Toomu Chandraiah and Others vs Civil Administrator

The applications filed by the Petitioners for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari were dismissed on the 4-4-1951. The Petitioners have now filed separate applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India under Article 132, Constitution of India. The learned Advocate for the Petitioners argues that there is a case made out for the grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 132 inasmuch as that there are substantial questions of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution. These applications were directed against an order of ''requisition'' made by the Collector of Warangal (then styled the Civil Administrator of Warangal) under the Defence of Hyderabad Regulation for public purposes.

It has to be observed that every question of law cannot be regarded as a substantial question of law which would warrant the grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The main objections that were raised with regard to the validity of the order were:

(a) That this order offended Article 19 (1), Constitution of India inasmuch as it deprived the Petitioners of possessing and holding the property,

(b) That this order infringed Article 31, Constitution of India because there was deprivation of the property without payment of compensation;

(c) That it was against the fundamental rights conferred under the Constitution under Article 14 of the Constitution because it went against the principle of equal protection of the laws;

(d) That according to Section 15, Defence of Hyderabad Regulation it was obligatory that an order of requisitioning should be made causing, the least inconvenience to the person who was deprived of his property and the matter as to whether the least inconvenience was being caused to the Petitioners required enquiry and. in this case no enquiry had been made and therefore the order was bad; and,

(e) The pre-requisite of there being a public purpose before a property could be requisitioned had not been satisfied in this case.

We must herein point out that every one of these aspects has been considered and the law with regard to these various points has been laid clown by the Supreme Court in the two leading: cases of Province of Bombay Vs. Kusaldas S. Advani and Others, and the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, . In the case of the Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani (A) the question as to whether there is a public purpose or not has been left to the satisfaction of the requisitioning authority and it is no longer open to the Court to scrutinise the existence or otherwise of a public purpose. The objective test which was sought to-be applied to a requisitioning order has been held to be not the proper test.

As regards the argument that it offended Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution, in the same-case it has been held that a requisitioning order for a public purpose where compensation is awarded does not offend Article 31 and that the restriction placed on the enjoyment and possession of the property by an individual is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(5) of the Constitution. So these objections have been disposed of by the Supreme Court.

With regard to the objection as regards there being no equal protection of the laws it has not been shown that there has been an arbitrary and discriminatory singling out of the Petitioners to the exclusion of others and under such circumstances it cannot be said to offend the principles under Article 14 of the Constitution. This has also-been made clear by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Charanjit Lal v. The Union of India (B) referred to above.

Therefore the legal objections that could be raised as regards the validity of the order and the right of the Court to go into the question as to whether the requisitioning order was, rightly issued are matters which do not warrant reconsideration by the Supreme Court.

One point, however, was raised by the learned Advocate for the Petitioners in the Writ applications that was, that the Rule under which the Civil Administrator of Warangal made the requisitioning order was under the Defence of Hyderabad Regulation which was an emergency Legislation and being an emergency legislation it could not continue to be in force after the emergency ceased to exist. This aspect of the question has been dealt with by us in our order. We have held in the order that the Defence of Hyderabad Regulation does not relate only to the Defence of Hyderabad but contains within it laws pertaining to other matters, and this order of requisition has been made under the law relating to the maintenance of order and the maintenance of services essential to the life of the community. Therefore the argument of the learned Advocate that it is only left to the President to declare a state of emergency under Article 352 and inasmuch as he has not declared a state of emergency the Defence of Hyderabad Regulation cannot be in force is not an argument which will hold water. We are therefore of opinion that there is no substantial question of the with regard to the interpretation of the constitution in the case. We there refuse leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 132 Constitution of India. Tins order will govern the connected applications.