High CourtsSingle Bench(1999) 05 P&H CK 0051

Union of India (UOI) and Others vs Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd.

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 11 May 1999 · Citation: (2001) ACJ 962 : AIR 2000 P&H 33 : (1999) 123 PLR 22 : (1999) 3 RCR(Civil) 372

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.S. Sudhalkar, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
F.A.F.O. No. 791 of 1999

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Judgment

12 paragraphs · 706 words

S.S. Sudhalkar, J.—The respondent had filed a suit against the appellants which was transferred to the Railway Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"). The learned Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 44120/- as compensation with proportionate costs and interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the claim application i.e. 25-8-87 till 23-11 -1994 and 6% per annum from 24-11-1994 to 15-4-98 and further interest @ 12% per annum from 16-4-98 till the realisation of the decretal amount. The case adjourned sine die because of the orders of the Apex Court and it remained sine die for the period 24-11-1994 to 15-4-98. Being aggrieved by the said award, the appellants have filed this appeal.

2.

I have heard learned counsel for the appellants.

3.

At the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the appellants stated that he restricted his argument only to the interest part and argued that when the matter remained stayed, the appellants should not have been burdened with interest. He also argued that as per the directions of the learned Tribunal 60 days time was allowed to make the payment and, therefore, no interest can be allowed for the period before the expiry of 60 days from the date of award.

4.

Taking the latter argument first, I find that by allowing some period to pay the amount, the liability to pay the amount is not postponed but only the inconvenience of immediate payment is avoided. Therefore, the second argument cannot be upheld.

5.

Regarding the first argument, it is not in dispute that the matter adjourned sine die for the period mentioned above. However, question is whether the liability to pay the interest should be curtailed because of the same? The answer should be in the negative. The delay in the proceedings has certainly resulted into the amount remaining in possession of the appellants which they ought to have paid earlier. Whatever may be the reasons for the delay, if interest is not awarded, beneficiary of the delay will be the appellants. They enjoyed the fruit of money which they would have otherwise paid to the claimant. In the case of Dr. Bhanuprasad Maganlal Bhatnagar v. Pravin Tapubhai Naik (1981) 22 Gau LR 1271 : (AIR 1982 p&h 73), it has been held by the Gujarat High Court as under :

"In the eye of law the compensation would be payable to the third party on the very date of the accident. However, when the liability is disputed by the other side, it has to be determined by a competent court. In an ideal state of affairs one would expect it to be settled within a couple of months, but there is an inordinate time distance between what is "ideal" and what is "real". Till the dispute is settled by the Court which in the present state of affairs takes considerable time (in the present case it has taken about seven years) the third party who is sought to be protected would be virtually altogether deprived of the benefit of the sum assured, if the liability to pay costs and interest were not thrown on the shoulders of the insurer."

Their Lordships also observed that:

"Insurance company which is liable to pay the insured amount immediately would secure the benefit of the user of the said sum for the period during which the litigation remains pending in the Court. In other words, the insurer does earn interest on the amount which is payable at once but is paid after a lapse of years. Thus, it is the insurer who benefits by the delay occasioned in the Court. And it is therefore, but just and proper that the insurer is saddled with the liability of this extent and is obliged to discharge the burden in respect of the item of interest."

I agree with the principle laid down in the above-mentioned judgment.

6.

Therefore, in view of the above, I am not in a position to accept the argument of learned counsel for the appellants that interest should not have been awarded.

7.

No other point has been argued before me.

8.

In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed.