High CourtsSingle Bench(1952) 07 KL CK 0004

T.K. Narayanan Vydian vs The State of Travancore-Cochin and Another

High Court Of Kerala · Decided on 17 July 1952 · Citation: AIR 1952 Ker 100

HON’BLE JUDGES
V.S. Subramanya Iyer, J
CASE NUMBER
Original Petition No. 80 of 1951

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Judgment

5 paragraphs · 712 words

Subramania Iyer, J.—This is a petition "under Article 226 read with Article 238 of the Constitution of India" for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari or mandamus or any other direction or order which may appear just in the circumstance of the case.

2.

At the instance of the applicant and Ors. , the erstwhile State of Travancore started proceedings under the Travancore Land Acquisition Act, 11/1089 for acquiring a tank which was alleged to have been used by the inhabitants of the locality including the Petitioner, for their purposes whether bathing and/or of drinking. A declaration that the land (tank) was needed for a public purpose was made by the State u/s 6 of the Act. The property was registered in the Revenue Records in the name of Respondent 2 in this case. He appeared before Government and objected that there was no public purpose as contemplated by Section 6 of the Act and that the conclusion reached to the effect that there is public purpose as a result of the enquiry conducted by the State was erroneous and that upon a consideration of the true state of facts, it would be found to be otherwise. At his instance there was a consideration of this question, by the State in the presence of the persons at whose instance the original proceeding was started including the applicant before this Court as also the objector, as a result of which, the State was satisfied that the view that there was public purpose justifying the acquisition under the Act was wrong and they, therefore, cancelled the declaration that they made u/s 6 as aforesaid. A copy of the order was given to ail the parties including the applicant. That is the order on which this application is based. The allegation made on behalf of the applicant is that it is beyond the competence of the State to review an order passed after enquiry and therefore the order passed at the conference attended by the owner of the property and by the Ors. should be quashed and the original declaration to the effect that there was public purpose made u/s 6 restored. It would appear that the enquiry conducted by the State preceding the first declaration was without notice to or the participation of the owner of the property, that is, Respondent 2. The State is Respondent 1 in this petition.

3.

Section 34(1) of the Act provides that "the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken." The proceedings in this case did not proceed beyond the making of the declaration u/s 6 and calling for claims u/s 9. No award was passed fixing the compensation nor was possession taken of the property. Making of a declaration and calling for claims are only some steps towards an acquisition, and if it is competent for the Government to withdraw from the acquisition even after progressing beyond the stage of calling for claims u/s 9 after declaration u/s 6 and even after the award has been passed, then it is clear that it is competent for the Government to withdraw it even at an earlier stage. This liberty is reserved to the Government by the statute itself which provides for the various stages in the matter of acquisition of land for public purpose. Government having the liberty so to withdraw it is within the competence of the Government to cancel a declaration made as regards the public purpose u/s 6. Under the circumstances there is no ground for interference with the order passed by the Government cancelling the declaration made u/s 6.

4.

In this view, the question as to whether it is within the competence of the executive to review its orders does not arise for consideration. Whatever be the name given to the proceedings, if it amounts to a withdrawal u/s 34(1) of the whole or any part of the proceedings in the matter of acquiring land under the Land Acquisition Act, then such act is immune from question at the instance of any subject.

5.

The result is that this petition must be dismissed with costs of the Respondents. Advocate''s fee Rs. 100 for each of Respondents.