Upendrakumar Jugeshwar Gupta vs Union Of India & Ors.

Heard Mr. Dipak R. Dave, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Shushil R. Shukla, learned advocate appearing for the respondents at length.

By way of the present petition, the petitioner herein has prayed for the following reliefs:

For the reasons stated herein above and such other as may be advanced at the time of hearing of this petition, the petitioner above respectfully prays that:-named most (A) A writ of mandamus and/or any order other appropriate writ, direction be issued

to quash and set aside office order dated 13.08.2015 respondent passed Nos. 4 ordering by removal from service to the petitioner and consequential order of reinstatement of the petitioner with all consequential benefits may kindly be orderd.;

to quash and set aside the order dated 11.01.2016 passed by respondent No.3 rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner;

to quash and set order passed aside the by the respondent no.2 in revision petition confirming the order of removal from service; (B) Pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay the implementation orders further and dated 11.01.2016 and further be execution, operation of 13.08.2015, 26.06.2016 pleased and to direct respondent Nos.2 to 4 to allow the petitioner to resume duty; (C) Any other and further relief reliefs to or which this Hon'ble Court deemed fit, in the interest of justice; may kindly be granted;”

Briefly stated that the petitioner herein joined in General Reserve Engineer Force - Multi Skilled Worker (Pioneer) [for short, “GREF - MSW (PNR)”] as on 11.01.2010 and was on probation period when he was on sanctioned casual leave from 16.02.2012 to 06.03.2013. Since his father met with an accident, the petitioner gave an application to the Commandant GREF, Cargill requesting to accept his resignation.

Thereafter, the petitioner joined in 221^st Battalion (BN) Central Reserve Police Force (for short, “CRPF”) on 27.02.2012 and he was under the impression that he already had submitted his resignation to GREF. The petitioner also made frequent application as well for other required documents and in all fairness there were no other pending proceedings or charge against the petitioner in GREF and in view thereof, the petitioner’s resignation came to be accepted on 01.11.2014. However, the same was communicated to the petitioner by the administrative order of GREF by Letter No. 96 dated 06.07.2015 and the said discharge certificate was also brought to the notice of the competent official seeking relief. Suddenly upon completing service of more than 3 years the petitioner received memo of charge to dated 28.03.2015 with a direction to the petitioner to submit show cause in view of his earlier service with GREF and in the interregnum period, joining CRPF on 27.02.2012 without admitting resignation in GREF.

It is the case of the petitioner that inspite of the discharge certificate issued to the petitioner on 13.08.2015, an order came to be passed by the respondent no. 4 - the Commandant 221^st Battalion, CRPF removing the petitioner from his service. The aforesaid gave rise to the filing of appeal before the before the respondent no.3 - Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP), Gandhinagar Range, CRPF, Gujarat which came to be dismissed by the impugned order dated 11.01.2016. The petitioner moved a revision petition before Inspector General CRPF, Belaganj, New Mumbai, Maharastra, which also came to be rejected on 26.06.2016.

The petitioner thereafter approached Hon’ble the Patna High by preferring a writ wherein by order dated 10.07.2017 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1687 of 2016, the order passed in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 11666 of 2016 was confirmed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. In view thereof, the petitioner approached this Court by preferring the present petition.

Mr. Dave, learned advocate at the outset submits that the orders passed by the Appellate Authority dated 11.01.2016 and the Revisional Authority dated 21.06.2016 confirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority are unreasoned orders. It is submitted it is incumbent to pass a reasoned order by the competent authorities.

To substantiate the submissions, reliance is placed on the order passed in Special Civil Application No. 1743 of 2012 dated 21.03.2025 duly confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1020 of 2025 dated 15.09.2025 wherein, it is held that reasons are the heart of the order. It is submitted that both authorities erred while passing orders without any reasons.

Mr. Shukla, learned advocate for the respondents is not in a position to dispute the aforesaid factual position brought to the notice of the Court by Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the petitioner.

It is not in dispute that the petitioner was issued a discharge certificate on 01.11.2014 which was communicated to the petitioner by the Administrative Officer of GREF vide Letter No. 96 dated 06.07.2015. The said certificate was also brought to the notice of the competent officials seeking relief. Upon completion of more than three years of service, the petitioner was issued the memo of charge dated 28.03.2015 with a direction to the petitioner to submit show cause in view of his earlier service with GREF and meanwhile, joining CRPF on 27.02.2012 without submiting resignation of GREF. The respondent no. 4 - the Commandant 221^st Battalion, CRPF removed the petitioner from service by initiating departmental proceedings against the petitioner.

Being aggrieved by the said order dated 13.08.2015, the petitioner was constrained to file appeal before the respondent no. 3 -DGIP, Gandhinagar Range, CRPF, Gujarat which came to be dismissed by the impugned order dated 11.01.2016. The petitioner thereafter, moved a revision petition before Inspector General CRPF, Belaganj, New Mumbai, Maharastra, which also came to be rejected by order dated 26.06.2016.

Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, upon perusal of the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 11.01.2016 and order passed by the Revisional Authority dated 21.06.2016, it emerges that both the orders merely record the facts, however, both the orders fail to assign any reasons to confirm the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority.

Upon perusal of the impugned orders passed by the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority as referred to herein-above, the said orders are unreasoned orders.

In the opinion of this Court, reasons are the heart of an order and an unreasoned order could prejudicially affect the rights of the petitioner herein which is well settled position of law.

At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the order passed in Special Civil Application No. 1743 of 2012 dated 21.03.2025 which is duly confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1020 of 2025. The relevant paragraphs of the said petition being Special Civil Application No. 1743 of 2012 read thus: “10. In the opinion of this Court, validity of an order hinges on the relevance and adequacy of the reasons assigned. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decisions emphasized that providing reasons for an order is a fundamental principle of natural justice. 10.1 At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Director (Marketing), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Santosh Kumar, reported in 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 388. Paragraphs 6 and 9 of the said decision read thus: “6. Before the High Court, a solitary contention was raised on behalf of respondent stating that despite a detailed response preferred by the respondent herein, the Appellate Authority passed the order dated 15.5.2000 without considering any of the issues raised by the respondent herein as petitioner in the writ petition. The learned Judges of the High Court had also perused the records placed before them by the Corporation. It is seen from the impugned order passed by the High Court that the Judges were satisfied that no reasons whatever had been recorded in either not accepting the issues raised by the respondent in response to the show cause notice nor had the claim of the respondent made in the various grounds raised by him in his appeal been considered. The learned Judges of the Division Bench felt that the orders of punishment dated 30.12.1999 as well as the order dated 15.5.2000 by which the respondent's appeal had been rejected are cryptic and non-speaking orders and, therefore, the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority are liable to be set-aside on the ground of non-application of mind. The High Court also held that the action taken by the authorities is arbitrary. However, the learned Judges, while setting- aside the order of dismissal as well as the appellate order, issued a direction to the appellant-Corporation to reinstate into service with continuity in service with all consequential benefits. Liberty was also reserved to the appellant to re-initiate the enquiry from the stage of consideration by the Punishing Authority and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.

We have also perused the order passed by the General Manager (Operations) which is available at page 51 and the order passed by the Director (Marketing) who is the appellate authority. A close scrutiny of both the orders would only go to show that the Appellate Authority has simply adopted the language employed by the Disciplinary Authority and inflicted the punishment of dismissal on the respondent herein.” 10.2 It is also apposite to refer to the decision rendered inLetters Patent Appeal No.1464 of 2004, dated 29.11.2011 Paragraphs 2 of the said order reads thus: “2. The respondent was serving as s Superintendent Engineer in the State Government and he retired on 31.12.1996. A departmental inquiry was initiated against him on 25.11.1994, and after the retirement the respondent No.1 by order 16.11.1998 a monthly cut of Rs.200/- on permanent basis from the pension of the respondent- workman has been imposed by the appellant. The respondent challenged the order dated 16.11.1998 by filing Special Civil Application No.2696 of 1999 which has been allowed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the disciplinary authority while awarding the pension has not considered the representation of the respondent and straightway passed the order of monthly cut of of Rs.200/- on permanent basis from the pension of the respondent without assigning any reasons. The relevant observations made by the learned Single Judge reads as under: “The submissions made by the learned advocates for the parties have been considered by me. After the respondent authority issued show cause notice and supplied the findings recorded by the inquiry officer to the petitioner while calling the explanation from the petitioner about the proposed punishment, the petitioner submitted detailed reply on 8.12.1997 which is at page 31 to 34 wherein various contentions including the contention that the findings have been vitiated and contradictory were raised and though the reply was submitted by the petitioner against the proposed punishment and though the findings recorded by the inquiry officer were challenged by the petitioner, the authority has not at all discussed as to what is the answer or explanation given by the petitioner and what are the contentions raised by the petitioner in his answer or explanation given by the petitioner and why the same are not acceptable and on what ground, they are not acceptable. Bare reading of the order in question would make it clear that it does not disclose anything in that regard and, therefore, this court is of the view that it amounts to non application of mind and it is an unreasoned order and, therefore, contrary to the law laid down by the apex court in the matter of Anilkumar versus Presiding Officer and others reported in 1985 SCC 1121 that the findings given by the inquiry officer are required to be reasoned one. Same principle would also apply to the facts of the present case. The respondents herein have also, after serving show cause notice as well as the findings of the inquiry officer to the petitioner and after receiving reply cum explanation of the petitioner as to why the punishment proposed should not be imposed, passed order of punishment without considering the reply of the petitioner and also without assigning any reason as to why the explanation tendered by the petitioner is not acceptable. Therefore, in absence of such discussion, in absence of reasons, I am of the opinion that the order in question is required to be quashed and set aside on that ground alone and without entering into other aspects of the matter.” 10.3 The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Moni Shankar Vs. Union of India & Anr., reported in 2008 (3) SCC 484 in paragraphs 4, 9 and 10 has observed as under: “4. In the said departmental proceeding, appellant inter alia raised a contention as regard to non compliance of paragraphs 704 and 705 of the Railway Vigilance Manual (the Manual) in the manner in which the purported trap was laid. It was furthermore contended that provisions of Rule 9(21) of the Railway Servant Discipline and Appeal Rules have not been complied with.

Dr. R.G. Padia, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would contend :

That finding of fact having been arrived at by the disciplinary authority, the same should not have been interfered with by the Tribunal particularly when some evidences have been led on behalf of the department.

The High Court has rightly opined that paragraphs 704 and 705 of the Manual pertaining to the manner in which the trap could be laid, contain only administrative instructions and are, thus, not enforceable in a court of law.

Since there was sufficient compliance of Rule 9(21), the impugned judgment should not be interfered with.

We may at the outset notice that with a view to protect innocent employees from such traps, appropriate safeguards have been provided in the Railway Manual. Paragraphs 704 and 705 thereof read thus :-"704. Traps. - (i)-(iv)

When laying a trap, the following important points have to be kept in view:

Two or more independent witnesses must hear the conversation, which should establish that the money was being passed as illegal gratification to meet the defence that the money was actually received as a loan or something else, if put up by the accused.

The transaction should be within the sight and hearing of two independent witnesses.

There should be an opportunity to catch the culprit red-handed immediately after passing of the illegal gratification so that the accused may not be able to dispose it of.

The witnesses selected should be responsible witnesses who have not appeared as witnesses in earlier cases of the department or the police and are men of status, considering the status of the accused. It is safer to take witnesses who are Government employees and of other departments.

After satisfying the above conditions, the Investigating Officer should take the decoy to the SP/SPE and pass on the information to him for necessary action. If the office of the S.P., S.P.E., is not nearby and immediate action is required for laying the trap, the help of the local police may be obtained. It may be noted that the trap can be laid only by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Local Police. After the S.P.E. or local police official have been entrusted with the work, all arrangements for laying the trap and execution of the same should be done by them. All necessary help required by them should be rendered. (vi)-(vii)

Departmental Traps. - For Departmental traps, the following instructions in addition to those contained under paras 704 are to be followed:

The Investigating Officer/Inspector should arrange two gazetted officers from Railways to act as independent witnesses as far as possible. However, in certain exceptional cases where two gazetted officers are not available immediately, the services of non-gazetted staff can be utilised. All employees, particularly, gazetted officers, should assist and witness a trap whenever they are approached by any officer or branch. The Head of Branch detail a suitable person or persons to be present at the scene of trap. Refusal to assist or witness a trap without a just cause/without sufficient reason may be regarded as a breach of duty, making him liable to disciplinary action.

The decoy will present the money which he will give to the defaulting officers/employees as bribe money on demand. A memo should be prepared by the Investigating Officer/Inspector in the presence of the independent witnesses and the decoy indicating the numbers of the G.C. notes for legal and illegal transactions. The memo, thus prepared should bear the signature of decoy, independent witnesses and the Investigating Officer/Inspector. Another memo, for returning the G.D. notes to the decoy will be prepared for making over the G.C. notes to the delinquent employee on demand. This memo should also contain signatures of decoy, witnesses and Investigating Officer/Inspector. The independent witnesses will take up position at such a place where from they can see the transaction and also hear the conversation between the decoy and delinquent, with a view to satisfy themselves that the money was demanded, given and accepted as bribe a fact to which they will be deposing in the departmental proceeding at a later date. After the money has been passed on, the Investigating Officer/Inspector should disclose the identity and demand, in the presence of the witnesses, to produce all money including private, and bribe money. Then the total money produced will be verified from relevant records and memo for seizure of the money and verification particulars will be prepared. The recovered notes will be kept in an envelope sealed in the presence of the witnesses, decoy and the accused as also his immediate superior who should be called s a witness in case the accused refuses to sign the recovery memo, and sealing of the notes in the envelope. (c)-(d) * * *” 10.4 Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594 in paragraphs 9, 15, 24, 25, 26, 32, 35, 36, 39 and 40, has observed as under: “9. The question under consideration can be divided into two parts:

Is there any general principle of law which requires an administrative authority to record the reasons for its decision; and (ii) If so, does the said principle apply to an order confirming the findings and sentence of a Court-Martial and post-confirmation proceedings under the Act?

The Committee on Ministers' Powers (Donoughmore Commit-tee) in its report submitted in 1932, recommended that "any party affected by a decision should be informed of the reasons on which the decision is based" and that "such a decision should be in the form of a reasoned document available to the parties affected." (P. 100) The Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (Franks Committee) in its report submitted in 1957, recommended that "decisions of tribunals should be reasoned and as full as possible." The said Committee has observed: "Almost all witnesses have advocated the giving of reasoned decisions by tribunals. We are convinced that if tribunal proceedings are to be fair to the citizen reasons should be given to the fullest practicable extent. A decision is apt to be better if the reasons for it have to be set out in writing because the reasons are then more likely to have been properly thought out. Further, a reasoned decision is essential in order that, where there is a right of appeal, the applicant can assess whether he has good grounds of appeal and know the case he will have to meet if he decides to appeal."

In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and Others, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 466 the order passed by the Central Government dismissing the revision petition under Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Roles, 1960, was challenged before this Court on the ground that it did not contain reasons. Bachawat, J., speaking for himself and Mudholkar, J., re- jected this contention on the view that the reason for rejecting the revision application appeared on the face of the order because the Central Government had agreed with the reasons given by the State Government in its order. The learned Judges did not agree with the submission that omission to give reasons for the decision is of itself a sufficient ground for quash- ing it and held that for the purpose of an appeal under Article 136 orders of courts and tribunals stand on the same footing. The learned Judges pointed out that an order of court dismissing a revision application often gives no reasons but this is not a sufficient ground for quashing it and likewise an order of an administrative tribunal reject- ing a revision application cannot be pronounced to be in- valid on the sole ground that it does not give reasons for the rejection. The decision in Hari Nagar Sugar Mills case (supra) was distinguished on the ground that in that case the Central Government had reversed the decision appealed against without giving any reasons and the record did not disclose any apparent ground for the reversal. According to the learned Judges there is a vital difference between an order of reversal and an order of affirmance. Subba Rao, J., as he then was, did to concur with this view and found that the order of the Central Government was vitiated as it did not disclose any reasons for rejecting the revision application. The learned Judge has observed: "In the context of a welfare State, administrative tribunals have come to stay. Indeed, they are the necessary concomi- tants of a Welfare State. But arbitrariness in their func- tioning destroys the concept of a welfare State itself. Self-discipline and supervision exclude or at any rate minimize arbitrariness. The least a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimizes arbitrariness; it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory court to keep the tribunals within bounds, A reasoned order is a desirable condition of judicial disposal." "If tribunals can make orders without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officer may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of power. But, if reasons for an order are given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if its discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations, will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard." "There is an essential distinction between a court and an administrative tribunal. A Judge is trained to look at things objectively, uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency; but an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. The habit of mind of an executive officer so formed cannot be expected to change from function to function or from act to act. So it is essential that some restrictions shall be imposed on tribunals in the matter of passing orders affect-ing the rights of parties; and the least they should do is to give reasons for their orders. Even in the case of appel- late courts invariably reasons are given, except when they dismiss an appeal or revision in limine and that is because the appellate or revisional court agrees with the reasoned judgment of the subordinate court or there are no legally permissible grounds to interfere with it. But the same reasoning cannot apply to an appellate tribunal, for as often as not the order of the first tribunal is laconic and does not give any reasons."

With reference to an order of affirmance the learned Judge observed that where the original tribunal gives rea-sons, the appellate tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing with those reasons and that what is essential is that reasons shall be given by an appellate or revisional tribunal expressly or by refer-ence to those given by the original tribunal.

This matter was considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagat Raja case (supra) where also the order under challenge had been passed by the Central Government in exercise of its revisional powers under Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 read with rules 54 and 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. Dealing with the question as to whether it was incum- bent on the Central Government to give any reasons for its decision on review this Court has observed: "The decisions of tribunals in India are subject to the supervisory powers of the High Courts under Art. 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of this Court under Art. 136. It goes without saying that both the High Court and this Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single word "rejected", or "dismissed". In such a case, this Court can probably only exercise its appeallate jurisdiction satisfactorily by examining the entire records of the case and after giving a hearing come to its conclusion on the merits of the appeal. This will certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing with the appeal."

In Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Limited case (supra) this Court was dealing with an appeal against the order of the Central Government on a revision application under the Sea Customs Act, 1878. This Court has laid down: "It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons." (P 495) "If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then along administrative authorities and tribunals, exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partera, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and merepretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law."

The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American Courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the Court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary Courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency.

Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the re- cording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.

The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fairplay in action." As pointed out earlier the requirement about re-cording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keep- ing in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi- judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that affect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the sub- ject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweight the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case.

For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.”

Upon harmonious consideration of the facts of the present case read with the position of law, as referred above, this is a fit case to exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The impugned orders are non-speaking orders; violative of principles of natural justice, are required to be quashed and set aside.”

Considering the aforesaid factual position which is not in dispute, the impugned orders passed by the Appellate Authority dated 11.01.2016 and the Revisional Authority dated 21.06.2016 being unreasoned orders are non-speaking orders and are violative of principles of natural justice and are required to be quashed and set aside which are hereby quashed and set aside in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The matter is remanded back to the Appellate Authority to decide the Appeal Bearing no. R-13-1/2015 preferably within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of this order, independently and in accordance with law.

This Court has otherwise not opined on the merits of the matter. The present petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. (VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI,J)