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Judgment
K. Chandru, J.—The petitioner in both the writ petitions is the same party namely The Youngmen''s Christian Association at Tiruchirapalli.
They came forward to challenge the two awards passed by the first respondent Labour Court in I.D. Nos. 397/95 and 400/95 in these two writ
petitions respectively.
Pending the writ petitions, this Court granted interim relief including the deposit of certain amounts to the credit of the IDs before the Labour
Court.
In respect of the contesting respondent A. Soosai (ID 397/95), he was engaged as a driver for the ambulance run by the petitioner association,
and in respect of Sundar (ID No. 400/95), he was engaged as an attender in the hostel run by them. When they were terminated from service, they
raised an industrial dispute before the Government Labour Officer, and subsequently the matter was taken to the Labour Court. Before the Labour
Court, there were six such workmen, and all the six IDs were tried together. But, it is now stated that in respect of the other four workmen they
have settled their claims, and what now remains is the Award relating to I.D. Nos. 397/95 and 400/95.
Before the Labour Court, on behalf of the workmen, 33 documents were filed, and they were marked as Exs.W1 to W33. On the side of the
petitioner management, 10 documents were filed, and they were marked as Exs.M1 to M10. The contesting respondent Soosai examined himself
as WW6, and the other contesting respondent Sundar examined himself as WW4. On the side of the petitioner management, Mr. L. Janaraj who
was the President of the Association, was examined as MW1.
The only contention raised by the management before the Labour Court was that the petitioner organisation will not come within the meaning of
industry in terms of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and it is a charitable and philanthropic organisation. Before the Labour Court, the
President of the petitioner association who deposed as MW1, was cross-examined. In his cross-examination, it was elicited that the shops let out
by them, were used for commercial purposes, and in the hostel run by them, there are 55 occupants with 28 rooms, and the Inspector of Labour
has prosecuted them for not maintaining the records as per the labour enactment, and they are also getting rents for the rooms let out, and even for
the ambulance, rent was collected for its usage.
Therefore, the Labour Court by placing reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court held that it is an ""industry"" within the meaning of
Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act and that the workmen are entitled to maintain the dispute. Thereafter, on going through the facts of the dispute the
Labour Court held that the termination of service of these two contesting respondents did not arise. Even on the plea of financial restraint, the
management had failed to produce documents to substantiate the same, and in view of that fact, the services of these workmen were not required.
The Labour Court also found that the workmen had worked for more than 12 years, and no disciplinary action was taken against them before they
were sent out. In that view of the matter, it had passed the impugned common award directing the reinstatement of the workmen with back wages
and continuity of service.
Mr. R. Parthiban, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the finding of the Labour Court that it is an industry within the meaning of
Section 2(j) of the Act is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa and
Others, . The Counsel placed reliance upon paragraph 132 of that judgment to reiterate the point that when the goal of the institution is charitable
or philanthropic, the fact that some scavengers served or employed will not make it an industry, and that this aspect was not considered by the
Labour Court. The passage relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is extracted hereunder:-
The heart of trade or business or analogous activity is organisation with an eye on competitive efficiency, by hiring employees, systematising
processes, producing goods and services needed by the community and obtaining money''s worth of work from employees. If such be the nature
of operations and employer-employee relations which make an enterprise an industry, the motivation of the employer in the final disposal of
products or profits is immaterial. Indeed the activity is patterned on a commercial basis, judged by what other similar undertakings and commercial
adventures do. To qualify for exemption from the definition of ""industry"" in a case where there are employers and employees and systematic
activities and production of goods and services, we need a totally different orientation, organisation and method which will stamp on the enterprise
the imprint of commerciality. Special emphasis, in such cases, must be placed on the central fact of employer-employee relations. If a philanthropic
devotion is the basis for the charitable foundation or establishment, the institution is headed by one who whole-heartedly dedicates himself for the
mission and pursues it with passion, attracts others into the institution, not for wages but for sharing in the cause and its fulfilment, then the
undertaking is not ""industrial"". Not that the presence of charitable impulse extricates the institution from the definition in Section 2(j) but that there is
no economic relationship such as is found in trade or business between the head who employs and the others who emotively flock to render
service. In one sense, there are no employers and employees but crusaders all. In another sense, there is no wage basis for the employment but
voluntary participation in the production, inspired by lofty ideals and unmindful of remuneration, service conditions and the like. Supposing there is
an Ashram or Order with a guru or other head. Let us further assume that there is a band of disciples, devotees or priestly subordinates in the
Order, gathered together for prayers, ascetic practices, bhajans, meditation and worship. Supposing, further, that outsiders are also invited daily or
occasionally, to share in the spiritual proceedings. And, let us assume that all the inmates of the Ashram and members of the Order, invitees, guests
and other outside participants are fed, accommodated and looked after by the institution. In such a case, as often happens, the cooking and the
cleaning, the bed-making and service, may often be done, at least substantially by the Ashramites themselves. They may chant in spiritual ecstasy
even as material goods and services are made and served. They may affectionately look after the guests, and, all this they may do, not for wages
but for the chance to propitiate the Master, work selflessly and acquire spiritual grace. It may well be that they may have surrendered their lucrative
employment to come into the holy institution. It may also be that they take some small pocket money from the donations or takings of the
institution. Nay more; there may be a few scavengers and servants, a part-time auditor or accountant employed on wages. If the substantial
number of participants in making available goods and services, if the substantive nature of the work, as distinguished from trivial items, is rendered
by voluntary wage-less sishyas, it is impossible to designate the institution as an industry, notwithstanding a marginal few who are employed on a
regular basis for hire. The reason is that in the crucial, substantial and substantive aspects of institutional life the nature of the relations between the
participants is non-industrial. Perhaps, when Mahatma Gandhi lived in Sabarmati, Aurobindo had his hallowed silence in Pondicherry, the inmates
belonged to this chastened brand. Even now, in many foundations, centres, monasteries, holy orders and Ashrams in the East and in the West,
spiritual fascination pulls men and women into the precincts and they work tirelessly for the Maharishi or Yogi or Swamiji and are not wage-
earners in any sense of the term. Such people are not workmen and such institutions are not industries despite some menials and some
professionals in a vast complex being hired. We must look at the predominant character of the institution and the nature of the relations resulting in
the production of goods and services. Stray wage-earning employees do not shape the soul of an institution into an industry.
The contention raised by the petitioner is found answered by the passage found in paragraph 133 in the very same judgment, which is as follows:
It now remains to make a brief survey of the precedents on the point. One case which is germane to the issue is Bombay Panjrapole. A
Bench of this Court considered the earlier case-law, including the decisions of the High Courts bearing on humane activities for the benefit of sick
animals. Let there be no doubt that kindness to our dumb brethren, especially invalids, springs from the highest motives of fellow feeling. In the land
of the Buddha and Gandhi no one dare argue to the contrary. So let there be no mistaking our compassionate attitude to suffering creatures. It is
laudable and institutions dedicated to amelioration of conditions of animals deserve encouragement from the State and affluent philanthropists. But
these considerations have no bearing on the crucial factors which invoke the application of the definition in the Act as already set out elaborately by
us. ""The manner in which the activity in question is organised or arranged, the condition of the cooperation between the employer and the
employee necessary for its success and its object to render material service to the community"" is a pivotal factor in the activity-oriented test of an
industry"". The compassionate motive and the charitable inspiration are noble but extraneous. Indeed, medical relief for human beings made
available free by regular hospitals, run by Government or philanthropists, employing doctors and supportive staff and business-like terms, may not
qualify for exemption from industry. Service to animals cannot be on a higher footing than service to humans. Nor is it possible to contend that love
of animals is religious or spiritual any more than love of human beings is. A panjrapole is no church, mosque or temple. Therefore, without going
into the dairying aspects, income and expenditure and other features of Bombay Panjrapole one may hold that the institution is an industry. After
all, the employees are engaged on ordinary economic terms and with conditions of service as in other business institutions and the activities also
have organisational comparability to other profit-making dairies or Panjrapoles. What is different is the charitable object. What is common is the
nature of the employer-employee relations. The conclusion, notwithstanding the humanitarian over tones, is that such organisations are also
industries. Of course, in Bombay Panjrapole the same conclusion was reached but on different and, to some extent faulty reasoning. For, the
assumption in the judgment of Mitter, J. is that if the income were mostly from donations and the treatment of animals were free, perhaps such
charity, be it a hospital for humans or animals, may not be an industry. We agree with the holding, not because Panjrapoles have commercial
motives but because, despite compassionate objectives, they have business-like orientation and operation. In this view, Section 2(j) applies.
If it is seen in this angle, then the finding of the Labour Court cannot be found to be either perverse or without materials.
Mr. K.M. Ramesh appearing for the second respondent in WP No. 13022/2000 also brought to the notice of the Court that whether the very
same YMCA Society which is running an Higher Secondary School (Sports School), was covered by the definition ""industry"" as per the provisions
of the I.D. Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court. The judgment of the Division Bench in Y.M.C.A. College Sports,
Higher Secondary School (Sports Wing) Vs. The Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court and P. Rajamanickam, . In that case, the Division
Bench after referring to the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board''s case (cited supra) held that YMCA even running a Sports School
amounts to an industry covered by the provisions of the I.D. Act. Therefore, the attempt made by the petitioner to challenge the findings of the
Labour Court with reference to the issue relating to the industry has to be necessarily rejected.
On the question of merits, a perusal of the affidavit does not show any serious challenge to the findings recorded by the Labour Court. Even
otherwise, as rightly pointed out by the Labour Court, the petitioner had failed to prove to the satisfaction of the Labour Court that the non-
employment of these two workmen was necessitated due to economic factors. The Labour Court found that none of the materials was produced
before it to come to such conclusion. When the stand of the management regarding economic reasons leading to the dispensation of the services of
the workmen, was rejected, this Court under Article 226 cannot reverse those findings in the absence of any credible records produced before the
Labour Court.
In the light of the above, both the writ petitions are misconceived, and they lack in merits and accordingly stand dismissed. No costs.
