Union of India vs Rishal Singh etc.

Sunil Gaur

There is delay of 2892 days in filing CM No. 345/2010 to seek restoration of the cross objections by the respondents. The appeal as well as the cross objections stood dismissed for non-prosecution on 17th August, 1995. The reason put forth for the manifestly inordinate delay is that upon the death of the first respondent in the year 2001, counsel for the respondents/cross objectors was apprised of it but the application for bringing on record the legal heirs of the first respondent was not filed by the counsel and in March 2009, the legal heirs of the first respondent learnt about it when they had known that other similarly placed claimants have received higher compensation upon the decision of their appeal by this Court, then the applicants had approached their counsel who due to his old age was unable to attend to his professional work for the last few years and had no knowledge about the decision in the appeals of the other similarly placed claimants. Thus application for restoration of the cross objections was filed in December, 2009 along with the instant application.

In response to the instant application, it is disclosed by the appellant that RFA No. 186/1986 Nand Kishore Vs. Union of India of the other similarly placed claimants stood decided on 11th July, 1998 and it is unlikely that the applicants would not have learnt about it and since sufficient cause is not shown, therefore, this application merits rejection.

After having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material on record and the decisions reported in Ram Sumiran and Others Vs. D.D.C. and Others, Yad Ram and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, Jayakrishna Mangaraj Mohapatra Vs. State of Orissa and Another, ; O.P. Kathpalia Vs. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) and Others, ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, ; State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others, ; Standard Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Gyan Chand Jain and Another, ;Rati Ram vs. UOI, 143 (2007)DLT 426; Nand Kishore Vs. Union Of India, , I proceed to deal with the instant application in the light of the following pertinent observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Others,

The expression "sufficient cause" implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word "sufficient" means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated.

In the instant matter, there is no convincing explanation for the delay from the year 1995 till the first respondent had died in the year 2001. Not only this, it is highly unlikely that the applicants would not know about the appeals of other similarly claimants being decided by this Court in the year 1998. In this view of the matter, applicants cannot get away by putting entire blame on their previous lawyer.

So far as the decisions relied upon by the applicants are concerned, it would suffice to say that there is no strait jacket formula which can be uniformly applied to condone the delay in such like matters. There is paradigm shift in the interpretation of expression "sufficient cause", as is evident in Balwant Singh (supra) when considered, vis-�-vis the decisions cited.

The necessity of liberal interpretation of "sufficient cause" and the balancing of the rights of the parties has to be seen within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the parties. The test to judge whether or not a cause is sufficient is to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by exercise of due care and attention. Instant case is of gross negligence on the part of the applicants. The Limitation Act mandates that application for condonation of delay filed belatedly should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for the delay occasioned. Unless applicant shows sufficient cause, such like applications cannot be dealt with by showing undue leniency.

Applying the basic rules governing judicial discretion to be exercised in dealing with such like applications, I am of the considered view that the reasons disclosed for the extra-ordinary delay of about seven years and eleven months, i.e.2892 days, hardly constitutes a sufficient ground to condone it. Therefore, the instant application is dismissed and as a consequence thereof, accompanying application for restoration of the cross-objection also stands dismissed as time barred. Resultantly, application for substitution of the applicants as legal heirs of the first respondent/ cross-objector also stands dismissed being barred by time. Accordingly, these three applications stands disposed of.