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Judgment
S.L. Jain, J.—This petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenges the order of State Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur dated Dec. 6, 2001 passed in O.A. No. 3823/2001.
Facts as have been depicted in the petition are that the Petitioner was working as Head Master in the Government Higher Secondary School, Betul. On the basis of frivolous, baseless and mala fide complaints made by some teachers and Respondents Nos. 3 and 4, he was transferred from Betul to another place. On being found that transfer was made due to some political influence and without any exigency, the order of transfer was cancelled. After cancellation of the transfer order, Petitioner took charge of his post at previous position namely Govt. Multipurpose Higher Secondary School Betul, on 15-10-2001.
Respondents Nos. 3 and 4, pursuant to a conspiracy took a number of records and money placed in Almirah after breaking open the lock of the office put their own lock thereon without handing over the key to the Petitioner. He filed a FIR regarding the aforementioned act of Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in concerned police station. He also made representation before the District Education Officer regarding the acts of harassment of Respondents 3 and 4. Despite representations no action has been taken against the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. For want of Attendance Register, Time Register and various other documents, thus locked by the Respondents Nos. 3 and 4, the routine work in the school has been disrupted and the students are suffering.
Petitioner has submitted that as Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are not giving proper information to the authorities he is not getting the salary for last 3 months. Petitioner filed an Original Application No. 3823/2001 before the State Administrative Tribunal, but the same has been dismissed on the ground that the matter is purely of administrative nature. Therefore, invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner has filed this writ petition.
We have heard Shri S.D. Khan, Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner. We also feel that the matter is purely administrative in nature and calls for no interference.
Ordinarily High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 does not interfere with the exercise of discretion by lower courts and Tribunals. Interference would be warranted only when the finding of the Tribunal is patently erroneous or when conclusions arrived at are totally unreasonable.
The only grievance of the Petitioner is that lock of the almirah was broken and the records have been taken away by the Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. It is not his case that locks were broken in his presence or registers were taken away to his knowledge. The matter is so trivial that senior authorities of the department can take care of it. Tribunal has rightly held that the applicant can request the senior authorities for redressal of the grievance. If the attendance register of the teacher is so important for the administration of the school, Petitioner could have opened a new register. It appears that the Petitioner desires to redress his personal grievances against Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.
Judicial review under Article 226/227 is directed not so much against the decision but it is confined mainly to examination of the decision making process. There is no material to hold that decision of the Tribunal is vitiated by taking into account the irrelevant factors. Order of the Tribunal cannot be said to be unreasonable.
While dealing with judicial review under Article 226 in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh and Others, the Apex Court observed thus:
It not unoften happens that what appears to be a judicial review for breach of natural justice is, in reality, a review for abuse of discretion. It is true that amongst the many grounds put forward in the show cause notice dated 19-1-1986, quite a few overlap each other and are distinguishable from those urged for the cancellation of the lease itself. Some of the grounds might, perhaps, be somewhat premature. Some of them even if true are so trivial that no authority could reasonably be expected to cancel the permission on that basis. For instance the ground that the permission was applied for and granted in the name of one only of the two lessees would be one such.
However, Judicial review under Article 226 cannot be converted into appeal. Judicial review is directed, not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision making process. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 1 W.L.R. 1155 refers to the merits - legality distinction in judicial review. Lord Hailshan said:
The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receipts fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after recording fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court."
Lord Brightman observed:
...Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made....
And held that it would be an error to think:
...that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision, making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself.
When the issue raised in Judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account of relevant, factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority, entrusted with the power in question could reasonably have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision-making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors.
The Apex Court of the country in The Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay and Another Vs. The Advance Builders (India) Private Ltd. and Others, observed that a writ is not a matter of right but is as a rule, a matter for the discretion of the Court. High Court in exercise of its Judicial discretion decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. and Another Vs. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and Another, it has been observed that
if the Petitioner makes a claim which is frivolous, vexatious or prima facie unjust or may not appropriately be tried in a petition involving extra ordinary jurisdiction, the Court may decline to entertain the petition.
Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made, dispute sought to be agitated or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction. ( Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Others Vs. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda and Others, . From the important position which a writ occupies as a remedial process, as well as from its nature as an extra ordinary remedy, that the exercise of the jurisdiction rests to a considerable extent, in the sound discretion of the Court, (subject always to the well settled principles which have been established by the courts). Cases may, therefore, arise where the applicant has some grievance but where the court may, in the exercise of a wise judicial discretion, still refuses the relief.
Even if direction, as prayed for by the Petitioner is given, it may be ineffective if Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 say that they have not taken away the papers from the almirah. It is not a practice of this Court to issue meaningless writs. Where there is no practical possibility of obedience, direction will generally be refused. Direction can be issued by this Court only where definite and fruitful purpose is likely to be served.
It is not a case in which interference in the order of the Tribunal is called for. The petition is devoid of substance, hence it is dismissed in limine without notice to other party.