Touseef Ahmad Hajam vs Union Territory Of Jammu And Kashmir & Ors.

**01.**The applicant has instituted the present Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, calling in question the legality and validity of communication No. PHQ/GB-Comp.Apptt/2022/12013-15 dated 12.06.2023, whereby his claim for appointment on compassionate grounds under the Jammu and Kashmir Compassionate Appointment Rules, 1994 (SRO 43 of 1994) came to be rejected. The applicant seeks quashing of the aforesaid communication with a consequential direction commanding the respondents to consider and appoint him on compassionate grounds in accordance with the applicable rules.

**02.**The facts giving rise to the present Original Application, to the extent relevant for adjudication of the controversy involved, are that the applicant is the son of Late Gh. Mohd. Hajam, who was serving as Follower in the 10th Battalion, Indian Reserve Police. While in service, the applicant's father died in harness on 01.03.2022, leaving behind his family in financial distress. It is the specific case of the applicant that after the demise of the sole breadwinner, the family was left without any regular source of livelihood and, therefore, he became entitled to seek appointment on compassionate grounds under the provisions of SRO 43 of 1994.

**03.**It is pleaded that soon after the death of his father, the applicant submitted the requisite application before the competent authority seeking appointment on compassionate grounds. According to him, all the documents required under the applicable scheme, including the legal heir certificate and other relevant certificates, were furnished to the respondents from time to time. It is his case that there was no deficiency in the documents submitted by him and, therefore, there existed no legal impediment in consideration of his claim.

**04.**The grievance projected by the applicant is that instead of considering his claim in accordance with the object underlying the compassionate appointment scheme, the respondents rejected the same by the impugned communication dated 12.06.2023. The rejection is founded upon the ground that during verification of his character and antecedents it was found that the applicant had figured as an accused in FIR No.26/2018 registered at Police Station Achabal for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 452, 354, 427 and 506 of the Ranbir Penal Code and that although he was acquitted by the competent criminal court, the competent authority formed the opinion that such acquittal was not an honorable acquittal.

**05.**According to the applicant, the respondents have completely misdirected themselves in law while examining the effect of the judgment of acquittal. It is pleaded that the competent criminal court, after full-fledged trial, acquitted the applicant of all the charges and no appeal against the judgment of acquittal has ever been preferred by the prosecution. It is thus contended that once the judgment of acquittal attained finality, the respondents could not have continued to treat the applicant as a person having doubtful antecedents.

The applicant further pleads that the respondents have travelled beyond the scope of their jurisdiction in undertaking an independent assessment of the criminal case. According to him, once the criminal court recorded an order of acquittal, it was not open to the departmental authorities to re-appreciate the evidence or arrive at a different conclusion regarding his alleged involvement in the criminal case.

It is also the specific case of the applicant that compassionate appointment is intended to provide immediate financial assistance to the family of a deceased government servant and that rejection of his claim on the basis of an acquittal defeats the very object for which the compassionate appointment scheme has been framed. According to him, the respondents have failed to appreciate that the object of the scheme is social welfare and that technical objections ought not to outweigh the humanitarian considerations underlying the policy.

It is pleaded that the impugned communication is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The applicant asserts that the respondents have ignored the settled legal position governing the effect of acquittal in criminal proceedings and have rejected his claim without any justifiable basis. According to him, the impugned communication, therefore, deserves to be quashed and appropriate directions deserve to be issued to the respondents for considering his case for compassionate appointment under the applicable scheme.

Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the applicant has been denied compassionate appointment solely on account that a mere acquittal in criminal case is not sufficient to render a candidate eligible for employment in a disciplined force. According to the learned counsel such a ground is per se arbitrary, irrational and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was contended that once the criminal court, upon appreciation of the entire evidence, recorded an order of acquittal, the respondents could not sit in appeal over the said judgment and arrive at an independent conclusion regarding nature or validity of the acquittal.

Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the respondents proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the acquittal secured by the applicant was not an honourable acquittal. It was contended that, in a catena of decisions, it has been held that the expressions 'honourable acquittal', 'acquittal of blame' and 'fully acquitted' are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was argued that an acquittal remains an acquittal in the eyes of law unless the respondents are able to point to any statutory provision or binding legal principle disentitling a person, who has been acquitted on the benefit of doubt, from appointment or from claiming service benefits. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Others v. Methu Meda, (2022) 1 SCC 1, and Commissioner, Amravati Municipal Corporation v. B.S. Sawai, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 2020.

It was further argued by the learned for the applicant that the criminal court, after evaluating the evidence produced by the prosecution, found that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges against the applicant and consequently acquitted him. According to the learned counsel, once the judgment of acquittal has attained finality, the respondents were bound to accord due weight to the same instead of treating the applicant as a person possessing doubtful antecedents.

Learned counsel further contended that the respondents have virtually reopened the criminal proceedings by undertaking an independent assessment of the evidence. It was submitted that such an exercise falls wholly outside the scope of administrative jurisdiction and amounts to substituting the considered opinion of the competent criminal court with the subjective satisfaction of the appointing authority. According to the learned counsel, the respondents could not have discarded the judicial verdict merely because they entertained a different opinion regarding the nature of the acquittal.

It was next submitted that compassionate appointment is a beneficial social welfare measure intended to mitigate the immediate financial hardship suffered by the family of a government servant dying in harness. Learned counsel argued that the applicant's father died while serving the Police Department and the family has been left without any regular source of livelihood. According to him, rejection of the applicant's claim on technical considerations completely frustrates the humanitarian object underlying the scheme and defeats the very purpose for which compassionate appointment has been envisaged.

Learned counsel also submitted that the governing scheme contains no provision authorizing the respondents to reject a claim for compassionate appointment merely because the applicant had once faced criminal prosecution, particularly when the proceedings culminated in acquittal. It was argued that the respondents have failed to demonstrate any rule or policy disentitling an acquitted person from consideration for compassionate appointment.

Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned communication suffers from arbitrariness and non-application of mind, and is unsupported by any objective assessment of the material on record and, therefore, cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.

Learned counsel also argued that the respondents completely ignored the humanitarian object underlying compassionate appointment and adopted an unduly technical or hyper-sensitive approach while examining the applicant's antecedents, despite there being no conviction against him.

Learned counsel, while reiterating the submissions advanced in the Original Application, prayed that the impugned communication dated 12.06.2023 be quashed and the respondents be directed to consider the applicant for compassionate appointment in accordance with the applicable rules, contending that the applicant satisfies all the eligibility requirements prescribed under the scheme and cannot be denied appointment merely because he had once faced a criminal prosecution which ultimately culminated in his acquittal.

Upon notice, the respondents entered appearance and filed objections resisting the Original Application. At the outset, preliminary objections have been raised regarding the maintainability of the application. It is pleaded that the applicant has neither disclosed any enforceable legal right nor pointed out any violation of the statutory rules governing compassionate appointment. According to the respondents, the impugned communication has been issued strictly in accordance with the applicable policy and after due consideration of all relevant aspects governing the applicant's eligibility.

The respondents do not dispute that the applicant's father, namely Late Gh. Mohd. Hajam, was serving as Follower in the 10th Battalion, Indian Reserve Police and died in harness on 01.03.2022. It is also admitted that pursuant to the death of the deceased employee, the applicant submitted an application seeking appointment on compassionate grounds under the provisions of SRO 43 of 1994. However, according to the respondents, compassionate appointment is not a matter of right and every claimant is required to satisfy not only the eligibility conditions prescribed under the scheme but also the standards relating to character, antecedents and overall suitability for public employment.

It is pleaded that during the process of verification of the applicant's character and antecedents, it came to the notice of the respondents that the applicant had been arrayed as an accused in FIR No.26/2018 registered at Police Station Achabal for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 452, 354, 427 and 506 of the Ranbir Penal Code. In view of the said criminal antecedents, the matter was examined at various levels and reports were sought from the concerned authorities before taking any decision on the applicant's request for compassionate appointment.

**21.**The respondents further state that although the applicant was ultimately acquitted by the learned Judicial Magistrate, the competent authority, after examining the judgment of acquittal as well as the reports received from the field agencies, formed an opinion that the acquittal could not be regarded as an honorable acquittal completely exonerating the applicant from the allegations levelled against him. According to the respondents, the acquittal was essentially the result of the prosecution failing to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, did not automatically entitle the applicant to appointment in public service.

**22.**It is specifically pleaded that the Director General of Police considered the communication received from the Senior Superintendent of Police, Anantnag, as well as the report furnished by the Police Headquarters regarding the applicant's antecedents. Upon evaluation of the material available on record, the competent authority arrived at the conclusion that the applicant did not satisfy the standards of character and integrity expected from a person seeking appointment in the Police Department. Consequently, his claim for compassionate appointment came to be rejected vide the impugned communication dated 12.06.2023.

**23.**The respondents contend that the Police Department is a disciplined force entrusted with maintenance of law and order and protection of public peace. According to them, persons inducted into such service are expected to possess impeccable character, unquestionable integrity and satisfactory antecedents. It is pleaded that merely because a person has been acquitted in a criminal case does not create an indefeasible right to appointment, particularly where the competent authority, upon an independent assessment of the nature of the acquittal and the surrounding circumstances, forms an opinion that the candidate is unsuitable for induction into the service.

It is further pleaded that the competent authority has not rejected the applicant's claim merely because he was once prosecuted in a criminal case. It is after careful examination of the judgment of acquittal and the reports received from the concerned authorities, a conscious administrative decision was taken that the applicant was not suitable for appointment in the Police Department. The respondents maintain that such an assessment falls exclusively within the administrative domain of the employer and does not warrant interference in exercise of judicial review unless shown to be arbitrary, mala fide or contrary to the governing rules.

The respondents have, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the Original Application by contending that the impugned communication is legal, valid and in conformity with the settled principles governing compassionate appointment as well as appointment to a disciplined force. According to them, no fundamental or statutory right of the applicant has been infringed and, consequently, no case for interference is made out.

Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the respondents supported the impugned communication and submitted that the applicant has no vested or indefeasible right to claim appointment on compassionate grounds merely because his father died while in service. It was argued that compassionate appointment constitutes an exception to the normal rule of recruitment and is governed entirely by the policy framed by the Government. Consequently, every claimant seeking such appointment must satisfy not only the conditions of eligibility prescribed under the scheme but also the standards relating to suitability, character and antecedents applicable to the post in question.

Learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that the applicant's claim was not rejected merely because he had once been prosecuted in a criminal case. According to him, the competent authority examined the judgment rendered by the learned criminal court as well as the reports received from the concerned police authorities and, upon an objective consideration thereof, formed the opinion that the applicant was not suitable for the post in question. It was, therefore, submitted that the decision impugned in the present proceedings is based upon an independent assessment of the applicant's suitability and not upon the mere factum of his prosecution.

Learned counsel further argued that appointment in the Police Department stands on a different footing from appointment to ordinary civil posts. The Police is a disciplined force entrusted with maintenance of law and order and protection of society, and, therefore, the employer is fully justified in insisting upon persons possessing impeccable integrity, unquestionable character and satisfactory antecedents. It was contended that the employer cannot be compelled to induct a person into such service merely because the criminal proceedings against him culminated in acquittal.

Learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that it is now well settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not ipso facto entitle a candidate to appointment in public service. The appointing authority is legally entitled to examine the nature of the acquittal, the surrounding circumstances, the gravity of the allegations and the overall antecedents of the candidate for the purpose of assessing his suitability. Such an assessment, according to the learned counsel, falls squarely within the administrative domain of the employer and ordinarily does not warrant interference by the Court in exercise of judicial review.

In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned Deputy Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685; Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Abhijit Singh Pawar, (2018) 18 SCC 733; and Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. v. Anil Kanwariya, (2021) 10 SCC 136, to contend that even after acquittal, the employer retains the authority to examine the antecedents of a candidate and to determine whether such candidate satisfies the standards of suitability prescribed for public employment, particularly where the appointment relates to a disciplined force.

Learned counsel also submitted that the compassionate appointment scheme cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to dilute the standards prescribed for induction into public service. According to him, while the object of the scheme is undoubtedly to provide immediate financial assistance to the family of a deceased employee, such objective cannot override the equally important requirement that persons entering disciplined services of government must possess the requisite character and integrity. It was contended that the employer is duty bound to maintain institutional discipline and public confidence, particularly in the Police Department, and therefore cannot be compelled to appoint every dependent merely because he otherwise satisfies the general criteria under the scheme.

Learned Deputy Advocate General, therefore, submitted that the competent authority has considered all relevant material, recorded reasons in support of its conclusion and rejected the applicant's claim on grounds germane to the requirements of public service. It was accordingly prayed that the Original Application, being devoid of merit, deserves dismissal.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings, the documents placed on record and considered the rival submissions advanced at the Bar.

The principal question which arises for consideration in the present Original Application is whether the applicant, who seeks appointment on compassionate grounds, can claim such appointment as a matter of right merely because he was acquitted in the criminal case in which he was prosecuted, and whether the respondents were justified in declining his claim on the ground that the acquittal was not an honorable acquittal and that the post in question requires a person possessing impeccable character and integrity.

At the outset, it is well settled that compassionate appointment is not a vested right nor an alternative mode of public employment. It constitutes an exception to the constitutional mandate embodied in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and has been evolved solely to provide immediate financial succour to the family of a Government servant who dies in harness leaving the dependents in financial distress. Consequently, a claimant seeking compassionate appointment must satisfy not only the financial and other eligibility conditions prescribed under the governing scheme but also the standards relating to suitability, character and antecedents applicable to the post for which appointment is sought. The object of the scheme cannot be stretched to such an extent as to dilute the standards prescribed for entry into public service.

The law governing compassionate appointment is no longer res integra. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138, the Hon'ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that compassionate appointment is intended only to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden financial crisis arising out of the death of the sole breadwinner and cannot be claimed as a matter of inheritance or as a vested right. The Court observed that compassionate appointment is an exception to the normal rule of recruitment and must, therefore, remain confined to the object for which it has been conceived. However, while compassionate appointment is an exception to the normal rule of recruitment, such exception does not dispense with the requirement that the candidate must otherwise be suitable for appointment under the applicable recruitment standards.

The aforesaid principle has been consistently reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in subsequent decisions. In State of Karnataka v. N.C. Santhosh, (2020) 7 SCC 617, the Supreme Court comprehensively summarized the principles governing compassionate appointment and held that such appointment is traceable solely to the scheme framed by the employer and no person can claim appointment dehors the governing policy. Similarly, in Central Bank of India v. Nitin, (2022) 7 SCC 508, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that compassionate appointment is intended to provide immediate relief to the bereaved family and every claim must necessarily be examined strictly in accordance with the applicable scheme without enlarging its scope beyond what has been provided therein.

Thus, while the compassionate appointment scheme undoubtedly deserves a purposive interpretation consistent with its humanitarian object, the same cannot be construed as dispensing with the essential requirements prescribed for induction into Government service. A claimant seeking compassionate appointment does not stand on a higher pedestal than any other person seeking entry into public employment so far as suitability, character and antecedents are concerned. Compassionate appointment merely relaxes the normal method of recruitment; it does not dilute the standards expected of a Government servant.

The record reveals that the applicant was involved in FIR No. 26/2018 registered at Police Station Achabal for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 452, 354, 427 and 506 of the Ranbir Penal Code. It is equally not in dispute that the applicant was subsequently acquitted by the competent criminal court. The respondents, however, upon examining the judgment of acquittal together with the reports received during character verification, formed an opinion that the acquittal was not an honorable acquittal and that the applicant did not satisfy the standard of impeccable integrity expected for induction into the Police Department. The correctness of this approach falls for consideration before this Tribunal.

The law is equally well settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not ipso facto confer an enforceable right to public employment. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even where a candidate has been acquitted, the employer is competent to examine the nature of such acquittal and independently determine whether the candidate is suitable for appointment. The Court observed that where the acquittal is founded on benefit of doubt, hostile witnesses or failure of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the employer is not denuded of its authority to assess the antecedents of the candidate, particularly where the appointment relates to a disciplined force requiring persons of impeccable character and unquestionable integrity.

The aforesaid principle was authoritatively affirmed by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471. The Constitution Bench held that the effect of acquittal cannot be examined in isolation and that the employer is entitled to consider the nature of the offence, the manner in which the criminal proceedings culminated, the overall antecedents of the candidate and the requirements of the post before arriving at a conclusion regarding suitability. The Court categorically recognized that even where criminal proceedings terminate in acquittal, the appointing authority may decline appointment if, upon an objective evaluation of the attendant circumstances, it forms the opinion that the candidate does not satisfy the standards required for public service.

**42.**The submission that the expression "honourable acquittal" is unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure is, by itself, of little assistance to the applicant. The issue before the appointing authority is not one of recording a criminal conviction or acquittal but of assessing suitability for public employment. As held in Avtar Singh and Mehar Singh, the employer is entitled to examine the nature of the acquittal and the surrounding circumstances for the limited purpose of determining suitability, particularly where appointment is sought to a disciplined force.

The principle enunciated in Avtar Singh (supra) has thereafter been consistently followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Abhijit Singh Pawar, (2018) 18 SCC 733, it was reiterated that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically confer a right to appointment. The employer is entitled to independently assess the antecedents of the candidate and determine whether he is suitable for induction into public service. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the appointing authority is not bound by the mere result of the criminal proceedings and may legitimately consider the overall conduct and antecedents of the candidate while taking a decision regarding appointment.

Likewise, in Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. v. Anil Kanwariya, (2021) 10 SCC 136, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that an acquittal founded on benefit of doubt or owing to insufficiency of evidence cannot, by itself, compel the employer to offer appointment. The Court held that the employer retains the discretion to assess the suitability of the candidate in the light of the nature of the allegations, the manner in which the criminal case concluded and the standards expected from a person entering public service.

Reference may also be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Rahul Bansal v. The Commissioner of Police & Anr (decided on March 10, 2026 by the Delhi High Court), wherein the petitioner had questioned the cancellation of his candidature for appointment on compassionate grounds after verification of his antecedents revealed his involvement in a criminal case. Although the petitioner had been acquitted, the competent authority found that the acquittal was not a clean or honorable acquittal and, consequently, declared him unsuitable for appointment. The learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, upheld the decision of the employer and the writ petition challenging the said decision came to be dismissed by the Hon'ble High Court. After considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mehar Singh (supra), Avtar Singh (supra) and the other decisions governing the field, the Hon'ble High Court reiterated that the employer is entitled to independently assess the suitability of a candidate notwithstanding his acquittal and that such assessment ordinarily does not warrant interference unless shown to be arbitrary, mala fide or contrary to the governing rules.

The observations made by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in paragraphs 17 to 25 of the aforesaid judgment in Rahul Bansal (supra) fortify the settled principle that the distinction between an honorable acquittal and an acquittal based on benefit of doubt is not, by itself, determinative of the issue. What is material is whether the employer, after objectively considering the antecedents of the candidate, the nature of the post and the applicable policy, has arrived at a bona fide conclusion regarding his suitability. The Hon'ble High Court further held that such an assessment lies primarily within the domain of the employer and judicial review is confined to examining whether the decision suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of statutory provisions. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court further observed that judicial review does not extend to substituting the subjective satisfaction of the employer regarding suitability with that of the Court and that once the employer has objectively assessed the antecedents of the candidate in accordance with the governing policy, interference would be unwarranted unless the decision is shown to be arbitrary or mala fide.

Examined in the light of the aforesaid settled principles, this Tribunal finds that the respondents have not rejected the applicant's claim merely because he was once prosecuted in a criminal case. The impugned communication itself discloses that the competent authority examined the judgment of acquittal together with the reports received during verification of the applicant's antecedents and thereafter arrived at the conclusion that the applicant did not satisfy the standards of suitability prescribed for appointment in the Police Department. The decision, therefore, cannot be said to be founded solely upon the existence of criminal proceedings but upon an independent assessment of the applicant's suitability for public employment.

It is equally significant that the appointment sought by the applicant is in the Police Department, which is admittedly a disciplined force. The nature of duties discharged by police personnel requires the employer to insist upon persons possessing impeccable character, unquestionable integrity and satisfactory antecedents. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the standards applicable to disciplined forces stand on a distinct footing. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:

**49.**The aforesaid observations apply with full force to the present case and reinforce the principle that the appointing authority is entitled to adopt a higher standard while assessing suitability for appointment in the Police Department.

**50.**The submission advanced on behalf of the applicant that his acquittal by the criminal court completely disentitles the respondents from examining his antecedents cannot, therefore, be accepted. This circumstance by itself would not create an indefeasible or enforceable right to compassionate appointment. As authoritatively held in Mehar Singh (supra) and reaffirmed by the Constitution Bench in Avtar Singh (supra), the employer is not denuded of its authority to independently assess the suitability of a candidate in the context of the nature of the post and the standards prescribed for public service.

Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Methu Meda (supra). The said judgment, however, does not advance the case of the applicant. On the contrary, in paragraph 22 thereof, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that where a person is acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt or on account of witnesses turning hostile, such acquittal does not automatically entitle him to employment, particularly in a disciplined force. The Court has further held that the employer is entitled to consider the candidature in accordance with the applicable policy and recommendations of the Screening Committee and cannot be compelled to grant appointment merely because the criminal proceedings have culminated in acquittal. The principle enunciated therein, therefore, supports the stand adopted by the respondents.

**52.**In the present case, the applicant admittedly figured as an accused in FIR No. 26/2018 registered for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 452, 354, 427 and 506 of the Ranbir Penal Code. The competent authority, upon examining the judgment of acquittal and the material available during verification of antecedents, formed the opinion that the applicant was not suitable for induction into the Police Department. Such satisfaction has been arrived at by the authority competent to consider the applicant's candidature and is based upon considerations germane to the object of maintaining discipline, integrity and public confidence in the Police Force. No material has been placed before this Tribunal to demonstrate that the said decision is arbitrary, actuated by mala fides or in violation of any statutory provision governing compassionate appointment.

Since the competent authority has examined the applicant's antecedents, considered the judgment of acquittal and arrived at a bona fide conclusion regarding his suitability, no case for interference in exercise of judicial review is made out.

The impugned communication reflects due application of mind to the relevant material placed before the competent authority. The applicant has not been able to demonstrate that the respondents ignored any mandatory provision of the governing scheme or that the decision suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides, perversity or procedural impropriety warranting interference in exercise of judicial review. Judicial review in such matters is confined to examining the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. The humanitarian object underlying compassionate appointment cannot eclipse the requirement of suitability for public employment nor compel the employer to appoint a person who, upon objective assessment of his antecedents, is found unsuitable for induction into a disciplined force.

For all the foregoing reasons, and in view of the settled legal position discussed hereinabove, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the impugned communication dated 12.06.2023 does not suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness, irrationality, procedural impropriety or perversity warranting interference in exercise of judicial review.

Consequently, the Original Application, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

Registry shall consign the record to the Record Room after due completion.