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Judgment
Judgment Pronounced by K.Govindarajan, J.—The appellant''s, lands were sought to be acquired for the formation of Maduravoyal
Neighbourhood Scheme sponsored by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board bearing survey Nos.11/2B measuring 0.94 cents, in 12/1a measuring 0.36
cents in 12/1b measuring 0.37 cents and 13/2 measuring 1.62 acres in total measuring 3.29 acres in Ambattur Taluk. The notification u/s 4(1) of
the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called ''The Act'') in G.O.Ms.No.857 Housing and Urban Development dated 26.8.1985 was published in
the Government Gazette on 25.9.1985. The declaration u/s 6 of the Act was made in G.O.Ms. No.1525, Housing and Urban Development, dated
28.9.1986. As the major portion of the lands are not required for the said project, the Government in G.O.Ms.No.31222/A2/87 2, Housing &
Urban Development, dated 7.12.1987 withdrew the above said Notification with respect to 2.37 acres leaving 0.92 cents in S.No.13/2 alone for
the above said Housing Scheme. The said Notification was published on 30.12.1987.
In the meanwhile, the-appellant/petitioner filed writ petition in W.P.No.8502 of 1988 to set aside the abovesaid two Notifications dated
26.8.1985 and 28.9.1986 and obtained an order of stay on 1.8.1988. Ultimately the said writ petition was dismissed on 26.3.1998, It is relevant
to mention here that though the Government had withdrawn the earlier Notifications dated 26.8.1985 and 28.9.1986 with respect to 2.37 acres of
land, the appellant had challenged both the Notifications as if the entire extent of 3.29 acres of land was sought to be acquired
Having felt that the said lands are necessary for forming bye-pass road, the Government issued Notification u/s 4(1) of the Act in
G.O.Ms.No.14 Transport Department dated 6.1.1986 with respect to 2.37 acres of land in survey Nos.11/2B (0.94 cents), 12/1B (0. 37 cents)
and 13/2 (0.70 cents Thereafter, the Government made declaration u/s 6 of the Act in G.O.Ms.No.322, Transport, dated 13.2.1987. Thereafter
the Government issued notice u/s 9(3) of the-Act. At this stage the appellant filed writ petition, in W.P.No.10654 of 1998 with respect to the land
measuring 0.92 cents in Survey No.13/2, and in, W.P.Nos,10655 of 1998 and 15009 of 1999 challenging the said notices on the ground either
award was not passed or the award was passed two years later from the date of declaration made u/s 6 of the Act.
The respondents resisted the said contentions of the appellant stating that with respect to the land sought to be acquired for the purpose of
formation of bye-pass road the award was passed on 9.10.1998 and possession was taken on 7.1.2000. According to them, as the
appellant/petitioner got the stay order in the earlier writ petition in W.P, No.8502 of 1988 with respect to the same land, though in the different
acquisition proceeding, the respondents could not pass the award within the stipulated period of two years from the date of declaration made u/s 6
of the Act.
The abovesaid facts are not in dispute. The appellant has, not. challenged any Notifications issued under the Act. The main attack of the
appellant on the said proceedings is that with respect to the o land bearing Survey No, 13/2, measuring 0.92 cents, no award is passed till date
and in view of Section 11-A of the Act, the award cannot be passed hereafter and thereby the entire proceedings have to be held invalid with
respect to the said land. The learned Government Pleader, on instructions, has submitted that so far, no award is passed. Though the award should
have been passed on or before 15.2.1999 no award is passed. So, in view of Section 11-A of the Act, the entire proceedings relating to the
acquisition of the land measuring 0.92 cents in S.No.13/2 shall lapse, as the award has not been passed within two years from the date of
publication of the said declaration, even after taking into consideration of the period during which the proceedings are stayed by the learned Judge.
Hence the acquisition proceedings insofar as the said 0.92 cents are concerned, in Survey No. 13/2, have to be set aside, as the entire
proceedings would lapse. Accordingly, the order passed in W.P, No.10654 of 1998 is hereby set aside and the Writ Appeal No.49 of 2000 is
allowed.
With respect to the lands measuring 2.37 acres acquired for the purpose of formation of bye-pass road the submission of the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant is that the award was passed on 9.10.1998 which is beyond the period of two years from the date of declaration made
u/s 6 of the Act and so now the entire proceedings are liable to be set aside. As submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing
for the second respondent and also as held by the learned Judge, the land in question was the subject matter of acquisition at the instance of the
Tamil Nadu Housing Board, which was under challenge in W.P. No.8502 of 1988 and the appellant got stay on 1.8.1988, That writ petition was
dismissed only on 26.3.1998 and so the award passed on 9.10.1998 is well within the scope of Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the respondents cannot rely on the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act to
save the award as they have not taken any proceedings to pass award pursuant to the said declaration made on 13.2.1987 within two years, and
the writ petition filed was only with reference to the Notification u/s 4(1) of the Act, dated 26.8.1985, and the said declaration was made on
28.9.1986, which are nothing to do with the award now under challenge.
The question is whether the stay granted in the said proceedings taken by the petitioner can be taken advantage of, to sustain the award passed
by the Government pursuant to the declaration made in G.O.Ms.No. 322, Transport, dated 13.2.1987.
It is not in dispute that the appellant has not challenged the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act, dated 22.1.1986 and the said declaration
made by the Government Order dated 13.2.1987 with respect to the land measuring 2.37 acres of land acquired for the purpose of formation of
the bye-pass road. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the land acquisition Proceedings with respect to 2.37 acres of land which was sought to be
acquired under the said Notification dated 26.8.1995, the appellant/petitioner filed writ petition in W.P. No.8502 of 1988 and obtained stay on
1.8.1988 and the said writ petition was dismissed on 26.3.1998. The learned Judge on the basis of Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act
sustained the award on the ground that the proceedings are stayed with respect to the same land. When the Court granted stay of further
proceedings, the authorities are not expected to proceed with any proceedings under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So we cannot
take any exception to the reasoning''s given by the learned Judge.
It is also not in dispute that possession has been taken on 7.1.2000. So, even assuming that the award has not been passed within two years as
contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the lands stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances, after handing over
possession of the said lands, under the said Notification u/s 4(1) and the Declaration made u/s 6 of the Act. This view is supported by the three
Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Satendra Prasad Jain and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:''
Whether notification u/s 4(1) and the declaration u/s 6 get lapsed if the award is not made within two years as envisaged u/s 11-A ? A Bench of
three Judges had held that once possession was taken and the land vested in the Government, title to the land so vest-ed in the State is subject only
to determina-tion of compensation and to pay the same to the owner. Divesting the title to the land statutorily vested in the Government and
reverting the same to the owner is not contemplated under the Act. Only Section 48(1) gives power to withdraw from acquisition that too before
possession is taken. That question did not arise in this case. The property under acquisition having been vested in the appellants, in the absence of
any power under the Act to have the title of the appellants divested except by exercise of the power u/s 48(1), valid title cannot be defeated: The
exercise of the power to quash the notification u/s 4(1) and the declaration u/s 6 would lead to incongruity. Therefore, the High Court under those
circumstances should not have interfered with the acquisition and quashed the notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 respectively.
Considered from either perspective, we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in allowing the writ petition"".
The Apex Court taking into consideration of the public interest and also the scope of Article 226 of Constitution of India, put a restriction to
interfere with the acquisition proceedings on technical; grounds. While doing so, the learned Judges have held as follows in the decision in
Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, :-
Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the Courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while
exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests
of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the
public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly
of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the
power under Article 226 indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct in case it finds finally that the
acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular
amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at all certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of
affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a
matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will
be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings"".
While dealing with similar facts. The Hon''ble The Chief Justice of India and another Hon''ble Judge, the decision in H.M.Kelogir Rao v. Govt.
of A.P. 1997 (1) SCC 722, agreeing with the view of the three-Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Senjeevanagar Medical and Health Employees
Co-operative Housing Society Vs. Mohd. Abdul Wahab and Others, have held that ""we have no hesitation to hold that in the established facts and
circumstances of the case, there is no scope for now directing the land, and which had vested in the State and of which posses-sion had been
taken by the State almost two decades ago to be now returned to the appellant"",
For the foregoing reasons, this Court cannot interfere with the land acquisition proceedings at this stage, and so W.A.Nos.47 and 48 of 2000
are dismissed accordingly, and, as stated above, W.A.No.49 of 2000 is allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.Ps. are closed.