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Judgment
S. Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.—The appellant who is a student-trainee in the Central Footware Training Centre at the Industrial Estate, Guindy,
has filed this appeal against the judgment of Veeraswami, J., dismissing his petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the
Director of Small Industries Service Institute, Madras, terminating his training at the Centre. The Central Footware Training Centre has been
started by the Government of India with the idea of developing footware industry in the country by giving technical training to youngmen in the
manufacture of footware. The period of training is eighteen months; during the period the trainee is to be paid a stipend of Rs. 60 per mensem;
there is also a hostel attached to the Centre. The appellant was one of those selected for training for the course between September, 1960 and the
end of February, 1962. He was also admitted as a member of the hostel attached to the training Centre. At the time of his selection, the appellant
executed an agreement in favour of the Director of Small Scale Industries Service Institute, agreeing to refund the stipends received by him in case
he were to leave the Institute before his training was completed. The rules under which training is given in the Institute provide for the termination of
the training at any time if the candidate absents himself from training for more than 35 days during the entire period of training or if he does not
evince interest or show progress in spite of warnings. The rules also provide for an examination at the end of the period of training and for the
award of certificate to successful candidates at such examination.
On the 4th of August, 1961, the Deputy Director of the Centre received a complaint from a certain girl living in a house close to the hostel that
the appellant had at about 10 a.m. on the 28th of July, 1961 trespassed into her house while she was alone with a young girl servant, and behaved
in an indecent manner by trying to hand over to her a letter. It appeared that such an attempt was not his first misbehaviour. It was alleged that
about ten days earlier, he had sent a letter addressed to the same girl conveying expressions of love and using objectionable language. The Deputy
Director of the Institute took action on the complaint forthwith, and on the same day issued a written notice to the appellant informing . him of the
substance of the complaint and calling upon him to show cause within 24 hours, as to why his training should not be terminated, as his conduct was
such that it brought discredit not only to him as a student, but to the training centre as well. Pending further investigation into the charges, the
appellant was suspended, On the following day, the appellant replied; he demanded that the charges against him should be precisely and clearly
stated by giving the name of the complainant, her full address and other particulars. Strangely enough there was nothing in the letter protesting
innocence. From what one can see, there was really nothing vague in the charges made. Reference to a college girl living close to the hostel was
sufficiently specific; further the graveman of the charge was the unworthy conduct as a student and it did not depend upon the fact whether it was
one girl or another. There was, however, no denial in the appellant''s reply of the offence of misbehaviour at all.
On receipt of the reply, the Deputy Director, after taking advice of the Director of the Institute, sent for the appellant and confronted him with
the letter alleged to have been sent by him by post to the girl. The appellant at first denied knowledge of the letter and also of the trespass into her
house. He did not, however, stop there. He suggested the names of some trainees in the centre as the possible culprits. This was proved to be false
on enquiry. Later, the appellant made an admission to the Deputy Director, the genuineness of which is not denied now, and stated that he had
visited the house of the complainant on the 28th July, as alleged by her. He, however, gave an explanation which has no substratum of truth behind
it viz., that the letter and his visit were in the course of exchanges of love between the particular girl and himself. This insinuation which has no
factual basis only reveals the depravity of the appellant and the extent to which he can go. The appellant was then taken to the Director of the
Institute on the 10th August, 1961, who again showed him the letter referred to above. But he completely went behind the admission before the
Deputy Director. He repudiated his authorship of the letter and also denied any knowledge of the girl to whom it was addressed. But this plea need
not detain us long as it is not now in dispute that the admission made by the appellant before the Deputy Director was free and voluntary and was
also a truthful one. The Director of the Institute decided that he should take disciplinary action against the appellant. He terminated his training. This
decision was communicated to the appellant by a letter of the Deputy Director, dated 11th August, 1961. The appellant was also directed to leave
the hostel immediately.
Thereupon the appellant filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order of the Director terminating his training on
the ground that it was arbitrary and opposed to the principles of natural justice.
The Writ Petition was filed on 23rd August, 1961. Along with it, was a petition for stay of implementation of the order of the Director.
Veeraswami, J., issued a rule nisi. The learned Judge also directed by his order, dated 28th August, 1961, that the order terminating the training of
the appellant should be suspended till the disposal of the Writ Petition. Judgment in the Writ Petition was delivered by the learned Judge on 5th
February, 1962 upholding the decision of the Director and dismissing the appellant''s Writ Petition.
The appellant who was allowed to continue his training by virtue of the interim order has filed this appeal. At the time when the appeal came up
for admission it was represented on behalf of the appellant that by virtue of the order of stay granted, by Veeraswami, J., which was in force during
the pendency of the Writ Petition, the appellant was enabled to complete the unexpired portion of his training and that he had only to sit for the
examination. It was submitted that the status quo should be allowed to continue pending disposal of the Writ Appeal. This request was acceded to
and by our order, dated 13th February, 1962, we permitted the appellant to sit for examination; but we directed the authorities not to publish the
result till the appeal was disposed of.
On the merits of the case there can be no doubt that the appellant was guilty of writing the objectionable letter in question to the girl who
happened to live close to the hostel in which the appellant was staying. Nor could there be any doubt as to the appellant having trespassed into the
house of the girl when she was practically helpless and having attempted to hand over another letter the contents of which are not known to us, as
that letter has not been preserved. Indeed there was no controversy before the learned Judge who disposed of the Writ Petition or before us, on
that question. But it has been contended by Mr. F. S. Vaz, learned Counsel for the appellant, that the complaint made against the appellant did not
disclose the commission of any offence, and that the punishment meted out was arbitrary; and that secondly, the procedure followed by the
respondent for terminating the training of the appellant by way of punishment, did not conform to the principles of natural justice.
The first part of the contention is sought to be sustained on a rather surprising line of argument. Learned Counsel said that there was really
nothing improper in principle, for a student of an educational institution to write a love letter to a girl or even to unauthorisedly enter a house to.
deliver such a letter. We cannot but strongly repel this contention. Learned Counsel then contended and we can only hope that he was not serious
about it, that nice rules of moral behaviour amongst students would not apply to the pupils of an institute like the present case which is ad hoc one
and with no need to build up a reputation. The argument can only be characterised as a desparate one. Maintenance of moral standards among
students is inherent in the very idea of education, and does not depend on the fact whether the institution that offers instruction is an ad hoc or
permanent one. The reputation of an institution is not mere commercial asset depending on the length or duration of its existence. It is its position on
the moral plane, secured mostly by the moral stature of its alumni, and in this respect it would make no difference whether the institution is ad hoc
or a permanent one. Any educational institution worth its name should have for its purpose, the improvement of the moral and intellectual standards
of its students. Enforcement of discipline helps to maintain the standards; laxity in such enforcement will defeat the very purpose of the institution
and bring it to disrepute.
The writing of love letters by a student even to a girl who reciprocates his feelings will, if permitted, undoubtedly demoralise him. It will render
unfit for the company of the rest of the students for it would have the effect of corrupting their morals as well. That will inevitably bring down in its
wake the fair name and reputation of the institution. To say the least, it will be a disgraceful conduct on the part of a student who had entered an
institution for the purpose of his studies, to indulge in such activities. But in the present case the offence is graver still. The objectionable letters
were written to an innocent girl who was a perfect stranger to the appellant. There can be no doubt, that it annoyed her, and the writer must have
intended them to annoy her. It was nothing short of a criminal trespass for the appellant to have entered the house of the girl to deliver such a letter.
Such conduct is unworthy of a student in any circumstances. To condone such conduct would be subvert the high standards, that should govern
any educational institution.
We are unable to find any substance in the second contention either. The memorandum, dated 4th August, 1961 from the Deputy Director,
Central Footware Training Centre, Madras, explicitly states that the appellant was harassing a college girl living close to his hostel by writing
objectionable letters and that on one occasion he attempted to hand over a letter in person by trespassing into her house when she was alone and
helpless. In view of these specific allegations, no further details such as the name of the girl, etc., was at all necessary. The conduct referred to in
the memorandum will be nonetheless objectionable whether the identity of the girl was known or not. But in the instant case there was sufficient
information given about the girl. Further discussion on the question has been rendered unnecessary in view of the admissions made by the appellant
himself before the Deputy Director that he had written the letter and that he entered into the house of the girl in the manner complained of. The
Director and the Deputy Director have given full opportunity to the appellant to explain his conduct; and the record reveals that they had enquired
into the matter as fully as can be desired. Veeraswami, J. upheld the punishment meted out to the appellant on the well known principle relating to
the authority of the head of an educational institution to maintain and enforce discipline among the students.
Learned Counsel for the appellant has, however contended that that principle will not apply to an institution like the Central Footware Training
Centre, where persons were being trained only for a vocation or trade. According to him the training given is analogous to the case of an
apprentice under a trader who goes to him to learn a trade or craft. In such a case, it is said, the relationship between the trainee and the institution
will be governed only by the terms of the contract and there would be no inherent power in the employer or teacher to take disciplinary action
outside the terms of the agreement.
As we have pointed out earlier, the conditions under which students are admitted to the Centre do not expressly reserve a power to its head,
to take disciplinary action against a misbehaving student. We shall consider presently whether such a power is not inherent in the head of the
institution. But before doing so, we must refer to the contention that a person who agrees to serve another for learning a trade, can continue to do
so even if he were guilty of misconduct. The argument, in support of it is entirely based on a statement contained in the Preliminary Note relating to
apprenticeship in Indian Conveyancer by P.C. Mogha (4th Edition , page 81), where it has been stated that a master cannot dismiss an apprentice
even for misconduct without an express contract. But this statement of the law which is confined only to apprenticeship properly so-called (i.e.,
analogous to a service agreement) cannot be accepted, as wholly correct. It will be sufficient for the present purpose to refer to the decision in
Learoyd v. Brook (1891) LR1 Q..B. 431 where the question whether in the absence of a provision to that effect in the articles of apprenticeship, it
was open to an employer to terminate the apprenticeship of a person who was proved to be a habitual thief, was answered in the affirmative. It is
not, however, necessary for the purpose of this case to consider whether it would be open to a master who takes an apprentice, to terminate his
services by an unilateral act, for the misconduct of the latter. Cases where the apprenticeship agreement is in the nature of a service agreement
involving mutual obligations on the part of the employer to instruct and to give facilities to learn, the employee being bound to serve the employer,
are obviously different, from those where apprenticeship is in the nature and for the purpose of an educational training. In the former class of cases
the employer himself will be carrying on some business or trade, and the apprentice works more or less as a servant but who at the same time gets
training in the trade carried on by his master. But in the latter as in the present case the position will be different. Indeed in establishing the Training
Centre, the Government did not carry on any business. The Centre was designed purely with a view to equip its trainees for their work in life. That
is obviously an educational course. Education means a systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young boy or even to adults in
preparation for the work of life. It need not necessarily be confined to (though it is so contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant), science
and arts. Vocational training will be an educational training. Therefore, the Central Footware Training Centre in the instant case which provides
instruction only for learning a craft or trade will undoubtedly be an educational institution. The head of such an institution will have all those powers
which a headmaster or principal of a school or college has over his students.
The power of the head of an educational institution to correct erring pupils is generally stated to be the same as that of a parent. Thus, he will
have a moderate degree of authority in the matter of punishing or even chastising (subject of course to the rules, etc., made in that behalf) his pupils
whenever he finds them misconducting themselves. But the responsibility of the schoolmaster or the head of an educational institution is not
confined to the pupil who errs. He has a greater responsibility of protecting the morals of the other students. He further owes a duty to maintain the
reputation of the Institution. Cockburn, C.J. in Fitzerald v. Worthcote 176 E.R. 734 observed that it was for the general benefit of the society and
especially of its youth that the authority of those charged, with good order and peace of the establishment should be maintained.
In C.D. Sekkilar Vs. R. Krishnamoorthy, , Subba Rao, J., upheld the right of a principal of a college or head of any other educational
institution to maintain discipline and to do such act as is reasonable for the upkeep of the necessary tone and standards of behaviour in a body of
students. In AIR 1947 193 (Bom.) , the principle that the headmaster of an educational institution while taking disciplinary action against a student
who had misbehaved should take into account not only the interests of the particular pupil concerned but also that of the other pupils was
recognised. But it goes without saying that such a right cannot arbitrarily be exercised. Punishment proposed or imposed should reasonably be
related to the offence committed. It should be aimed with a view to maintain discipline and to keep up the necessary tone and moral standards
amongst the students and cannot be imposed with an ulterior object or prompted by an indirect motive. We agree with Veeraswami, J., that the
Deputy Director of the Central Footware Training Centre had the power to expel the appellant for his proved misconduct.
The learned Judge has, however, towards the end of his judgment indicated his view that the respondent should consider whether it was
necessary to insist upon the expulsion of the appellant at this stage when he had almost finished his training and there were only a few more days
left to complete entire course and whether a lesser punishment would not serve the purpose of maintaining the moral standards of the other pupils
and the reputation of the institution. We are with great respect unable to share in these observations. The termination of the training of the appellant
took place as early as nth August, 1961, and it was only by virtue of an interim order of this Court with a view to avoid prejudice to the appellant
in case he were to succeed in his Writ Petition that he was allowed to continue his course. The circumstance that he had de facto completed his
training cannot, therefore, be taken into account for making any recommendation for a lenient treatment. Secondly, it is only in case where there is
no serious moral lapse on the part of the student and where it can be said in the circumstances that the punishment imposed, though within the
bounds of the authority of the head of the institution, is severe, that the Court will be justified in expressing its views. In the present case the offence
committed by the appellant is such that it cannot be said that termination of his training was unreasonable or even an excessive punishment. To
suggest a lesser degree of punishment will be to require the authorities to adopt a less serious view of the deviation from moral standards than the
one which they have adopted. If the Director or the Government thought that the maintenance of moral standards of the institution required a
particular punishment, it will not be for the Court to advise or suggest a lesser punishment, as to do so would tantamount to require them to lower
the standards. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.