Uttam Biswal vs State Of Orissa And Ors.

Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J

Since both the applications arise from the same facts and involve the same parties, the same were taken up for hearing together and are being dealt with by this Common Judgment and Order.

This Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “A&C Act”) has been filed against the judgment dated 20.11.2024 passed by the learned District Judge, Kendrapara in Arbitration Proceeding No.1 of 2023 wherein the learned District Judge has allowed the petition filed by the present Respondents under Section 34 of the A&C Act thereby setting aside the award dated 1.12.2022 passed by the learned Arbitrator in Arbitration Proceeding No.2 of 2021. The Writ Petition is preferred by the Petitioner (Appellant in ARBA No.13 of 2025 making a prayer to quash the order dated 20.11.2024 passed by the learned District Judge, Kendrapara in Execution Proceeding No.50 of 2023 arising out of the award passed in Arbitration Proceeding No.2 of 2021.

I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

The brief facts of the case are that the Appellant was awarded the work of "Augmentation to Piped Water Supply to Village- Mahakalapada of Block Mahakalapada in the district of Kendrapara'' on 9.10.2017 by the Respondents vide tender notice dated 18.4.2017 which was to be completed within 10 months.

It is alleged by the Respondents that the Appellant did not start the work in time and a letter was issued to him that if work is not commenced within a week, i.e. by 4.4.2018, the contract was liable to be rescinded with imposition of fine.

Despite the notice, it is alleged that the work did not commence and therefore, the present Respondents rescinded the contract on 26.4.2018.

Being aggrieved by such recission, the present Appellant preferred ARBP No. 54/2018 before this Court seeking appointment of a sole arbitrator. Vide order dated 11.12.2020, Sri Bijay Kumar Das (Retd.) District Judge and Former Acting Chairman, Odisha Administrative Tribunal was appointed as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the dispute between the Parties.

Vide award dated 1.12. 2022, the Ld. Sole Arbitrator was pleased to hold that the recission of the contract by the respondent is illegal and arbitrary and the respondent has terminated the contract four months prior to the scheduled date of completion without invoking the provisions for extension of time and imposition of compensation and penalty. Accordingly, a sum of Rs.22,71,960/- was awarded as compensation for loss of profit and refund of security money along with pendent lite interest @ 18% from the date of recission of the contract till date which comes to Rs.16,35,811/- and in total Rs.39,07,771/- to the present Appellant with future interest if payment was not made within three months.

Being aggrieved, the present Respondents preferred an appeal under Section 34 of the A&C Act before the learned District Judge, Kendrapara in Arbitration Proceeding No.1 of 2023.

Vide judgment dated 20.11.2024, the Ld. District Judge was pleased to allow the appeal under Section 34 of the A&C Act and accordingly, set aside the award dated 1.12.2022 for being perverse and patently illegal.

Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 20.11.2024 passed by the Learned District Judge, Kendrapara in Arbitration Proceeding No.1 of 2023, the Appellant has preferred this appeal.

The present Appellant had also filed Execution Case No. 50 of 2023 in the court of the Ld. District Judge, Kendrapara for execution of the award. While allowing the Appeal of the Opposite Parties u/s 34 of the Act, the Ld. District Judge has also deemed it appropriate to dismiss Execution Case No. 50 of 2023 initiated by the present Appellant on the ground that the same has become infructuous by the judgment and order dated 20.11.2024. Aggrieved by this, the Appellant has preferred W.P.(C) No. 5117 of 2025 which is being taken up together with ARBA No. 13 of 2025 here presently.

Now that the facts leading up to the instant Appeal has been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to summarise the contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been raised to seek the exercise of this Court’s limited jurisdiction available under S. 37 of the A&C Act.

II. APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:

The learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Ld. District Judge has in a challenged under Section 34 of the A&C Act attempted to re-appreciate the entire evidence and re-assess the case of the parties which is not permissible in law. The Ld. District Judge has sought to substitute its own view for the Arbitrator’s view which again is beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.

Furthermore, it was argued that the present Appellant would have found a way to complete the work within the stipulated time or would have sought extension of time as provided for in the contract. The present Respondents ought to have waited till at least the entire period of time awarded to the Appellant was over before rescinding the contract in such a hurried manner.

It was also contended that the learned Arbitrator, has meticulously considered the facts of the case and the evidence on record, to pass the award, and as such the same warranted no interference.

III. RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS:

On the contrary, during course of hearing, learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that the contract was rescinded because of the abject non commencement of the work.

Furthermore, it was submitted that the Appellant, knowing fully well the nature of the work and the place of execution, accepted the contract; but subsequently, failed to execute the work, as he was supposed to. In such a scenario, the Respondents were fully within their jurisdiction to rescind the contract, which was a time-bound one. So, there was no illegality in the rescission of the contract.

It was also contended that the learned Arbitrator, without considering the facts of the case and the evidence on record, has passed the award, and as such the same is patently illegal.

It was earnestly contended that there is absolutely no illegality in the judgment of the Ld. District Judge for which the Court may feel inclined to interfere with the same.

IV. ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION:

Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record, this court here has identified the following solitary issue to be determined:

A. Whether the order of the Ld. District Judge warrants interference keeping in mind the limitations of this court’s powers under Section 37 of the A&C Act?

V. ISSUE A: WHETHER THE ORDER OF THE LD. DISTRICT JUDGE WARRANTS ANY INTERFERENCE KEEPING IN MIND THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS COURT’S POWERS UNDER SECTION 37 OF THE A&C ACT?

Before going into the merits of the contentions, it is necessary to outline the ambit and scope of Section 37(2)(b) of the 1996 Act. The said section is extracted below:

“37. Appealable orders.—(1)[Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal] shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from ∗∗∗original decrees of the court passing the order, namely:

(2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the Arbitral Tribunal—

(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 16; or

(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17.”

The Supreme Court and this Court in catena of judgments have held that the powers of appellate court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) of the 1996 Act against orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is very restricted and narrow and the same should be exercised when the orders seems to be perverse, arbitrary and contrary to law. The judgment of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.[ 1990 Supp SCC 727] passed by the Apex Court, elaborates the ambit and scope of the appeals. Although the aforesaid judgment is not dealing with the arbitration proceedings but the same deals with the power of appellate court in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). Operative paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are extracted below:

“13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the Appellate Bench fell into error on two important propositions. The first is a misdirection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order. The second pertains to the infirmities in the ratiocination as to the quality of antox's alleged user of the trade mark on which the passing-off action is founded. We shall deal with these two separately.

The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) (P) Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph (SCC OnLine SC para 9)

‘9. …These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston “the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a to the application of well-settled principles in an individual case.”’

The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.”

The aforesaid judgment has been consistently followed and applied by various Courts across the country while adjudicating matters arising under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Reference may be made to Green Infra Wind Energy Ltd. v. Regen Powertech (P) Ltd.[ 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8273]; Sona Corpn. India (P) Ltd. v. Ingram Micro India (P) Ltd.[ 2020 SCC OnLine Del 300]; Manish Aggarwal v. RCI Industries & Technologies Ltd.[ (2022) 3 HCC (Del) 289]; Tahal Consulting Engineers India (P) Ltd. v. Promax Power Ltd.[ 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2069] and Handicraft & Handlooms Exports Co. of India v. SMC Comtrade Ltd.[ 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3981]. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid decision has been reiterated and followed with approval, thereby reinforcing its authoritative value in the domain of arbitral jurisprudence.

In Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa[(2024) 1 SCC 479], the Apex Court noticing its previous decision in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.[ (2019) 4 SCC 163] has noted the limited scope of interference under Section 34 and further narrower scope of appeal under Section 37 of the Act particularly when dealing with the concurrent findings of the arbitrator and that of the Court.

Relevant paragraph ‘14’ of MMTC Ltd.(supra) as noted in paragraph ‘26’ in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.(supra) is to be extracted hereinunder:—

“14. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under Section34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.”

The same view has been expressed in UHL Power Company Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh[(2022) 4 SCC 116] in paragraph ‘16’ while noticing paragraph ‘11’ in MMTC Ltd.(supra):—

“16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. In MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293], the reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the ArbitrationAct have been explained in the following words : (SCC pp. 166-67, para 11)

“11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223(CA)] reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent illegality” itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract.”

In Haryana Tourism Ltd. v. Kandhari Beverages Ltd.[ 2022) 3 SCC 237] as noted in paragraph ‘30’ in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.(supra), it was held on the scope of interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act' 1996 as under:—

“30. In Haryana Tourism [Haryana Tourism Ltd. v. Kandhari Beverages Ltd., (2022) 3 SCC 237 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 87], this Court yet again pointed out the limited scope of interference under Sections 34 and37 of the Act; and disapproved interference by the High Court under Section 37 of the Act while entering into merits of the claim in the following words : (SCC p. 240, paras 8-9)

“8. So far as the impugned judgment and order [Kandhari Beverages Ltd. v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 3233] passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the award and the order passed by the Additional District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act are concerned, it is required to be noted that in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the High Court has entered into the merits of the claim, which is not permissible in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

As per settled position of law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, an award can be set aside only if the award is against the public policy of India. The award can be set aside under Sections 34/37 of the Arbitration Act, if the award is found to be contrary to : (a) fundamental policy of Indian Law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality; or (d) if it is patently illegal. None of the aforesaid exceptions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The High Court has entered into the merits of the claim and has decided the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act as if the High Court was deciding the appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. Thus, the High Court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The impugned judgment andorder [Kandhari Beverages Ltd. v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 3233] passed by the High Court is hence not sustainable.”

It was, thus, observed in paragraph ‘33’ of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.(supra) as under:—

“33. Keeping in view the aforementioned principles enunciated by this Court with regard to the limited scope of interference in an arbitral award by a Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section34 of the Act, which is all the more circumscribed in an appeal under Section 37, we may examine the rival submissions of the parties in relation to the matters dealt with by the High Court.”

It is observed in Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills[2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632] that:

“9. The object of the Act is to provide for a speedy and inexpensive alternative mode of settlement of dispute with the minimum of intervention of the courts. Section 5 of the Act is implicit in this regard and prohibits interference by the judicial authority with the arbitration proceedings except where so provided in Part-I of the Act. The judicial interference, if any, is provided inter-alia only by means of Sections 34 and 37 of the Act respectively.

Section 34 of the Act provides for getting an arbitral award set aside by moving an application in accordance with sub-Section (2) andsub-Section (3) of Section 34 of the Act which inter-alia provide for the grounds on which an arbitral award is liable to be set aside. One of the main grounds for interference or setting aside an award is where the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India i.e. if the award is induced or affected by fraud or corruption or is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law or it is in conflict with most basic notions of morality and justice. A plain reading of Section 34 reveals that the scope of interference by the court with the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited and the court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid scope to find out if the award is good or bad.

Section 37 of the Act provides for a forum of appeal inter-alia against the order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act. The scope of appeal is naturally akin to andlimited to the grounds enumerated under Section 34 of the Act.

It is pertinent to note that an arbitral award is not liable to be interfered with only on the ground that the award is illegal or is erroneous in law that too upon reappraisal of the evidence adduced before the arbitral trial.

Even an award which may not be reasonable or is non- speaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the courts. It is also well settled that even if two views are possible there is no scope for the court to reappraise the evidence and to take the different view other than that has been taken by the arbitrator. The view taken by the arbitrator is normally acceptable and ought to be allowed to prevail.

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It is equally settled law that the appellate power under Section 37of the Act is not akin to the normal appellate jurisdiction vested in the civil courts for the reason that the scope of interference of the courts with arbitral proceedings or award is very limited, confined to the ambit of Section 34 of the Act only and even that power cannot be exercised in a casual and a cavalier manner. xxxxxx

It is seen that the scope of interference in an appeal under Section37 of the Act is restricted and subject to the same grounds on which an award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. In other words, the powers under Section 37 vested in the court of appeal are not beyond the scope of interference provided under Section 34 of the Act.”

The Supreme Court has once again reaffirmed the settled legal position that an arbitral award, even if it appears to be not wholly reasonable or is partially nonspeaking, does not, for that reason alone, warrant interference by the Court. It is now trite that where two plausible views are possible on the basis of the material placed before the arbitral tribunal, the Court, while exercising its limited supervisory jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, cannot re-appreciate the evidence or substitute its own view for that of the arbitrator. The interpretation adopted by the arbitral tribunal, if found to be a possible and rational view, must ordinarily command judicial deference and be permitted to stand.

In Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project[(2023) 9 SCC 85] referring to MMTC Limited (supra) it has been held that:

“19….The scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal appellate jurisdiction. It is well-settled that courts ought not to interfere with the arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle courts to reverse the findings of the arbitral tribunal…”

In Dyna Technology Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited[(2019) 20 SCC 1], the Apex Court observed as under:

“24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.

Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.”

Judicial interference with arbitral awards is narrowly circumscribed under Indian law. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, prescribes the exclusive grounds for challenge, confined to jurisdictional errors, procedural irregularities, violation of natural justice, or patent illegality. Courts cannot intervene merely because an alternative view appears more plausible. The appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 is still narrower, limited to examining whether the court under Section 34 acted within its statutory remit. Reappraisal of evidence or reconsideration of factual findings is impermissible. The legislative design of Sections 34 and 37 thus underscores the finality, autonomy, and minimal judicial oversight that form the cornerstone of arbitral jurisprudence.

It is now firmly established that judicial review under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is not an appellate exercise on facts or merits. The court’s jurisdiction is narrowly confined to examining jurisdictional errors, procedural improprieties, violations of natural justice, or patent illegality apparent on the face of the award. The appellate power under Section 37 is even more circumscribed, being limited to verifying whether the Section 34 court acted within its statutory bounds. The existence of an alternative or even a more plausible view does not justify interference. The appellate court is not a second forum of first instance and cannot substitute its own interpretation for that of the arbitral tribunal absent a manifest miscarriage of justice or jurisdictional transgression. The statutory framework thus upholds arbitration as an autonomous, self-contained process, shielded from excessive judicial intervention and governed by the principle of minimal court interference.

When interpreting Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it must be read in conjunction with Section 5, which enshrines the legislative policy of minimal judicial intervention. Section 5 unequivocally restricts court interference in arbitral proceedings to instances expressly sanctioned by the Act—a limitation that is substantive, not merely procedural. Accordingly, the appellate jurisdiction under Section 37, particularly under clause (2)(b), is narrowly circumscribed by both the statutory design and the overarching principle of arbitral autonomy. Unlike conventional civil appeals, scrutiny under the Arbitration Act does not extend to a reappraisal of evidence or discretionary determinations. The legislative intent is to safeguard the finality and integrity of arbitral adjudication and to prevent its erosion through prolonged judicial scrutiny. Orders of the arbitral tribunal, even at interlocutory stages, merit judicial deference unless vitiated by patent illegality, manifest arbitrariness, or perversity. Courts must eschew the temptation to substitute their own view merely because an alternative interpretation appears more plausible. Party autonomy remains the bedrock of the arbitral regime, and judicial oversight must remain confined within the narrow parameters delineated by Sections 5, 34, and 37 of the Act.

The judiciary's intervention in arbitral matters must be exercised with utmost caution, especially where the arbitral tribunal’s decisions reflect reasonable interpretations of contractual terms or factual matrices. The 1996 Act was introduced with the explicit objective of limiting the role of courts, ensuring faster and more efficient resolution of disputes outside traditional litigation. Consequently, appellate courts under Section 37 must act with deliberate restraint, only intervening when the arbitral process has clearly deviated from established legal standards. This includes instances of perversity, gross arbitrariness, or when settled legal principles have been ignored or misapplied. Importantly, arbitral decisions—even at interim stages—deserve judicial respect unless a substantial illegality is apparent. The appellate court’s function is supervisory, not substitutive. It is not tasked with forming a fresh opinion but must ensure that the arbitral tribunal's discretion has been exercised within legal bounds. In other words, Section 37 does not allow for wholesale re-litigation of disputes that have already been adjudicated by an arbitral forum. The credibility of the arbitration system hinges on this judicial discipline. Allowing appeals to turn into de facto retrials would defeat the very purpose of choosing arbitration over courtroom adjudication.

The foundational framework of the Arbitration Act reflects an express intent to exclude ordinary civil appellate practices in arbitral matters. The powers conferred under Section 37(2)(b) are not akin to those under civil appellate jurisdiction, where factual reappraisal and discretionary judgments are routine. Rather, the Act envisions a system where arbitral orders are largely immune from judicial revisitation unless a serious and demonstrable breach of procedure or law occurs. This philosophy is rooted in the recognition that arbitration is a consensual mechanism designed to bypass the complexities and delays of civil litigation. Courts, therefore, must respect the principle of finality, stepping in only where an order of the arbitral tribunal is tainted by evident perversity or gross misapplication of law.

In view of the above position in law on the subject, the scope of the intervention of the court in arbitral matters is virtually prohibited, if not absolutely barred and that the interference is confined only to the extent envisaged under Section 34 of the Act. The appellate power of Section 37 of the Act is limited within the domain of Section 34 of the Act. It is exercisable only to find out if the court, exercising power under Section 34 of the Act, has acted within its limits as prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or failed to exercise the power so conferred. The Appellate Court has no authority of law to consider the matter in dispute before the arbitral tribunal on merits so as to find out as to whether the decision of the arbitral tribunal is right or wrong upon reappraisal of evidence as if it is sitting in an ordinary court of appeal. It is only where the court exercising power under Section 34 has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it by Section 34 or has travelled beyond its jurisdiction that the appellate court can step in and set aside the order passed under Section 34 of the Act. Its power is more akin to that superintendence as is vested in civil courts while exercising revisionary powers. The arbitral award is not liable to be interfered unless a case for interference as set out in the earlier part of the decision, is made out. It cannot be disturbed only for the reason that instead of the view taken by the arbitral tribunal, the other view which is also a possible view is a better view according to the appellate court.

It must also be remembered that proceedings under Section 34 of the Act are summary in nature and are not like a full-fledged regular civil suit. Therefore, the scope of Section 37 of the Act is much more summary in nature and not like an ordinary civil appeal. The award as such cannot be touched unless it is contrary to the substantive provision of law; any provision of the Act or the terms of the agreement.

It is within this statutory and jurisprudential framework that the present appeal must be evaluated. The core issue for consideration here is whether the manner of setting aside of the award by the Ld. District Court, warrants interference under Section 37 of the Act.

The Learned Arbitrator has concluded that time was not of the essence of the contract, given the explicit provision allowing for the extension of the intended completion date, and the provision for the payment of liquidated damages in case of delays. Furthermore, the Arbitrator found that, with four months still remaining before the expiration of the completion deadline, the termination of the contract was both premature and arbitrary, lacking proper invocation of the contract's provisions. In this context, the Learned District Judge examined Clause 4 and Clause 28 of the contract, which provided mechanisms for extending the completion date, and emphasized the distinction between an extension of time for completion of work and an extension for commencement of work. Moreover, the District Judge reviewed Clause 54, which addresses termination in the case of a fundamental breach of the contract. The District Judge observed that the clause did not explicitly authorize termination due to non-commencement of work, although it did not rule out such a possibility. After assessing the evidence, including a letter marked Ext.C/12 which purportedly imposed an ultimatum for the commencement of work, the District Judge concluded that the Arbitrator had erred by ignoring this critical evidence, thereby rendering the Arbitrator's award legally flawed.

This Court finds that the Learned Arbitrator is the primary authority when it comes to evaluating and interpreting the evidence presented during the arbitration proceedings. The Arbitrator is entrusted with the responsibility of weighing the relevance, credibility, and weight of the evidence in order to arrive at an informed decision. In this regard, the Arbitrator's findings and conclusions, grounded in the evidence before him, are binding and final. Courts, upon reviewing such findings, should not substitute their own judgment for that of the Arbitrator, unless there is a clear and evident error of law or fact. The Arbitrator's discretion in assessing evidence is paramount, as he or she is the sole arbiter of the factual matrix of the case.

It is also well-established in legal precedent that a court, when reviewing an arbitral award, is not entitled to reappraise the evidence or reconsider the factual aspects of the case. The court's role is confined to ensuring that the award is not vitiated by legal errors or procedural irregularities. The court is not a forum for a fresh evaluation of the evidence or for substituting its own conclusions for those reached by the Arbitrator.

A reviewing court cannot substitute its own view or judgment in place of that of the Arbitrator merely because it believes its perspective might be superior or more reasonable. The court must respect the Arbitrator's role as the decision-maker based on the facts and evidence presented during the arbitration process. The standard of review does not permit the court to override the Arbitrator’s conclusions simply because it might prefer a different outcome.

The impugned order, which seeks to set aside the award of the Arbitrator, should not be readily upheld. Upon careful review, it becomes evident that the award, while subject to scrutiny, does not exhibit characteristics of being patently illegal. There is no manifest error of law or fact that would justify a complete disregard for the Arbitrator’s findings. The courts should exercise caution before interfering with an arbitral award, particularly in the absence of glaring irregularities. Unless the award is shown to have violated established principles of law, it should not be set aside on the grounds of perceived legal deficiencies that are not sufficiently egregious.

Courts are generally reluctant to interfere with the findings of an Arbitrator, as arbitration is meant to provide a swift and conclusive resolution to disputes. The courts’ jurisdiction to review arbitral awards is limited and narrow in scope, intended only to address issues of legality, fairness, or procedural error. Judicial intervention in arbitral awards is an exception rather than the rule. Courts should be cautious not to undermine the efficiency of the arbitration process, which is designed to provide a more expedient and specialized forum for dispute resolution. As such, intervention should be sparing and only when it is absolutely necessary to correct clear and material legal flaws in the award, which is not the case in the present matter.

VI. CONCLUSION:

In the above context, it cannot be said the view taken in the impugned award is not even a possible view, so as to warrant interference in proceedings under Section 34 and/or 37 of the A & C Act. On the contrary, the approach of the arbitrator appears to be judicious taking into account the attendant facts and circumstance.

In the circumstances, there is no justification to interfere with the findings in the impugned award in respect of the aforesaid claims, having regard to the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and/or 37 of the A&C Act.

As ARBA No.13 of 2025 is allowed, with regards to the prayer made in W.P.(C) No.5117 of 2025, this Court deems it appropriate to not delve into merits, but to quash the order dated 20.11.2024 passed in Execution Proceeding No.50 of 2023 and restore the same before the court of the learned District Judge, Kendrapara.

ARBA No.13 of 2025 and W.P.(C) No.5117 of 2025 are disposed on the abovementioned terms. No order as to costs.

Interim order, if any, passed earlier in any of the aforesaid Application/ Petition stands vacated.