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Judgment
Bharati Sapru, J.—I have heard Sri Manoj Mishra learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri V.S. Sengar learned Counsel for the respondent workman.
The present petition has been filed against an award of the Industrial TribunalcumLabour Court dated 2.12.1997 passed in Industrial Dispute No. 50 of 1995 by which the Tribunal has held that the termination of the workman concerned is in breach of provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and has reinstated the workman.
The order of reference is whether the termination of the services of Sri Suresh Kumar Sonkar, casual workman with effect from 23.7.1993 is legal and justified? If not, what relief is the said workman entitled to?
The facts of the case are that the respondent workman claims that he was working as casual employee with the petitioner bank and worked beyond the period of 240 days and was wrongly terminated in breach of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner bank on the other hand submitted that the respondent workman was engaged on temporary basis as water boy. As he was engaged as daily rated workman in the petitioner bank and did not work continuously, he could not be absorbed in the services of petitioner bank through a back door entry as the bank has a complete procedure for appointing a person on regular basis.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the burden of proof to establish that the workman had worked for more than 240 days lay clearly on the workman. While the matter was drawing the attention of the Tribunal, a joint inspection was carried out and a report was submitted to the learned Tribunal. The joint inspection report dated 8.3.1997, which has been appended as Annexure 6 to the writ petition, amply demonstrates that indeed the respondent workman did not complete 240 days in any given year.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that this joint inspection report has been completely ignored by the learned Tribunal which has recorded a finding that the employer could not establish its case because the person who adduced evidence on behalf of an employer, was not there in all those years and therefore, had stated that oral testimony of the workman stood unrebutted.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner has next urged that in para 12 of the writ petition, it has been clearly stated that although a joint inspection report was called for, the learned Tribunal failed to examine the same.
In reply to the averments in para 12 of the writ petition, there is no specific denial in the counteraffidavit. Therefore, it is apparent that even though the Tribunal itself called for a joint inspection report, it failed to go into it and simply relied on the oral testimony.
Hon''ble Supreme Court has held in catena of decisions and very recently in the case of Manager, R.B.I. v. S. Mani, JT 2005 (3) SC 248, held that the burden of proof that workman has completed 240 days of service lay on the workman himself as the claim has been raised by the workman.
The contention as raised by the petitioner in the present writ petition, has substance and well founded and the same is liable to be accepted by this Court. The learned Tribunal has erred in not considering the joint inspection report while passing the impugned award and has ignored the material evidence, which was before it to decided the question of 240 days work. As such the conclusion drawn by the learned Tribunal is vitiated. For this reason, I am of the opinion that the award of the Industrial Tribunal deserves to be set aside.
The writ petition is allowed. The impugned award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 2.12.1997 passed in Industrial Dispute No. 50 of 1995 is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Tribunal, which shall reconsider the matter afresh after affording opportunity of hearing to both parties but shall not allow any unnecessary adjournments to either side. As the industrial dispute is of 1995, the learned Tribunal is directed to conclude the matter within a period of six months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. Interim order dated 27.4.1998 is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.