previous 5 years. In Ex. B10 quite contrary to Ex. B5 it was reported that the patient was not a known case of hypertension. To prove the factum of pre-existing disease, the opposite party examined Dr. C. R. Krishna Rao as DW1. He deposed in chief-examination that he examined one Manoharan and that he was suffering from hypertension for the previous 5 years as narrated under Ex. B6. In cross-examination, he had specifically admitted that he had not treated Manoharan at any point of time. He further admitted that as per World Health Organisation Blood Pressure Level 160/90 mg was hypertension. BP level 140 to 160 mg was border line hypertension. At the time of admission, BP level was 190/100. According to circumstances BP might shoot up +10 mg. There were no documents to show that the deceased was suffering from hypertension during the year 1994. In further cross-examination DW1 admitted that as per discharge summary Manoharan was not a known case of hypertension. As per Ex. B10, BP level was 145/90. The District Forum had dismissed the complaint on the basis of the chief-examination of DW1 without considering the specific admission made by DW1 in cross-examination. Counsel also relied on a number of judgments in support of his submission that the opposite party should have filed affidavits from doctors and produced acceptable evidence in support of their stand that there was suppression of material facts by the deceased while purchasing the policies. We will refer to the authorities in due course. Per contra, Mr. P. V. Raghavan, learned Cousel for the opposite parties submitted as follows: As per the history sheet of the patient''s admission in the hospital which had been recorded from the patient himself, he had pre-insurance ailment and consequent hospitalisation and treatment. As per the terms and conditions of the policy and also in accordance with Section 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938 such rejection was valid in law and it could not be treated as deficiency in service. It was open to the insurer to repudiate the policy if any material facts contained in the policy were inaccurate, it was not necessary for the insurer in such a case to establish that the suppression was fraudulently made or the policy holder must have known at the time of making the statement that it was false or the suppressed facts were material to disclose. The terms of the policy would clearly show that the statement made as to the state of health in the proposal form and personal statement of health submitted by the policy holder in the proposal coupled with the declaration that the basis of the contract between the parties and any mis-statement or suppression of fact with regard to the health of the insured would vitiate the contract of insurance and would enable the insurer to repudiate the contract ab initio forfeiting all moneys paid therein. The claim under the policy had arisen within the 24 months of acceptance of the risk and in such circumstances, the claim was rightly repudiated. Counsel also relied on a number of decisions.

WE have gone through the materials on record. The question for consideration in the present appeal is whether there was material suppression of any ailment by the insured at the time he submitted his proposal for buying the policies? According to the learned Counsel for the appellant/complainant purporting to be the medical attendant''s certificate had no evidentiary value whatsoever as there were blanks and the details were not reflected in the discharge summary that there was no affidavit from the resident doctor and so far as the doctor examined on the side of the opposite parties was concerned, he had deposed in cross-examination that the insured was suffering from hypertension for the previous five years as set out in Ex. B6 that he was not the one who had treated the patient at any point of time and that there was no document to show that the insured was suffering from hypertension during the year 1994. Further, as per the discharge summary, the insured was not a known case of hypertension and under Ex. B10, B. P. level was 145/90. When the doctor examined as DW1 had said that the insured was not a known case of hypertension the District Forum, in the submission of the learned Counsel, was in error in holding that there was suppression. On the side of the opposite parties, the learned Counsel, besides relying on Exs. B5 and B6 also relied on Exs. B10, B11 and B12 which according to Counsel clearly showed that at the time he submitted the proposal the insured had some serious ailments which had not been disclosed in the proposal form.

WITH regard to Ex. B10, it is to be noted as follows: the patient was admitted on 31. 1. 1995. He was discharged on 4. 2. 1995. The final diagnosis is noted as follows: "essential HYPERTENSION chest PAIN FOR INVESTIGATION normal CORONARIES"

Under the head ''presenting Complaints and Duration with details (In brief), it is noted as follows: "chest pain since 5 hours before admission, retrosternal, radiating to the praecordium, continuous, increased on breathing. No history of breathlessness/palpitations/syncope. Not a known case of ischaemic heart disease/diabetes mellitus/hypertension. Chronic smoker - 4 to 5 cigarettes/day. Occasionally consumes alcohol. "

B. P. is noted as 140/90 mm Hg. Under the head ''course in hospital and brief details of treatment'', it is noted as follows : "this patient was admitted for evaluation of chest pain. ECG showed lateral wall ST T changes. Cardiac enzymes were normal. Coronary angiogram done showed normal coronaries. Blood pressure was brought under control with anti hypertensives and the patient is being discharged in a stable condition on medical therapy. "

RECOMMENDATIONS: salt restricted less than 3 gms/day. The following drugs were prescribed: cap. Presolar; Tab. Lisinopril 5 mg. Tab. Lasix 40 mg. Tab. ASA 50mg. , review in Cardiology OPD after 15 days any day from Monday to Friday. It could be thus seen that the complainant had undergone treatment; for chest pain in St. John''s Medical College Hospital, Bangalore, between 31. 1. 1995 and 4. 2. 1995. This had admittedly not been disclosed.

EVEN leaving out Ex. B10, we have Exs. B11 and B12 and it is seen from Exs. B11 and B12 that the insured had Ess. Hypertension on 31. 1. 1995 and on 5. 6. 1996. It was reported that he had history of chest tightness since that morning as also breathlessness since morning. The past history showed that he was admitted in February 1995. Cardio A SIS of Essential hypertension, chest pain for evaluation. . . His B. P. was 180/90. Again in June 1996, it was recorded that he was a known hypertension since one year; stopped medicines since 3 months on his own and the then problem in June 1996 was chest pain since 5 days; Precordine/inaxillary and scapular aua. B. P. was 170/110. These documents had not been disputed by the complainant as pertaining to the insured and the documents relate to 1995 and 1996. In the proposal, these details had not been disclosed. This would clearly justify the stand of the opposite parties that there was suppression of material facts. No doubt, learned Cousel for the complainant relied on the admission by the doctor examined on the side of the opposite parties that the insured was not a known case of hypertension. At the same time, it should be noted that the said doctor had not treated the insured and it was some other doctor. With Exs. B11 and B12 clearly showing that the insured had serious ailments which had not been disclosed in the proposal forms, we should uphold the ultimate conclusion by the District Forum that there was material suppression which justified the repudiation by the opposite parties. The learned Counsel for the complainant vehemently submitted that there was no documentary proof filed by the opposite parties nor was any doctor examined in support of their case justifying the repudiation by the opposite parties. Counsel in this connection has relied on a number of decisions. They are being referred to below: (1) In LIC of India by Zonal Manager v. Janaki Ammal, 1981 LW 54 (DB), it has been held by a Bench of the Madras High Court that ''a policy of insurance can be called in question within a period of 2 years from the date on which it was effected on the ground that any statement leading to the issue of the policy was inaccurate or false, but if the policy is questioned after a period of two years, the insurer can repudiate that policy only if he shows that such a statement was on a material matter or the insured suppressed fact which it was material to disclose and that it was fraudulently made by the policy holder and that the policy holder knew at the time of making it that the statement was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose, it has also been held by the Bench that the policy of insurance could be avoided by the Company under Section 45 of the Insurance Act only on the ground of suppression of illness which affects the expectation of the life of the insured and not mere temporary or trivial illness and that unless the disease he was suffering from is clearly established and it is also established that that disease would have a material bearing on the insurability of the policy holder, the policy cannot be invalidated. The three conditions for the application of the second part of Section 45 are: (1) The statement must be on a material matter or must suppress facts which it was material to disclose; (2) the suppression must be fraudulently made by the policy holder; and (3) the policy holder must have known at the time of making the statement that it was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose.

(2) In Mohini Mohindroo v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. , I (1997) CPJ 585, the Himachal Pradesh State Commission has held that ''it is settled law that the opinion of the doctor - an expert - unless he is subjected to the test of examination and cross-examination in a Court, cannot be considered as authentic and such evidence cannot be relied upon and form the basis of a finding. Merely the proof of documents does not mean that the contents thereof are necessarily true. '' (3) In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Ors. , II (2003) CPJ 142 (NC), the doctor was found to have issued a false certificate and had never treated the insured nor was he his patient. The National Commission held that ''non-disclosure of relevant material facts by the proposer to the insurer violates the principle of utmost good faith. Fair enough. But what happens to the good faith the proposer has in the insurer when rightful and legitimate claims by his family for the insured amount after his death is being denied by producing false certificates and on flimsy grounds based on surmises and conjectures ? We believe that it certainly is violation of the sacrosanct principle of utmost good faith, when the insured regularly paid all the premium with the utmost good faith in the hope that the family will be protected in the event of his/her untimely death but the insurer evades the claim on concocted grounds. The principle of utmost good faith should work both ways and not only one way. ''

(4) In L. I. C. of India v. Smt. Chandra Baghrech, IV (2003) CPJ 16 (NC) the claim of the complainant was repudiated on the ground that the insured had concealed his illness before taking the policy. It was recorded by the State Commission that insurance was accepted only after insured was thoroughly examined by the doctor of the Insurance Company itself and moreover the reliance by the Insurance Company had been placed on the report of a doctor but that doctor did not file any affidavit nor any prescription slip had been produced for any treatment by him. The State Commission did not rely on the report that the insured was suffering from any illness which was stated to be concealed. This decision of the State Commission was upheld by the National Commission. (Is it to be taken that if a prescription is produced, no affidavit from the doctor is necessary nor there will be a need to cross-examine him?) (emphasis supplied)

(5) In Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. v. Radhika Madhariya, IV (2004) CPJ 131, the Chhattisgarh State Commission held that the burden to prove existence and knowledge of disease at time of policy, lies heavily on insurer; no symptoms suggesting ''abnormality or disease of respiratory system'' shown at time of medical examination; policy was issued on the basis of medical report; it was held that material suppression had not been proved though the leave record of the policy holder and photocopies of alleged medical certificates were produced. They were not relied upon. It was also observed that affidavits of the doctors who are said to have given the said certificates had also not been filed.

(6) In Branch Manager, L. I. C. of India and Anr. v. Smt. A. Lalitha, IV (2004) CPJ 232, the claim was repudiated on the ground of suppression of material facts. The insured underwent surgery for tumour. He died of massive heart attack. This Commission held that the contention that the insured was suffering from diabetes for more than 10 years was not proved by producing the best available evidence. It was also held that what had been noted by the doctor in the certificate of medical treatment for which only a Xerox copy was filed would not be accepted as providing infallible proof of the case of the opposite parties. The case sheet and other registers maintained by the hospitals were also not produced. There was no separate certificate or affidavit produced from the doctor who performed the surgery. It was recorded that at the time when the doctor examined the insured, the patient told him that he was suffering from diabetes for the previous about 10 years. The certificate produced was only a Xerox copy of a printed form, when the burden was very heavy upon the opposite parties by merely relying upon some notings made by a doctor who had issued the certificate to them, they could not hope to discharge the burden satisfactorily. Neither the doctor who admitted the patient was examined nor was the case sheet summoned was produced. In those circumstances, it was held that best available evidence had not been produced and therefore the Insurance Company was liable.

(7) In Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. v. Rehana Begum, IV (2004) CPJ 292, it has been held by the Andhra Pradesh State Commission that Enteric fever like Typhoid is a common ailment and can be suffered by any common person and is not a chronic or acute disease for the Insurance Company to repudiate the claim. There was also no nexus between the alleged suppression of Enteric fever and the actual cause of death which is admittedly due to heart attack. The State Commission followed its own earlier decision in Branch Manager, LIC of India, Cuddapah v. M. Parvathi @ Radha and Ors. , 1992 (2) ALD (Cons.) 93, where it has been held that ''mere production of doctor certificates enclosed with the application for leave on medical grounds without examining the doctors does not prove that the insured was in fact suffering from the disease and that they have been suppressed by the insured. ''

(8) In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Zayada Begum, IV (2004) CPJ 124, the Uttaranchal State Commission, has observed that ''t. B. is a disease which is not ordinarily known. In that case, a certificate from a doctor was produced to the effect that the insured was suffering from disease for the previous 2 years was not accepted as according to the Commission. It was only hearsay. It has been further observed in the said decision that though the doctor had written that detail of his illness was disclosed by the patient himself. It was not clear as to how he could know. The mere casual statement, the report of the doctor without formal proof, the absence of affidavit to prove these facts, without concrete evidence as to who gave that type of statement, all go to prove that such bald allegations cannot form basis of rejection of the claim. At least there is no evidence that the insured had got any treatment, examination, etc. , earlier and in the absence of any such evidence to find a way to repudiate the claim cannot be justified.

(9) In Parumal Choudhary v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, IV (2004) CPJ 488, also by the Chhattisgarh State Commission rejected the case of the Insurance Company stating that the certificate of medical treatment did not prove that the deceased suffered from the diseases mentioned from 3 years prior to his death or had knowledge of the ailments. No affidavit of the doctor or the son of the deceased had been filed.

(10) In Sampath S. Kumar v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. , I (2006) CPJ 375, it has been held by the Karnataka State Commission, that the doctor whose affidavit had been filed did not treat the complainant and in such circumstances, no reliance could be placed on his affidavit.

(11) In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vasant Rao, II (2006) CPJ 113 (NC), the complainant underwent successful by-pass surgery in 1986. Policy was taken in 1995. Such fact was disclosed. The patient suffered Ischemic Heart Disease (IHT) in 1999. No heart ailment or medication for heart disease during the period 1995 to 1999. It was held that the disease of 1999 was not continuation of pre-existing disease of 1986 and that the repudiation was unjustified.

(12) In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Kamla Devi, II (2006) CPJ 308, certificate of hospital treatment was relied on by the insurer. The doctor who signed the certificate was not the one to whom the history was reported. The doctor who recorded the history was still with the hospital. The history of the patient was reported by an attendant, the patient being semi-conscious. In those circumstances, it was held that no advantage could be obtained by the Insurance Company from Annexure R-II to the certificate of hospital treatment. The Medical Officer of the Zonal Hospital who had signed Annexure R-II had not sworn to any affidavit. There was no other evidence in the shape of affidavit of the doctor who actually examined him. No record from the hospital to the effect that the deceased was being treated had been produced.

(13) LIC of India v. Sampath Devi, III (2006) CPJ 32. In that case, the insurance policy lapsed due to non-payment of the annual premium. It was revived subsequently and at that time a fresh declaration was given by the insured and in that declaration he had not mentioned that he was suffering from hypertension and vertigo weakness in the limbs for which he took treatment and this amounted to suppression of material facts. It was held by the Rajasthan State Commission observing as follows: "in our considered opinion, there are certain diseases such as kidney, heart and brain and they are connected with the life span of a person and if any mis-statement is made in respect of such type of diseases by the person seeking insurance, in such case it can be believed that knowingly the person taking out the insurance has made mis-statement. But if any one suffers from temporary illness such as fever, cough, cold, etc. , and the same was not mentioned at the time of taking insurance, it cannot be said in true sense that a mis-statement in respect of the state of health has been made by the person seeking insurance. The diseases "hypertension" and "vertigo" cannot be treated as diseases in the same manner as the diseases such as kidney, heart and brain, which directly affect the life span of a person. Hypertension and vertigo are not permanent diseases and they sometimes increase and sometimes they reduce and a person suffering from these diseases can survive for a longer period. Apart from this, there is no doctor''s certificate or other material or document showing cause of death of deceased and from the papers available on record, it cannot be reasonably be presumed or inferred that cause of death of deceased was hypertension or vertigo. "

(14) Gurram Varalakshmi v. LIC of India, III (2006) CPJ 304 (NC ). In that case, the certificate of doctor, who examined the deceased was not produced. There was also no documentary evidence to show that the deceased had taken treatment for diabetes and that it led to cardiac arrest. The deceased was first observed on 27. 7. 1991; died on the same day. It was held that it was a case of sudden death due to heart attack. There was no suppression of facts regarding health. The repudiation was unjustified. A document merely signed by the doctor containing reference to the insured having the ailment cannot be held to be sufficient discharge of burden. The National Commission referred to the decision in L. I. C. of India v. Smt. Promila Malhotra, I (2004) CPJ 91 (NC), where a similar view had been taken. It was a case where admittedly the deceased had taken six policies. The claim was settled in respect of those policies. Only in respect of one policy, the Insurance Company had refused to make payment. The National Commission ultimately held against the Insurance Company on the following two grounds. The Company had failed to produce on record the certificate given by a doctor who examined the insured at the time of proposal and it had failed to bring on record any documentary evidence to indicate that the insured had taken the treatment for diabetes and that diabetes finally led to his cardiac arrest.

(15) In Chief Postmaster and Ors. v. Rajammal and Ors. , IV (2006) CPJ 125, this State Commission held that the Insurance Company had attempted to repudiate the claim on mere suspicion. Their definite stand was that the deceased committed suicide for which they relied on the affidavit of one of its employees but the employee was not examined. According to the Insurance Company, the deceased was taken to Dr. Govindaraj, who treated him. Dr. Govindaraj was also not examined. So was the case with another doctor who had treated him. In such circumstances, it was held that the Insurance Company was not justified in repudiating the claim.

(16) Laxman Prasad Pandey v. LIC of India, IV (2006) CPJ 139 (NC ). In that case, no records were filed by opposite party indicating treatment taken by insured either as in or out patient in any hospital. The insured had been medically examined. The examining doctor having affirmed and the questions in the proposal form regarding health having been answered correctly, the repudiation by LIC was held to be illegal and arbitrary.

(17) In A. Rajendran v. National Insurance Company Ltd. , R. P. No. 3310/2006 dated 24. 1. 2007, the National Commission reversed the decision of this Commission on the ground that there was no evidence to support the case of the Insurance Company and no material document or oral evidence or an affidavit by the doctor who had examined the complainant had been filed. The National Commission also referred to its earlier decision in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Mary Jane Govias and Ors. , IV (2006) CPJ 228 (NC ). The contention of the Insurance Company in that case was that the pre-existing disease of throat irritation was not revealed while taking the policy. Further contention was that the disease was contracted within 30 days from the commencement of cover and therefore there was no liability. There was evidence that both patient and treating doctor were unaware of existence of any disease. In such circumstances, the National Commission held that it could not be said that material fact had been suppressed. There was no evidence as to when that disease i. e. , Cancer started. Merely because tests got done within 30 days, it could not be construed to mean that the same was within knowledge of insured. It was held that the insurer was liable to reimburse the medical expenses.

As against the above decisions, the following decisions were relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent/opposite parties Insurance Company. (1) Panni Devi v. L. I. C. and Ors. , III (2003) CPJ 15 (NC ). In that case, the Insurance Company pleaded suppression of material facts that information of prior surgery was concealed. The contention on behalf of the complainant that the deceased was examined by LIC Medical Officer and nothing adverse was noticed was not accepted on the ground that if the person withheld information, the doctor would not know it unless it was visible. In that case, cardiological problem was not visible. At pre-anaesthetic check up, it was recorded that he had undergone surgery 15 years back. It was held by the National Commission that there was suppression of material fact at the time of taking of policy and that the repudiation of the claim was justified. It has to be noted that the doctor though not examined due weight to a statement recorded in the normal course of discharge of one''s duties has to be given. It cannot be taken but true. In that case, the second policy was taken on 25. 6. 1995. As early as 24. 1. 1996, a doctor certifies that the insured is suffering from Severe Aortic Reqingitation and Coaractation that he would require Aortic Valve replacement. It was held by the National Commission that though this certificate did not antedate the ailment/heart problem, it had to be noticed that nobody developed heart valve problem overnight. The National Commission concurred with the conclusion reached by the State Commission that there was wilful suppression of material facts.

(2) In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Mansa Devi, II (2003) CPJ 135 (NC), the Insurance Company repudiated the claim on the ground that existence of diabetes and treatment undergone for 8 years were not disclosed. Leg had to be amputated after a thorn prick. There was renal failure of insured causing his death. The National Commission held that it clearly indicated long suffering due to diabetes. There was suppression of material facts and therefore there was justification in repudiating the claim. In that case, the State Commission disbelieved all the documents produced by the opposite party Insurance Company on the ground that they were copies of the originals that they were not properly attested and that the Insurance Company did not file an affidavit in support of the said documents. The State Commission further observed that the opinion of the doctor could not be authentic unless he was subjected to examination and cross-examination. The National Commission found that the State Commission had erred in their view that the opposite party had failed to substantiate that the respondent''s husband had suppressed material facts at the time of proposing for insurance. It was very clear from the statement of the employer of the insured wherein he certified that the insured was diabetic and that he was under treatment. The employer further certified that the life assured was on leave for the illness on various occasions. It was held that there was wilful suppression.

(3) In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Krishan Chander Sharma, II (2007) CPJ 51 (NC), R. P. No. 1935/1999, decided on 23. 1. 2006, it was contended on behalf of the complainant that the burden to prove that the life assured was suffering from allergic bronchitis and asthma, etc. , before purchasing the policy in question was on the Insurance Company and that the Insurance Company had not filed any affidavit or examined as witness the treating doctor. Reliance was also placed on the decision of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Narmada Agarwalla and Ors. , AIR 1993 Ori. 103 and LIC of India v. Ambika Prasad Pandey, AIR 1999 MP 13. It was urged that the deceased had died due to heart failure which had no nexus with the ailments she was allegedly suffering from. It was observed by the National Commission that as the policy in question had not run for two years, Section 45 of the Insurance Act could not be attracted and those decisions would be of little assistance to the complainant. The National Commission accepted the submission on behalf of the insurer that non-filing of affidavit and/or non-examination of treating doctor of the deceased was not fatal as it had been admitted in the complaint that the deceased was treated for allergic bronchitis, asthma, etc. , in a hospital and there was also the claim inquiry report and certificate issued by a hospital wherein it was mentioned that the deceased remained admitted in the hospital during several periods as she was seriously ill because of asthma and allergic bronchitis. The complainant, in that case was also a doctor by profession. After issuance of the certificate by the hospital with reference to admission of the deceased during those periods non-filing of affidavit or non-examination of treating doctor was not ruinous. (Emphasis supplied) The National Commission held that certificate of the Medical Officer of Insurance Company certifying the deceased as enjoying good health would not be of much consequence. Ultimate cause of death of the deceased had no relevance whatsoever to the disclosing of information regarding health as required by various Sub-clauses (a), (b), (d) and (i) of Clause 11 of the proposal form. The answers given by the deceased who was suffering from asthma and allergic bronchitis to those questions were false to the knowledge of the insured and therefore the Insurance Company was justified in repudiating the claim.

THE decisions are either way. Each case must depend on the facts and circumstances of that particular case. In the present case, de hors the doctor''s evidence as DW1 and the documents Exs. B5 and B10, we have the documents Exs. B11 and B12 which clearly show that prior to his taking the last two policies the deceased had serious health problems which had been duly recorded in Exs. B11 and B12. Having regard to the discussion above, we are of the view that though not for the reasons set out in the order of the District Forum, we have to concur with the conclusion reached by the District Forum that the deceased had suppressed material information regarding his health and the repudiation by the Insurance Company was in order. No interference is called for.

IN fine, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No cost. Appeal dismissed.