Union of India and Others vs Gheesu Lal and Another

R.S. Chauhan, J.—The Union of India is aggrieved by the order dated 20.12.2013 passed by the Central Industrial Tribunal, whereby the learned Tribunal has dismissed the petitioners'' application for leading evidence by way of submitting documents with regard to the educational qualification of respondent No. 1 for the post of Khalasi. The brief facts of the case are that on 2.5.1976, the respondent No. 1, Gheesu Lal was appointed on the post of Khalasi with the then Western Railways (presently North-Western Railways) in the Chief Workshop Manager, Loco situated at Ajmer. Although he could not read and write, but according to his attestation form submitted for the direct recruitment, he had claimed that he had studied upto 8th Class. However, subsequently a CBI inquiry was conducted and it was discovered that Gheesu Lal had never studied at the school where he claimed to be a student for the period 8.9.1959 to 2.7.1962. Moreover, the school was a Middle School till 1961. Considering the fact that a false declaration had been made in his attestation form, his services were terminated. Therefore, an industrial dispute was raised which was eventually referred to the learned Tribunal.

By award dated 31.7.2000 the learned Tribunal had passed an award in favour of Gheesu Lal. Since the petitioners were aggrieved by the award dated 31.7.2000, they filed a writ petition before this court namely S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5582/2000. By judgment dated 11.8.2006 a learned Single Judge set aside the award, and remanded the case back to the learned Tribunal. This Court directed the learned Tribunal "to hear the matter afresh and after affording opportunity of being heard," to pass the award on merit. Since Gheesu Lal was aggrieved by the judgment dated 11.8.2006, he filed a Special Appeal before the learned Division Bench of this Court. By judgment dated 24.7.2013 the learned Division Bench did not interfere with the direction issued by the learned Single Judge, but merely extended the period for deciding the case "to six months from the date of the judgment". Therefore, the case travelled back to the learned Tribunal.

During the course of the proceedings before the learned Tribunal, the petitioners filed an application on 26.11.2013 and prayed that they be allowed to submit the evidence on their behalf. However, by order dated 20.12.2013 the said application was dismissed by the learned Tribunal. Hence this petition before this Court.

Mr. P.C. Sharma, the learned counsel for petitioners, has vehemently contended that by order dated 11.8.2006 the learned Single Judge had set aside the award, and-directed that the case be heard "afresh" after affording an opportunity of being heard. According to him, the word "afresh" would mean that a de novo proceedings would have to be initiated. Hence the petitioners should be given an opportunity to submit their evidence. Secondly, that the learned Division Bench did not interfere with the part of direction issued by the learned Single Judge. It merely extended the period of time for deciding the case within a stipulated period of six months. Therefore, the learned Tribunal was not justified in concluding that the direction is merely limited to an opportunity of hearing being given to the petitioners. In fact the opportunity of hearing would per se include the right to submit the evidence. Lastly, that a last opportunity should be given to the petitioners to submit the necessary documents to prove the fact that the respondent, Gheesu Lal, does not have the qualification that he had claimed in his attestation form. Hence the impugned order deserves to be interfered with.

On the other hand, Dr. V.S. Nain has contended that by order dated 4.10.1998 the learned Tribunal had granted an opportunity to the petitioners to submit their evidence. From 4.10.1998 till 6.1.1999 the petitioners kept on seeking opportunities to submit their documents and to examine their witnesses. According to the order dated 4.2.1999, the last opportunity was granted to them to submit their evidence. Even thereafter on 4.3.1999 and 15.4.1999, opportunities were given to the petitioners to submit their evidence. Since the petitioners had failed to do so, by order dated 19.5.1999 the learned Tribunal closed the petitioners'' evidence. However, the order dated 19.5.1999 was never challenged by the petitioners. Hence it achieved finality.

Secondly, although by order dated 23.8.1999 it was recorded that the petitioners shall be given a chance to submit their evidence, but in the impugned order the learned Tribunal has clarified the fact that order dated 23.8.1999 was inadvertently recorded. The opportunity to submit the evidence could not be reopened as there was no application filed by the petitioners prior to 23.8.1999.

Thirdly, according to the learned counsel once the evidence was closed, once the order was never challenged, obviously the word "afresh" could not mean that a de novo proceeding needs to be initiated, giving a complete opportunity to the petitioners to submit their evidence.

Fourthly, the word used by the learned Single Judge is that "an opportunity to be heard should be given". Therefore, the direction is limited only to the extent of "hearing" of the arguments, and cannot be expanded to include the right to submit the evidence.

Fifthly, the said direction was untouched by the learned Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, the learned Tribunal is justified in denying the opportunity for submitting their evidence to the petitioners. Hence the learned counsel has supported the impugned order.

Admittedly, from 4.10.1998 till 4.2.1999 repeated opportunities were given to the petitioners for submitting their evidence. According to the order dated 4.2.1999, the last opportunity was given for the same. Even thereafter, two more opportunities were given. However, by order dated 19.5.1999, the opportunity to submit the evidence was closed. A bare perusal of the order-sheets further reveal that between 19.5.1999 and 23.8.1999, no application had been filed by the petitioners for giving them an opportunity of submitting their evidence or for recalling the order dated 19.5.1999. Moreover, in the impugned order, the learned Tribunal has clearly observed that inadvertently an order was passed on 23.8.1999 granting an opportunity to the petitioners to submit their evidence. Thus, obviously when the award dated 31.7.2000 was challenged before the learned Single Judge, the fact that the petitioners'' evidence was closed was well known to the petitioners. But despite knowing this fact, the petitioners never requested this Court to permit them to submit their evidence. Therefore the direction issued by the learned Judge directing the Tribunal "to hear the matter afresh" cannot be construed to mean that "the petitioners should be given an opportunity to submit their evidence". The direction was merely to give an opportunity of hearing and not an opportunity to submit evidence. Even before the learned Division Bench, the petitioners never prayed that it should be clarified that an opportunity of hearing would also include the opportunity to present their evidence. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the word "afresh" would have to be interpreted as the reopening of the entire case and as granting the right to start a proceeding de novo, is unacceptable. Hence, the learned Tribunal is absolutely justified in holding that even the learned Division Bench did not direct it to give an opportunity to the petitioners for submitting their evidence. The direction was, indeed, limited to an opportunity of being heard being given to both. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the order dated 20.12.2013. This petition being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed.