Union of India vs Mehta Pharmacuticals (P) Limited

S.S. Sodhi, J.—According to the provisions of Section 39 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as they then were, an appeal from a decree of a Subordinate Judge lay to the District Judge, where the value of the original suit, in which the decree was passed, did not exceed Rs. 10,000/- and in other cases to the High Court. By an amendment of the Act which came into effect on July 21, 1975, this figure of Rs. 10,000/- for appeals to the District Judge was changed to Rs. 20,000/-. The result being that the forum for appeals from decrees where the value of the original suit was between Rs. (sic) and Rs. 20,000/- got shifted from the High Court to the District Judge. The controversy that now arises is with regard to the effect that this had upon the limitation for filing of appeals against decrees falling in this category, namely there of the value of Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 20,000/- which had been passed before this amendment came into force, as the limitation for the filing of an appeal before the District Judge was 30 days while that to the High Court is 90 days.

Turning to the case here, on January 31, 1975 the Subordinate Judge passed a decree of Rs. 18311/- against the Union of India. In order to appeal against it, a copy of this judgment and decree was applied for on February 3, 1975 which was prepared on June 27, 1975 and delivered to the counsel for the Union of India on July 7, 1975. As the value of the suit exceeded Rs. 10,000/-, the appeal then lay to the High Court and 90 days was the limitation for filing it, the last date of limitation being September 23, 1975.

On July 21, 1975, however, as mentioned earlier, the Act was amended and this appeal being of less than Rs. 20,000/- in value fell within the jurisdiction of the District Judge Counsel for the Union of India consequently wrote to the Government Department concerned on July 26, 1975 informing of this change in the law though also observing therein that in the present case the limitation for the filing of the appeal would probably be 90 days. Later, on receipt of the requisite amount for court-fee, the appeal was eventually filed on August 5, 1975, accompanied by an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of the delay in filing it.

It will be seen that if the limitation for the filing of the appeal is to be taken to be 90 days, the appeal filed on August 5, 1975 would be well within time, but not if the limitation was 30 days, in which event the question to be considered would be whether there was sufficient cause for the condonation of the delay in the filing of the appeal.

The nearest precedent to the situation as has arisen in this case is provided by the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Manipur in Abdul Gani Mia v. Abdul Gani Mia and ors. AIR 1961 Man 25. In that case, on the date of the delivery of the copy of the judgment and decree of the trial court, appeal lay to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, the time for filing of which was 90 days. Before the filing of this appeal, however, the Manipur (Courts) Act, 1955, was passed whereby the venue of the appeal in that particular case, because of its valuation got changed from the Court of the Judicial Commissioner to that of the District Judge. The limitation for filing of an appeal before the District Judge was only 30 days. It was held that by changing the venue of the appeal, the period of limitation for filing it could not be deemed to have been curtailed. In holding so, reference was made to the observations of the Full Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan in Jethmal v. Amb Singh AIR 1955 Raj. 97 (F.B.), which are reproduced hereunder:-

Although a law of limitation is primarily a law relating to procedure and as such comes into effect right from the moment it has been enacted and governs all proceedings instituted thereafter and thus has retrospective operation, there is overwhelming authority in favour of the principle that where a subsequent law curtails the period of limitation previously allowed and such law comes into force, it should not be allowed to have retrospective effect which it would otherwise have, so as to destroy pre-existing vested rights of suit, because the giving of such retrospective effect amounts to not merely a change in procedure but a forfeiture of the very right to which the procedure relates.

Further,

Where the language of a law relating to limitation is not precise and is of doubtful import such law may be construed equitably, or reasonably that is, such construction thereof may be adopted which favours the right to sue rather than which bars that right.

where two interpretations are found to be equally possible, the Court must impute a reasonable intention to the Legislature-and hold the suit not to be falling within a shorter period of limitation.

Respectfully agreeing with the observations of the Full Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan and the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Manipur, it must be held that by the amendment in the Punjab Courts Act, which came into effect in July 1975, the period of limitation for appeals against decrees, where the value of the original suit was between Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 20,000/-, was not curtailed and it follows, therefore, that the appeal in the present case was filed well within time. It must also be observed that there was, at any rate, ample justification for the condonation of the delay in the filing of the appeal even if the period of limitation were taken, to have been curtailed to 30 days by this amendment.

The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is accordingly hereby set aside and the case is remanded to that court for fresh decision on merits, in accordance with law.