Tikait Ganesh Narayan Sahi Deo vs Chandu Mistri and others

Dawson Miller, C.J.—This is an application in revision brought by the landlord of certain property against an order of the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi, in which he refused to interfere by way of exercising powers of revision over an order of the Deputy Collector made in an application under S. 211 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. It appears that the Petitioner who is the landlord of the property in question obtained a decree for rent against his registered tenant. He thereupon sought to put in execution the decree. The Opposite Party Mangal Nath Tewari and Jagdish Nath Tewari instituted proceedings before the Deputy Collector under S. 211 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, contending that they were the transferees of the tenants who had been sued, the transfer having taken place sometime before the rent action was instituted, and that they alone were entitled to the land; and they asked the Deputy Collector to adjudicate upon their claim. The section in question provides in effect that, if before the day fixed for the sale of the property in suit a third party appears and alleges that he, and not the person against whom the decree has been obtained, was in lawful possession or had some interest in the tenure or holding when the decree was obtained then the Deputy Commissioner shall examine such party according to law, and, if he sees sufficient reason for so doing and, if the party deposits in Court or gives security for the amount of the decree, he shall stay the sale and, after taking evidence, adjudicate on the claim. There is a proviso, however, to the section that no transfer of a tenure (which this was) shall be recognised unless it has been registered in the office of the landlord or sufficient cause for non-registration is shown to the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner. Now the Deputy Collector before whom the case originally came considered the evidence put forward by the objectors, the present Respondents, and it appears that they filed certain documents showing that they had been sued for rent by the landlord, that is to say by the manager appointed under the Encumbered Estates Act to manage the property in question, and they also produced a money order receipt for payment of registration fees. The Deputy Collector considered that in these circumstances the landlord could not contend that they had not registered their names because he had already recognized them as tenants and had already recognized the transfer.

From that decision the landlord applied to the Deputy Commissioner asking him to exercise his powers of revision, if in fact he had any, over the Deputy Collector and to set aside his order on the ground that he had not properly exercised his jurisdiction under S. 211. It is clear that the Deputy Commissioner had no power to hear an appeal from a decision under the section in question from the Deputy Collector. Whether he has any powers of revision or not depends upon the interpretation of S. 270 of the Act. That section provides that in the performance of their duties and the exercise of their powers under the Act Deputy Commissioners shall be subject to the general direction and control of the Commissioner and the Board, and Deputy Collectors exercising the functions of the Deputy Commissioner (which was the case here) shall also be subject to the direction and control of the Deputy Commissioner. That section I think provides for giving certain powers of control both to the Commissioner and to the Deputy Commissioner over acts performed by subordinates whilst exercising the powers of their superiors and it is not necessary in my opinion to lay down with any exactitude or precision the entire scope of the powers which are intended to be included in that section. I think however that if it can be shown that the Deputy Collector whilst exercising the powers delegated to him of the Deputy Commissioner has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which he might have exercised or has usurped a jurisdiction which it was not within his competency to exercise then the Deputy Commissioner would have power to order him either to exercise that jurisdiction or to refrain from exercising it as the case may be. The same of course would apply in the case of the Commissioner and the Board dealing with acts performed by the Deputy Commissioner. In the present case the Deputy Commissioner considered that he had no powers of revision under S. 270 and refused to interfere. To that extent I think he was wrong. But whether the present case is one in which he ought to have interfered is another question. Having considered the decision of the Deputy Collector I think it is clear that what he intended to hold was that the circumstances of the case brought it within the exception to the proviso which I have already mentioned. The proviso is that no transfer of a tenure shall be recognized except in certain cases and these exceptions are where it has been registered in the office of the landlord or sufficient cause for non-registration is shown to the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner. What I think the Deputy Collector intended to hold was, although he does not say so in terms, that the circumstances of'' this case show that as there had been recognition by the landlord of the tenancy of the objectors there was sufficient reason shown for not having it registered. There was further the evidence which he had before him of a money order receipt in payment of registration fees and he may well have thought in these circumstances that that was an additional reason for coming to the conclusion that sufficient cause had been shown for non-registration. It appears therefore that there was in fact no failure to exercise jurisdiction nor was there any attempt to usurp a jurisdiction which he in fact had not. In these circumstances it seems to me that the Deputy Commissioner was right in refusing to interfere by way of revision with the order made by his subordinate officer. I think that this application should be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee 3 gold mohurs.

Das, J.

I agree.