AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
D.S. Zoting, J.—Appeal from Order No. 59 of 2003 arises out of the order passed below Exh. 35; whereas Appeal from Order No. 49 of 2003 arises out of the order passed below Exh. 41 in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 1999. Both the appeals arise out of the common order dated 7.7.2003. A common question is involved in both the appeals and as they arise out of the same common order they are being disposed of by this common order.
In order to appreciate the relevant contentions of both the parties, it would be just and proper to note down the background of the litigation between the two parties as under.
The dispute is regarding contract of erection of distillery between these two parties and the said dispute was referred to the Arbitrator on 26.12.1994. On 20.6.1999, the Arbitrator passed the award. The award was challenged before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangamner. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division had set aside the said award and remanded the matter for afresh hearing on 6.5.2000. The said order was challenged before the High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 801 of 2000 and in Appeal From Order No. 50 of 2000 by the parties. This court rejected the Civil Revision Application and allowed the Appeal From Order on 20.1.2000. Thereafter on 7.5.2002 the Supreme Court set aside the order passed by this court and remanded the matter back to the Arbitrator for afresh hearing. After remand, the Arbitrator passed the award on 24.11.2002. On 28.11.2002 the said award was filed before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangamner in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 1999. Both the parties were served with notices. However, there is a delay of 30 days and 9 days in filing the objections to the said award by these parties. Therefore, both the parties have filed applications Exhs. 35 and 41 for condonation of delay.
After hearing the arguments advanced by both the parties, the learned Judge rejected both the applications vide order dated 7.7.2003.
Being aggrieved by the said common order dated 7.7.2003, both the parties have preferred these appeals.
I have heard the arguments advanced by both the parties.
It is well settled that while deciding the application for condonation of delay, sufficient cause is to be interpreted in a liberal way and pragmatic approach is required to be taken rather than a pedantic approach. In this regard, law is well settled and if any authority is needed in this regard, it is to be found in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, . In this regard, the Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines at para 3 of the judgment, which are as under :
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :-
Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
"Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. "
It is to be noted that both the parties fought the legal battle between them upto the Supreme Court in the matter pending before the concerned court. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the parties stand to benefit by lodging objections late.
As regards delay of 30 days and 9 days in filing objections inspite of notices to the parties, it is a common ground raised by both the parties that the delay is caused due to bulk of work and correspondence between the advocate and the parties who were residing at Bombay and Pune and the litigation is going on at the third place which is far away from these places, and, therefore, there passed some time for raising objections. In addition to the above ground, in Appeal From Order No. 59 of 2003 arising out of the order passed below Exh. 35, it is submitted that the Managing Director of Sangamner Sugar Factory has resigned on 3.2.2003 and it took some time for negotiation of the dispute with the incoming Managing Director. Taking into consideration the facts and the circumstances, in which the delay is caused, as pointed out by both the parties, in my opinion, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the objections by both the parties and this approach is consistent with the making a justice oriented approach from the perspective reflected from the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in the above referred case. Refusing to condone the delay may result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. If the delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
Considering the facts and the circumstances, as pointed out above, it cannot be said that the delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides, as both the parties do not stand to benefit by resorting to delay in the present matter, on the contrary, they run the risk in the matter on account of delay. Accordingly, delay caused by both the parties in raising the objections deserves to be condoned.
In the result, both the applications of the parties for condonation of delay deserve to be allowed. The common order dated 7.7.2003 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangamner below Exhs. 35 and 41 is hereby quashed and set aside. Delay caused by both the parties in raising objections is condoned. Both the appeals are allowed accordingly. In view of final disposal of Appeal From Order No. 49 of 2003, Civil Application No. 5727 of 2003 does not survive and as such it is disposed of.