Unnamalai Achi vs K. Damodaran Nair and Others

Veeraswami, J.—The second Respondent held two permits in respect of two vehicles MDY 2067 and MDR 2207 on the routes

respectively Devakottai to Karaikudi Railway Station (Via) Karaikudi Ram Nagar, and Tiruppattur to Karaidkudi Railway Station (Via)

Nachiapuram. It is a firm of partnership. In Original Suit No. 88 of 1954 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, the

Petitioner obtained a decree against one of the partners Sornalingam Chettiar, but on appeal against the firm itself. On July 14, 1956, there was an

order made in execution of the decree charging the interests of Sornalingam Chettiar in the partnership for repayment of the debt. On August 27,

1956, again in execution and at the instance of the Petitioner, a receiver was appointed for realising the amounts which Sornalingam Chettiar was

entitled to from the partnership. On April 26, 1956 a division Bench of this Court, modifying an earlier order of a learned single Judge, directed

that Sornalingam Chettiar might be allowed to run the buses, and that the receiver appointed without being in possession of and running the buses

would inspect and collect moneys due to Sornalingam Chettiar from the partnership and deposit the proceeds into Court. On September 23,

1958, Sornalingam Chettiar consented to a certain S.R. Company paying Rs. 1,000 a month towards the decree until the same was discharged,

and on that the execution petition was dismissed with liberty to renew the same if necessary. In Execution Application No. 69 of 1959 filed by her,

the Petitioner sought to implead one Damodaran Nair, the first Respondent in this Court in the main execution petition with a view to interdict a

transfer of the permits by the holder thereof to Damodaran Nair. Sornalingam Chettiar in his counter-affidavit denied any transfer or sale of the

buses. What happened thereafter in the execution proceedings, it is not clear. On February 16, 1959, the Petitioner made an application to the

Regional Transport Authority of Ramanathapuram bringing to its notice that she was a creditor and in the circumstances she objected to transfer of

the buses to Damodaran Nair. On February 27, 1959, a joint application would appear to have been made by the permit-holder and Damodaran

Nair for transfer of the permits to the latter. Under the enabling power under Rule 109 the Regional Transport Authority applied to the application

the procedure prescribed by Section 57 and fixed April 5, 1959, as the last date for making representations. Admittedly the Petitioner did not

make any representations by that time. On April 24, 1959, when the Regional Transport Authority took up the matter for hearing, the Counsel for

the Petitioner appeared and raised objections. I am told by Mr. Venugopal for the first Respondent that at that meeting Counsel for the Petitioner

informed the Regional Transport Authority that he would move the executing Court for an injunction restraining the Authority from proceeding

further with the application for transfer. But actually no such order was ever obtained by the Petitioner. On April 28, 1959, the Petitioner sent up

her objections to the Regional Transport Authority by registered post to the proposed transfer and these objections were received by the Authority

on April 30, 1959. On April 27, 1959, the executing Court is said to have granted an injunction restraining Sornalingam Chettiar from transferring

buses to third parties. It seems that earlier on April 2, 1959, Damodaran Nair himself had made an endorsement in the application for injunction;

Execution Application No. 69 of 1959 as to his having not purchased the buses or paid any consideration for the same. The Regional Transport

Authority took up the application for transfer for further hearing on May 1, 1959, and actually on June 2, 1959, the Authority granted the

application for transfer. Against that order the Petitioner preferred a revision to the State Transport Authority u/s 64-A and successfully. That

Authority set aside the order directing transfer and remitted the application for fresh enquiry. The first Respondent then preferred to the State

Transport Appellate Tribunal a revision petition u/s 64(2) against the order of the State Transport Authority and this petition was allowed and the

order of State Transport Authority was set aside. This petition is to quash the Tribunal''s order.

The Tribunal rested its order on three grounds : (i) the Petitioner in this Court did not make any representations in writing on or before April 5,

1959, the date fixed for making such representations u/s 57(3) and therefore she had no right to agitate the correctness of the order of transfer by

preferring a revision u/s 64-A; (ii) she was not also competent to make representations u/s 57(4) as she was not one of the categories of persons

contemplated by Section 47(1) who are entitled to make representations and therefore she had no locus stand to file a petition u/s 64-A; and (iii)

the State Transport Authority was not right in its view of the facts with reference to the alleged suppression of facts in the context of Rules 196 to

The Tribunal was aware that it might be that the transfer was in violation of the orders of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai interdicting

transfer. But the Tribunal considered that was not germane in the proceedings relating to transfer of the permit under the provisions of the Motor

Vehicles Act. It was on that view the Tribunal reversed the order of the State Transport Authority and restored that of the Regional Transport

Authority.

The contention for the Petitioner in this Court is three-fold: (i) Section 47(1) is not exhaustive as to the categories of persons entitled to make

representations and that the bar u/s 57(4) is only on the represented and not on the Regional Transport Authority; (ii) even if the Petitioner had not

made representations in time u/s 57(4) in the circumstances of the case, she is a person aggrieved and so entitled to canvass the order of the

Regional Transport Authority by means of a revision petition u/s 44-A and (iii) in any case the competency of the Petitioner to apply in revision

binder Section 64-A would only arise at the stage of the application and before the Authority calls for records and that once the records are called

for by the Authority, the question is of no moment, as it can act in exercise of its suo motu powers. On the other hand, the argument for the first

Respondent is that for the Petitioner to succeed, she must meet every one of the points relied on by the Tribunal against her. Learned Counsel

submits that no person who has not made representations in time and followed the other requisites prescribed by Section 57(4) is entitled to be

heard by the Regional Transport Authority under Sub-section (5) of Section 57, that such a person is not even entitled to be impleaded as a party

to the proceedings and that further once the transfer of permit has been directed, no party other than the parties to the transaction, namely, the

transferor and the transferee, will or can have any interest in the subject-matter so that such a party cannot be regarded as one aggrieved or

interested so as to invoke the powers of the Authority u/s 64-A.

It seems to me that the point I have to consider and decide lies in a narrow compass. It is not denied for the Petitioner that it is only a person

aggrieved who is entitled to apply u/s 64-A. Is the Petitioner such a person? The test was laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in Swami Motor

Transport Ltd. v. Raman and Raman Ltd. ILR (1961) Mad. 110, 120 (F.B.) in these terms:

The true principle is to determine whether the Applicant has an interest distinct from the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law

being wrongfully administered.

The contention for the Petitioner is that this test is answered by her. It is said that though the Petitioner did not make representations in

accordance with the requirements of Section 57(4), as she had brought to the notice of the Regional Transport Authority her objections to the

transfer on February 16, 1959, and April 28, 1959, she must be regarded as having substantially complied with the requirements of Section 57(4)

and that, therefore, she was a person entitled to be heard u/s 57(5) and as the order of the Regional Transport Authority went against her, she was

a person entitled to question it by filing a revision. Counsel for the Petitioner further argues that even assuming that the Petitioner was not one of the

categories of persona contemplated by Section 47(1), as that provision was not exhaustive it was open to any member of the public to place

before the Regional Transport Authority relevant facts and considerations. In support of this, Counsel has relied on Abdul Gafoor Vs. State of

Mysore, . I am not inclined to the view that the objections preferred by the Petitioner on February 16, 1959, were in substantial compliance with

Section 57(4). As a matter of fact on that date an application for transfer itself was not in existence. It was made, as I said, only on February 27,

1959. The objections of the Petitioner, dated April 28, 1959, were received by the Regional Transport Authority on April 30, 1959, which was

after the date fixed by that Authority for receipt of objections u/s 57. The Petitioner cannot, therefore, be regarded as having complied with

Section 57(4). Even granting that the right of representations u/s 47(1) is not confined to the categories of persons mentioned therein, and the

Petitioner was entitled to make representations, that in itself, in my opinion, would not entitle her to be heard by the Regional Transport Authority,

and if the order went against her, she could not take the order in revision. On this matter the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Purushottam

Bhai Punambhai Patel v. State Transport Appellate Authority Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Civil Appeal No. 762 of 1963, appears to be conclusive.

There, the Supreme Court laid down.

We consider that the terms of Sections 57 (3) and (4) of the Act preclude any party, who had not notified its objections in time, to be heard at any

stage of the proceedings original or appellate in relation to the grant of permit on an application duly advertised u/s 57(3).

On that view of the scope of those statutory provisions, it would follow that though u/s 47(i) the Petitioner might not have been prevented from

making representations, since the representations did not conform to the provisions of Section 57(4) she would not be entitled to be heard at the

stage of Regional Transport Authority or of the Appellate Authority in relation to the transfer of permit.

That would answer also the second point for the Petitioner, namely, that she should be regarded as a person aggrieved. It may be that in a sense

she might be regarded as aggrieved by the order of the Regional Transport Authority. But that could only be as a creditor who was interested in

reaching the permits of the firm in execution of the decree. But that interest did not bear upon the subject-matter of transfer itself of the permits.

The interest which the Petitioner could be said to possess is therefore only an indirect one, not relevant germane to the considerations on which the

transfer itself could be made or refused. On that view, the Petitioner cannot be said to answer the test laid down by Swami Motor Transport Ltd.

v. Raman and Raman Ltd. ILR (1961) Mad. 110 (F.B.). Further, this Court in Writ Petition No. 311 of 1962 took the view that an objector to

the transfer of permit who was an existing operator was not entitled to file a revision. This was on the view that such a person, notwithstanding the

fact that his representations were not accepted and the transfer was directed, could not be regarded as a person interested or aggrieved. This is

what this Court pointed out:

I do not think that by reason of Rule 199, the representer will have any right beyond making representations before the prescribed authority. There

is also the other aspect. Once permission is granted, as stated by the learned Advocate General, the contract is completed. There is no statutory

indication that the contract which has come into effect will still be subject to the powers of revision u/s 64-A. This will be apparent if this is

contrasted with the terms of Section 59 itself to the effect that a transfer cannot take effect without permission of the prescribed authority. In other

words, a transfer of permit is only subject to permission being granted therefore. The deeming effect of Blue 199, therefore, in my view, cannot be

carried further than it is strictly necessary. That rule merely by applying the procedure u/s 57 read with Section 47 enables the representer to make

representations why permit should not be granted for transfer. Once that representation is made, the representer has no further interest. Merely

because his representation is not accepted and permission is granted, I do not think that the representer can be regarded as a person interested or

aggrieved.

These observations of mine in that case seem to apply to the instant case with even better force. In that case, the person who made objections

for transfer of permit was an existing operator unlike here where the Petitioner was no more than a creditor of the firm and claimed to have a

charge over the permits. Such a person will have her remedies elsewhere and cannot be regarded as a person interested or aggrieved so as to

enable her to agitate the order of the Regional Transport Authority in revision u/s 64-A.

On that view I think the Tribunal''s order should be sustained. But, for the Petitioner it is contended that the revision petition filed by the first

Respondent u/s 64(2) itself was not maintainable. This is on the ground that after the introduction of Section 64-A , Sub-section (2) of Section 64

could not prevail or exist side by side. But I think this contention cannot carry the Petitioner very far because when once it is held that the Petitioner

herself had no right to move the State Transport Authority u/s 64-A, the order made by that Authority would be one without jurisdiction and

therefore a nullity.

The petition is dismissed with costs of the first Respondent.