Tukaram Tulshiramji Chahande vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors.

(PER : NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J.)

Rule. Rule made reaturnable forthwith. Heard finally by the consent of the learned counsel for the respective parties.

By the present writ petition, the petitioner seeks the following reliefs:

The fact leading to filing of the petition is that the petitioner claims to be the owner of agricultural land admeasuring 3 Hectares and 40 R situated in Survey No. 193 at Village Taroda, which he inherited from his father. According to the petitioner, in the year 2007, he got the said land measured through the concerned revenue authorities. Upon perusal of the measurement map and report prepared by the Taluka Inspector of Land Records, he allegedly came to know that the respondents had encroached upon a portion of his land admeasuring 0.27 R for the construction of Taroda-Gangaon Road.

The petitioner, therefore, submitted a representation dated 06.07.2009 to respondent No. 2, alleging that the State authorities had taken possession of the aforesaid portion of his land without following the prescribed procedure for acquisition and without payment of compensation. By communication dated 29.07.2009, respondent No. 2 informed the petitioner that Taroda-Gangaon Road had been constructed during the years 1972–1973 under the Employment Guarantee Scheme (Rojgar Hami Yojana). It was further stated that, as the road had been constructed approximately 30 to 35 years earlier, the District Collector could not grant the compensation sought by the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter addressed a communication to the Collector, Yavatmal, reiterating his claim and stating that his father had objected to the construction of the road through the agricultural land and had sought compensation. According to the petitioner, no appropriate action was taken on the said representation.

The petitioner subsequently submitted another complaint dated 02.07.2018 before the Collector, Yavatmal. In response thereto, the Collector called upon the concerned authorities to produce documents demonstrating the manner in which possession of the land had been obtained under the Employment Guarantee Scheme during the years 1972–1973, particularly whether the landowners had executed any Danpatra or had otherwise consented to the taking over of their land. According to the petitioner, no documentary evidence establishing the execution of any such Danpatra by his father was furnished. The respondents, however, maintained that the land had been made available to the Government on the basis of a Danpatra. The petitioner contends that neither his father nor he had consented to the transfer of the land in favour of the State Government, nor had any Danpatra been executed in respect thereof. It is further contended that the respondents failed to initiate acquisition proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and unlawfully took possession of the land for the construction of the road. On these grounds, the petitioner seeks a direction for payment of compensation for the land admeasuring 0.27 R.

During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioner amended the petition in view of the reliance placed by the respondents upon the Government Resolution dated 26.10.2010. The said Government Resolution provides guidelines concerning claims for compensation in respect of lands made available to the Government for public purposes during periods of scarcity and drought, including cases where the landowners had executed Danpatra, Bakshishpatra, or other documents evidencing their consent to the transfer of possession. According to the petitioner, the said Government Resolution cannot be applied to deny compensation in a case where the land has been taken without consent and without following the procedure established by law. The petitioner has, therefore, sought quashing and setting aside of the said Government Resolution and grant compensation.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents took possession of the land admeasuring 0.27 R from Survey/Gat No. 193 at Village Taroda without obtaining the consent of the petitioner or his father and without initiating any acquisition proceedings in accordance with law. It is submitted that, although the respondents contend that the land was made available for the construction of Taroda-Gangaon Road under the Employment Guarantee Scheme during the years 1972–1973, they have failed to produce any documentary evidence to establish that the petitioner's father had executed a Danpatra or voluntarily surrendered the land in favour of the State Government. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the respondents cannot justify the taking over of private property merely by relying upon the fact that the road was constructed under a Government scheme or that several other landowners had allegedly donated their lands for the said purpose.

The learned counsel further submits that the Government Resolution dated 26.10.2010, upon which the respondents rely, cannot override the protection available to a landowner against deprivation of property otherwise than in accordance with law. It is contended that the said Government Resolution, insofar as it denies compensation to landowners whose lands have been taken without lawful acquisition and without their consent, is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569. Placing reliance on the judgment in Vidya Devi (supra), the learned counsel submits that the right to property is a constitutional and human right and that the State cannot forcibly deprive a citizen of private property without following the procedure prescribed by law. It is further submitted that the mere passage of time cannot validate an otherwise unlawful deprivation of property. The learned counsel also relies upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, Aurangabad Bench, reported in 2022 (7) All MR 106, (Mr. Appasaheb Narayan Chaudhari v The State of Maharashtra and Ors.) in support of the submission that a claim for compensation arising from the alleged unauthorised taking over of private property by the State can be considered notwithstanding the lapse of time, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. On the aforesaid grounds, the learned counsel submits that the respondents are liable to compensate the petitioner for the land utilised for construction of the road and that the Government Resolution dated 26.10.2010 deserves to be quashed and set aside.

Per contra, the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing on behalf of respondent no. 1 and 2 opposes the petition on the ground of delay and laches. It is submitted that the road in question was constructed during the years 1972–1973 under the Employment Guarantee Scheme and that the petitioner has approached this Court after an inordinate and unexplained lapse of time. According to the learned Additional Government Pleader, no objection was raised by the petitioner or his father at the time when the road was constructed, nor was any claim for compensation pursued before the competent authorities within a reasonable period. It is, therefore, submitted that the petitioner cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India after such a considerable lapse of time.

The learned Additional Government Pleader further submits that the construction of roads under the Employment Guarantee Scheme was undertaken during periods of drought and scarcity with the object of providing employment to agriculturalists and other persons in need of livelihood. In several instances, agricultural land was made available for such public works by the landowners through Danpatra or oral consent, without any claim for compensation. It is submitted that the Government Resolution dated 26.10.2010 was issued in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar reported in (1995) 4 SCC 683, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances in which land had been made available for scarcity-relief works and the considerable delay with which claims for compensation were subsequently raised. The learned Additional Government Pleader submits that the said Government Resolution prescribes guidelines for dealing with such claims and provides that, where the landowners had voluntarily relinquished their rights in respect of the land made available to the Government, they would not be entitled to claim compensation at a later stage.

The learned Additional Government Pleader further relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (supra) wherein the said judgment takes into consideration the circumstances in which extensive road works were undertaken to provide employment to persons affected by drought and scarcity, as well as the difficulties associated with entertaining claims for compensation after an inordinate lapse of time. According to the learned Additional Government Pleader, the principles laid down in the said judgment squarely apply to the present case. It is, therefore, submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, particularly when the claim relates to a road constructed more than four decades ago and the petitioner has failed to establish a legally sustainable basis for overcoming the objection of delay and laches.

Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 adopts the submissions advanced by the learned AGP. Hence, to avoid repetition, the same are not being separately reproduced or discussed.

We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material placed on record. The principal question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to a direction for payment of compensation in respect of the land admeasuring 0.27 R in Survey/Gat No. 193 at Village Taroda, allegedly taken over for the construction of Taroda-Gangaon Road during the years 1972–1973, and whether the Government Resolution dated 26.10.2010 warrants interference by this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

At the outset, it is necessary to note that the petitioner's claim is founded on the allegation that the respondents took possession of a portion of his agricultural land without initiating acquisition proceedings and without paying compensation. The respondents, on the other hand, dispute the allegation of encroachment and contend that the road was constructed under the Employment Guarantee Scheme during the years 1972–1973, when lands were made available by agricultural landowners for public works, in certain cases through Danpatra or oral consent. Thus, the controversy involves not merely a claim for compensation but also a dispute concerning the circumstances in which the land was made available for the construction of the road.

The fact that the petitioner obtained measurement of his land in the year 2007 and thereafter submitted representations to the authorities indicates that he subsequently raised a claim regarding the portion of land allegedly utilised for the road. However, the claim pertains to an alleged taking over of land during the years 1972–1973. The petitioner was, therefore, required to place sufficient material on record to establish the circumstances in which the land was taken over and to explain the considerable lapse of time before the claim was brought before this Court.

It is true that the right to property is protected under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, which mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. However, the existence of a constitutional right to property does not dispense with the requirement that a person invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court must establish the factual basis of the claim and satisfy the applicable principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The question of delay and laches must, therefore, be examined in the context of the nature of the claim, the circumstances in which the alleged deprivation occurred, the conduct of the parties, and the explanation furnished for the delay.

In the present case, the alleged taking over of the land is stated to have occurred during the years 1972–1973. The petitioner claims to have discovered the alleged encroachment upon measurement of his land in the year 2007 and submitted a representation in the year 2009. He thereafter approached the Collector by filing a complaint in the year 2018. Thus, even according to the petitioner's own case, the grievance was raised several decades after the road was constructed. Although the petitioner relies upon the representations submitted to the authorities, the mere submission of representations, by itself, does not necessarily explain or overcome the delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the circumstances in which the State of Maharashtra had undertaken relief works during the acute scarcity conditions prevailing in the years 1971–1972. The State had undertaken relief works across approximately 23,000 villages to provide employment to small agriculturists and agricultural labourers for earning their livelihood. These relief works included the construction of approximately 38,000 kilometres of roads. The case concerned a claim for compensation in respect of land allegedly taken over for such public works, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined whether the considerable delay in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India had been satisfactorily explained. The relevant observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 25 of the said judgment read thus:

Thus, the principle emerging from the said decision is that a claim for compensation under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must be considered in the context of the delay in approaching the Court, the explanation furnished for such delay, and the circumstances surrounding the alleged deprivation of property.

The reliance placed by the petitioner upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidya Devi (supra), also requires consideration. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the State cannot forcibly take possession of private property without following the procedure established by law and that the right to property is a constitutional right protected under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The decision underscores the obligation of the State to respect the property rights of citizens and not to deprive them of their property through unlawful means. The principles laid down in the said judgment cannot be disputed. However, the applicability of those principles to the facts of the present case must be examined in the context of the controversy raised by the parties.

In the present case, the respondents dispute the petitioner's allegation that the land was forcibly taken over and contend that the land was made available for the construction of Taroda-Gangaon Road under the Employment Guarantee Scheme during the years 1972–1973. The claim, therefore, arises out of the utilisation of land for public works undertaken during the period of scarcity, and the petitioner has approached this Court seeking compensation after a considerable lapse of time. The reliance placed by the petitioner upon Vidya Devi (supra) does not, by itself, entitle him to the reliefs sought. The principles laid down therein concerning the constitutional protection of property rights are well settled. However, the applicability of those principles must be examined in the context of the facts of the present case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Digambar (supra), wherein the circumstances in which the lands were made available for such public works and the effect of the considerable lapse of time in raising claims for compensation were specifically considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The controversy raised in the present petition arises in the context of similar scarcity-relief works and involves a claim for compensation in respect of land allegedly utilised for the construction of a road during the same period. The principles laid down in Digambar (supra), therefore, have a direct bearing on the controversy involved in the present petition. The petitioner's claim is required to be considered in the light of the said binding precedent, particularly having regard to the considerable delay in seeking relief and the circumstances in which the land was allegedly taken over.

The petitioner has also challenged the Government Resolution dated 26.10.2010 on the ground that it is contrary to the constitutional protection afforded to private property. The said Government Resolution was issued in the context of claims relating to lands made available for public works during periods of scarcity and drought. It provides guidelines for dealing with claims for compensation, including cases in which the landowners had voluntarily made their lands available to the State Government by executing documents evidencing donation or relinquishment. However, the challenge to the Government Resolution must be examined in the context of the relief sought and the circumstances of the present case. The petitioner is required to establish that the impugned provisions of the Government Resolution adversely affect his legally enforceable rights and that the relief sought is warranted notwithstanding the considerable delay in raising the claim.

In the present case, the petitioner's claim for compensation is founded on an alleged encroachment dating back to 1972–1973. The respondents rely upon the historical circumstances in which the road was constructed and upon the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Digambar (supra). In these circumstances, the petitioner's challenge to the Government Resolution cannot be accepted merely on the ground that he disputes the respondents' assertion regarding the manner in which the land was made available for the construction of the road. The constitutional validity of the Government Resolution must be assessed on its own terms, and its application cannot be presumed to be unlawful in every case involving a claim for compensation arising out of the utilisation of land for a public purpose.

In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the issue raised in the present petition is substantially governed by the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Digambar (supra). The petitioner has not established sufficient grounds to warrant exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court for grant of the reliefs sought. Consequently, no case is made out either for directing the respondents to pay compensation as claimed or for granting the consequential relief of quashing and setting aside the Government Resolution dated 26.10.2010. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.