Union of India (UOI) and Another vs Ashokkumar

Nazki, J.—The respondent filed aclaim petition before the Motor Accidental Claims Tribunal on 10-8-1994, in which he submitted that

while he was going on a scooter on 6-8-1993, he was hit by a Vehicle owned by B.S.F. and he sustained injuries. Along with his claim petition he

filed an application for condonation of delay.

The accident has taken place on. 6-8-1993 and claim petition was filed on 10-8-1994 along with an application for condonation of delay. This

application was decided by the learned Tribunal

Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, before the amendment of Section 166, provided as under:--

No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months from the date of occurrence, provided that the

Claims Tribunal may entertain an application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later then 12 months, if it is satisfied that the

applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making application in time.

Interpreting this provision, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that he had no powers to entertain the claim petition which had been

presented after 12 months. The petition had been presented before the learned Tribunal f6ur days after the expiry of period of 12 months,

therefore, he rejected the application and also the claim petition. An appeal was taken against this order by the respondent and the learned single

Judge of this Court allowed the appeal.

We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. In this appeal the order of the learned single Judge has been challenged.

Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act provided Sub-section (3) which barred presentation of claims beyond 12 months. This section was,

however, amended and sub- section (3) was omitted by the amendment of Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14-11-1994. Certain facts are undisputed :--

(a) That the claim had been filed after four days of the 12 months of the accident.

(b) That When the Tribunal decided the application on 17-3-95, Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was on statute as the amending Act of 54 of

1994 had become operative from 14-11-1994.

Now the question arises whether the Tribunal had to apply Sub-section (3) of Section 166 to the facts of the case or he had to proceed in the

matter without taking subsection (3) of Section 166 into consideration.

To us, it appears that on the date when the Tribunal decided the matter, Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was not a part of the Statute and,

therefore, this Sub-section should not have been applied at all. We came to this conclusion for various reasons, including that if the claimant had

withdrawn his application on the date it was decided and had filed a fresh application, the Tribunal was bound to entertain such a claim petition.

Even if the claimant files a fresh petition today, the petition will not be time barred and it will have to be entertained.

Mr. Salathia, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that operation of the Amending Act of 54 of 1994 was not retrospective but

it was prospective and requirement of prefering the claim within a period of 12 months would apply to all those cases in which accident has taken

place before 14-11-1994.

We don't agree with this view. The occurence of accident is not material but the date of presentation of claim or date of decision of claim

would be material for the purposes of operation of Section 166, sub-clause (3). On the date when the Tribunal decided the matter, there was no

restriction with regard to the limitation. However, the Tribunal has dismissed the application and the claim applying the provisions of law which was

not in force when applied.

In this case, we are fortified in our view by a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Bhag Singh and Others Vs. Union Territory of

Chandigarh through the land acquisition collector, Chandigarh, brief facts of the case were that certain land was acquired by the Government. An

award was given with which the land owners were not satisfied. They moved the Court of Addl. District Judge in a reference u/s 18. The Addl.

District Judge enhanced the amount of compensation and for two different belts of land, two different amounts were fixed as compensation. He

also allowed the interest @ 6% and solatium at the rate of 15% on the enhanced amount of compensation. The claimants were not satisfied with

the enhanced compensation. They filed an appeal before the High Court. The learned single Judge of the High Court enhanced the amounts but

limited the enhanced amount of compensation to only these appellants who had paid the Court-fee. It appears that some of the appellants had not

paid the required Court-fee. The appellants, therefore, filed an appeal before the Division Bench. The Division Bench also enhanced the amount of

compensation but agreed with the learned single Judge that these appellants who had not paid the requisite Court-fee will not be entitled to the

benefit of the enhanced compensation. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court The Supreme Court disagreed with the learned single Judge as

well as Division Bench by holding that only option with the High Court was to ask the appellants to pay the Court-fee and not to reject their claims

for enhanced compensation because it would mean that the State was allowed to take their land at the rate which even according to the High Court

was not fair.

11A. While deciding this matter, another important question came up before the Supreme Court. During pendency of these proceedings of

acquisition, amendment had been made in the Land Acquisition Act. The rate of interest had been increased from 6% to 9% and solatium from

15% to 30%.

The case of the appellants before the Supreme Court was that since the Act had been amended during the acquisition proceedings, therefore,

they were entitled to the increased rate of interest and solatium.

Section 30(2) of the amended Act reproduced below came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court:--

30(2). The provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Principal Act, as amended by Clause (b) of Section 15 and Section

18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court

or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the Principal Act after 30th

day of April, 1982 (the date of introdcution of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of People) and before the

Commencement of this Act.

The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Section had the retrospective or prospective operation, because the Act itself and

restricted its operation to only those claims in which the award had been made by the Collector or Court or by the High Court or by the Supreme

Court before 30th April, 1982.

The Supreme Court while deciding this matter and taking note of the fact that the earlier two Benches of the Supreme Court had differed from

in their opinion and posed a question. The question was that if the amended Act had not made a reference to its application to 30-4-1992 what

should have been the position? and the Supreme Court proceeded further to say,"" but if an award was made by the Court on reference u/s 18 is

prior to the commencement of the Amending Act and an appeal against such award were pending before the High Court u/s 54'at the date of

commencement of the Amending Act which provisions would the High Court have to apply in deciding the appeal and determining the amount of

compensation : the amended provisions in Section 23, Sub-section (2) and Section 28 or the amended provisions?

The Court replied that the answer can only be that the High Court would have to alleged provisions of amended Provisions in Section 23, Sub-

section (2) and Section 28.

It further held :--

The appeal against an award would be a continuance of the proceedings pending before the Court by way of reference u/s 18 and when the High

Court hears the appeal it would in fact and substance be hearing the reference and while determining the amount of compensation, it would have to

give effect to Sections 23 and 28 as it finds them at the date of decision of the appeal.

So the law laid down by the Supreme Court that once the matter is pending in a Court and law is amended, the law shall be applicable as it

existed on the date on which the matter is decided either by a Court subordinate to the High Court or High Court with appeal.

When the application for condonation of delay was decided by the learned Tribunal, the law had been amended and there was no limitation

prescribed for filing an application for compensation under Motor Vehicles Act.

For these reasons, we find no merit in this appeal which is rejected and the Tribunal is directed to proceed further with the claim of the

claimant.

No order as to costs.