Union of India (UOI) vs Krishna Pal Singh and Another

P.N. Bakshi, J.—The accused opposite parties have been convicted under Sections 18(a)(i)(ii), 27(a) and 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The accused opposite party Kishan Pal Singh has been sentenced to 2 years'' RI while Raj Pal Singh accused opposite party has been sentenced to one year''s RI. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the court below was of the opinion that instead of undergoing the substantive terms of imprisonment, the benefit of the First Offenders Probation Act should be extended to them. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ghaziabad, therefore, passed an order on 11-2-1974 releasing the said opposite parties on probation under the First Offenders Probation Act, on their entering into a bond of Rs. 5,000/-with two sureties of Rs. 2,000/-each to appear in court and receive sentence when called upon to do so during the above period, and in the meantime to be of good behaviour. Aggrieved thereby the instant revision has been filed in this Court. No interim order however, suspending the sentence was obtained from this Court.

I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also perused the impugned order. The applicant''s counsel contends that the offence under the Drags and Cosmetics Act for the sale of spurious injections is a serious matter and the accused opposite parties should not be awarded a light sentence for such offences. I am inclined to agree with the submission made by the learned Counsel for the applicant, but there are some difficulties in my way.

Learned Counsel for the opposite parties has pointed out that since no stay order had been passed by this Court in 1974, the alternative sentence which was awarded to the accused opposite parties by way of a grant of the benefit of the First Offenders Probation Act, by the execution of a personal bond and two sureties, must have been complied with by now. If that has been done, then the sentence awarded had already been carried out and the opposite parties can not. now be sent to jail again to serve the sentence of imprisonment. If, however, those conditions have not been complied with, only then the question of sending the opposite parties to suffer the term of imprisonment could arise. The accused can not be ordered to suffer a sentence twice for the same offence.

Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that in offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the benefit of First Offenders Probation Act should not be given. He has drawn an analogy from decided cases under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. There is nothing in law to prevent the application of the First Offenders Probation Act to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Even according to the amended law as modified upto date under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the benefit of the First Offenders Probation Act has been extended under the provisions of that Act, subject to the condition that the accused is less than 18 years of age. Thus, even in socio-economic offences, there is no absolute prohibition of the application of the First Offenders Probation Act. This, however, does not mean that the said Act should be liberally applied for the offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. In my opinion even though the application of the First Offenders Probation Act is not expressly excluded to offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, yet courts should be reluctant to apply the same unless there are adequate and special reasons.

In the instant case the position appears to be that the accused opposite parties have already been put to a considerable mental,'' physical and financial strain for about a decade since the proceedings were commenced in February, 1969. Further the opposite parties have already carried out the order of the court below by the execution of bonds of Rs. 5,000/-plus two sureties of Rs. 2,000/-each. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the opposite parties were manufacturing the injections themselves, which are alleged to have been sold to the Drugs Inspector. Only four injections and no more are in question. Nothing objectionable has come on record to discredit their character and antecedents. They have a fixed place of residence and business. They are not previous convicts. Having regard to all the circumstances, I am of the opinion that there did exist adequate reasons for the application of the First Offenders Probation Act in the instant case.

With this observation, I do not find any merit in this revision application, which is hereby dismissed.