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Judgment
The question is whether the document of the 2nd February of 1891 relied on by the plaintiff is a promissory note within the meaning of Section 4
[Section 4.--A ""promissory note"" is an instrument in writing (not being a bank note
or a currency note) containing an unconditional undertaking,
Promissory note."" signed by the maker, or to pay a certain sum of money only to,
or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument.]
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, or a mere acknowledgment of liability falling under Article 1 of Schedule 1 of the General Stamp Act, or
an agreement.
If it is a promissory note, the suit must fail as rightly decided by the lower Courts. The correct translation of the document is set out in paragraph
2 of the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court. The only question is whether the words therein ""I am liable to pay"" can be held to be an
undertaking"" to pay within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act. The construction depends on the actual words used rather than what their effect
may be as regards the rights of the parties. Examining the document in this light, we are of opinion that the words do not amount to an undertaking
to pay, but constitute only an acknowledgment of liability to pay.
The words ""I am liable to pay ""do not, in fact, mean anything more than the previous words in the document "" I am bound to pay "" which clearly
do not constitute an undertaking to pay.
We must, therefore, hold that the document is not a promissory note and the plaintiff''s claim as a suit for money lent is sustainable.
We set aside the decrees of the Courts below and remand the suit for disposal according to law. Costs hitherto incurred will abide and follow
the result.