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Judgment
R. Mala, J.—The Civil Revision Petitions arise out of the order dated 24.11.2006 in L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994 and in I.A. No. 199 of 2000
in L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994 on the file of the Principal District Court, Pondicherry.
The petitioner herein has filed application in I.A. No. 199 of 2000 in L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994, to condone the delay of 624 days in filing a
petition to set aside the order dated 30.6.1998 passed in L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994 and to restore the same to the file, to implead him as one of
the respondents to adjudicate his claim for compensation as a person interested and to apportion the same in the compensation amount awarded
by the respondent-Deputy Collector-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Pondicherry. Since he is a cultivating tenant, the person interested, he is
entitled to compensation and hence he sought for the above reliefs. The respondents filed counter affidavit to the said application.
The trial Court, after hearing the arguments of both counsel, dismissed I.A. No. 199 of 2000 and has not reopened the award passed in
L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994. Against the same, the present Civil Revision Petitions are filed by the petitioner.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that it is not in dispute that the respective respondents in the Civil Revision
Petitions are the owners of the properties in question. The petitioner is a cultivating tenant. The lands in question have been acquired by the
Government of Pondicherry. No notice has been issued to the petitioner. Since the petitioner is a person interested and admittedly, he is a
cultivating tenant, as per the dictum of the Apex Court, the petitioner is entitled to 3/4 share of the compensation amount and the respondents-land
owners are entitled to only 1/4 share of the compensation amount. The respondent-Deputy Collector-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Pondicherry
has not issued any notice to the petitioner.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would further submit that after the award was passed, the legal representatives of the land
owners filed an application for payment-out in I.A. No. 18 of 1999 and in that case, publication was made and then only, the petitioner herein
came to know about the order passed by the Court. Immediately, the petitioner filed a petition in I.A. No. 99 of 1999 in I.A. No. 18 of 1999, to
implead himself as a party to the land acquisition proceedings, which was dismissed. Against that, the petitioner herein filed C.R.P. No. 3981 of
1999, which was allowed by this Court on 19.2.2004. During the pendency of C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999, the petitioner herein filed I.A. No. 199
of 2000 to condone the delay of 624 days in filing the application for setting aside the order dated 30.6.1998 passed in L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994
and to restore the L.A.O.P. to file, to implead him as a party to L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994 and the said I.A. No. 199 of 2000 was dismissed by
the impugned order.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner further submitted that in C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999, it was clearly decided that the
petitioner herein is the person interested, since he is a cultivating tenant and the said C.R.P. was allowed. The trial Court, while disposing of I.A.
No. 199 of 2000, came to a conclusion that the petitioner herein is not the person interested and he is not a cultivating tenant, and the application
was dismissed, even though a copy of the order in C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999 was produced before the trial Court. The trial Court is not the higher
forum to over-rule the order passed by this Court in C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999. So, the trial Court has committed error in dismissing I.A. No. 199
of 2000 and not reopening the award passed in L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner further submitted that the respondents have wantonly not brought to the notice of the Court
that the petitioner is also an interested person and he is in possession of the properties as a cultivating tenant. Furthermore, he submitted that the
trial Court has not considered the aspect of delay and it mainly concentrated on the point whether the petitioner herein is the interested person or
not. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on various decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his submissions and
prayed for allowing the Civil Revision Petitions.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners fairly conceded that the trial Court has committed error by deciding that the
petitioner is not the person interested. He also fairly conceded that the petitioner herein is a cultivating tenant, not only in the properties in question,
but also in respect of the other properties belonging to the respondents-land owners.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners further submitted that at the time of reference of the land acquisition
proceedings, the petitioner''s name was not included, but however, the petitioner had the knowledge about the acquisition proceedings. The
petitioner has not taken steps to implead himself as a party before passing of the award.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners relied upon the Advocate''s notice, dated 17.6.1990, issued on behalf of
the petitioner, to the Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) of the Government of Pondicherry, in which the petitioner stated that he is in possession
of the properties in question for more than 25 years and had spent more than Rs. 1.5 lakhs for the development of the lands and hence, he prayed
to add him as a party to the proceedings for hearing his objections in respect of the lands in land acquisition proceedings.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners further submitted that even on 11.9.1993, the petitioner sent another
representation to His Excellency. The Governor, with a prayer to intervene in the matter and give a direction to the Land Acquisition Officer
(Pondicherry) and award his share in the land acquisition compensation amount. But after that, the petitioner has not taken any steps. He came
forward with the application only in 2000 in I.A. No. 199 of 2000 to condone the delay of 624 days in filing the application for setting aside the
order dated 30.6.1998 in L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994 and to restore the L.A.O.P., to implead him as a party, that too, after the award was passed
and the payment-out application was filed by the legal representatives of the land owners.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners further submitted that wantonly, the petitioner was not taking steps to
implead himself as a party to the proceedings and he kept quiet all along and only after newspaper publication was made on 8.5.1999, he came
forward with the application to implead him as a party, with a petition to condone the delay of 624 days in filing the application for setting aside the
order dated 30.6.1988 passed in L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994, and other reliefs. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners
relied on various decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, in support of his submissions and prayed for dismissal of the Civil Revision
Petitions.
Learned Additional Government Pleader (Pondicherry) appearing for the official respondents of Pondicherry, fairly conceded that no notice
was issued to the petitioner herein, before the acquisition proceedings. The Land Acquisition Officer issued notice only to the land owners.
Learned Additional Government Pleader (Pondicherry) further submitted that the notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published in
the Gazette on 21.4.1987; the declaration u/s 6 of the Act was published in the Gazette on 4.4.1988 and the lands were taken possession and
handed over to the requisitioning Department, i.e. Public Works Department, Pondicherry, on 9.1.1992. Learned Additional Government Pleader
relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Maharashtra and Another Vs. Umashankar Rajabhau and Others, in support of
his contentions.
The admitted facts are that at the time of reference, the petitioner was neither added as a party to the proceedings, nor notice was issued to
him. But award was passed. The properties acquired by the Land Acquisition Officer belong to the respondents-land owners and the petitioner
herein is admittedly the cultivating tenant, not only in respect of the properties acquired under the land acquisition proceedings, but also in respect
of the other properties. It is also admitted that there are so many legal battles between the petitioner and the respondents-land owners.
Since the law of acquisition of lands in India is a special law and the Land Acquisition Act is a special enactment, the authorities ought to have
followed the procedures laid down in the special enactment. In support of the same, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied
upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Kunwar Pal Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , in which, it was held as
follows:
Section 6(2), on a plain reading, deals with the various modes of publication and they are: (a) publication in the Official Gazette, (b) publication
in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and (c) causing
public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality. There is no option left with anyone to give up
or waive any mode and all such modes have to be strictly resorted to. The principle is well settled that where any statutory provision provides a
particular manner for doing a particular act, then, that thing or act must be done in accordance with the manner prescribed therefore in the Act.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner further relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2006 (10) SCC 96 (A.
Jithendernath v. Jubilee Hills Coop. House Building Society) and submitted that since the Land Acquisition Officer has not followed the procedures
laid down in the enactment, it is violation of the principles of natural justice, that the award passed without giving opportunity to the person
interested in the properties, is vitiated, that the award itself is a nullity and that the principles of res-judicata will have no application. In the said
decision, it was held as follows:
Despite knowledge, that Plot No. 39 has been allotted to somebody else, the appellant did not make the said Srinivas a party in his application
before the Registrar. Ex facie the award being in violation of the principles of natural justice would be a nullity.
We have, furthermore, noticed hereinbefore the prayers made by the appellant in the said arbitration proceedings. In view of prayer (a) which
was the main prayer ex facie the Registrar acted illegally and without jurisdiction in directing the first respondent to allot Plot No. 39. The first
respondent made it clear that the plot in question had been allotted in favour of the said Srinivas. The question as to whether he raised
constructions thereupon or not was immaterial. He despite such allotment having been made in his favour was not impleaded as a party. He was a
necessary party. No award therefore could have been passed in his absence. In any event, so far as Plot No. 39 is concerned, the only prayer
made by the appellant was an order of injunction. The Registrar while exercising his judicial function had no jurisdiction to pass such an order of
injunction in view of prayer (a) made in the application.
The said award, therefore, was a nullity. In this view of the matter, the principles of res judicata will have no application....
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in N. Krishnamachari Vs.
Managing Director, APSRTC, Hyderabad and Others, and submitted that the beneficiary of an order of acquisition is a person interested and is
entitled to challenge the award when made without notice to him. In the said decision, it was held as follows:
It is contended by Mr. Madhava Reddy, learned Senior Counsel that there is a conflict of decisions as regards self-same matters that two
Review Petitions were dismissed relating to other claimants holding that the Corporation was not a necessary party, in other words, it was not an
interested party and Review Petition in the impugned order was allowed by implication that the Corporation was an interested party. It is also
further contended that on the question of locus standi of the beneficiary to be impleaded as a party, there is a conflict of decisions of this Court in
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor
Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., and when this conflict was brought to the notice of another bench that Bench has distinguished the decision of the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation case (supra) and that therefore, the conflict still subsists and requires to be resolved. We do not find force in
the contentions. In Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation case (supra) the Bench had held that when the property was acquired for the benefit of the
Municipal Corporation by the State, though ultimately the municipality may be benefited, it has no right to file an appeal against the decision of the
High Court as the Corporation is not an interested party. It would appear that Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, definition of ""person
interested"" had not been brought to the attention of the learned Judges. When Section 3(b) defined in wide language, would bring within its ambit
the beneficiary to be a person interested, the omission to bring to the notice of the important provisions of the law constitutes an infirmity in the
judgment. However, in later decisions starting with Himalayan Tiles case (supra) this Court consistently has held that the beneficiary is a person
interested to protect the interest which the beneficiary seeks to acquire the land under the notification, including perfect title to the property and
payment of proper compensation. Therefore, it is entitled to challenge the award when it was made without notice to it even by filing a Writ Petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution, apart from impleading itself as a party respondent in the acquisition proceedings or pending appeal or
independently filing an appeal u/s 54 of the Act. In view of this later development of law, we do not find that the conflict any longer subsists.
Therefore, we hold that A.P.S.R.T.C. is a person interested with the meaning of Section 3(d) of the Act and that, therefore, it is entitled to support
the validity of the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act when it is the subject matter of the challenge in the High Court....
At this juncture, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court
reported in Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Shivbai and others, and submit that the Land Acquisition Officer is required to give notice of award and
the award copy need not be served along with the notice and the limitation begins to run from the date of notice. In the said decision, it was held as
follows:
...It is now settled law that it is not necessary that the award or its copy should be served on the claimant along with notice u/s 12(2) of the Act.
If the parties are not present on the date the award came to be passed, then Collector/Land Acquisition Officer shall give immediate notice of his
award. The limitation begins to run from the date of the notice as per the proviso to Section 18(2). The date of the award and the date of the
receipt of the compensation were incidentally the same. Under these circumstances, it must be presumed that they were present on the date when
the award was made and the compensation was received without any protest. Under these circumstances, they are not entitled to seek any
reference.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners further relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1996
(1) MLJ 113 (SC) (The Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal), in which it was held that one of the conditions
precedent to make a valid reference to the Court is that the application u/s 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act shall be in writing and must be made
within six weeks from the date of the award when the applicant was present either in person or through counsel, at the time of making of the
award. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners submitted that since the application has not been made by the
petitioner in the present case within six weeks, it is barred by limitation. In the said decision, it was held as follows:
Section 18(1) envisages that any interested person who has not accepted the award may, by application in writing to the Collector, require him
to refer the dispute raised in the application for the determination of the court. Under Sub-section (2), the grounds on which objection to the award
is taken have to be stated in the application. However, under the proviso to Sub-section (2) every such application shall be made (a) if the person
making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector''s
award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector u/s 12, Sub-section (2), or within six months from the
date of the Collector''s award, whichever period shall first expire. It would thus be clear that if the interested person was present at the time the
Collector made the award, he should make the application within six weeks from the date of the award of the Collector. In other cases, it should
be made within six weeks after the receipt of the notice from the Collector/LAO u/s 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector''s
award, whichever period shall first expire. Admittedly, the application for reference is beyond six weeks under Clause (a) of proviso to Sub-
section (2) of Section 18.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners further relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court, reported
in The Spl. Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Tamil Nadu Housing Scheme Vs. Thilagam and Others, for the same proposition that when the
land owners have failed to make a written application and the claim is barred by limitation, then the claim for enhancement of compensation is a
nullity, since the basic ingredients of Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are not satisfied.
The abovesaid three decisions relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners, are not relevant for the
purpose of the facts of the present case, because, in the present case, admittedly, the petitioner was not impleaded as a party and no notice u/s
4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued to him and so, the notice of award has also not been issued to the petitioner. The petitioner came to
know about the passing of the award only after the publication of the payment-out application, even though the petitioner has sent Advocate''s
notice dated 17.6.1990 to the Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) of the Government of Pondicherry. Even after receipt of the notice, neither the
petitioner was impleaded as a party to the acquisition proceedings, nor the passing of the award has been intimated to the petitioner. In the above
circumstances, the citations relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners, are not relevant for the purpose of
the facts of the present case.
As already noted, it was observed by this Court in C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999, order dated 19.2.2004, that the revision petitioner is a
cultivating tenant, and as per the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in N. Krishnamachari Vs. Managing Director, APSRTC, Hyderabad
and Others, , the petitioner herein is a person interested. Further, as per the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Mangat Ram, etc. Vs.
State of Haryana and others, etc., relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the tenant is entitled to 3/4 of the
compensation amount and the owner is entitled to 1/4 of the compensation amount. In the said decision, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
As regards apportionment of the compensation, the High Court has directed to pay 1/4 to the tenant and 3/4 to the Wakf Board. In view of the
Judgment in Col. Sir Harinder Singh Brar Bans Bahadur Vs. Bihari Lal and Others, and Inder Parshad Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , the
tenants are entitled to 3/4 of the compensation while the landlord is entitled to 1/4 of the compensation. In view of the above law, the order of the
High Court in appeals arising from reference u/s 30 is modified to the extent that appellants/tenants-Mangat Ram and Ors. are entitled to 3/4 while
the Wakf Board is entitled to 1/4 of the compensation amount. The amount awarded in the judgment of the single Judge u/s 23(1A) also requires
to be apportioned accordingly.
At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the decision of the Supreme Court, relied on by the learned Additional Government Pleader
(Pondicherry) appearing for the official respondents of the State of Maharashtra and Another Vs. Umashankar Rajabhau and Others, , in which,
the Supreme Court held as follows:
It is seen that Section 4(1) does not require the service of the personal notice nor the one u/s 6 declaration. What is needed to be served in the
locality and the Gazette which have been complied with. As regards the notices u/s 9, it now transpires from the revenue records that the original
owner namely, Usmanshahi Mill was served. Since mutation had not been effected in the name of Respondents 1-3 though purchased prior to the
publication of notification u/s 4(1), they could not be issued notices as required u/s 9. Notice to the fourth respondent is obviously impossible, since
the award has already been made on 15.9.1971. His purchase thereafter is obviously illegal as it does not bind the State after the notification u/s
4(1) was published....
But the abovesaid citation in State of Maharashtra and Another Vs. Umashankar Rajabhau and Others, , is not applicable to the facts of the
present case, because, before the notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, the name of the petitioner herein has been recorded in the
Revenue records as a cultivating tenant. In the said decision, the purchase by one of the respondents therein was, after the notification u/s 4(1) and
in such circumstances, it was held therein that no notice was necessary, since no mutation of Revenue records has taken place. But in the present
case, the petitioner''s name has already been recorded as a cultivating tenant and he is in possession even before issuance of notification u/s 4(1) of
the Land Acquisition Act and even after he sent advocate''s notice, dated 17.6.1990, no notice u/s 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, has been
issued by the authorities and he has not been impleaded as a party before the matter has been referred to the Court. Hence, the said decision is not
applicable to the facts of the present case.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner also relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Satyadhyan Ghosal and
Others Vs. Sm. Deorajin Debi and Another, and Ashok Kumar Srivastav Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Others, , wherein the
Supreme Court held as follows:
Satyadhyan Ghosal and Others Vs. Sm. Deorajin Debi and Another,
The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a respondent is judicata, it
shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter - whether on a question of fact or a
question of law - has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a
higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same
parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but
even where Section 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The
result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was
correct.
Ashok Kumar Srivastav Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Others,
Though the said explanation may not stricto sensu apply to the trial stage, the principle couched in it must gain application thereto. It is
immaterial that the writ petition was filed only subsequently because the findings made therein became final as no appeal was filed against the
judgment. The basic idea in the rule of res judicata has sprouted from the maxim ""nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem cause"" (no man should
be vexed twice over for the same cause). In Y.B. Patil and Others Vs. Y.L. Patil, a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered the effect of a
decision rendered in a writ petition at subsequent stages of the same lis. It held: (SCC Headnote)
The principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same
proceedings. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding.
In the present case, the award passed by the authority, has not created any res-judicata. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner
would contend that already the petitioner filed an application in I.A. No. 99 of 1999, to implead himself in I.A. No. 18 of 1999, and the said I.A.
No. 99 of 1999 was dismissed and the same was challenged before this Court in C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999, which was allowed, stating that the
petitioner herein is a person interested and so, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner further submitted that it operates as res-judicata
and the respondents-land owners are estopped from questioning that the petitioner is not the person interested. There is no quarrel over the
proposition laid down in the said decisions regarding res-judicata. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents-land owners would fairly
concede that the petitioner is the person interested and he is a cultivating tenant and the trial Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the
petitioner herein is not the person interested.
In this regard, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would cull out paragraph 8 of the order dated 19.2.2004 passed by this
Court in C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999, wherein, this Court directed as follows:
In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The order dated 7.12.1999 made in I.A. No. 99 of 1999 in I.A. No. 18 of 1999 in
L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994 on the file of the Principal District Court, Pondicherry is set aside. The Principal District Court, Pondicherry is directed
to restore the I.A. No. 99 of 1999 and implead the revision petitioner as a party in I.A. No. 18 of 1999 and dispose the same in accordance with
law along with the other petitions, viz., to reopen the land acquisition proceedings, etc., which are said to be pending. No costs. Consequently, the
connected C.M.P. No. 22046 of 1999 is closed.
Relying on the said portion of the order of this Court in C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner
submitted that since this Court in the said C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999, has given a direction to the trial Court that, ""...The Principal District Court,
Pondicherry is directed to restore the I.A. No. 99 of 1999 and implead the revision petitioner as a party in I.A. No. 18 of 1999 and dispose the
same in accordance with law along with the other petitions, viz., to reopen the land acquisition proceedings, etc., which are said to be pending"", the
trial Court ought to have allowed I.A. No. 199 of 2000.
Considering the said argument along with the aforesaid paragraph 8 of the order passed in C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999, I am of the view that the
trial Court ought to have allowed the present I.A. No. 199 of 2000 and given an opportunity to the petitioner herein to put-forth his case.
As per the decision of the Supreme Court reported in N. Krishnamachari Vs. Managing Director, APSRTC, Hyderabad and Others, , as a
beneficiary of an order of acquisition, the petitioner herein is the person interested, and he is entitled to challenge the award made without notice to
him.
Admittedly, as per the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Kunwar Pal Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , where
any statutory provision provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, then that thing or act must be done in accordance with the manner
prescribed therefore in the Act. It is not disputed in the present case, that, the Land Acquisition Officer has not followed the procedures laid down
in the special enactment, namely Land Acquisition Act. In such circumstances, as per the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2006 (10)
SCC 96, since the award passed in the present case, is in violation of the principles of natural justice, the same is a nullity.
I am of the view that even though the petitioner herein has issued Advocate''s notice dated 17.6.1990 to the Deputy Collector (Land
Acquisition), of the Government of Pondicheery, but still, no notice was issued to the petitioner and his name was not included before passing of
the award. Moreover, as seen from the order of this Court, dated 19.2.2004 in C.R.P. No. 3981 of 1999, the petitioner herein is a cultivating
tenant and he is a necessary party to the adjudication, and I am of the opinion that the trial Court has committed error in dismissing the application
without assigning proper reasons for condonation of delay in filing the petition to set aside the order dated 30.6.1998 passed in L.A.O.P. No. 27
of 1994, to implead him as a party to the L.A.O.P. and to adjudicate his claim for compensation as a person interested.
The revision petitioner herein has stated that since he has not received any notice regarding the acquisition proceedings, he had no knowledge
about the same and hence, he has not filed any application in time, and after publication regarding the payment-out application, he came to know
the acquisition proceedings and he sought to implead himself as a party in I.A. No. 18 of 1999 and subsequently, the present I.A. No. 199 of
2000 was also filed and the same was dismissed, and in such circumstances, the impugned order passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside.
In the result,
(a) both the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed.
(b) The impugned order dated 24.11.2006 passed in L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994 and in I.A. No. 199 of 2000 in L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994, on the
file of the Principal District Court, Pondicherry, is set aside.
(c) The trial Court is directed to implead the petitioner herein as a party-respondent to L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994 on the file of the Principal District
Court, Pondicherry and give an opportunity to the petitioner by re-opening the said L.A.O.P. No. 27 of 1994 and dispose of the same in
accordance with law.
(d) The Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
(e) No costs.