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Judgment
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.—The petitioner functioned as a clerk in Chinnaravulapally Multipurpose Co-operative Society, Bibinagar Mandal, Nalgonda District (for short "the Society"), upto 24.6.2007. An inspection was caused, u/s 52 of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (for short "the Act"), by the Inspecting Officer, into the affairs of the society. A report, dated 31.10.1989, was submitted after the inspection. Based on the report, surcharge proceedings, u/s 60 of the Act, were initiated against the petitioner. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Bhongir, the 1st respondent herein, passed order dated 6.7.1992, requiring the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 6,375/-, with interest at 18%.
On a representation made by the petitioner, the 1st respondent reviewed his order, through proceedings dated 8.4.1993 and took the view that the petitioner is liable to pay only a sum of Rs. 100/-. Thereafter, the matter was reopened and another order, dated 14.12.1995, was passed u/s 60, to the effect that the petitioner is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 4,000/-, with interest. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed C.T.A. No. 81 of 2003, before the A.P. Co-operative Tribunal, at Warangal. The appeal was dismissed on 12.2.2007.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the very basis for initiation of surcharge proceedings was defective, inasmuch as the inspection u/s 52 of the Act was not conducted, in accordance with law. He further submits that once an order u/s 60 was passed, there was no basis for reviewing it, and complains that though these grounds were urged before the Tribunal, the same were not taken into account.
Learned Government Pleader for Co-operation, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner did not raise any ground pointing out defect, or infirmity, in the proceedings, u/s 52. He further contends that though a surcharge order was passed on 6.7.1992, it was reviewed, at the instance of the petitioner, and it is not open to him, to take an objection for an exercise of similar nature, at a later point of time.
Proceedings u/s 60 of the Act can be initiated, on the basis of the outcome of an inspection, audit, or enquiry, conducted under the relevant provisions of the Act. In the instant case, the petitioner was surcharged, on the basis of the report, submitted after conducting the inspection. The petitioner had full opportunity to raise all the factual and legal grounds available to him, in response to the show-cause notice issued, u/s 60. The record does not disclose that the petitioner urged any grounds, touching upon the validity of the proceedings u/s 52. Therefore, it is not open to him, to raise the ground, at this stage.
The second plea, raised by the petitioner is that an order u/s 60, once passed, cannot be reopened, or reviewed by the same authority. It is stated that in an order, dated 8.4.1993, passed u/s 60, the liability of the petitioner was fixed at Rs. 100/-, whereas, the 1st respondent reopened the matter, and through a fresh order passed on 14.12.1995, enhanced the liability to Rs. 4,000/-.
The point urged by the petitioner is no doubt valid and legal. The authority, who passes the order u/s 60, cannot review the same, since he is not vested with such power. Had it been a case, where the order dated 8.4.1993 was the first one, passed against the petitioner, and it was reviewed later on, there would not have been any difficulty, in setting aside the subsequent order. The fact remains that the first order passed against the petitioner is the one, dated 6.7.1992, in which, the liability of the petitioner was shown at Rs. 6,375/-. Thereafter, two more orders were passed on 8.4.1993 and 14.12.1995, against the petitioner, under the same provision. One is at the instance of the petitioner himself, and the other, on the own accord of the authority. If the contention of the petitioner is to be accepted, both the two orders referred to above, have to be ignored, and the one passed on 6.7.1992 is to be treated as valid. The petitioner wants this Court to take the second order, i.e. the one passed on 8.4.1993, as valid, and the subsequent one, as not legal. This plea cannot be accepted.
Therefore, this Court does not find any basis to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal. At any rate, the amount is very meagre, and the petitioner dragged on the proceedings for the past 1 1/2 decades, on one pretext or the other.
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.