Union of India vs Ganda Singh and others

Manmohan Singh Liberhan, J.—This order will also dispose of Civil Misc. No. 388/1988. In L.P.A. No. 1200 of 1982 as the material facts and questions of law raised in both these applications are common. The factual matrix is taken from Civil Misc. No. 387/1988.

A notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was published on October 29, 1976, with respect to the acquisition of the land of the applicants. After the award of the Collector, the applicants preferred claim petition u/s 18 of the Act which was disposed of by the Additional District Judge on March 28, 1979 and by this Court on March 23, 1982. The Union of India preferred Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment dated March 23, 1982. which was dismissed summarily on September 15, 1982.

The applicants though applied under Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the review and modification of orders dated March 23, 1982 and September 15, 1982, but in substance, rather, in fact the purport of the application was prayer for redetermination of the market value of the land of the applicants on the basis of the award of the Supreme Court dated 24.7.1987. A reference to Section 28-A of the land Acquisition Act was also made.

The applicants claim that their lands in village Phus Mandi and the land of the village Bathinda and phus Mandi relating to which the Supreme Court, vide its order dated July 24, 1987, assessed the value, were acquired under the same noticfiation though the Collecter gave two different awards and consequently two different awards were given by the High Court, one relating to the lands of the applicants and the other relating to the persons in whose case the amount was assessed by the Supreme Court The value of the lands is said to be the same as the lands were identical. A further prayer for a consequential relief of solatium and interest in view of the amended provisions on the assessed market value was made

The Appellant controverted the allegations and contended that the lands covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court, though acquired by the same notification, are the lands of village Bathinda as the award of the Additional District Judge deciding the reference u/s 18 of the Act related to the lands of village Bathinda. The lands of both the villages are said to be of different value. The application was said to be barred by time. It was pleaded that the lands under both the awards relate to different revenue estates. The applicability of Section 28-A of the Act as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984 was denied. Some distinguishing features relating to the judgment of the Supreme Court were pleaded.

The counsel for the applicants relied on Baord of the Nawan Mission America v Union of India (198-1) 93 P.L.R. 4, in order to canvass that the government should not be allowed to raise technical pleas of limitation so as to discriminate between the claimants and other land-owners in whose case they have willingly granted benefit on the lines of Section 23(2) and Section 23 of the Act as amended by Act No. 68/1984.

The counsel for the applicants further relied upon Nand Ram and Ors. V. The State of Haryana 1988 P.L.J. 505.

One of the objects of law is to end the litigation. It is in the interest of the society that the things should not be kept, in fluid state People in a civilised society should know their rights and live with them and not with a sword of damocles hanging on their bead. It is not envisaged that a person should be permitted to drag a skelaton from a cupboard and get the settled things unsettled. The State cannot be treated differently. The question of facts and law determined in a proceeding before a competent court cannot kept in the realm of uncertainty. The person cannot be permitted to take advantage of fertiorari circumstances. Once he has accepted the judgment and decree without bestirring his rights in appeal under the law he can not be permitted to claim again on the basis of some view taken by the apex court on the facts of a particular case before it.

It has been observed in S.G. Jaisinghani Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , that rule of law means that decisions should be made by application of known principles and rules, and, in general, such decision should be predictable and the citizen should know where he stands

We are of the view that in view of the facts and circumstances narrated above, the purport of the application is re determination of the market value of the land in dispute on the basis of alleged subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court having been gives, assessing the market value of the land in dispute in that case before it on the basis of evidence on record in the case. The counsel for the applicants has not been able to satisfy us how re-determination can be done except by de novo trial which is not envisaged by any provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court finally determined the compensation and no error has been pointed out on the part of the Court Coming into being a view contary to the earlier view is not a sufficient ground for review of a judgment passed half a decade earlier.

Section 152 of the CPC confers a power on a court for the amendment of judgments, decrees or orders where clerical or arithmetical mistakes have arisen from any incidental slip or omission on the part of the court, and the same can be corrected. The object of the section is that a party should not suffer on account of an error of the court. Nothing has been pointed out that there was any clerical or arithmetical mistake in the judgment The only prayer made is that in view of the higher compensation awarded in the subsequent judgment relating to the lands alleged to have been acquired under the same notification, the claims of the applicants be re determined. In our considered view, Section 152 of the CPC is not attrected at all. No fresh trial is permissible under the provisions cited. In Banta Singh v. Union of India (1988-2) 94 P.L.R. 49 (F.B.), their Lordships of the Full Bench observed that under the provisions of Section 28-A, a claimant who had not made an application to the Collector u/s 18, could ask for the amount of compensation payable to him as determined by the Court in case of a third party''s application for enhancement of compensation. A person who had been claiming enhanced compensation and whose metter was pending before the High Court when Section 28-A of the Act came into force is not entitled to claim redetermination.

Even otherwise, the Legislature in its wisdom thought of giving a right of getting the claim re determined to a limited category of persons, i.e., those who had not already preferred a claim u/s 18. It is they and they alone who are entitled to ask for re determination of their compensation. Since the statute is specific, it is presumed that the other categories of persons, i.e., those who have already preferred a claim u/s 18 and have got it settled up to the High Court, can not ask for redetermination of their claim.

The learned Judges of the Full Bench further observed that where no appeal is pending and no review is posible, the principle enunciated in the judgment of the Supreme Court to the effect that the State is bound to treat the similarly situated claimants similary, though the claim of the Petitioner has been determined earlier, can not be invoked in these proceedings and no relief can be granted We are in full agreement with the observations made by the Bench.

The counsel for the Union of India contended that the application preferred by the applicants is barred by time, as the same is governed by the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act it is not disputed that the lis became final between the parties on 23rd March, 1983 or, at the most, on 15th September, 1982 when the Letters Patent Appeal of the Union of India was dismissed summarily. The application having been preferred for re-determination of the value on 11th December, 1987, is beyond limitation. Prima facie, we find force in the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondent. However, in view of our above observations on the whole we refrain ourselves from expressing any final view on it. So far as the judgment in Nand Ram''s case (supra) referred to on behalf of the counsel for the applicants is concerned, it has got no application to the facts an circumstances of this case, inasmuch as it was observed that similarly situated lands having been acquired through indetical notifications, similar compensation should have been granted. The state can not refuse to pay in respect of lands acquired under the same notification, compensation at a reason-able market value reflected in the compensation awarded to the land-owners whose similary situated lands had been acquired under the same notification. Herein admittedly, the similarily of the lands and its situation is being disputed. The courts taking into account of the facts and the evidence on record finally determined the market value of the Appellants land as far back as 1982. The evidence produced by the parties was taken into consideration while assessing the market value. Subsequently, the assessment of the market value of the different lands though acquired under the same notification by itself is not sufficient to re-open the matters settled, in particular, when the applicants have not cared to bestir their rights in a higher court. As a matter of policy it ought to be limited at certain or some point of time. The liability of the State can not be left indeterminate for an indeterminate time for indeterminate reasons and for an in-determinate class of people.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no force in the applications. The same are dismissed but with no order as to costs.