High CourtsSingle Bench(2004) 02 MAD CK 0115

Union of India (UOI) vs S. Dilli Babu and The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal

Madras High Court · Decided on 18 February 2004

HON’BLE JUDGES
S. Sardar Zackria Hussain, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision Petition No. 2664 of 1999

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Judgment

112 paragraphs · 1,991 words

S. Sardar Zackria Hussain, J.—This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the award of the reinstatement of the service of the first

respondent by the second respondent as per award dated 11.2.1999 in I.D. No. 187 of 1994 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal, Tamil Nadu,

Chennai, pursuant to the reference made as to whether the termination of service of the first respondent with effect from 28.8.1984 is proper, legal

and justifiable.

2.

The first respondent, workman raised industrial dispute as per claim petition that he was selected and appointed by the Heavy Vehicles Factory,

Avadi, viz., the revision petitioner as Blacksmith C as per order dated 27.7.1981 and claiming that he worked from 5.8.1981 to 31.5.1982

without any break and he was reappointed in the same post as per order dated 3.11.1981 and during the year 1981-82 he worked for 264 days.

He was given appointment as casual Blacksmith C in the scale of pay of Rs. 210-290 as per orders dated 17.9.1983, 10.11.1983, 17.12.1983,

3.2.1984, 21.3.1984 and 18.5.1984 and finally as per order dated 14.7.1984 and accordingly he worked for 308 days for the year 1983-84 with

artificial breaks. As such, according to the first respondent, he worked for 572 days with the revision petitioner factory. Though casual workers,

who were recruited along with him, were given regular appointment, viz., M. Babu, M. Nithiyanandam and Deva Anbu, who have been working in

the Forge Shop, Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi, Madras, he was not reappointed after termination on 28.8.1984. No notice nor retrenchment

compensation was given to him at the time of termination and it is void and against Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such,

he is entitled for reinstatement with all benefits including continuity of service, arrears of salary, etc.

3.

The claim petition was resisted in the counter that the revision petitioner factory is performing sovereign functions of the Central Government

under Ministry of Defence, catering the needs of the Indian Army and though the first respondent joined duty on 5.8.1981 as per appointment

order dated 27.7.1981 for the post of Blacksmith C for three months on casual basis, his services were terminated on 4.11.1981. Even thereafter

he was only appointed purely on casual basis at different spells as mentioned below:-

Date of appointment Period of Spell Date of completion of spell

5.8.1981 3 months 4.11.1981

13.11.1981 3 months 12.2.1982

3.3.1982 3 months 31.5.1982

23.9.1983 44 days 2.11.1983

10.11.1983 34 days 13.12.1983

20.12.1983 44 days 31.1.1984

3.2.1984 44 days 16.3.1984

22.3.1984 44 days 14.5.1984

18.5.1984 44 days 30.6.1984

16.7.1984 44 days 26.8.1984

The first respondent has filed Industrial Dispute only in the year 1994 after lapse of 10 years after termination of service and the delay has not been

explained. It is denied that he worked on casual basis from 5.8.1981 to 31.5.1982 without break. He was lastly appointed as casual basis for 44

days i.e. 16.7.1984 and accordingly his services were terminated on 28.8.1984. Deva Anbu was appointed on compassionate grounds as

Blacksmith ""SS"" on 8.8.1986.

4.

The Industrial Tribunal considering the evidence of workman as W.W.1 and that of the management as M.W.1 Chief Manager of the Heavy

Vehicles Factory, Avadi and Exs.W-1 to W-12 marked on the side of the workman and Exs.M-1 to M-17 marked on the side of the

management, viz., Heavy Vehicles Factory Avadi, the revision petitioner herein, accepting the contention put-forth by the workman, the first

respondent herein recorded finding that the Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi is an industry as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and also

finding that the first respondent has worked for 308 days and more than 240 days as contemplated u/s 25-B(2)(a)(ii) of the Industrial Disputes

Act, awarded compensation directing reinstatement of the first respondent with back-wages from April, 1992 and all other attendant benefits like

continuity of service. The correctness of the award dated 11.2.1999 made in I.D.No.187 of 1994 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal is challenged

in this Civil Revision Petition.

5.

The learned counsel for the revision petitioner mainly contended that the revision petitioner, Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi is not an industry

within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and it is also submitted for the revision petitioner, that the Heavy Vehicles Factory is discharging

only sovereign functions, in that the products are not marketable, and so the said factory is not industry or trade to attract the jurisdiction of the

Industrial Tribunal. It is further stated that the first respondent was only sponsored under the category of casual employment and appointed

accordingly on casual basis and the reappointment given to one Deva Anbu on compassionate grounds is purely within the discretionary powers of

the revision petitioner as per the instructions of the Government of India and the same cannot be equated to the employment given to the persons

sponsored by the employment exchange.

6.

The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the decision in the case of General Manager, Telecom - vs. - A.Srinivasa Rao and

others reported in (1997) 8 Supreme Court Cases 767, in which the Full Bench of the Hon''ble Apex Court has ruled in paragraphs 5 and 6:-

The dominant nature test for deciding whether the establishment is an ""industry"" or not is summarised in para 143 of the judgment of Justice

Krishna Iyer in Bangalore Water Supply case which is as under:(S.C.C. pp.283-84)

143.

The dominant nature test:

(a) Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify for exemption, others not, involves employees on the total undertaking, some of whom

are not ''workmen'' as in the University of Delhi and Another Vs. Ram Nath, or some departments are not productive of goods and services if

isolated, even then, the predominant nature of the services and the integrated nature of the departments as explained in the The Corporation of the

City of Nagpur Vs. Its Employees, will be true test. The whole undertaking will be ''industry'' although those who are not ''workmen'' by definition

may not benefit by the status.

(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign functions, strictly understood, (alone) qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or

economic adventures undertaken by government or statutory bodies.

(c) Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be

considered to come within Section 2(j).

(d) Constitutional and competently enacted legislative provisions may well remove from the scope of the Act categories which otherwise maybe

covered thereby.

6.

. . . . according to this test the Telecommunication Department of the Union of India is an ""industry"" within that definition because it is engaged in

a commercial activity and the Department is not engaged in discharging any of the sovereign functions of the State.

7.

The learned counsel for the revision petitioner also argued that inasmuch as the revision petitioner, Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi performs

sovereign functions of the Central Government under the Ministry of Defence, as such according to the learned counsel, since the revision

petitioner factory is not an industry, in that it is discharging only sovereign functions and therefore, the Industrial Dispute case as filed before the

Industrial Tribunal is not maintainable. In any event, according to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, since the first respondent has not

worked for more than 240 days in a year continuously, he is not entitled for reinstatement as claimed and therefore, the finding recorded by the

learned Industrial Tribunal being perverse, this Court sitting in revisional jurisdiction, is to set aside the said award.

8.

On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent/workman argued that though the revision petitioner factory is performing

sovereign functions, in view of the fact that there have been industrial units severable from the essential functions and the employees of those units

are workmen and those undertakings are industries since the first respondent was appointed as Blacksmith C and the nature of work being to clean

machines, floors or shop areas around machine sections and such other similar places as and when required and to keep the place of work tidy as

per Clause (g) of the appointment orders Exs.W-1 to W-10, the Industrial Dispute as filed is maintainable. It is further submitted that since the first

respondent has worked for more than 240 days, he is entitled for reinstatement because of the fact he was retrenched from service without notice.

9.

Exs.W-1 to A-10 are the appointment orders issued to the first respondent as Blacksmith C time and again in the revision petitioner factory

from July 1981 to July 1984 with artificial breaks. Clause(g) of the said orders disclose the nature of work of the first respondent that the first

respondent is to clean machines, floors or shop areas around machine sections and such other similar places as and when required and to keep the

place of work tidy. Therefore, such work assigned to the first respondent cannot be said to be as involved in the production sector. The first

respondent was in lathe (Forge) shop. So the said work assigned to the first respondent in the machine section or unit being severable from the

sovereign functions of the revision petitioner, Heavy Vehicles Factory, viz., for the production of tanks for the purpose of using in the defence, the

revision petitioner factory is only an ""industry"". As such, the first respondent fits into the definition as workman. It follows that the Industrial Dispute

raised is very much maintainable.

10.

It is seen from the Exs.W-1 to W-10 and M-1 to M-17 that the first respondent was lastly terminated with effect from 28.8.1984. As per

counter filed by the revision petitioner factory, the first respondent worked for

44 days from 23.9.1983 to 2.11.1983

34 days from 10.11.1983 to 13.12.1983

44 days from 20.12.1983 to 31.1.1984

44 days from 3.2.1984 to 16.3.1984

44 days from 22.3.1984 to 14.5.1984

44 days from 18.5.1984 to 30.6.1984 and

44 days from 16.7.1984 to 26.8.1984

and accordingly he worked for 298 days. Section 25-B(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads thus:-

(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to

be in continuous service under an employer -

(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date which reference to which calculation is

to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than:-

(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and

(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case

The first respondent during the period from 23.9.1983 to 26.8.1984 has worked 298 days and more than 240 days as contemplated u/s 25-B(2)

(a)(ii) of the Industrial Dispute Act and as such, the first respondent was deemed to be in continuous service under the revision petitioner factory.

Considering all these aspects, the Tribunal has rightly decided that the first respondent was in continuous service of the revision petitioner factory

within the meaning of 25-B(2) of the said Act and therefore, since the first respondent was retrenched from service without notice as contemplated

u/s 25-F of the Act, the first respondent is entitled for retrenchment. In deciding so, the Tribunal has rightly ordered that the first respondent is to

be reinstated with back-wages from April, 1992 with all other attendant benefits like continuity of service though he was terminated from service

with effect from 28.8.1984, in that he raised the Industrial Disputes before the Regional Labour Commissioner only on 20.4.1992. It follows the

said award of the Tribunal is to be confirmed.

11.

In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. The Award dated 11.2.1999 made in I.D. No. 187 of 1994 on the file of the Industrial

Tribunal, Chennai is confirmed. No costs.