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Judgment
Prem Narain,Presiding Member
The present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment dated 25th March 2019 of the West Bengal State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Kolkata (the 'State Commission') passed in Complaint case no. CC/455 of 2016.
The brief facts of the case are that the respondent took two fire insurance policies from the appellant herein and filed a claim. The appellant settled the claim and got the discharge voucher signed by the complainant/ respondent. After three years, the complainant filed consumer complaint before the State Commission praying for more amount of insurance treating the amount paid through discharge voucher as part payment. The appellant insurance company objected that the complainant's case was time barred and the cause of action arose on 06.09.2013 when the voucher was signed. However, the State Commission vide its order dated 25.03.2019 observed that the representation for the balance claim was rejected by the Insurance Company on 14.04.2014 and that gave rise to a new cause of action. The complaint has been filed on 05.10.2016. The State Commission has, though acknowledged that the complaint has been filed beyond two years but has also stated that the complainant has satisfactorily explained the delay. The learned counsel states that the cause of action actually arose when the voucher was signed on 06.09.2013 and the cause of action cannot be extended by any amount of correspondence between the parties.
Learned counsel has also stated that there is a delay of 109 days in filing the present appeal and the delay has occurred due to obtaining the orders of the higher authorities and in inter-departmental consultation. It has been prayed that the delay may be condoned as the delay has occurred inadvertently and there is no intention behind the delay.
I have carefully, considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and examined the record. It is seen that the delay of 109 days has been reported by the Registry and the only reasons given for this delay are in terms of the procedural delays. The appellant is a Semi Government Company and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chief Post Master General and Others vs Living Media India Ltd., and Another (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563 has held:
"After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under;
"It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.
Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land losers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest."
The Court further observed;
"It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.
In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.
In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.
In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs".
Otherwise also, special limitation periods have been provided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to settle the consumer disputes within a reasonable time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), has held that:
"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras".
In the case of R B Ramalingam vs R B Bhavaneshwari 2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed:
"We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."
The above authoritative judgments from the Hon'ble Supreme Court are fully applicable in the present case and negligence, deliberate inaction and lack of bona fides are imputable to the appellant in filing the appeal. It is seen that the appellant has not shown reasonable diligence in the prosecution of its appeal. Hence, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal is also liable to be dismissed.
Consequently, the First Appeal no. 1711 of 2019 is dismissed on the ground of limitation.