Uttam Singh vs State Of Uttarakhand And Another

Alok Kumar Verma, J

The application in CLMA No.6661 of 2019, seeking condonation of delay of 500 days in preferring the Special Appeal is not opposed by learned counsel for the respondents. The Delay Condonation Application is allowed. Delay is condoned.

This intra-court appeal has been filed assailing the judgment and order dated 29.11.2017 passed in Writ Petition No.2005 of 2016 (M/S) 'Uttam Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand and another', whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant-writ petitioner.

Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned Chief Standing Counsel assisted by Mr. S. S. Chaudhary, learned Brief Holder appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this Special Appeal. He contended that in the light of the provision of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, applicable to High Court of Uttarakhand under U.P. Re-organization Act, 2000, the remedy of filing an intra-court appeal is not available to the appellant-writ petitioner.

Mr. B.B. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner refuting the above submission, contends that this intra-court appeal is maintainable.

In order to appreciate the issue which arises at the preliminary stage of this Special Appeal, a brief reference to the factual background is necessary, which is as follows :-

The appellant-writ petitioner filed the writ petition No.2005 of 2016 seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 20.12.2014 passed by the Prescribed Authority/ Labour Commissioner, Uttarakhand, Haldwani in Claim Petition No.111 of 2013 'Uttam Singh vs. Chief Engineer (Kumoun Kshatra) and others; a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pay wages and dearness allowances and other allowances to the petitioner for the period from 07.11.1984 to 31.07.1990 for working in the post of Beldar (mate) as a daily wager in the Public Works Department at Bhowali, District Nainital. The case of the appellant-writ petitioner is that he was employed as a daily wager in the Public Works Department at Bhowali, District Nainital for a salary @ Rs.240/- per day with effect from 07.11.1984 to 31.07.1990, for a total period of six years, but his wages of this period and dearness allowances have not been paid as provided under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The appellant-writ petitioner earlier filed Writ Petition No.991 of 2011 'Uttam Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand and another' under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was finally decided on 15.03.2013, in which the petitioner was directed to file a claim petition under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, if he desires. The petitioner filed Claim Petition No.111 of 2013 'Uttam Singh vs. Chief Engineer (Kumoun Kshatra), Lok Nirman Vibhag, Almora and others', which was finally decided on 20.12.2014 by the Authority under the Minimum Wages Act/Labour Commissioner, Uttarakhand. The said authority dismissed the claim petition on the ground that there is no provision for dearness allowance and other daily wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 for daily wagers.

Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed the writ petition. The writ petition was decided on 29.11.2017. Learned Single Judge observed that to bring a workman within the purview of an "employee" as defined under Section 2(i), though, it classifies the nature of employment, i.e. skilled, unskilled, manual or clerical, but what is relevant is that he should be an employee as defined under the Act. The term employed used in sub-section (i) of Section 2, would denote an employment in terms of the rule as applicable against a clear existing vacancy and will not imbibe and include within its ambit the workman. It has never been the case of the petitioner either before the Prescribed Authority under the Minimum Wages Act, or even for that purpose before this Court, that he has ever been employed by the department against an existing and clear vacancy. In that eventuality, the denial which has been made by the Prescribed Authority, in relation to the claim of payment of dearness allowance and, consequently, minimum wages was legally justified, as it was not admissible to him. He further places reliance on a Notification, as published in the official gazette of the Government of India on 21.10.2005, which is nomenclatured as "Minimum Rate of wages payable to the employees in the employment in agriculture".

Learned Single Judge further observed that on a simple interpretation of the nomenclature of this notification, yet again, it would be applicable to the employees who are under and in the regular cadre and are in the employment in relation to the Agricultural Department. The said aspect is further clarified from the head note of the notification itself which provides that whatsoever the implication of the said notification may be, it relates to the revision of minimum rate of wages payable to the employees in the Agriculture Department of the Central Government, required under the proviso to sub-section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act. It is further clarified that they have to be in employment, relating to agriculture only, to attract the notification dated 21.10.2005. Since the petitioner claims to be a daily wager with the Public Works Department, he would not be able to bring himself within the ambit of the Notification dated 21.10.2005.

Regarding relief No.II, the learned Single Judge observed that without going into the issue, pertaining to the delay in raising the claim, this relief even otherwise cannot be granted by this Court, for the reasons that the parameters contemplated for invoking a writ of mandamus, has not been complied with, as it is not the case of the petitioner that prior to approaching this Court for payment of dearness allowance, he has simultaneously approached the authorities for the same, and there has been a denial or non consideration. In that eventuality, relief II cannot be granted. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed.

Feeling aggrieved, the appellant-writ petitioner is before us.

Before we examine the contentions of both the parties, it is necessary to consider the scope of Rule 5 of the Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 which makes provisions for an intra-court appeal. Rule 5 of the Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 reads as under :-

"An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award-(a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one judge".

From a perusal of the aforesaid Rule, it is clear that no Special Appeal will lie in the following matter;

(i) the judgment passed by the Single Judge in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court;

(ii) an order made by the Single Judge in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction;

(iii) an order made by the Single Judge in the exercise of the power of superintendence of the High Court;

(iv) an order made by the Single Judge in the exercise of Criminal jurisdiction;

(v) an order made by the Single Judge in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgment, order or award by-

(a) the Tribunal,

(b) the Court, or

(c) Statutory arbitrator, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act (as applicable in the State of Uttarakhand) or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or

(vi) an order made by the Single Judge in respect of any judgment, order or award of the Government or any Officer or Authority made or purported to be made in the exercise of the appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act (as applicable in the State of Uttarakhand) or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.

Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned Chief Standing Counsel assisted by Mr. S.S. Chaudhary, learned Brief Holder appearing for the State-respondents, contended that the impugned order dated 20.12.2014 was passed by the "Authority" under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act; that "Authority" is Tribunal; therefore, no Special Appeal is maintainable against the judgment and order dated 29.11.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(M/S) No.2005 of 2016 which was filed by the appellant-writ petitioner against the Award dated 20.12.2014 passed by the Authority/Labour Commissioner under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act.

Mr. B.B. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the impugned order dated 20.12.2014 was passed by the "Authority"/Labour Commissioner; and, therefore, the "Authority" is not a "Tribunal".

Therefore, the question to be considered is whether the 'Authority'/Labour Commissioner, while exercising jurisdiction under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, particularly Section 20 thereof, acts as a Tribunal.

We requested Mr. Bhagwat Mehra, learned Advocate to assist this Court on this question of law.

We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and Mr. Bhagwat Mehra, Advocate, learned Amicus Curiae.

In order to decide the said question, it is necessary to refer to the provision of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act. Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act reads as under :-

"20. Claims.- (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as stipendiary Magistrate to be the Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under Section 14, to employees employed or paid in that area.

(2) Where an employee has any claim of the nature referred to in sub-section (1), the employee himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorized in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under sub-section (1), may apply to such Authority for a direction under sub-section (3):

Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable:

Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.

(3) When any application under sub-section (2) is entertained, the Authority shall hear the applicant and the employer, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and after such further inquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under this Act, direct-

(i) in the case of a claim arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages, the payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages payable to him exceed the amount actually paid, together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount of such excess,

(ii) in any other case, the payment of the amount due to the employee, together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think fit, not exceeding ten rupees, and the Authority may direct payment of such compensation in cases where the excess or the amount due is paid by the employer to the employee before the disposal of the application.

(4) If the Authority hearing any application under this section is satisfied that it was either malicious or vexatious, it may direct that a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees be paid to the employer by the person presenting the application.

(5) Any amount directed to be paid under this section may be recovered-

(a) if the Authority is a Magistrate, by the Authority as if it were a fine imposed by the Authority as a Magistrate, or

(b) if the Authority is not a Magistrate, by any Magistrate to whom the Authority makes application in this behalf, as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate.

(6) Every direction of the Authority under this section shall be final.

(7) Every Authority appointed under sub-section (1) shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents, and every such Authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898).

Mr. B.B. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that a Labour Court is not a Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; and, therefore, the "Authority" under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act is also not a Tribunal. In support of his submission, he cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Assam Vs. Horizon Union & another, AIR 1967 SC 442.

Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand, relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Pratappur Sugar & Industries Limited, Pratappur District Deoria vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner, U.P. Gorakhapur Region, Gorakhapur and others, (2000) 3 UPLBEC 2161, Mohd. Arif vs. M/s. Mirza Glass Works and others, (2005) (107) FLR (129), Special Appeal Defective No.319 of 2008, Silk and Kapda Karmchari Union vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner, Varanasi and others dated 04.07.2012 as well as the judgment of this Court in Shanta Kumar Belwal vs. M/s G.S.Bhandari & Co. 2011(1) UD 44.

Mr. Bhagwat Mehra, Advocate, learned Amicus Curiae, cited before us, the judgments in Sudershan Singh Bedi vs. Additional District Magistrate (Rent Control and Eviction Officer), Varanasi and others, Allahabad Rent Cases, 1993(1) 121, Pratappur Sugar & Industries Limited, Pratappur district Deoria (Supra), Vajara Yojana Seed Farm vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (2003) (1) UPLBEC 496, Hira Kalyan Das vs. The Additional Commissioner (Administration), Garhwal Region and others, 2008(1) UD 5, Intezar Hussain and another vs. State of Uttarakhand and others, 2015 (2) UD 261 and judgment of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court dated 05.01.2016 passed in the Special Appeal No.898 of 2015, Pradeshik Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd. vs. Authority under Minimum Wages Act and two others.

Mr. B.B. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that, in Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, the word "Authority" is used; and therefore, the impugned order dated 20.12.2014, which was passed by the 'Authority/Labour Commissioner" is not a "Tribunal". Learned counsel for the appellant argued that a Labour Court is also not a Tribunal and in the support of this submission, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Assam Vs. Horizon Union & another, AIR 1967 SC 442; in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that Labour Court is not a "Tribunal". Learned Counsel for the appellant further argued that Special Appeal No.898 of 2015 Pradeshik Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd. vs. Authority under the Minimum Wages Act was filed before the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, and the said Special Appeal was allowed on 05.01.2016.

In Sushil Kumar Agarwal vs. Meenakshi Sadhu and others, 2019 (1)SCCD 350, the appellant therein placed reliance on the decision in Faquir Chand Gulati vs.Uppal Agencies Private Limited, (2008) 10 SCC 345, where the issue was whether a land owner, who enters into an agreement with the Builder, for construction of an apartment building is a "consumer" entitled to maintain a complaint against the builder as a Service Provider under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held, "The issue involved before this Court was in relation to the interpretation of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and not on the maintainability of a suit filed by the developer against the owner for specific performance in view of Section 14 (3) (c) of the Act. Therefore, the decision cannot be relied upon in relation to the issue before us".

In Special Appeal No.898 of 2015, the issue was not whether the "Authority" under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act was a "Tribunal" or not; and, therefore, the issue was not regarding the maintainability of the Special Appeal in the light of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. In the instant Special Appeal, the issue involved is whether the "Authority" under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act is a "Tribunal", if yes, whether this Special Appeal is maintainable in the light of the provision of Rule 5 of the Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. Therefore, in the light of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sushil Kumar (Supra), the decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No.898 of 2015 (Supra), cannot be relied upon in relation to the issue involved in the instant Special Appeal.

A tribunal, generally, is any person or institution with authority to judge, adjudicate on, or determine claims or disputes, whether or not, it is called a tribunal in its title. Nomenclature may be different. In Bharat Bank Limited vs.Employees of the Bharat Bank, 1950 SCR 459, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed, "......it is to be noticed that owing to the intricate and complex system of Government that exists in a modern State and the vast expansion of social legislation of all sorts that have taken place in England and in other countries including own, within the last few decades, the so called administrative and quasi-judicial tribunals have come to be a permanent feature of our social and political system. They function as adjudicating bodies in disputes concerning a large number of economic and social affairs. In a sense they are governmental bodies appertaining to the executive and not to the judicial branch of the State, though in various matters they are armed with judicial powers analogous to those normally carried out by Courts of law".

In Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd, Meerut vs. Lakshmichand and others, AIR 1963 SC 677, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed "Question whether a decision is judicial or is purely administrative, often arises when jurisdiction of the superior courts to issue writs of certiorari is invoked. Often the line of distinction between decisions judicial and administrative is thin; but the principles for ascertaining the true character of the decisions are well-settled. A judicial decision is not always the act of a judge or a tribunal invested with power to determine questions of law or fact; it must however be the act of a body or authority invested by law with authority to determine questions or disputes affecting the rights of citizens and under a duty to act judicially. A judicial decision always postulates the existence of a duty laid upon the authority to act judicially. Administrative authorities are often invested with authority or power to determine questions, which affect the rights of citizens".

In Kihoto Hollohon vs. Shri Zachilhu, AIR 1993 SC 412, the Hon'ble Apex Court referring to its earlier decision in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1669, set out a test to determine whether an authority exercising adjudicatory powers is a Tribunal or not; ....there is a lis an affirmation by one party and denial by another and the dispute necessarily involves a decision on the rights and obligations of the parties to it and the authority is called upon to decide it, there is an exercise of judicial power. That authority is called a Tribunal, if it does not have all the trappings of a Court.

In Sudershan Singh Bedi vs. Additional District Magistrate (Supra), the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, while dealing the controversy of maintainability of Special Appeal under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, has observed, "The word "Tribunal" has not been defined under this Act, but now it is settled principle of law that a tribunal is a body or an authority which is invested with the judicial power to adjudicate on question of law or fact affecting the right of parties in a judicial manner". In para 15, it was observed, "The declaration of vacancy by Rent Control and Eviction Officer contemplates pleadings and evidence and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is invested with the power of a Civil Court in regulating the procedure for taking evidence etc. He is also to determine the dispute after taking into account the objections raised by the parties and has to pass reasoned order". In these circumstances, it was held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer acts as a Tribunal and order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer shall be treated as an order of Tribunal.

In Pratappur Sugar and Industries Limited, Pratappur, District Deoria vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner, U.P. Gorakhpur Region, Gorakhpur and others, [(2000) 3 UPLBEC, 2161], the Division Bench of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court has observed that the dictionary meaning shows that tribunal is a body authorized by law to decide disputes and impart justice. The Hon'ble Division Bench referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Durga Shankar Mehta vs. Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1950 SC 188 , in which it was held that the expression "Tribunal" as used in Article 136 of the Constitution of India meant the same thing as Court but includes within its submit adjudicating bodies, provided they are constituted by State and are invested with judicial power as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions. The Hon'ble Division Bench referred the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Hari Nagar Sugar Mills vs. Shyam Sunder, AIR 1961 SC 1669, in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that by "Tribunal" is meant those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. The Hon'ble Division Bench also referred the judgment of Hon'ble Constitution Bench in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha vs. The Hind Cycles Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 874, in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has held, "....The expression "a court" in the technical sense is a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of courts which are invested with the State's inherent judicial powers. The tribunal as distinguished from the court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi-judicially, but it does not constitute a court in the technical sense. The tribunal, according to the dictionary meaning, is a seat of justice; and in the discharge of its functions, it shares some of the characteristics of the court. A domestic Tribunal appointed in departmental proceedings, for instance, or instituted by an industrial employer cannot claim to be a tribunal under Article 136(1). Purely Administrative Tribunals are also outside the scope of the said Article. The Tribunals which are contemplated by Article 136(1) are clothed with some of the powers of the courts. They can compel witnesses to appear, they can administer oath, they are required to follow certain rules of procedure: the proceedings before them are required to comply with rules of natural justice, they may not be bound by the strict and technical rules of evidence, but, nevertheless, they must decide on evidence adduced before them; they may not be bound by other technical rules of law, but their decisions must, nevertheless, be consistent with the general principles of law. In other words, they have to act judicially and reach their decisions in an objective manner and they cannot proceed purely administratively or base their conclusions on subjective tests or inclinations. The procedural rules which regulate the proceedings before the tribunals and the powers conferred on them in dealing with matters brought before them, are sometimes described as the "trappings of a court" and in determining the question as to whether a particular body or authority is a tribunal or not, sometimes a rough and ready test is applied by enquiring whether the said body or authority is clothed with the trappings of a court". In para 8, it was observed, ".....it would thus be noticed that apart from the importance of the trappings of a Court, the basic and essential condition which makes an authority or a body a tribunal under Article 136, is that it should be constituted by the State and should be invested with the State's inherent judicial power...". The Hon'ble Division Bench also referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Companies vs. P.N. Sharma and another, AIR 1965 SC 1595, wherein, it was held, ".....Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the Courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basis and the fundamental features which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State.

In considering the question about the status of any body or authority as a Tribunal under Article 136(1) the main test to be applied is whether the body or authority has been constituted by the State and has been clothed with the State's inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between parties and determine them on the merits fairly and objectively".

Applying the test laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Division Bench has held that an Additional/ Deputy Labour Commissioner while exercising power under sub-clause (6) of Clause LL of the Standing Orders functions as a Tribunal.

Before the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Mohd. Arif vs. M/s. Mirza Glass Works and Others (Supra), the question for consideration was as to whether the Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is a Tribunal. The Division Bench extracted Section 15 (1) and Section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, which are as below:-

"15. Claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims.-(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint [a presiding officer of any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or under any corresponding law relating to the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State or ] any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other office with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendirary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of wages, [of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters, incidental to such claims............."]

"Section 18 provides for powers of authorities appointed under Section 15 which is extracted below:-

Powers of authorities appointed under Section 15.-Every authority appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 15 shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and every such authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and of [Chapter-XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974).]"

The Division Bench has held, "From a conjoint reading of Section 15 (1) with Section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, it is clear that the authority empowered to decide claims arising out of deduction from wages is entrusted with all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes of taking evidence and for attendance and compelling the production of documents. Thus, the said authority has the trapping of Court and is a Tribunal. Any order, thus passed by the authority, under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, is an order passed by Tribunal. The Special Appeal being barred against an order of one Judge exercising Jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution arising out of a writ petition from an order of the Tribunal, the preliminary objection raised by Counsel for the respondents has substance. The appeal is barred under Chapter-VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court and is dismissed as not maintainable".

The provision of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and Section 15 as well as Section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act are similar except with some variations. There is no reason why the interpretation placed on Sections 15 and 18 of the Payment of Wages Act should not be applied in interpreting Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act.

In the matter of Hira Kalyan Das vs. The Additional Commissioner (Administration) (Supra), the appellant-petitioner filed the writ petition seeking quashing of the judgment and order dated 31.07.1984 passed by Prescribed Authority/Sub-Divisional Officer [under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (Act No.1 of 1961)], Dehradun and the Judgment & Order dated 15.03.1990 passed by Additional Commissioner (Administration), Garhwal Region, Pauri, Dehradun (Appellate Authority under Act No.1 of 1961). This High Court, after referring to the judgment passed in Sudershan Singh Bedi (Supra), has held that against the judgment passed in writ petition, which was dismissed, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India, a Special Appeal under Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules,1952 is not maintainable.

The Orders dated 08.03.2001, impugned in the Civil Misc. Writ Petition, were passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Varanasi in the exercise of his jurisdiction under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace ( Timely Payment of Wages) Act, 1978. The learned Single Judge, by the Judgment and Order dated 10.12.2007, allowed the writ petition. The Special Appeal was filed against the Judgment and Order of the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, in Special Appeal Defective No.319 of 2008, Silk and Kapda Karmchari Union (Supra), has held on 4.07.2012 that the Labour Commissioner, while exercising the power under the 1978 Act, particularly Section 3 thereof, acts as a Tribunal.

The Order impugned dated 03.08.2007 was passed by the Prescribed Authority under the Uttar Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972. That order was not a final decision. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on merit. Against the Judgment and Order of the learned Single Judge, Special Appeal was preferred. The Division Bench in Intezar Hussain and another (Supra) held that the Prescribed Authority would be a Tribunal.

Reverting to the question whether this Special Appeal is maintainable or not, we must consider the scheme of the Act. The Minimum Wages Act had been passed for the welfare of labour deriving legislative competence from Item No.27 of the Concurrent Legislative List in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, falls under Item No.24 of List III-Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. The object of the Act is to prevent exploitation of the worker and for that purpose it aims at fixation of minimum wages which the employers must pay and to decide all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages, or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under Clause (b) or Clause (c) of sub section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under Section 14, to employees employed or paid in that area, "Authority"/Labour Commissioner is appointed by the State Government. Therefore, the "Authority" is appointed to decide controversies arising under this Special Law. The "Authority"/Labour Commissioner records findings after hearing both the parties or giving them an opportunity of being heard and after such further enquiry, if any, as it may the authority consider necessary. Sub-section (6) of Section 20 lays down that the direction issued by the "Authority" shall be final. Therefore, the direction issued by the "Authority" shall not be questioned by any party before any Court and thus a finality is attached to the direction issued by the Authority. For issuing the direction, the "Authority" has been given, by sub-section (7), all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents. The said sub section lays down that every such authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) (Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973). The authority has been constituted by the State and has been clothed with the State's inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between the parties and to determine them on merits, fairly and objectively. The "Authority" under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, particularly Section 20 thereof, is constituted by the State and is invested with judicial power as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions.

Therefore, under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, the proceedings before the "Authority"/Labour Commissioner have the "trapping of a Court".

Applying the test laid down by the decisions as above mentioned, it is clear that the "Authority"/Labour Commissioner, while exercising the power under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, particularly Section 20 thereof, acts as a "Tribunal".

In Vajara Yojana Seed Farm (Supra), the Division Bench of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, after analyzing the provision of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, held that a Special Appeal, questioning the order of the learned Single Judge setting aside an Award of the Labour Court, was not maintainable.

In Shanta Kumar Belwal (Supra), a Division Bench of this High Court observed that a right of appeal is a creature of a statute and a litigant does not have an inherent right to prefer the appeal against an order or judgment unless such a right is conferred to the litigant by law as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another, 1981 (4) SCC 8, wherein it was held that the right of an appeal, available to a litigant, depends on the statute creating a right to appeal, and the order must be an order made appealable by the statute and has to satisfy the test. The Division Bench has held that the provision of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court makes it absolutely clear that no appeal shall lie against a judgment rendered in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgment, order or an award of a Tribunal.

For the reasons discussed above, in the result, the instant Special Appeal filed against the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2017 of learned Single Judge, passed in Writ Petition No.2005 of 2016 (M/S), is not maintainable under Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952.

The Special Appeal is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. The Special Appeal is accordingly dismissed at the stage of admission. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

Before we part with this Special Appeal, we place on record our deep appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered to this Court by Mr. Bhagwat Mehra, Advocate, learned Amicus Curiae, in this matter.