Trilok Chand Sahu vs State Of Chhattisgarh

CGHC010099712017 2026:CGHC:36552 NAFR

WPS No. 2618 of 2017

 Trilok Chand Sahu S/o Late Shri Makhan Lal Sahu, Aged About 37 Years Occupation Ex Serviceman Constable, R/o Village Talegori, Tahsil Lormi Distt. Bilaspur Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh --- Petitioner(s) versus

State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Home Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

Inspector General Of Police, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

Director General Of Police, Bastar Zone, Lalbhagh Jagdalpur, Lalbagh, Distt. Jagdalpur Chhattisgarh Pin Code 494901, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh

Superintendent Of Police, Jagdalpur Chhattisgarh., District :

Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) WITH WPS No. 2684 of 2017

 Teerath Das Burman S/o Shri Chaitram Barman, Aged About 36 Years Occupation Ex Serviceman Constable, R/o Village Sukhari, Post Matwari, Tahsil Gunderdehi, Distt. Durg Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh ---Petitioner(s) Versus

State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Home Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

Inspector General Of Police, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

Director General Of Police, Bastar Zone, Lalbhagh Jagdalpur, Lalbagh, Distt. Jagdalpur Chhattisgarh Pin Code 494901, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh

Superintendent Of Police, Jagdalpur, District Baster At Jagdalpur Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s)

WITH WPS No. 2688 of 2017

 Laxminaryan Patel S/o Shri Padum Lal Patel Aged About 33 Years Occupation Ex Servicemen Constable R/o Village Sonbhatha Post Khatti, Ps Baghbhara, District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh ---Petitioner(s) Versus

State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Home Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

Inspector General Of Police, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

Director General Of Police, Bastar Zone, Lalbhagh Jagdalpur, Lalbagh, District Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh- Pin Code 494901, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh

Supritendent Of Police, Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh, District :

Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s)

Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board 17.8.2026

In this batch of petitions, petitioners have assailed the orders issued by the Director General of Police, State of Chhattisgarh whereby orders of removal from service issued against the petitioners have been maintained.

Facts of present cases are that petitioners were initially appointed as Constables in between 2008 and 2009. They were sent for basic training on 17.6.2009 to Special Training Centre, (STC), Border Security Force, Chakur, Maharashtra. They left the training camp midway without authorization and resumed their services after respectively 47, 47 and 70 days. On 8.2.2010, petitioners were served one month’s notice and thereafter, they were removed from service. Thereafter, they preferred departmental appeals which were dismissed. Subsequently, the mercy petitions filed by the petitioners were also dismissed. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the details of the petitioners are set out in the following table:-

Dr. Nirmal Shukla, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits that petitioners were appointed according to the constitutional mandate against sanctioned and vacant posts therefore respondent authorities were under obligation to conduct inquiry(s) strictly in accordance with law. He further submits that petitioners remained absent from their duties for a short span of time on account of medical conditions and sufficient documents were produced. He has placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of B.C. Chaturvedi Versus Union of India and Others^{11.1. (1995) 6 SCC 749}, Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya versus Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Others^{22.2. (2004) 4 SCC 560} and Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Another Versus Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another^{33.3. (1986) 3 SCC 156}. He has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the co-ordinate Bench in the matter of Khushi Ram Sandilya Versus State of Chhattisgarh and Others^{44.4. 2015 SCC OnLine Chh 1208}. He prays to allow these petitions.

On the other hand, Mr. Kanwaljeet Singh Saini, learned State counsel would oppose. He submits that petitioners were members of armed forces and they remained absent from their duties for considerable period without intimating their superior authorities. He further submits that petitioners were never appointed as permanent government servants, rather they were appointed according to M.P. Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi-Permanent Service) Rules, 1960 [hereinafter to be referred as ‘Rules of 1960’], their status was temporary in nature and they were removed from service according to Rule 12 of Rules of 1960. He contends that Rule 12 confers power on appointing authority to terminate the services of a temporary government servant who is not in quasi-permanent service after service of notice in writing and in present cases, one months’ service notices were served upon petitioners before termination. He has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in matter of State of Punjab and Others Versus Ex. C. Satpal Singh^{55.5. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1848} .

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record with utmost circumspection.

The judgments quoted by Dr. Shukla are summarized herein below :-

 In B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that disciplinary authority and appellate authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. It is further held that High Court/ Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. Relevant paragraph 18 reads as under :-

A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. It the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases. impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.

 In Bhagwan Lal Arya (supra), the delinquent employee remained absent for 2 months 7 months and 17 hours on medical grounds. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that absence of an employee on medical grounds with application for leave as well as sanction of leave can under no circumstances be termed as grave misconduct or continued misconduct rendering him unfit for police service. Relevant paragraph 10 reads as under :-

In the instant case, the appellant had absented himself for 2 months, 8 days and 17 hours on medical grounds. The above two rules provide that penalty of removal can be imposed only in cases, if grave misconduct and continued misconduct indicating incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. The absence of the appellant on medical grounds with application for leave as well as sanction of leave can under no circumstances, in our opinion, be termed as grave misconduct or continued misconduct rendering him unfit for police service.

 In Brojo Nath Ganguly (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held Rule 9(i) of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd.

(Service, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 void and unconstitutional to the extent it confers such right of termination on the Corporation. Relevant paragraph 112 read as under :-

In the result, both these Appeals fail and are dismissed but the order passed by the Calcutta High Court is modified by substituting for the declaration given by it a declaration that clause (i) of Rule 9 of the "Service, Discipline & Appeal Rules - 1979" of the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited is void under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as being opposed to public policy and is also ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution to the extent that it confers upon the Corporation the right to terminate the employment of a permanent employee by giving him three months' notice in writing or by paying him the equivalent of three months' basic pay and dearness allowance in lieu of such notice.

 In Khushi Ram Sandilya (supra), Writ Court extracted the prepositions of law enunciated in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) and Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya (supra) and arrived at a similar conclusion holding that penalty of removal on account of unauthorized absence for period of 15 days is shockingly high and disproportionate looking to the misconduct. Relevant paragraphs 14 and 15 reads as under :-

Applying the law laid-down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, I find that penalty of removal from service for unauthorised absence for 15 days is shockingly high and disproportionate to the 3 AIR 1996 SC 484 misconduct of the guilty which he is held to have committed in discharge of his official duty and therefore, matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority i.e. Superintendent of Police, Janjgir-Champa to consider the question of punishment afresh in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in above stated judgments and to pass appropriate order keeping in mind the punishment has to be reasonable and in consonance with the misconduct of the delinquent.

As a fall out and consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is allowed and order dated 31.1.2006 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Superintendent of Police, Janjgir-Champa, order dated 11.9.2006 (Annexure P-2) affirming the order passed by the Superintendent of Police, Janjgir-Champa dated 31.1.2006 by the Inspector General of Police, Bilaspur Range, Bilaspur and order dated 23.7.2008 dismissing mercy appeal by the Director General of Police, Raipur are hereby set aside. The matter is remitted to the Superintendent of Police, Janjgir-Champa for consideration afresh. The Superintendent of Police, Janjgir-Champa shall pass the order within 45 days from the date of production/communication of certified copy of this order. No order as to cost(s).

Below is a summary of the judgment cited by Mr. Saini :-

 In Ex. C. Satpal Singh (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that unauthorized absence or overstaying leave without sanction in a disciplined force constitutes gross indiscipline that qualifies as a "gravest act of misconduct," justifying the penalty of dismissal. Relevant paragraphs reads as under :-

This Court, in K. Manche Gowda's case (supra), has held that if the past conduct of an employee is the basis for imposing punishment, the department is obliged to disclose that his past record will also be taken into consideration while inflicting punishment. Now, the question arises for consideration is whether the disciplinary authority had taken into consideration the past conduct of the respondent while passing the dismissal order. From careful reading of the dismissal order reproduced hereinabove, it appears that the disciplinary authority had clearly observed that it had perused the report of enquiry and conclusion thoroughly, whereby the respondent was held guilty for the unauthorized absence and agreed with the conclusion of the enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority had further mentioned regarding the issuance of show cause notice to the respondent and had observed that despite the receipt of the show cause notice, the respondent did not submit his reply, which shows that the respondent accepted the allegation against him. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority had noted that 17 years of service of the respondent were forfeited as a result of his absence for 224 days and for which he was punished accordingly.

To properly understand the controversy in the light of question framed, it is necessary to examine the relevant judicial precedents, as discussed below. This Court in the case of India Marine Services Private Ltd. (supra), dealt with the case of punishment awarded to an employee in a similar situation, as follows: -

It is true that the last sentence suggests that the past record of Bose has also been taken into consideration. But it does not follow from this that that was the effective reason for dismissing him. The Managing Director having arrived at the conclusion that Bose's services must be terminated in the interest of discipline, he added one sentence to give additional weight to the decision already arrived at. Upon this view it would follow that the Tribunal was not competent to go behind the finding of the Managing Director and consider for itself the evidence adduced before him. The order of the Tribunal quashing the dismissal of Bose and directing his re-instatement is, therefore, set aside as being contrary to law."

In the case of Director General, RPF & Ors. vs. Ch. Sal Babu, this Court in appeal while setting aside the order of Division Bench of High Court, which had affirmed the order of Single Bench setting aside the order of removal of respondent, observed in para 6 as under: -

Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required department/establishment in which the delinquent person the concerned works.

Similarly, in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, wherein the respondent employee was dismissed from service on account of misconduct having been found fast asleep on an iron plate during working hours and had also been earlier imposed with minor punishment on three occasions, this Court observed as under: -

"32.... In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the past conduct of the respondent as also his conduct during the domestic enquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was wholly disproportionate to his act of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary."

Likewise, in the case of Govt. of A.P. and Ors. us. Mohd. Taher Ali, where the respondent who was employed as police constable was imposed with a punishment of compulsory retirement on the account of unauthorized absenteeism from election duty, this Court had held that: -

....In our opinion there can be no hard-and-fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often (necessary) only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority."

This Cout in Bishamber Das Dogra's case (supra), has examined a similar issue and, after taking into consideration the judgment of this Court rendered in K. Manche Gowda's case (supra) held as under: -

In State of Mysore u. K. Manche Gowda, this Court held that the disciplinary authority should inform the delinquent employee that it is likely to take into consideration the past conduct of the employee while imposing the punishment unless the proved charge against the delinquent is so grave that it may independently warrant the proposed punishment. Though his previous record may not be the subject matter of the charge at the first instance xx xx xx xx 30.In view of the above, it is evident that it is desirable that the delinquent employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment. But in case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in the absence of statutory rules, the authority may take into consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the employee for adding the weight to the decision of imposing the punishment if the facts of the case so require. [Emphasis

Supplied]

lt is settled legal proposition that habitual absenteeism means gross violation of discipline (vide Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR p. 530, para 5) and L&T Komatsu Ltd. v. N. Udayakumar (SCC p. 226, para 6).]

The instant case is required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.

Admittedly, the respondent employee has not completed the service of six years and had been imposed punishment three times for remaining absent from duty. On the fourth occasion when he remained absent for ten days without leave, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. The show-cause notice could not be served upon him for the reason that he again deserted the line and returned back after fifty days. Therefore the disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded expeditiously. The respondent submitted the reply to the show-cause notice and the material on record reveal that during the pendency of the enquiry he further deserted the line for ten days. There is nothing on record to show any explanation for such repeated misconduct or absenteeism. The court/tribunal must keep in mind that such indiscipline is intolerable so far as the disciplined force is concerned.

The respondent was a guard in CISF. No attempt had ever been made at any stage by the respondent employee to explain as to what prejudice has been caused to him by non-furnishing of the enquiry report. Nor had he ever submitted that such a course has resulted in failure of justice. More so, the respondent employee had never denied at any stage that he had not been punished three times before initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and deserted the line twice even after issuance of the show-cause notice in the instant case. No explanation could be furnished by the respondent employee as under what circumstances he has not even considered it proper to submit the application for leave. Rather, the respondent thought that he had a right to desert the line at his sweet will. It was a case of gross violation of discipline. Appeal filed by the respondent employee was decided by the statutory appellate authority giving cogent reasons.

The facts of the present case did not present special features warranting any interference by the Court in limited exercise of its powers of judicial review. In such a fact situation, we are of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority on such technicalities…"

This Court, in the case of State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Ram Singh Ex- Constable while interpreting Rule 16.2(1) of the Rule of 1934 has held as under: -

Rule 16.2(1) consists of two parts. The first part is referable to gravest acts of misconduct which entails awarding an order of dismissal. Undoubtedly there is distinction between gravest misconduct and grave misconduct. Before awarding an order of dismissal it shall be mandatory that dismissal order should be made only when there are gravest acts of misconduct, since it impinges upon the pensionary rights of the delinquent after putting long length of service. As stated the first part relates to gravest acts of misconduct. Under General Clauses Act singular includes plural, "act" includes acts. The contention that there must be plurality of acts of misconduct to award dismissal is fastidious. The word "acts" would include singular "act" as well. It is not the repetition of the acts complained of but its quality, insidious effect and gravity of situation that ensues from the offending 'act'. The colour of the gravest act must be gathered from the surrounding or attending circumstances. Take for instance the delinquent who put in 29 years of continuous length of service and had unblemished record; in thirtieth year he commits defalcation of public money or fabricates false records to conceal misappropriation. He only committed once. Does it mean that he should not be inflicted with the punishment of dismissal but be allowed to continue in service for that year to enable him to get his full pension. The answer is obviously no. Therefore, a single act of corruption is sufficient to award an order of dismissal under the rule as gravest act of misconduct.

The second part of the rule connotes the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service and that the length of service of the offender and his claim for pension should be taken into account in an appropriate case. The contention that both parts must be read together appears to us to be illogical. Second part is referable to a misconduct minor in character which does not by itself warrant an order of dismissal but due to continued acts of misconduct would have insidious cumulative effect on service morale and may be a ground to take lenient view of giving an opportunity to reform. Despite giving such opportunities if the delinquent officer proved to be incorrigible and found completely unfit to remain in service then to maintain discipline in the service, instead of dismissing the delinquent officer, a lesser punishment of compulsory retirement or demotion to a lower grade or rank or removal from service without affecting his future chances of re-employment, if any, may meet the ends of justice. Take for instance the delinquent officer who is habitually absent from duty when required. Despite giving an opportunity to reform himself he continues to remain absent from duty off and on. He proved himself to be incorrigible and thereby unfit to continue in service. Therefore, taking into account his long length of service and his claim for pension he may be compulsorily retired from service so as to enable him to earn proportionate pension. The second part of the rule operates in that area. It may also be made clear that the very order of dismissal from service for gravest misconduct may entail forfeiture of all pensionary benefits. Therefore, the word 'or' cannot be read as "and". It must be disjunctive and independent. The common link that connects both clauses is "the gravest act/acts of misconduct."

We have perused the show cause notice and the order of dismissal passed against the respondent. After going through the same, it is clear that penalty of dismissal is a consequence of proved misconduct. Therefore, the order impugned is within the first part of Rule 16.2 (1) of the Rules. While passing the order dismissing the appeal, the disciplinary authority recorded the finding that the act of absence of the respondent from duty is a grievous act of misconduct. The respondent was appointed as a constable in the Punjab Armed Forces and then transferred to the Commando Force, which is a disciplined force. The authority while passing the order has referred to his previous act of absence from duty besides proving an gravest act of misconduct leading to the order of dismissal. gravest act of misconduct leading to the order of dismissal.

Notably, B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) and Brojo Nath Ganguly (supra) have one thing in common. These matters involved regular government servants whereas the cases at hand pertain to temporary government servants. Thus, it is quite vivid that the facts of present cases and the cited cases are entirely different. In Bhagwan Lal Arya (supra), a formal departmental inquiry resulted in the major penalty of removal whereas Rules of 1960 are governed by the express condition that service is terminable at any time by one month's notice (or salary in lieu) on either side. Thus, the facts of present case are entirely distinguishable as Rule 12 of Rules of 1960 does not entail evil consequences or forfeiture of accrued benefits.

Bearing in mind the aforesaid factual position and the legal principles established by the Apex Court, we will now advert to the facts of the case.

This Court vide order dated 10.8.2026 directed the State to place appointment orders of petitioner and the same are now available on record. The appointment orders would reveal that petitioners were appointed as temporary government servants according to Rules of 1960. Petitioners were sent on basic training to Special Training Centre, Border Security Force, Chakur, Maharashtra on 17.6.2009 but they left the training camp without intimating the superior authorities. As they had not attained the status of permanent government servants, therefore the service rules, as argued by Dr. Shukla would not apply. Petitioners were appointed according to Rules of 1960 and they were removed from service according to its Rule 12.

Rule 2 of Rules of 1960 defines “Quasi-Permanent Service”. This rule states that temporary service commences from such date as may be specified in the declaration issued under Rule 3. Rule 2(d) defines “Temporary service”. This rules states that temporary service means officiating or substantive service in a temporary post and officiating service in permanent post in State Government. Rule 3 states that a government servant shall be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service if he has been in temporary service in the same post continuously for more than three years.

In the cases on hand, petitioners prior to completion of three-year service, left the training camp midway and remained absent for considerable period therefore action was taken against them according to Rule 12. Rule 12(a) expressly states that temporary government servant, who is in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointment authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant.

As the petitioner had not attained the status of quasi-permanent government servant, in my opinion, there was no need for the respondent authorities to conduct departmental inquiry(s) and they were rightly removed from services in accordance with Rule 12 of Rules of 1960. Furthermore, petitioners who were members of the uniformed forces cannot absent themselves on frivolous pleas, having regard to the nature of the duties enjoined on those forces. In such forces desertion is a serious matter. Cases of this nature, in whatever manner described, are cases of desertion particularly when there is apprehension on the member of the force being called upon to perform onerous duties in difficult terrains or an order of deputation which he finds inconvenient, is passed. Such matters cannot be taken lightly, particularly when it relates to uniformed forces of this country. In cases of this nature, dismissal/ removal from the force is a justified disciplinary action and cannot be described as disproportionate to the misconduct alleged.

In consequence, these writ petitions are dismissed.

No order as to costs.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Sd/-(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)

JUDGE