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Judgment
C.V.N. Sastri, J.—This is an application for review of the judgment dated 11-9-1995 dismissing the writ petition at the admission stage. The writ petition is filed questioning an order dated 1-9-1995 passed by the second respondent i.e., the District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District, Saroornagar, placing the petitioner under suspension pending the initiation and conclusion of the departmental enquiry into certain charges levelled against the petitioner. The order dated 1-9-1995 is challenged in the writ petition inter alia on the grounds that it was passed without considering his objections and without giving any prior opportunity to the petitioner to give his explanation to the charges or to substantiate his defence, that the allegations contained in the suspension order differ from those contained in the memo dated 28-7-1995 issued by the second respondent, that the petitioner duly handed over charge of all the records and case properties on the date of his transfer i.e., on 26-8-1994, that he was validly discharged and that the Last Pay Certificate was also issued to him after transfer indicating that he was validly discharged, and that there is no justification for passing the impugned order after a lapse of nearly one year after the date of his transfer.
It may be mentioned that the petitioner worked as Deputy Nazir in the Munsif-Magistrate Court, Medchal, and on 26-8-1994 he was transferred from Medchal and posted as U.D.B.C. in the Additional Sub Court at Saroornagar, Ranga Reddy District. It is stated in the impugned order dated 1-9-1995 that on taking an inventory of the case properties on 28-6-1985, 131 case properties were found missing which included costly electronic goods such as colour T.V., V.C.P., etc, that on account of the missing properties the trial of some cases had to be stopped, that the Munsif-Magistrate, Medchal has also reported mat the petitioner has misappropriated surety amount of Rs. 2,000/- in C.C.No. 409 of 1989 drawn on 12-8-1994 without paying the amount to Sri A. Lakshmana Rao by falsifying the accounts and registers, that the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District visited the Munsif-Magistrate Court, Medchal, perused the original registers and entries, recorded statement of staff members and submitted reports to the District Judge on 30-8-1995, that on a perusal of the j said statements, documents and also the reports submitted by the Additional j District Judge as well as the reports submitted by the Munsif-Magistrate, Medchal, the District & Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District was of the opinion that prima facie it was a fit case for initiating departmental enquiry for the gross misconduct of the petitioner under A.P.C.S. (C.C.A) Rules, 1963 and accordingly the petitioner was placed under suspension pending initiation and conclusion of departmental enquiry. In exercise of the power conferred under Rule 13(1) of the A.P.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules, 1963 in public interest for a period of six months or till the enquiry is completed whichever is earlier. The impugned order dated 1-9-1995 was preceded by a show cause-notice dated 28-7-1995 issued by the District & Sessions Judge, Range Reddy District to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause within three days from the date of receipt of the said notice as to why disciplinary action cannot be initiated against him for missing of criminal case property items and for not handing over the criminal case items. It is stated that the petitioner submitted a reply to the said show-cause-notice, but it is not dear as to on what date he submitted the said reply which is undated. In his reply the petitioner stated that he has handed over charge of Deputy Nazir after his transfer from the court of Munsif-Magistrate to the Additional Sub-Court, Rangareddy District within one week i.e., from 28-6-1994 to 2-9-1994 and that as such his L.P.C. also was sent through the Munsif-Magistrate to the court of Additional Sub-Judge. He further requested that a copy of the inventory prepared by his successor in the Munsif-Magistrate Court at Medchal may be supplied to him and that he may be given one month time for submitting his detailed explanation in this regard.
When the writ petition came up for admission before me on 11-9-1995, after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, I passed order dismissing the writ petition holding that having regard to the grave nature of the charges and the fact that the impugned order was preceded by a preliminary investigation made by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, who after inspection of the records of Munsif-Magistrate Court at Medchal, submitted reports against the petitioner, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order.
In this review petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following conditions:
(1) In the show-cause-notice dated 28-7-1995, there is no reference to the alleged misappropriation of surety amount of Rs. 2,000/- by the petitioner.
(2) As per the Circular dated 18-5-1991 issued by the second respondent, L.P.C. will be issued only after charge is duly handed over and the Presiding officer satisfies himself in that behalf. The L.P.C. issued by the third respondent on 22-9-1994 gives no indication about the alleged missing of case properties or any misappropriation by the petitioner.
(3) The explanation submitted by the petitioner to the show-cause notice was not considered at all and there is no reference to the same in the impugned order dated 1-9-1995.
(4) A copy of the inventory of the case properties said to have been prepared by the petitioner''s successor at Medical was not supplied to the petitioner.
(5) Rules 220 and 221 of the Criminal Rules of Practice show that the presiding officers are personally responsible for the safe custody of the case properties and the petitioner cannot be held responsible for any loss of the case properties.
(6) The impugned order is purported to be passed in exercise of the powers conferred by Rules 13(1) of the A.P.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules 1963 which have been superseded by the A.P.C.S. (CCA) Rules, 1991, and as such the order is vitiated and it is illegal.
It is contended that as the above points were not properly submitted to the court on 11-9-1995 by the Counsel for the petitioner who then appeared in the matter, it is a fit case for reviewing the judgment dated 11-9-1995. The Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa Vs. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, for the proposition that an order of suspension should not be passed in a mechanical and routine fashion and that it should be passed only after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be enquired into or investigated and the nature of evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of mind by the disciplinary authority and that the appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action.
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the review petition is barred by limitation as it is filed beyond time, that there are absolutely no valid grounds whatsoever for review of the judgment dated 11-9-1995, that under the guise of a review petition, it is not open to the petitioner to virtually seek a re-hearing of the writ petition on merits and that the proper remedy is only by way of appeal but not review. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sow Chandra Kante and Another Vs. Sheikh Habib, .
As regards the question of limitation, Article 124 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of 30 days for filing an application for review of a judgment or decree. Since the judgment in this case was pronounced on 11-9-1995, the review pension has to be filed on or before 10-10-1995. The petitioner initially filed a petition, W.P.M.P. No. 28975 of 1995, on 28-9-1995 under Order 9 Rule 9, C.P.C styling it as one to set aside the dismissal order passed on 11-9-1995 in W.P. No. 20322 of 1995. When the said petition came up before me on 28-9-1995, I point out that the said application is misconceived and that the petitioner should file a petition for review. The counsel for the petitioner thereupon sought permission to amend the petition accordingly and time was granted till 31-10-1995 for the said purpose. Instead of amending the said petition which was originally filed on 28-9-1995 within time, the petitioner seems to have filed the present petition for review under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114, C.P.C The office, however, has rightly numbered it as Review W.P.M. No. 28975 of 1995 which is the same number given to the original petition filed under Order 9 Rule 9 C.P.C. Though the present petition for review appears to have been filed on31-10-1995, the same is, in fact, the amended version of the original petition which was filed within time on 28-9-1995. It must be, therefore, held that the petition is filed within time and it is not barred by limitation.
Now coming to the merits of the application for review, it is well settled that review of a judgment is permissible only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record but not on the ground that the judgment is erroneous on merits. I am of the view that none of the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is a valid ground for review of the judgment. All the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner which are referred to above tough the merits of the order of suspension and they do not afford a valid ground for review of the judgment passed in the writ petition. It is well settled that in the name of the review, there cannot be re-hearing of the writ petition on merits. In Chandra Kanta v. Sk. Habib (2 supra) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
"A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition through different counsel of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient."
Prima facie, the charges levelled against the petitioner are grave in nature. Whether the said charges are true or not, is a matter to be gone into in the enquiry, it is also well settled that suspension pending enquiry is not a punishment and that normally the High Court will not interfere with such an order under Article 226 of the Constitution unless the order is patently illegal or without jurisdiction or is vitiated by mala fides. In the impugned order valid and cogent reasons are given for placing the petitioner under suspension. It cannot be said that the order is mechanically passed without application pf mind. Merely because it is mentioned in the impugned order of suspension that it was passed in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 13(1) of 1963 Rules which have been superseded by 1991 Rules, it cannot be said that the order is thereby vitiated. It is well settled that quoting a wrong provision of law does not affect the validity of the order if the power is traceable to some other provision. Admittedly under the 1991 Rules also, an order of suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings is permissible as provided in Rule 8 of the A.P.C.S. (CCA) Rules, 1991.
For all the aforesaid reasons, I see no merit in the review petition and it is accordingly dismissed. If the petitioner is aggrieved by the judgment, the proper remedy is only by way of appeal but not review.