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Judgment
Rajagopalan, J.—For the assessment year 1946-47, the period from 16th August, 1944 to 16th August, 1945, was the accounting year of
the assessee for Income Tax and was also the chargeable accounting period for excess profits tax. The assessee firm traded in arecanut, with its
head office at Virudhunagar, within the taxabki territories. The assessee obtained imports of arecanut from the Travancore State. That arecanut
was subjected to excise duty in the year of account both by the Government of India and by the Travancore State. Upto 31st December, 1944,
the assessee paid sums totalling to Rs. 36,094, as excise duty to the Government of India and debited his account with those payments.
On the representation of the dealers in arecanuts, pointing out the difficulties in paying excise duty both to the Government of India and to the
Travancore State, the Government of India issued certain executive instructions to its subordinates. On 29th December, 1944, the Government
directed the Excise Authorities not to enforce the system of voluntary payment of excise duties by the dealers on goods imported from Travancore
after 14th November, 1944, the date on which the Travancore State notified the imposition of excise duty on arecanuts (See : Annexure A) Hinder
annexure A-1 dated 2nd June, 1945, the excise authorities were directed to refund to the traders the excise duty they had voluntarily paid to the
Government of India on nuts imported from the Travancore State, if any trader applied for refund. Neither of these orders was communicated to
the assessee or to any of the dealers. They were only executive instructions to the departmental authorities issued by the Government of India.
The assessee continued the payments of excise duty upto 31st December, 1944. On nth January, 1945, he applied to the Collector of Excise
for repayment of the excise duty the assessee had paid on nuts imported from Travancore subsequent to 14th November, 1944 (Annexure B). On
31st March, 1945, the assessee applied for refund of the duty he had paid to the Government of India between 1st April, 1944, and 13th
November, 1944 (Annexure B-2). On 27th November, 1945, the Excise authorities ordered the refund of Rs. 22,743-13-0. On 17th November,
1946, a further sum of Rs. 27,049-4-0 was ordered to be refunded to the assessee. These amounts included Rs. 36,094, which the assessee had
paid in his ysar of account 1944-45. The refunds were thus received only in the succeeding years of account.
In computing the assessee''s income for 1944-45, in the assessment year 1946-47, the Departmental Authorities included this sum of Rs.
36,094, in the assessee''s income, though there were no credit entries in his accounts during the accounting year in question, and though the
amounts had not actually been received by the assessee in that year. The Department was of the view that the Government of India had definitely
agreed in the year of account itself to refund the said amount to the assessee after the necessary scrutiny. When the assessee appealed to the
tribunal, it confirmed the asessment. The question referred to this Court u/s 66(1) of the Income Tax Act was:
Whether the sum of Rs. 36094, being the refund of Indian Excise Duty on betelnuts imported from Travancore State was assessable as profits of
the accounting period for Income Tax and excess profits tax.
It was not disputed that the excise duty, the assessee has paid in the year of account to the Government of India was reflected in the prices the
assessee charged his customers. The Tribunal recorded:
We find that, by the Government of India''s notification, collection of the excise duty in question has been cancelled with effect from the 14th
November, 1944, onwards. Their inclination to refund the excise duty paid before that date from the inception of the duty has also been made
clear by the same notification. The assessee has thereunder acquired a right on that date to receive the payment of the duty already paid by him till
then...it (the assessee) was fully aware of its rights.
The Tribunal recorded further:
As these amounts have been already charged to the trading account, the debt due from the Government in respect thereof is clearly a trading
surplus relating to the accounting year in question. In this view, the date of recovery of this advance is immaterial. The amount recovered from the
Government is not in the nature of damages for some wrongful act done to the assessee by the Government, but the amount recovered by the
Government in extortion which they agreed to refund of their own accord.
We fail to understand how a levy of excise duty under a valid enactment can amount to extortion by the Government. The Tribunal, in our
opinion, was also wrong in viewing the amount as a debt due to the assessee from the Government. ! Apart from the fact, that no notification as
such, as that expression is normally understood, was issued by the Government of India, - as we pointed out, they only issued executive
instructions to their subordinates without communicating them directly or even indirectly to the traders concerned - there was no question of the
assessee acquiring any rights, any legally enforceable rights, against the Government even under the letters marked annexures A and A-1, which
apparently the Tribunal regarded as notifications issued by the Government of India. Whether it was a case of an inclination to refund, which was
the interpretation placed upon the annexure A-1 by the Tribunal, or whether it was a definite order by the Government communicated to its
subordinates, it did not vest any rights in the assessee, legally enforceable against the Government. It was just a case of a remission of tax, a tax
which had been lawfully collected by the Government of India. The jural relationship between the assessee and the Government during the year of
account based on that act of remission was certainly not that of creditor and debtor.
We have next to consider whether, independent of the reasoning of the Tribunal ana its findings, the addition of Rs. 36,094, to the assessee''s
income in the year of account could be sustained. The assessee, it should be remembered, maintained his accounts on the mercantile basis. There
was no credit entry in his books for this, sum of Rs. 36,094, in the year of account. If, however, he was bound to credit himself with that amount in
the year of account itself, his omission to make credit would not, of course, absolve him of his liability. An ascertained liability, whether or not it is
discharged in the year of account, is sufficient to sustain an entry in the accounts-maintained on the mercantile basis. Was there such an ascertained
liability with reference to this sum of Rs. 36,094, is the question. We have already pointed out that it was a case of a remission of tax lawfully
imposed on the assessee under a valid enactment. The tax was also paid by the assessee in the year of account. The direction to refund the tax so
collected was issued by the Government to its subordinates. It still continued to be a case of a remission of tax, which was within the powers of
the Government to grant. The direction given to its subordinates in annexures A and A-1 did not even amount to a promise of. remission or refund
communicated to the assessee. As we said, no rights legally enforceable against the Government vested in the assessee at any time during the year
of account. He had no right to get back this sum of Rs. 36,094, from the Government, though, of course, in the normal circumstances, the excise
authorities were bound to give effect to the instructions, given to them in annexures A and A-1. Could it be said that under these circumstances that
it was an ascertained liability of the Government to pay this sum of Rs. 36,094 to the assessee, on the basis of which the assessee should have in
the normal course of maintaining his accounts, credited himself with that amount? In our opinion, the answer to that question must be in the
negative.
In E.D. Sassoon and Company Ltd. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City, , the Supreme Court observed:
It is clear therefore that income may accrue to an assessee without the actual receipt of the same If the assessee acquires a right to receive the
income, the income can be said to have accrued to him, though it may be received later on its being ascertained. The basic conception is that he
must have acquired a right to receive the income. There must be a debt owed to him by somebody. There must be as is otherwise expressed
debitum in praesenti solvendum in futuro....'' Unless and until there is created in favour o� the assessee a debt due by somebody, it cannot be
said that he has acquired a right to receive the income or that income has accrued to him.
Judged by that test, we have to hold that the amount of Rs. 36,094, did not represent the income that accrued to the assessee in the year of
account in question.
Mr. Rama Rao Sahib relied on the decision of the House of Lords in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. New Castle Breweries, Ltd. (1927)
12 T.C. 927, and also on the decision of, Roxburgh, J. in Severne v. Dadswell 35 T.C. 649, support of his contention, that though the sum of Rs.
36,094 was actually received, by the assessee in the succeeding years of account, this sum should be included in the income of the year of account,
when alone the real profit of the assessee in the year of account could be ascertained.
In the Newcastle Brewreies Ltd. Case (1927) 12 T.C. 927, a certain quantity of rum which belonged to that assessee was taken by the
Grown, and a sura of � 10,300 was paid to the assessee in the year of account. Subsequently, an additional sum of � 5300 was ascertained
to be due to the assessee by the war Compensation Court, which was the Tribunal competent to decide the question, what was the amount
payable to the assessee for the rum that the Government had taken. The claim of the department, that this sum of � 5,300 was a business, profit,
receipt of which should be related back to the year of account 1917-18 was sustained. Viscount Cave, L.C., pointed out at page 953:
The rum was taken in 1918, and the right to some payment arose at once, though there was delay in ascertaining the amount to be paid.... The
change of the Tribunal which was to ascertain the amount and enforce payment did not create the right to payment, or alter the date when the right
to payment in fact arose. An illustration was put in the course of the argument when it was aksed whether, if a partner had been interested in the
profits of the appellant''s business for the year 1918, he would have had a right to share in this sum. I think the answer should dearly be in the
affirmative; and just as the sum was part of the profits of the year so as to entitle a partner to share in it, so it appears to me that it was profit of the
year so as to entitle the Government to take a share in the form of Excess Profits Duty.
Thus the basis of the decision was that the right to the payment as part of the price of the rum seized arose in the year of account itself, though its
ascertainment and actual payment were deferred. It was a trade debt that arose, though it was the Crown that was liable to discharge it.
The principle laid down in that case was extended in Severne v. Dadswell 35 T.C. 649. In that case Mr. Dadswell, as a licenced flour miller,
was entitled to certain rebates. He was what was called a non-pool miller. The pool millers were entitled to certain further sums by way of
compensation payable by the Ministry of Food. These amounts were comprehensively called ""remuneration"". The concession given to the pool
millers was extended to non-pool millers, of whom Mr. Dadswell was one, and he eventually received a further sum of � 3,289. That payment
was in December, 1949. Mr. Dadswell had meanwhile ceased to trade on 30th September, 1945. Roxburgh, J., pointed out at page 656:
It is common ground that when Mr. Dadswell ceased to trade on 30th September, 1945, he had no legal or equitable right to any further payment
from the Ministry, and that he had no asset which could then have been properly entered in a final account as a book debt...the relevant question is
not whether at the date of retirement there was any outstanding book debt or any contingent or deferred legal or equitable right, but whether any
work had been done in the course of trade in respect of which die reward had not been finally settled, or, in other words, anything outstanding in
the nature, of, or analogous, to a book debt.
At page 659 the learned Judge recorded:
Authority in my view establishes the proposition that if it can be said at the moment of discontinuance that the payment for some work already
done has not been finally settled, even though there is no legal claim for any more, then if a further payment is made afterwards, even though it is
wholly gratuitous, the account can be reopened so as to let in what is analogous to a trade debt at the figure actually received. If on the other hand,
the item is not analogous to a trade debt, or if there has been a final settlement, the account has been finally closed.
In the Newcastle Breweries case (1927) 12 T.C. 927, it was a trade debt itself. In Dadswell''s Case 35 T.C. 649, it was treated as analogous
to a trade debt, a remuneration for services rendered by Dadswell as a flour miller, ""analogous"" because there was no legal basis for a claim.
Roxburgh, J., himself made it clear that if an item was not analogous to a trade debt, there could be no justification for reopening a closed account
and to relate back the subsequent receipt, to the year of account.
The question is, can the principle laid down in the New Castle Breweries Case (1927) 12 T.C. 927, and extended in Dadswell''s Case 35
T.C. 649, be further extended to a case of a remission of tax by the Government. We have already pointed out that it could not be called a debt
payable by the Government to the assessee. Nor could it be treated as something analogous to a trade debt. No doubt the tax was imposed
originally in the year of account on the basis of the trade activities of the assessee. But it is equally true that it was for a tax that was eventually
remitted and paid to the assessee, paid not in the year of account but in the succeeding years of account. But it was not payment by way of
remuneration, as in the case of Mr. Dadswell for anything done by-the assessee in the course of his trading activities in the year of account. Once
again we have to point out that the tax was lawfully levied and lawfully collected. The Government decided to remit the tax, and payment was
made much later. It is difficult to find any basis for bringing the assessee''s receipt of Rs. 36,094 within the scope of the ruling in Severne v.
Dadswell 35 T.C. 649, and treat it as income to which he was entitled in the relevant year of account.
In our opinion it is the principle laid down by the House of Lords in the British Mexican Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Jackson (1932) 16 T.C. 571,
that should apply to the case of the assessee. In that case by 30th June, 1921, the assessee Company owed a sum of � 1,073,281, to Huasteea
Company for the purchase of petrol, etc. Subsequently, the Huasteca Company remitted a sum of � 9,45,232. The question was whether this
sum of � 9,45,232, had 10 be brought into account for purposes of computing the profits of the assessee Company. Lord Thankerton observed
at page 591:
The main argument for the appellant was that the amount of � 1,073,281 owing to the Huasteca Company had been treated as an expense of
the trade deductible from grcss receipts in the trading account to 30th June, 1921, but that, to the extent to which it was subsequently released, it
was in fact never expended: that the original price for the goods having been reduced by agreement, the price actually paid and not the original
price was the amount of the deduction allowable for Income Tax purposes: and that the account to 30th June, 1921, should be opened up and the
deduction should be brought into conformity with the amount actually paid.
That contention was negatived. At page 592 Lord Thankerton observed:
I am of opinion in the present case, that the account to 30th June, 1921, cannot be reopened as the amount of the liability there stated was
correctly stated as the finally agreed amount of the liability and the subsequent release of the respondents proceeds on the footing of the
correctness of that statement.
Lord Macmillan observed at page 594:
Now it may be that where during the currency of an accounting period a trading debt is incurred, and the creditor agrees during the currency of the
same period to accept less than the full amount of the debt due to him, it is only the balance of the debt as exacted or agreed to be exacted, which
ought to enter, as a debit, the debtor''s accounts for the period. As to this, I say nothing, for the present case has been argued by the Crown on the
footing that the whole sum of � 9,45,232, ought either to be dealt with in a reopened account for the year to 30th June, 1921, or credited in the
eighteen months'' account to 31st December, 1922 and as in my opinion neither of these contentions is admissible, I concur in the motion that the
appeal be dismissed.
The assessee in the present case was liable to pay Rs. 36,094, as excise duty to the Government of India in the year of account. There was no
dispute about that liability. It was also discharged in the year of account. Subsequently, there was a total remission of that liability. Nonetheless, it
was only a release from the obligations lawfully imposed on the assessee in the year of account. That remission was not in the year of account.
Subsequent releases cannot be related back to the year of account itself.
Our answer to the question referred to this Court is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of
this reference. Counsel''s fee Rs. 250.