High CourtsSingle Bench(2003) 03 P&H CK 0103

Tilak Raj vs Parshotam Dass and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 12 March 2003 · Citation: (2003) 134 PLR 701 : (2003) 2 RCR(Rent) 138

HON’BLE JUDGES
N.K. Sud, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision No. 3468 of 1986

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Judgment

5 paragraphs · 634 words

N.K. Sud, J.—This civil revision has been filed by the petitioner tenant against the order of the Appellate Authority, Ambala dated 4.11.1986 dismissing his appeal against the order of the Rent Controller dated 27.10.1983. The respondent-landlord''s petition u/s 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act. 1973 was allowed by the Rent Controller on the ground that the petitioner had changed the user of the demised premises and that he demised premises was unfit and unsafe for human habitation.

2.

Ms. Reeta Kohli appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that both the authorities below were not justified in holding that there was any change of user. She submits that it is true that the demised premises had been taken on lease for running a Halwai shop and that in the year 1975 a sugarcane crushing machine had been installed in the demised premises. Yet both the Authorities have overlooked the fact that the business of sugarcane had been carried on for one season only and that too for about two and a half months. Thus she has contended that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Lal Vs. Parma Nand, the petitioner could not be evicted on the ground of change of user.

3.

Regarding the second ground about the building having become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, she states that both the Courts below have wrongly rejected the report of the expert produced by the petitioner-tenant to show that the building was in sound condition and only minor repairs was carried out to stop the leakage in one of the rooms.

4.

I have heard the Counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned orders. The Courts below after appraising the evidence on record have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the building in question has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Such a finding cannot be interfered with in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court as held in the cases of Sunder Dass and Anr. v. Avinash Chander Sood 1992(1) R C R 18 and Brij Lal v. Shiv Mohan and Anr. 1996(2) R L R 450. No material has been brought to my notice to show that the finding is vitiated or is contrary to the evidence or law. It is trite law that under these circumstances this Court cannot reappraise the evidence to reverse the finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial Court and the first Appellate Court. In Shiv Lal Vs. Sat Parkash and Another, , it has been held by the Apex Court that while exercising jurisdiction u/s 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrictions Act, 1949, the High Court does not act as a regular third appellate Court and can interfere only within the scope of the sub-section. The High Court cannot re-examine the evidence on record to reverse the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Courts below. Similarly. In Parveen Kumar and Ors. v. Suresh Chand and Ors. AIR 2001 S.C.W. 4779 (2), the Supreme Court has observed that in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can interfere only if the trial Court is shown to have committed any jurisdictional error or it is shown that its decision would have resulted into any manifest injustice. No such case has been made out before me. Thus the petitioner is liable to be evicted on this ground alone.

5.

In view of the above, it is not necessary to go into the other question as to whether there has been any change in user or not. Consequently, I find no merit in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed. Since no one has put in appearance on behalf of the respondents, there shall be no order as to costs.