Union of India (UOI) and Another vs Sunita Pradhan

R.M. Doshit, J.—Heard the learned advocates.

With the consent of the learned advocates, the petition is heard and decided today.

This petition preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India arises from the judgment and order dated 19th August, 2008 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in Original Application No. 413/2007.

The respondent, a Principal in Kendriya Vidyalaya, Dwarka, filed the above Original Application No. 413/2007 against the action of the appellants - authorities to suspend her from service pending inquiry and in initiating the inquiry in respect of beating a child named Arjun, a student in Class-IV. The Tribunal has, by impugned order dated 9th August, 2008, directed that the Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan shall review the order of suspension. The Tribunal has noted that a criminal complaint has been lodged in respect of the said incidence. In view of the pending investigation, the Tribunal has stayed further proceeding in the disciplinary inquiry for six months. Feeling aggrieved, the Union of India and the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan have filed the present petition.

Ms. Sheth has appeared for the petitioners. She has submitted that the Tribunal has, without justiciable reason, stayed the further proceeding in the disciplinary inquiry. She has further submitted that the power of review of the order of suspension lies unto the authority making such order. In the present case, it is the Assistant Commissioner, the petitioner No. 2, who has placed the respondent under suspension. It is, therefore, the Assistant Commissioner who has authority to review the order of suspension made against the respondent.

Mr. Pathak has contested the petition. He has submitted that the Assistant Commissioner, the petitioner No. 2 has no authority either to suspend the respondent or to initiate disciplinary proceeding against her. He, however, candidly admits that neither the order of suspension nor the initiation of disciplinary proceeding has been challenged by the respondent on the ground that it is made without the authority of law.

We have perused the impugned judgment of the Tribunal and the pleadings before the Tribunal. We see no justification for stay of the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the respondent. It is well settled that the purpose of the criminal prosecution and of the domestic inquiry are quite different. The law of evidence does not apply to the domestic inquiry nor the stringent rules of proof of a fact apply to the domestic inquiry. In the present case, criminal prosecution is yet at the stage of investigation. Charge-sheet is yet to be filed. Merely because some complaint has been made in respect of the incidence in question, the domestic inquiry need not be stayed.

In above view of the matter, we partly allow this petition. The impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal in so far as the disciplinary proceeding is stayed, is quashed and set-aside. The domestic inquiry shall proceed against the respondent in accordance with law and shall be completed as expeditiously as possible.

As to the review of the order of suspension, the order of the Tribunal is modified to the extent that the order of suspension will be reviewed as directed by the Tribunal but by the reviewing authority (the Assistant Commissioner in the present case) and not by the Commissioner, as directed by the Tribunal.

The petition is disposed of in the above terms. Parties will bear their own cost.