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Judgment
Per: Justice B. P. Sharma
These petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India have been preferred by the petitioners calling in question the legality, validity and propriety of the common order dated 19.02.2025 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench in O.A. No.200/139/2022 and O.A. No.200/185/2022, whereby the Original Applications preferred by the respondents have been allowed, the orders of dismissal dated 28.09.2020 have been set aside and liberty has been reserved in favour of the petitioners to proceed against the respondents by conducting a regular departmental enquiry in accordance with law.
Since common questions of fact and law arise for consideration in these petitions, they were heard analogously and are being decided by this common order.
Briefly stated, the respondents were working as Senior Section Engineers under the West Central Railway. On the basis of registration of a criminal case against them for offences punishable under Sections 376-D, 328 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, they were placed under suspension. Thereafter, by separate orders dated 28.09.2020, the disciplinary authority invoked Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. During the pendency of the dispute, the respondents were acquitted by the competent criminal Court by judgment dated 23.07.2024. Aggrieved by the orders of dismissal, the respondents approached the Central Administrative Tribunal by filing the aforesaid Original Applications, which came to be allowed by the impugned common order.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that considering the gravity of the allegations and the misconduct involving moral turpitude, the disciplinary authority was justified in invoking Rule 14(ii) of the Rules of 1968. It is contended that departmental proceedings are independent of criminal proceedings and acquittal in a criminal case has no bearing on disciplinary action. Reliance has been placed upon Management of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. M. Mani (2018) 1 SCC 285 and The Divisional Controller KSRTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao (2012) 1 SCC 442.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order and submitted that the respondents have been dismissed from service without conducting any departmental enquiry and without giving any reasonable opportunity of hearing. Reliance has been placed upon Tarsem Singh vs State of Punjab and others (2006) 13 SCC 581, Amit Chaurasia v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine MP 5933 and the decision of the Delhi High Court in Government of NCT of Delhi v. Dushyant Kumar 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1136.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
The undisputed position is that before imposing the major penalty of dismissal, no regular departmental enquiry was conducted against the respondents. Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 undoubtedly empowers the disciplinary authority to dispense with such enquiry. However, such power is an exceptional one and can be exercised only upon recording objective satisfaction, supported by reasons in writing, that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. In Tarsem Singh (supra) , the Supreme Court held that though the competent authority may dispense with a departmental enquiry in exceptional cases, the satisfaction recorded by it must be founded on objective material. Mere subjective satisfaction or reliance upon a preliminary enquiry, without any material demonstrating that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a regular enquiry, would not justify invocation of the exceptional power to dispense with the enquiry. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by this Court in Amit Chaurasia (supra) wherein it has been held that mere gravity of the allegations cannot justify dispensing with the mandatory requirement of a departmental enquiry. A similar view has been taken by the Delhi High Court in Government of NCT of Delhi (supra), holding that seriousness of the allegations cannot substitute the statutory requirement of recording reasons demonstrating the impracticability of holding an enquiry.
In the present case, facts are peculiar. FIR was registered against the present respondent on 26-09-2020 at Police Station GRP, Bhopal and immediately thereafter, both the respondents were placed under suspension on 26-09-2020 itself. Soon after placing the respondents under suspension, the disciplinary authority passed an order dated 28-09-2020 thereby dismissing the respondents from service referring to the provisions contained i n Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968.Therefore, learned Central Administrative Tribunal interfered in the dismissal order because case was registered and even charge-sheet was not filed, what to say of conduct of trial. Importantly, the trial resulted into acquittal of respondents. Therefore, the whole controversy is to be looked into from ventage point of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
Keeping the aforesaid settled principles in view, this Court has examined the orders of dismissal dated 28.09.2020. A perusal thereof, reveals that except referring to the registration of the criminal case, the seriousness of the allegations and the preliminary enquiry report, the disciplinary authority has not recorded any objective satisfaction indicating as to why it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry. The orders do not disclose any circumstance which made the holding of such enquiry impossible or impracticable. Mere gravity of the allegations or involvement of moral turpitude, by themselves, cannot be treated as sufficient compliance with the mandate of Rule 14(ii) of the Rules of 1968.
The reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on Management of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (supra) is misconceived. In the said case, the disciplinary action was preceded by a regular departmental enquiry, which was held to be legal and proper, and the Supreme Court merely reiterated the settled principle that acquittal in a criminal case would not invalidate a valid departmental enquiry. The said decision has no application to the facts of the present case where no departmental enquiry was conducted at all and respondent was acquitted in a criminal case.
Similarly, the decision in The Divisional Controller KSRTC (supra) also does not advance the case of the petitioners. The issue before the Supreme Court therein was the effect of acquittal on disciplinary proceedings conducted after a lawful departmental enquiry. In the present case, the controversy is not regarding the effect of acquittal but the legality of dispensing with the enquiry itself without satisfying the statutory preconditions under Rule 14(ii) of the Rules of 1968.
The Tribunal has rightly noticed the aforesaid infirmity and has interfered with the orders of dismissal on the ground that the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Rules had not been followed. Significantly, the Tribunal has not foreclosed the right of the petitioners to proceed departmentally against the respondents. On the contrary, liberty has specifically been reserved in favour of the petitioners to initiate and conclude a regular departmental enquiry in accordance with law after affording due opportunity of hearing to the respondents. Thus, no prejudice is caused to the petitioners.
The scope of interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. Unless the order passed by the Tribunal suffers from patent perversity, jurisdictional error or manifest illegality, interference is unwarranted. In the present case, the Tribunal has correctly appreciated the legal position governing Rule 14(ii) of the Rules of 1968 and has rightly concluded that the respondents could not have been dismissed from service without conducting a departmental enquiry or without recording the satisfaction mandated by the Rule for dispensing with such enquiry.
Consequently, this Court finds no perversity or patent illegality in the impugned common order passed by the Tribunal warranting interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Accordingly, both the Miscellaneous Petitions, being devoid of merit, are hereby dismissed.