High CourtsDivision Bench(2007) 06 MAD CK 0032

Union of India (UOI) vs The Central Administrative Tribunal Union of India (UOI) Vs S. Srinivasan Union of India (UOI) Vs C. Madasamy, S. Sivapunniya Moorthy and R. Sivasankara Dass

Madras High Court · Decided on 14 June 2007

HON’BLE JUDGES
S. Tamilvanan, J · F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No''s. 19725 of 2001 and 23815 and 32787 of 2002

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Judgment

32 paragraphs · 674 words

F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.—The challenge in all these Writ Petitions is to the orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal, dated

27.11.2000 in O.A. No. 570 of 2000 (in W.P. No. 19725 of 2001), dated 28.11.2000 in O.A. No. 391 of 1999 (in W.P. No. 23815 of 2002)

and dated 28.11.2000 in O.A. No. 347 of 1999 (in W.P. No. 32787 of 2002).

2.

The respective applicants approached the Tribunal, challenging the action of the petitioners in not considering their names for being placed

before the Department Promotion Committee for promotion to the grade of Inspector of Central Excise. According to the applicants, who are the

second and third respondents in the respective Writ Petitions, as per the prevailing practice, for the purpose of promotion, the upper age limit for

all posts was 45 years with five years relaxation for SC/ST community and that the respective second and third respondents belong to SC/ST

community. It was also stated that the crucial date for consideration of their case for determination of their age limit was 1.1.1999 and that as on

that date, they did not complete 50 years of age and therefore, their names ought to have been included for consideration by the Department

Promotion Committee. Since by applying a subsequent instructions of the Union of India, dated 17.2.1999, which prescribed the age limit as 38

for all, with the age relaxation upto 40 years for SC/ST, the claim of the respective second and third respondents was denied by the Tribunal. One

other contention raised on behalf of the second and third respondents was that there were three other employees belonging to SC/ST category, for

whom the earlier age limit of 50 years applicable to SC/ST was extended and that discriminatory treatment was meted out to the second and third

respondents alone.

3.

As far as prescription of the age limit of 50 years for SC/ST in respect of promotional posts prior to 17.2.1999, the same was not disputed

before the Tribunal. The fact that the crucial date for promotion in respect of the respective second and third respondents was 1.1.1999, was also

not in dispute.

4.

In such circumstances, the conclusion of the Tribunal in stating that the age limit prescribed and which was in force as on 1.1.1999 alone, ought

to have been applied in the case of the respective second and third respondents and not the age limit prescribed in the circular dated 17.2.1999,

was perfectly in order and we do not find any illegality or irregularity in the said conclusion of the Tribunal.

5.

In fact, when these Writ Petitions were entertained, though interim order of stay was granted initially, subsequently, on 5.9.2003, taking note of

the fact that two other employees who were also the Original Applicants before the Tribunal, though crossed the age of 50 years, were promoted

based on the recommendations of the Department Promotion Committee, this Court held that eventually, if the respective respondents got

selected, their promotion would be subject to the result of the Writ Petitions. Inasmuch as we have found that the Tribunal was justified in holding

that the crucial date for determination of the upper age limit was what was prevailing as on 1.1.1999 and not as the one prescribed in the

circular/instructions dated 17.2.1999, we do not find any merit in the Writ Petitions. The Writ Petitions fail and the same are liable to be dismissed.

6.

Mr. Jagadeesan, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioners, raised a contention that in the case of the second respondent in W.P.

No. 19725 of 2001, there is a controversy relating to his community status. Therefore, the relief granted by the Tribunal, as confirmed by this

Court, will always be without prejudice to the stand of the petitioners as regards the community status of the second respondent in W.P. No.

19725 of 2001 and any promotion will be depending upon the ultimate outcome of the proceedings relating to the determination of such

community status.

7.

With the above observations, the Writ Petitions are dismissed. No costs.