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Judgment
S. Jagadeesan, J.—The plaintiff Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Telecommunications through the Assistant General
Manager (Buildings), Madras Telephones, has filed the suit seeking for a bare injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 4 from alienating the suit
property either by sale or by other mode of transfer. Pending dis-posal of the suit, the plaintiff has filed this application, Application No. 178 of
1996, seeking an interim injunction restraining the respondents 1 to 3 from alienating the suit property pending disposal of the suit. In the said
application only notice was ordered and no interim order has been granted. When the application came up for final disposal on 17.1.1997, it was
represented that the respondent/defendants herein filed a suit C.S. No. 1917 of 1991 before the City Civil Court, Madras, challenging the
acquisition proceedings and also obtained an order of interim injunction restraining the applicant herein from interfering with the peaceful; ossession
and enjoyment of the second respondent. When it is admitted that the applicant/plaintiff herein is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property
as tenant, in order to ascertain as to how the respondents/defendants herein have filed an application for injunction restraining the applicant/plaintiff
from interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the suit property, records have been called for from the City Civil Court. After calling for
the records I find that the respondents have filed two applications, one for restraining the applicant herein from interfering with the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the respondents and Anr. application seeking for an injunction against the applicant from proceeding with the
acquisition proceedings.
The Supreme Court has held in a decision in State of Bihar Vs. Dhirendra Kumar and others, that the validity of notification u/s 4 and
declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, cannot be challenged before the Civil Court since the civil Court has no jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court held as follows:
The question is whether civil suit is maintainable and whether ad interim injunction could be issued where proceedings under the Land Acquisition
Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued u/s 9 of the Act and delivered to the ben-eficiary. The provisions of the Act are designed to acquire
the land by the State exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to comply with Statutory
requirements contained in. Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural
steps of publication in papers and the local publication envisaged under the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications
and declaration u/s 6, the public purpose gets crystalised and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land
Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award. Section 1l-A now prescribes limitation for making the
award within two years from the last date of publication envisaged u/s 6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Government needs
possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power u/s 17(4) of the Act and dis-pense with the enquiry u/s 5-A. Thereon, the State is
entitled to issue notice to the parties u/s 9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled to make immediate possession even before the award
could be made. Otherwise, it would take possession after the award u/s 12. Thus it could be seen that the Act is a complete code in itself and is
meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the Civil Court
to make cogni-zance of the case u/s 9 of C.P.C. stands excluded, and a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or
legality of the notification u/s 4 and declaration u/s 6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the Civil
suit itself was not maintainable. When such is the situation, the finding of the trial Court that there is a prima facie triable issue is unsustainable.
Moreover, possession was already taken and handed over to Housing Board. So, the order of injunction was without jurisdiction.
From the above passage, it is clear that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case u/s 9, C.P.C., since the said provision
stands excluded and equally, a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant any interim order in respect of the acquisition proceedings. Hence, the civil
suit O.S. No. 1917 of 1991 filed by the respondents on the file of the City Civil Court is not maintainable and cannot be allowed to stand on file
any more. Hence, under the suo motu inherent powers I directed transfer of the suit, O.S. No. 1917 of 1991 from the City Civil Court to this
Court and the office is directed to renumber the suit. The said suit, C.S. No. 26 of 1997 (O.S. No. 1917 of 1991) is dismissed as the same is not
maintainable in law in view of the well established principles laid down by the Supreme Court which is extracted above. Interim applications filed in
the said suit are also dismissed.
Counsel for the respondents, however contended that when a writ appeal was pending before this Court challenging the acquisition proceedings
a Division Bench of this Court has granted permission to the respondents herein to challenge the acquisition proceedings by way of separate suit
since evidence was required.
Only pursuant to the direction of this Court, the suit has been filed by the respondents before the City Civil Court. When once it has been held that
the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Civil Suit, the direction given by this Court cannot be construed as if it confers jurisdiction on the
Civil court to enter-tain the suit. It has been held in decision of this Court in Govindasami Pillai Vs. T.M. Srinivasa Chettiar and Others, as, follows:
The question that really falls for determination in these second appeals is whether the statement of this Court while dismissing the writ petition, that
the petitioner''s proper remedy is to institute a suit ""can be said to be a determination of the question regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court
entertain a plea whether a land in an estate is a ryoti land or not. For one thing, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel that the
statement contained in that order disposing of the writ petition, constitutes a determination on the question regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court. No doubt, that statement was the basis on which the writ petition was dismissed. But that will not by itself constitute the statement a
determination of the question regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go into an issue whether a particular land is a ryot land or not. Apart
from this, the question of jurisdiction is really a matter between a party and a Court and cannot be said to be a matter between the parties this
Court. Whether a particular party raises the question regarding the want of jurisdiction of a Court or not it is the duty of the Court to take note the
Statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction on it or taking away the jurisdiction from it. If under the law, a court has no jurisdiction, no amount of
consent, acquiescence or assertion on the part of any of the parties can confer jurisdiction on the Court.
It is clear from the above passage that neither the consent of the parties nor leaving open the position to be decided by the Civil Court, will confer
any jurisdiction on the Civil Court, if such jurisdiction is totally prohibited under the ""Land Acquisition Act. Hence, the contention of the counsel for
the respondents cannot be sustained.
Coming to the facts of the present case, C.S. No. 159 of 1996, the plaintiff has filed the suit seeking for a decree for injunction restraining the
defendants from alienating the suit property on the ground that the suit property has been acquired by the plaintiff and the award has also been
passed. In spite of the passing of the award, the defendants in the suit are repeatedly entering into sale agreements with various persons and trying
to dispose of the properties, and the conduct of the defendants would complicate the issue as the third parties interest would get involved. Such
third parties would challenge the acquisition proceedings by way of separate proceedings independently that of the defendants, and that would
delay the proceedings or it will end in multiplicity of proceedings.
In am unable to agree with the pleadings raised by the plaintiff because once the Union of the State Government acquire the lands invoking
sovereign powers under the Land Acquisition Act, and notification have been issued thereon, the land owners can challenge the acquisition
proceedings. In case, if the land owners fail in their attempt, the acquisition proceedings would become final. In this case, subse-quent to the
notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the award enquiry has been held and award has also been passed on
18.11.1989. As per Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the District Collector can take possession of the land immediately after passing of the
award u/s 11 of the Act. On taking possession of the land or property, the same shall vest absolutely with the Government free from all
encumbrances. Admittedly, the award has been passed and no question of taking over possession arises in this case as the plaintiff is in possession
of the property already as a tenant. Only formal recording of delivery is necessary. Since the award has been passed u/s 11 of the Act, the plaintiff
is deemed to have taken any possession of the property u/s 16 of the Act, the property shall vest with the plaintiff free from any encumbrance. If
once the property vests free of any encumbrance the transaction that may be entered into by the defendants, in the suit, subsequent to the passing
of the award and vesting of the land with the plaintiff is of no use and cannot be enforced so far as the plaintiff is concerned. There is absolutely no
need for the plaintiff to file the suit seeking for such relief of injunction. Hence, I am of the opinion that the suit is of no merit and accordingly, it is
dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected Application No. 178 of 1996 is also dismissed.
It is further represented by the learned Counsel for the defendants that the defendants have filed writ petition, W.P. No. 1625 of 1989
challenging the award passed in this case. Since the writ petition is pending before this Court, it is open to the defendants to raise other pleas, in
respect of the validity of the acquisition proceedings, also in the same writ petition by filing additional affidavit. It is open to the State Government
as well as Telecom Authorities to file additional counter.