High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 10 AHC CK 4343

U.P. Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam vs Basant Lal & Ors.

Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench · Decided on 27 October 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, J
RESULT
Partly Allowed
CASE NUMBER
First Appeal From Order No. 732 of 2007 with Cross Objection No. 5 of 2011

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Judgment

89 paragraphs · 6,635 words

HON’BLE SYED QAMAR HASAN RIZVI, J.

1.

Sri Ambika Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Hari Prakash Srivastava, learned counsel for the Insurance Company-respondent no. 6, Sri Syed Ahmad Abbas Zaidi, learned counsel for the claimant(s)/respondent nos. 1 to 4 and Sri Sanjay Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 are present.

2.

By means of the present Appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the appellant / Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'Corporation'), has assailed the judgment and award dated 03.04.2007 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Barabanki (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 320 of 2001 (Basant Lal and others versus U.P. Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam and another), whereby the claim petition filed by respondent nos. 1 to 4 under Sections 166 and 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been decided and compensation of Rs. 1,69,500/- (Rupees One Lakh Sixty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred only), along with simple interest @ 5% per annum from the date of the petition till the date of payment, has been awarded against the appellant-Corporation.

3.

Objecting to the present appeal, respondent nos. 1 to 4 have filed Cross Objection which has been registered as Cross Objection No. 5 of 2011 (Basant Lal and others versus Zafar Ahmad Khan and another) under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking enhancement of the award in question. Since both the appeal and the cross-objection assails the same judgment and award dated 03.04.2007, therefore are being disposed of by this common judgment.

4.

A succinct recap of the factual matrix, as adumbrated in the pleadings, reveals that on 30.06.2001, at about 4:00 P.M., the wife of respondent no. 1/Basant Lal and the mother of respondent nos. 2 to 4, namely Jamuna Devi while returning to home on foot, along with her husband and a cousin brother, was hit from behind by a Bus bearing registration no. UP32 Z 2369, near village Bhulbhulia (Gulmuliya) Purwa, on the Barabanki-Gonda road, within the territorial limits of Police Station Masauli, District Barabanki. The deceased Jamuna Devi sustained grievous injuries in the said accident and was taken to the District Hospital, Barabanki, for medical treatment where during the course of treatment she succumbed to her injuries on the intervening night of 03/04.07.2001, pursuant to the same, Case Crime No. 90 of 2001, under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A I.P.C., was registered at Police Station Masauli, District - Barabanki.

5.

Respondent nos. 1 being the husband and the respondent no 2 to 4 being the sons of the deceased filed Claim Petition No. 320 of 2001 under Sections 166 and 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the learned Tribunal, claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five lakh rupees only) with respect to the death of Jamuna Devi.

6.

The Appellant-Corporation / Opposite Party No. 1 filed Written Statement before the learned Tribunal, denying its knowledge of the facts of the accident in question, for want of information; but in paragraph 15 of the said Written Statement this much has been admitted that the Bus No. UP32 Z 2369 stood contracted with it. The same is quoted here-in-below for ready reference:

“पैरा 15- यह कि पैरा 15 में वर्णित तथ्य मात्र बस सं० यू०पी०32जेड/2369 विपक्षी उत्तरदाता के द्वारा अनुबंधित होना स्वीकार है।”

7.

Despite due service of notice, Respondent No. 5 (Zafar Ahmad Khan, the registered owner of the Bus (arrayed as Opposite Party No. 2 in M.A.C.P. No. 320/2001) neither filed Written Statement nor entered appearance either in-person or through his counsel. Consequently, the learned Tribunal vide order dated 08.07.2005 proceeded ex-parte against him.

8.

The Learned Tribunal on the basis of pleadings framed the following issues for determination:

“1.

क्या दिनांक 30-6-2001 को समय करीब 4.00 बजे सायं गोण्डा- बाराबंकी मार्ग ग्राम भुलभुलिया थाना मसौली बाराबंकी के सामने उ०प्र०राज्य सड़क परिवहन निगम से अनुबंधित बस संख्या यू०पी०-32 जेड-2368 के चालक द्वारा तेजी व लापरवाही वे बस चलाकर याची सं०-1 की पत्नी व याचीगण 2 तथा 4 की माता जमुना देवी को पैदल जाते समय टक्कर मार दी थी, जिससे जमुना देवी की आयी हुई वोटों के कारण मृत्यु हो गयी ?

2.

क्या याचिका अनुबन्धित बस की बीमाकम्पनी को पक्षकार न बनाये जाने के कारण दोषपूर्ण है?

3.

क्या कथित वाहन परिवहन निगम से अनुबन्ध के पश्चात् चलाये जाने पर बीमा कम्पनी का दायित्व शून्य हो जाता है?

4.

क्या कथित दुर्घटना दिनांक 30-6-2001 को अनुबन्धित बस का बीमा वैध एवं प्रभावी था?

5.

क्या याची विपक्षी से कोई प्रतिकर प्राप्त करने के अधिकारी है, यदि हां तो कितना और किस पक्षकार से |”

9.

While deciding Issue No. 1, the learned Tribunal relied upon testimony of PW-1/ Basant Lal, the husband of the deceased an eye-witness to the accident, the contents of the First Information Report, the site plan / naksha nazari, the injury report and the post-mortem report. No oral or documentary evidence was led on behalf of the appellant-Corporation, to rebut the evidence, nor did the owner of the Bus (respondent no. 5), entered appearance to contest the claim. Subsequently, the applicant herein moved an application dated 19.03.2007 inter-alia stating that UP State Road Transport Corporation is not a necessary party in the case before the learned Tribunal and requested to delete it from the array of the Respondents. The said application was strongly objected by the claimants. The learned Tribunal finally dismissed the aforesaid application vide order dated 23.03.2007. The learned Tribunal on the basis of the material available on record, returned finding that the accident in question occurred due to negligence on the part of the driver of Bus No. UP32 Z 2369 which was under contract with Roadways/ U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, and accordingly answered Issue No. 1 in favour of the claimants.

10.

Further, in deciding the Issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4, the learned Tribunal recorded in terms, that since the learned counsel appearing for appellant-Corporation, on 14.02.2007, did not press any of the said three issues, as such, all the three issues are answered in the negative. For convenience, the relevant part of order dated 14.02.2007 is reproduced herein below -

“उभय पक्ष के विद्वान अधिवक्तागण के तर्क सुने गये। वाद विन्दु संख्या 2 या 4 दुर्घटना कारित करने वाली बस के बीमा और बीमा कम्पनी के दायित्व से संबंधित है, उपरोक्त तीनों वाद विन्दुओं जिन्हें प्रतिपक्षी संख्या -1 द्वारा प्रतिवाद पत्र में रखे गये अभिवाक् के आधार पर विरचित किया गया है, तर्क के समय प्रतिपक्षी संख्या -1 यू०पी०एस०आर०टी०सी० के विद्वान अधिवक्ता द्वारा उनपर कोई बल नहीं दिया गया और कहा गया है वे उन्हें नोट प्रेस करते हैं। पत्रावली दिनांक 19-2-2007 को निर्णय के लिए पेश हो।”

11.

On Issue No. 5, relating to the entitlement and quantum of compensation, the learned Tribunal noted that the appellant-Corporation, in its Written Statement, has admitted that the offending Bus stood contracted with it but by a subsequent application (paper no. Ka-43), sought to contend that the Bus, at the time of the accident, was not in contract with it, as such any liability, if any, rest upon the owner and insurer of the Bus as per Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. For ready reference the relevant part of the order dated 03.04.2007 is reproduced as under:

“अपने प्रतिवाद पत्र प्रपत्र संख्या ख-8 के प्रस्तर-15 में प्रतिपक्षी संख्या - 1 उ०प्र०राज्य सड़क परिवहन निगम द्वारा यह तथ्य स्वीकार किया है कि बस संख्या यू०पी०-32 जेड -2369 का उनके यहाँ से अनुबंधित होना स्वीकार है। कालान्तर में प्रतिपक्षी सं०-1 की ओर से एक प्रार्थना पत्र क- 43 इस आशय का प्रस्तुत किया गया कि दुर्घटना के समय उक्त बस न तो उनके यहाँ से अनुबंधित थी इसलिए प्रतिपक्षी सं०-1 न तो उक्त बस का स्वामी है और न ही चालक का नियोक्ता है और न ही उक्त बस का बीमा कर्ता है और ऐसी स्थिति में उसका क्षतिपूर्ति के वाद में कोई संबंध नहीं है। उनकी ओर से यह भी तर्क प्रस्तुत किया गया कि मोटर वाहन अधिनियम 1988 की धारा 168 के अन्तर्गत क्षतिपूर्ति के दायित्व निर्धारण हेतु जो व्यवस्था दी गयी है, उसके अनुसार उक्त उत्तरदायित्व वाहन के स्वामी, वाहन चालक एवं वाहन की बीमाकर्ता बीमा कम्पनी का संयुक्त रूप से या प्रथक प्रथक रूप से होगा। प्रतिपक्षी संख्या-1 उपरोक्त में से कोई नहीं है।”

12.

The Learned Tribunal in determining the quantum of compensation, assessed the deceased's income @ Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand Only) with one-third deducted towards personal expenses, leaving Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) as annual dependency; the deceased being aged between 35 and 40 years at the time of the accident, was assigned a multiplier of 16, resulting in Rs.1,60,000/- (Rupees One lakh Sixty Thousand Only) towards loss of dependency, and Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand Only) towards funeral expenses along with Rs. 2,500/- (Rupees Two Thousand and Five Hundred Only) towards loss of property and Rs. 5,000/-(Rupees Five Thousand Only) towards loss of consortium. Thus, the total compensation was assessed at Rs.1,69,500/- (Rupees One lakh Sixty Nine Thousand and Five Hundred only) together with interest at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of the claims petition. Out of the awarded sum, 50% was ordered to be paid to Respondent No. 1 and the remaining 50% to be divided equally among Respondent Nos. 2 to 4, and each claimant's share to be kept in three-years fixed deposit account with a nationalized bank.

13.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and award dated 03.04.2007, the appellant-Corporation preferred the present appeal along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The Registry of this Court reported delay of 29 days in filing the appeal. However, this Court vide order dated 29.02.2012 condoned the said delay. On the other hand, the claimants/respondents no. 1 to 4 preferred cross-objection, which was registered as Cross Objection No. 5 of 2011 under Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking enhancement of amount of the compensation; on which the Registry of this Court report delay of 2 years 7 months and 18 days in filing the said Cross Objection.

14.

Assailing the impugned judgment and award dated 03.04.2007, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant-Corporation vehemently argued that the same is bad in law being perverse and contrary to the facts and evidence on record. He urged that the Appellant-Corporation is neither the registered owner of the Bus allegedly involved in the accident nor is the employer of it’s driver, and therefore cannot be saddled with any liability towards the alleged accident. His contention is that under the explicit terms of the agreement executed between the Corporation and the registered owner/Respondent No. 5, any liability arising out of the operation of the vehicle while plied under the agreement rests exclusively upon the owner/Respondent No. 5 and the insurer, as such, the learned Tribunal while passing the impugned judgment and award has committed serious legal error in shifting the liability upon the Appellant-Corporation. He asserted that the learned Tribunal has misconstrued the law on the subject as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation versus Kailash Nath Kothari and others reported in AIR 1997 SC 3444, in holding the Corporation liable.

15.

The learned counsel further submitted that the quantum of impugned compensation as awarded by the learned Tribunal is entirely excessive and unsupported by material available on record. To buttress his argument, the learned Counsel placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation versus Kulsum and others reported in (2011) 8 SCC 142 and Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation versus Rajendri Devi and others, reported in (2020) 19 SCC 230.

16.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 (Claimants) supported the findings returned by the Learned Tribunal to the extent of holding the Appellant-Corporation liable to pay compensation. At the same time, the learned counsel pressed cross objection filed by them under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded. He contended that the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is on the lower side and deserves to be enhanced in light of the well settled law.

17.

His submission is that the notional income of the deceased, being a housewife, ought to have been assessed at least @ Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees Three Thousand Only) per month, whereas the learned Tribunal, in utter disregard of the settled legal position, assessed her income as Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) per annum, and prayed for the enhancement of the impugned award.

18.

It would not be out of context to mention here that the following additional evidences were filed by Appellant-Corporation as per Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C. before this court which were allowed vide order dated 10.07.2013, considering the same as essential for the effective adjudication of the controversy involved in the matter -

i)

Photocopy of the Certificate of Registration of Bus No. UP 32-Z/2369 owned by Zafar Ahmad Khan allegedly involved in the accident.

ii) Photocopy of the order U.P.S.R.T.C. regarding attachment of the bus allegedly involved in the accident along with the agreement dated 23-01-01 in that regard in between UPSRTC and the registered owner of the aforesaid bus.

Iii) Photocopy of insurance policy effective from 08-12-2000 to 07-12-01 issued by United India Insurance Company Ltd., Lucknow.

19.

Pursuant to the order dated 25.07.2013 passed by this Court, the United India Insurance Company Limited, Narhi, Lucknow was impleaded as Respondent Nos. 6.

20.

The learned counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 6 (Insurance Company) vehemently opposed the instant appeal. His contention is that if an issue is not pressed before the Trial Court, the Appellate Court is bound to decide only those issues which were pressed before the learned Trial Court and cannot entertain the same in view of the principle of ‘waiver of right’. He asserted that where a party does not press an Issue before the Trial Court, it is generally considered to have waived its right to raise such Issue at a later stage. To support his argument, he placed reliance upon a judgment passed by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Gour Hari Das versus Jharna Rani Das (C.O. 2306 of 2017) wherein it was held as under –

“23.

On the other hand, it is settled that if an issue is not pressed in the trial court, then the appellate court is bound to decide only those issues that have been pressed before it. If an issue is not raised in the Trial Court, the Appellate Court typically cannot entertain it in accordance with the Principle of Waiver of Rights. When a party does not press an issue before the trial court, it is generally considered that they have waived their right to raise that issue later. This principle is supported by the observation that if an issue is not pressed, it is presumed that the party has abandoned it.”

21.

Heard learned counsel for the parties, and perused the material available on record.

22.

In view of the above, the question that requires consideration at the very outset, is that whether the learned Tribunal could have decided the duly framed issues in negative merely on the basis of the statement made by the counsel for one of the defendants, that he is not pressing the said issues; and if it constitutes a valid and sustainable adjudication of those issues. For convenience, the relevant portion of the impugned judgment dated 03.04.2007 passed by the learned Tribunal is extracted herein below:

“वाद विन्दु संख्या - 2,3 तथा 4 का निस्तारण

वाद विन्दु संख्या-2 दुर्घटना में संलिप्त अनुबंधित यस की बीमा कम्पनी को पक्षकार न बनाये जाने के कारण आवश्यक पक्षकार के असंयोजक्ष के दोष से संबंधित है, तीसरा वाद विन्दु इस बावत है कि दुर्घटना कारित करने वाले वाहन को उ०प्र०राज्य सड़क परिवहन निगम से अनुबंधित हो जाने के उपरान्त उक्त वाहन की बीमा कम्पनी का उत्तरदायित्व शून्य होने के संबंध में है तथा चौथा वाद विन्दु दुर्घटना कारित करने वाले वाहन अनुबंधित बस के वैध एवं प्रभावी रूप से बीमित होने से संबंधित है।

जैसा कि उपर आ चुका है कि दुर्घटना कारित करने वाले वाहन बस का स्वामी जफर अहमद खान प्रतिपक्षी सं०-2न तो इस प्रतिकर वाद में उपस्थित आया और न ही उसकी ओर से कोई प्रतिवाद पत्र ही प्रस्तुत किया गया तथा उसके विरुद्ध न्यायाधिकरण के आदेश दिक्षांकित 08-7-05 के अनुसार एक पक्षीय रूप से प्रतिकर वाद की कार्यवाही अग्रसारित हुयी। इस प्रकार उपरोक्त तीनों ही वाद विन्दु प्रतिपक्षी सं०-1 उ०प्र० राज्य सड़क परिवहन निगम द्वारा प्रस्तुत प्रतिवाद पत्र में किये गये अभिकथनों के आधार पर विरचित किये गये हैं और उ०प्र० राज्य सड़क परिवहन निगम की ओर से उपस्थित विद्वान अधिवक्ता श्री अकील इरशाद फारूकी ने दिनांक 14-2-2007 को उपरोक्त तीनों ही वाद-विन्दुओं पर कोई बल नहीं दिया गया तथा उन्हें नाट प्रेस भी किया गया। इसलिए वाद विन्दु संख्या 2,3 तथा 4 नकारात्मक रूप से निर्णीत किये जाते हैं।”

(emphasis supplied by this Court)

23.

A bare perusal of the above quoted judgment reveals that the learned Tribunal on the basis of the pleadings consciously framed the issues, but while adjudicating the same answered the three issues in negative only on the instance and mere statement of the learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation, without any independent discussion.

24.

Before delving into the correctness of the aforesaid decision, it would be apt to go through the relevant Rules known as U.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998. For convenience, Rules 209, 211, 220, 221 of the same are quoted here-in-below:-

“Rule 209. Framing of issues. - After considering the application and the written statements and oral statements of the parties, the Claims Tribunal shall proceed to frame the issues on which the right decision of the claim appears to it to depend.

Rule 211. Determination of issues - After framing the issues the Claims Tribunal shall proceed to record evidence thereon which each party may like to produce.

Rule 220. Judgment and award of compensation.— (1) The Claims Tribunal, in passing orders, shall record concisely in judgment the findings on each of the issues framed and the reasons for such finding and make an award, specifying the amount of compensation to be paid by the insurer or in the case of a vehicle exempted under sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 146 by the owner thereof and shall also specify the person and persons to whom compensation shall be payable.

Rule 221. The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall so far as may be apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V; Order IX, Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII, Rules 2 to 21 of Order XVI; Order XVII; and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII.

25.

A conjoint reading of the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure with Rule 221 of U P Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 makes it evident and beyond pale of any doubt that on determination of Issues, the Tribunal shall record evidence and make brief memorandum of the substance of what is deposed.

26.

The framing of issues constitutes an imperative stage in civil proceedings, as it delineates the scope of the trial by separating wheat from the chaff, thereby identifying the real dispute and narrowing the area of controversy. There cannot be any lis without issues. In that background, failure to determine the issues not only amounts failure to exercise judicial duty enjoined upon by the trial Court, but also a travesty of justice to be expended to the parties in its letter and spirit.

27.

So far as the effect of not pressing of issues by the counsel representing a party before the learned Tribunal is concerned, the same is well settled in law that the non-pressing of an issue by a party’s counsel, otherwise arising from the pleadings, should not be calculated to amount to a waiver of the plea by the party as it is the duty of the Court to frame correct issues arising from the pleadings, reference can be made to the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court in the case of N.K. Bhatia versus J.P. Singh, reported in 1990 SCC OnLine Del 306, wherein it was held as under:

“ 4. ………...The non-pressing of an issue by a party's counsel, otherwise arising from the pleadings, should not be calculated to amount to a waiver of the plea by the party himself because it is the duty of the Court also to frame correct issues arising from the pleadings. We must not forget in the present case that the parties have not yet led evidence on various issues. The objection about lack of territorial jurisdiction, which is otherwise taken in the written statement at the earliest stage, is now being merely repeated by means of this application under Order 14 Rule 5 of the Code which otherwise mandates that before passing any decree, the Court shall either amend or frame additional issues as may be necessary for determining the matters in controversy between the parties. It is not even an application in the midst of the evidence seeking amendment of the written statement whereby the defendant wants to introduce the plea of lack of jurisdiction of this Court by amendment of the written statement. The plea is already there. It is only in those cases where trial has taken place, and the objection regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction is taken for the first time before an appellate or a revisional court, that it may be possible to say that the case had been tried on merits and judgment rendered, so it was not liable to be reversed purely on the technical ground of lack of jurisdiction. This principle will not apply when such an objection is taken before the trial court itself. It was clarified in the case of Kiran Singh (supra) in para 7 in the following words.

“With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying sections 21 and 99, CPC and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unelss there has been a prejudice on the merits.”

28.

The Division Bench of the Orissa High Court while deciding the case of Pramodini Mishra & Ors versus Krushna Prasad Mishra, reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Ori 471 has observed as under:

“22…..‘Not pressed’ contextually is a statement which may mean abandonment, admission and taken back. It is not an answer to any issue. The consequence of ‘not pressed’ of an issue if not analyzed in the judgment, cannot be a caveat to doubt and ambiguity. It is wrong to import meaning into the words ‘not pressed’ when the said combination of words, i.e. ‘not pressed’ is likely to have several consequences in the lis. ……………...

26.

A lawyer can abandon an issue but when court is under legal obligation to answer that issue, it is desirable that a written memorandum is obtained in that regard and mention is made in the order sheet. The consequence of such ‘not pressed’ statement should be analyzed in answering the issues so that meaning of ‘not pressed’ can be read in to the context of the decision.”

29.

Dealing with the ambit of waiver, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India versus Bali Ram, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1319, has held that,

“49….. Whether or not a party has waived his right has to flow from his conduct and is, essentially, a question of fact. We have not been able to find either in the LPA or in this appeal, any point of waiver having been pleaded by the appellants. Without a pleading, a plea of waiver need not be adjudicated.”

30.

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pulin Elehari Lal versus Mahadeb Dutta, reported in (1993) 1 SCC 629 has held that,

"6....... Waiver is a question of fact which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case of waiver of any provisions of the statute it is necessary to prove that there was conscious relinquishment of the advantage of such provisions of the statute..........".

31.

The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and social welfare legislation enacted with the object of protecting innocent third-party victims of motor vehicle accidents. Chapter XI of the Act aims to protect third parties and not to promote the business interests of insurance companies. The nature of the Motor vehicle Act, has been duly considered in the case of Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Kokilaben Chandravadan, (1987) 2 SCC 654, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

“13…….In other words, the legislature has insisted and made it incumbent on the user of a motor vehicle to be armed with an insurance policy covering third party risks which is in conformity with the provisions enacted by the legislature. It is so provided in order to ensure that the injured victims of automobile accidents or the dependents of the victims of fatal accidents are really compensated in terms of money and not in terms of promise. Such a benign provision enacted by the legislature having regard to the fact that in the modern age the use of motor vehicles notwithstanding the attendant hazards, has become an inescapable fact of life, has to be interpreted in a meaningful manner which serves rather than defeats the purpose of the legislation. The provision has therefore to be interpreted in the twilight of the aforesaid perspective.”

(emphasis supplied by this Court)

32.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Raghbir Singh Gill versus S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, reported in 1980 Supp SCC 53, held that where a prohibition enacted is founded on public policy, courts should be slow to apply the doctrine of waiver but if such privilege granted under the Act is for the sole benefit of an individual, the person in whose benefit the privilege was enacted has a right to waive it because the very concept of privilege inheres a right to waiver. The observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in this regard is as under:

“24.

…….. It was held that if the privilege conferred or the right created by the statute is solely for the benefit of the individual, he can waive it. It was, however, said that even in those cases the courts invariably administered a caution that having regard to the nature of the right some precautionary and stringent conditions should be applied before the doctrine is invoked or applied. ..…..The inescapable conclusion is that Section 94 enacts a qualified privilege in favour of a voter not to be compelled to disclose for whom he voted but if he chooses to volunteer the information Section 94 is not violated.”

33.

It would not be out of place to note that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jogindra Singh Sodhi versus Amar Kaur, (2005) 1 SCC 31,has been pleased to hold that a bald plea of waiver cannot defeat statutory provision made in larger public interest.

34.

It is true that when a party does not press an Issue before the trial court, it is generally considered that they have waived their right to raise that issue later but such waiver cannot be construed as a waiver of a statutory provision enacted in public interest, nor can the conduct or omission of a party operate to defeat or dispense with the statutory mandate.

35.

So far as the requirement of notice to the owner of the motor vehicle and its insurer is concerned, the same has been dealt with by the Karnataka High Court in the case of B. Srinivasa Reddy And Anr. versus Khatumbi And Ors, reported in 1974 SCC OnLine Kar 81, which held that,

“3.

The Tribunal framed issues and proceeded to try the case. On 3-8-1972 the claimants filed a memo stating that they did not intend to press their claim against the Insurance Company and that their claim against it (the Insurance Company) might be dismissed as not pressed. On the basis of that memo, the Tribunal made an order on that day itself dismissing the application as against the Insurance Company.

17.

A duty is cast on the Tribunal to send a notice of such application to the insurer. When such notice is issued to the insurer, he can be regarded as a party to the proceedings before the Tribnual.

19.

A like view was taken by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Besarlal v. M.A. Claims Tribunal Their Lordships observed at page 340:

“It is quite clear on a reading of the prescribed form that it does not direct the claimant for compensation to include in the application any party as defendant and/or opposite party. We apprehend that all the relevant facts are in this connection left to be ascertained by the Claims Tribunal which has been entrusted with the very serious duties of finding out all the parties who may be liable to pay compensation by recording evidence to be produced by the parties concerned…………”.

21.

After notice was issued to the Insurance Company and it filed its statement of objections and the Tribunal framed issues as to whether the compensation to the claimants, the Tribunal could not, in our opinion, delete the Insurance company as a party to the proceedings even if the Claimants stated that they did not press their case against the Insurance Company. So long as the Claimants did not give up their claim against the owner of the Vehicle involved in the accident, the Insurer to whom a notice had already been issued, was necessary party because under Section 96(1) of the Act the insurer is liable to pay the person entitled to the benefit of the decree passed against the insured.

22.

Thus, the Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the Claimants' application as against the Insurance Company merely because the Claimants did not press their claim against the Insurance Company. The judgment of the Tribunal is vitiated by this material illegality.

23.

…The question whether the Insurance Company can be given up by the Claimant and whether the Tribunal can decline to make an award against the Insurance Company solely on the ground that the Claimant did not press his claim against the Insurance Company, are pure questions of law and do not involve investigation of any disputed questions of fact. Hence, there is no impediment for our permitting those questions being raised for the first time in this appeal.

36.

Reference can also be made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd., vs. Shila Datta and Others, reported in (2011) 10 SCC 509, wherein it has been held as under:

“13.

The scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as contained in Chapters XI (Insurance of Motor Vehicles) against Third Party risks) and XII (Claim Tribunals) proceeds on the basis that an insurer need not be impleaded as a party to the claim proceedings and it should only be issued a statutory notice under section 149(2) of the Act so that it can be made liable to pay the compensation awarded by the tribunal and also resist the claim on any one of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of section 149. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (7) of section 149 clearly refer to the insurer being merely a noticee and not a party. Similarly, sections 158(6), 166(4), 168(1) and 170 clearly provide for and contemplate insurer being merely a noticee for the purposes mentioned in the Act and not being a party-respondent.”

37.

For ready reference the relevant provisions are quoted herein below: Section 168 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, provides as under:

“168.

Award of the Claims Tribunal.—(1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be……”

Rule 207 of Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998, is reproduced as under:

“Rule 207. Notice to parties involved.— (1) If the application is not dismissed under Rule 206, the Claims Tribunal shall send to the owner of the motor vehicle involved in the accident and its insurer, a copy of the application and documents filed together with a notice of the date on which it will hear the application, and shall call upon the parties to produce on that date any evidence which they may like to produce.”

38.

In view of the above, the Learned Tribunal was duty bound to issue notice to the Insurance Company (Respondent no. 6) more particularly when it was specifically pleaded that the same has not been made party; in view of the mandatory use of the word “shall” in the Act as well as Rules framed therein. Such statutory obligation of issuing notice to Insurance Company under Section 168(1) is not founded merely upon the private rights of the parties to the proceedings and, therefore, cannot be defeated by waiver of the parties.

39.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it can be easily observed the expression “not pressed” is contextual and in the present case, having regard to the context in which the expression “not pressed” has been recorded, there is no specific pleading to that effect. Though the issues were framed on the basis of the pleadings their adjudication was not confined to the private interest of the defendant/appellant-Corporation alone. Mere recital that an issue was “not pressed”, without examining its legal and factual consequence, cannot substitute a reasoned determination of the issue. The learned Tribunal was under legal obligation to determine all the Issues that were framed on the basis of the pleadings as were inextricably interconnected. The questions as to the quantum of compensation and the person(s) liable to pay the same, assumes greater significance in proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, being a beneficial legislation and it was incumbent upon the learned Tribunal to adjudicate all the Issues so framed; however, it omitted to do so, renders the impugned order defective and unsustainable in law. Suffice it to say that matter needs to be sent back to the Claims Tribunal for fresh adjudication.

40.

Insofar as the connected Cross Objection No. 5 of 2011 filed by the claimants/respondent nos. 1 to 4; under Order XLI Rule 22(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is concerned the same has been filed with delay of 2 years, 7 months and 18 days as against the statutory period of one month prescribed under Order XLI Rule 22(1) CPC. Taking into consideration the cause of delay as furnished by the claimants, this Court finds that explanations for the delay in filing the same are not "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, so as to warrant condonation of delay. Thus, the application for condonation of delay is hereby rejected in light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Mahadev Govind Gharge and others versus Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi, Karnataka, reported in (2011) 6 SCC 321, has observed as under:

“61.

Needless to notice that the cross-objections are required to be filed within the period of one month from the date of service of such notice or within such further time as the appellate court may see fit to allow depending upon the facts and circumstances of the given case. Since the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code itself provide for extension of time, the courts would normally be inclined to condone the delay in the interest of justice unless and until the cross-objector is unable to furnish a reasonable or sufficient cause for seeking the leave of the court to file cross-objections beyond the statutory period of one month.”

41.

Resultantly, the Cross Objection No. 5 of 2011 stands dismissed being barred by limitation.

42.

However, it is made clear that the dismissal of Cross Objection No. 5 of 2011 on the ground of limitation does not, in the facts of the present case, foreclose the substantive right of Claimants/respondent nos. 1 to 4 to press for just and adequate compensation before the learned Tribunal as it would not be proper for this Court to delve into the merits of the rival claims and to record any final view on the same, at this stage.

43.

Resultant, present Appeal stands partly allowed. The finding returned by the learned Tribunal on Issue Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the Judgment and Award dated 03.04.2007 passed in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 320 of 2001 (Basant Lal and others versus U.P. Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam and another), are hereby set aside.

44.

The matter is remitted to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Barabanki, for fresh adjudication after affording due opportunity to all parties to place their arguments as are available to them under law and thereafter to pass a fresh award in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible. All the parties present before this Court are directed to appear along with their counsel before the learned Tribunal on 10.12.2026. The Tribunal is directed to treat the Insurance Company as continuing to be a party in the proceedings.

45.

It is made clear that the amount already released in favor of the claimants/respondent nos. 1 to 4 under the orders of the Court shall remain subject to the final determination to be made by the learned Tribunal in the remanded proceedings. The final entitlement of the claimants, as well as the liability of the parties, shall abide by the fresh award to be passed by the learned Tribunal, strictly in accordance with law.

46.

Registry is directed to transmit a certified copy of this judgment, along with the original records, to the learned Tribunal concerned, forthwith.

47.

Before parting with, I appreciate the efforts and the research made by Mr. Rajat Srivastava, Research Associate and Ms. Mizana Kabeer, Law Intern in finding out the relevant case laws applicable to the present case.